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CONTENT

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POVERTY IN ROMANIA: DIMENSIONS OF POVERTY AND LANDMARKS OF POVERTY RESEARCH[1]

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***Abstract**: The first objective of the paper is to offer a synthetic account of the main research coordinates of scientific literature on poverty in Romania. In this respect, three main stages are distinguished: (i) accumulation of expertise at the national level with a divergence of methodologies and approaches being developed (ii) the temporary consensual adoption of the absolute poverty line; and (iii) the official alignment to the European relative poverty lines in parallel with a new mix of approaches: a social development-oriented approach, concurrently with the study of poverty and extreme poverty at the territorial and community level. The second main objective is to look at the level and dynamic of poverty in Romania using the most important measurement methodologies in order to establish linkages between poverty research and the actual situation and to stress research needs in the following period.*

***Keywords:** poverty profile, methodology, research, overview*

Landmarks of poverty research in Romania

As a result of reviewing the massive corpus of scientific literature regarding poverty in Romania until 2014, a plausible periodization has emerged. The research on poverty in Romania in the last 25 years has undergone three main stages, according with the dominant approach/methodology (with the proviso that a multitude of approaches being developed is the defining trait of the first period).

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(1) Accumulation of expertise at the national level, with a divergence of methodologies and approaches being developed: 1990-2000

In the first decade of the transition, Romania witnessed an outburst of poverty levels, with two peaks in 1994 and 1999 (see Figure 1). At the political level, the phenomenon was partially ignored, as indicated by the much moderate increase in expenditures with social protection policies in Romania in comparison with the other countries in transition and the low level of direct financial transfers funding anti-poverty programs (Zamfir, 1999: 74).

However, the academic side rapidly took up the task of developing measurement methodologies and elaborating studies of the phenomenon, with the Research Institute for Quality of Life (RIQL) as one of the most prominent research centres. In fact, the first decade of the transition has been the most prolific phase in terms of number of scientific contributions in the field: a 2001 study (Zamfir, Mărginean, 2001:53-55) lists no less than 71 significant contributions up to that moment. The substantial production of literature on the subject was perhaps unsurprising considering the novelty and gravity of the social problem but nonetheless it makes difficult to offer a complete and fair account of important contributions. At the academic level, RIQL has an extensive tradition of poverty research and reporting. The first concerns to find landmarks for the construction of a normative poverty line emerged in 1991, when a program for the analyses of poverty was launched. The main objective was to determine a basic needs basket, in other words to establish a poverty threshold. In 1992, the Quality of Life Journal published several contributions aimed at defining a poverty threshold using the normative method (e.g. Barbu, 1992). In 1995, the first large study on poverty has been issued by RIQL (Zamfir, 1995). The institute has gradually developed the normative method, using the recommendations of the specialists regarding the minimum caloric intake, and adding non-food and services components, to estimate minimum standard levels (i.e. the decent living minimum and the subsistence minimum). A distinctive line of research has been dedicated to social policy analyses, including anti-poverty policies (Zamfir and Zamfir, 2005 and Zamfir, 1999).

The National Institute of Statistics (NIS) has launched the Integrated Household Survey in 1995. Until 1994, NIS collected information regarding the incomes and consumption expenditures of the wage earners, agricultural workers and retired individuals through a panel research, i.e. the Family Budget Survey. This instrument was replaced by a new survey, more adequate in terms of the structure of the sample and the collected information (Teşliuc, Pop and Teşliuc, 2001: 26). The new survey allowed the construction of a consolidated welfare measure. The experts of the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) and of the World Bank started to refine the absolute poverty method, using the consumption habits of the poorest deciles or alternatively of the poorest 30% of the population. At the same time, a series of reports issued by the specialists of the National Institute of Economic Research, the Academy of Economic Studies and the National Institute of Statistics favoured the use of the relative thresholds (Wagner and Chircă, 1998, UNDP, 1999, Chircă and Teşliuc, 1999, Molnar, 1999).

Between 1996 and 1999, UNDP has initiated a research program, with the support of RIQL experts among others, that was finalized with two volumes, one dedicated to the

analyses of poverty and one to the evaluation of anti-poverty policies (Stănculescu, 1999, a; Stănculescu, 1999, b). It was a study that described and offered illustrations of the results of all the existing measurement methods; hence, it might be considered that with the 1995 RIQL study, with the 1998 study (Wagner, Chircă, Zamfir, Molnar, Parciogv, 1998) and with this 1999 volume the research on poverty already reached its maturity.

Another series of studies approached the phenomenon of community poverty (Sandu, 1999, Stănculescu, 1999a), i.e. the traditional poverty in the rural areas, using in fact deprivation aggregated indexes, related with access to infrastructure, the endowment of the households, the structure of occupation and demographic indicators. This type of research aimed for the creation of poverty maps at the level of locality and it was continued after 2000 with the creation of rural community deprivation indexes.

The 1/2/4/ dollars per day per capita at purchasing parity power thresholds used by the World Bank and the United Nations organisations system were gradually implemented in Romania but they were considered inadequate for the particular situation of Romania: for instance, the Millennium Development Goals Reports monitor the evolution of absolute poverty instead of poverty against one of these thresholds (United Nations Development Program, 2003 and the consecutive reports).

In 2000, NIS issued the monthly consumer basket, used for a few years to fundament various monetary benefits awarded by the government[1].

The estimations on the level of poverty in Romania in the first decade of the transition were invariably high according with all the methodologies: for instance, a UNDP report offered the following estimations based on a 60% of the average consumption threshold (Stănculescu, 1999a: 59): 32% in 1994, 22% in 1995, 20,5% in 1996.

Another important direction of research in RIQL was the study of vulnerable groups, especially the Roma (Zamfir and Preda, 1998) and the children (Zamfir, 1997). This direction of research also benefited from the results of the poverty analyses, as the latter indicated a disproportionately high poverty risks for certain socially excluded groups.

(2) *The adoption of the absolute poverty line: 2001-2006*

Between 2001-2006, the absolute poverty line promoted by the World Bank received a series of methodological adjustments commonly agreed by a consortium of institutions: the governmental Poverty Alleviation and Social Inclusion Promotion Commission (CASPIS), RIQL and NIS[2]. In fact, the main driver behind this development was the establishment of CASPIS. This governmental body attracted for a while the expertise of the RIQL specialists and facilitated methodological consensus in the area.

One of the major methodological shifts brought by the new status of Romania of EU country was the emergence of the discourse centred on the concept of social inclusion

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1 Emergency ordinance 217/2000

2 A legislative act, Government Decision 488 /2005, was eventually issued, establishing the status of the absolute poverty line as the official national poverty threshold and setting up a set of social exclusion indicators designed to monitor the situation in all the social sectors: labour market, education, health, social safety.

rather than poverty. The new paradigm promotes a more holistic approach of the needs of the individuals and takes into account non-monetary, non-economic, "softer" dimensions (Atkinson, Cantillon, Marlier and Nolan, 2002). This new paradigm is also considered a suitable framework for a more constructive approach of the social policy planning process, instead of the existing practices, mainly reactive and focused on the management of isolated social issues. The EU promotes a relative poverty measure, set at a certain point of the median income: 40%, 50%, 60% or 70%; the main relative poverty measure uses the 60% threshold. However, the relative poverty rate (or the "at-risk of poverty" rate) is considered complementary to the absolute poverty line. The absolute poverty rate indicator is used as the central monitoring tool, as it entails a good analytical grasp on the hardships of the population in a society undergoing massive structural difficulties, with large parts of population still unable to fulfil their basic needs. In 2000, poverty estimated against this absolute threshold reached 35.9%.

The main argument against the relative poverty rate is that it measures inequality rather than poverty. As pointed out by the international experts (Ravaillon and Chen, 2011), the relative poverty rate would remain the same if all the incomes are multiplied or contracted with the same proportion. The richest European country could theoretically have the same relative poverty rate as the poorest European country. The lack of real comparability over time and across countries decreased the attractiveness for Romania of relative poverty indicators since the predominant concern was to surpass the historical deficits and to narrow the gaps with the European countries. Another important advantage of the absolute poverty method is that it uses consumption as the welfare aggregate instead of income. The consumption expenditures are an appropriate choice for a welfare measure in a country with a large informal and self-consumption sector, such as Romania. The national plan developed in 2002 by CASPIS made marginal use of the relative poverty rate (Romanian Government, 2002). The World Bank Poverty Assessments in 2003 and 2007 have reported on poverty using the same absolute poverty line.

One of the most important studies carried during this period was the first absolute poverty map at the level of localities, using separate poverty thresholds for the urban and rural areas. (Pop, L., 2003).

An important study of this period used a totally different approach, researching the phenomenon of territorially concentrated, extreme multi-dimensional poverty of urban areas (Stănculescu, Berevoescu, 2004).

In this period, a distinct concern is to find ways to evaluate the impact of poverty alleviation programs at the national and at the local level (Cace, 2005).

(3) The official alignment to the relative poverty measurement approach together with a new mix of perspectives on the study of poverty: a social development-oriented approach concurrently with the study of poverty and extreme poverty at the territorial and community level: 2006-2014

In the last decade, the Eurostat relative poverty rate set at 60% of the median consumption has been increasingly used in country reports (MoLFSPE, 2014 b) as the main monitoring tool. The relative poverty methodology has not inspired specific

national research since it is not intended to be adapted to the national specific situation. However, it is still present in the forefront of the poverty analyses. Recently, a more complex indicator has been developed at the European level: at risk-of-poverty and social exclusion rate, a multi-dimensional indicator, measuring the proportion of the population at risk of relative poverty or with very low work intensity or affected by severe material deprivation. This indicator is used to set the headline target for the Europe2020 strategy in the area of poverty and social exclusion. In Romania, relative poverty was preferred as the main indicator, as the low work intensity has a limited significance in Romania on account of the widespread informal market and high emigration (MLFSPE, 2014 b).

The Ministry of Labour has been issued the latest annual values of the social inclusion and absolute poverty indicators since 2006. Based on the data, the Ministry has released annual update reports. However, the yearly reports have become a mere reporting habit used in little extent to ground policy plans (e.g. MoLFSPE, 2014 a). Moreover, the fact that some elements of the methodology have become obsolete may induce a partially false image of the real extent of absolute poverty in Romania. Absolute poverty is reported to have dropped to extremely low levels (see the next section). The structure of the consumption basket is derived from the consumption habits of the poorest deciles. However, the same structure of food and non-food items has been used since 2002 although the consumption habits have significantly changed since then.

The public interest on poverty diminished drastically during the 2009-2011 economic crises, being replaced by the objective to increase fiscal austerity, i.e. to identify means to cut down public expenditures. Once again, like at the beginning of the transition period, poverty was rather ignored by decision-makers.

The RIQL specialists started a program of research dedicated to the study of social development (Zamfir, 2006, Zamfir, 2007) and social innovation (leading to the creation of a social innovation journal within RIQL).

The institutional set up for poverty alleviation

This section offers information on the involvement of the researchers in the activity of the anti-poverty institutions set-up during the transition period. The performances in poverty reduction are the result of a complex intertwines of policies and factors, from the GDP growth, to employment policies or social assistance services. Virtually, all the structural characteristics of a society might be reflected in poverty levels and profile. However, this sections addresses only the institutions established to specifically address poverty

Specific structures dedicated to poverty research and strategic planning were established within various governmental administrations. However, their sustainability throughout changing governments was not ensured (they were one mandate public bodies). Poverty alleviation programs have been maintained in the responsibility of line ministries, such as the ministry of labour, education or health. In 1998, an anti-poverty commission was created under the patronage of the Romanian presidency; this commission has issued the first anti-poverty strategy, a quite comprehensive document (Zamfir, Şandor, Pasti,

Crowther, 1998). However, the executive role of this strategy could not be ensured. In 2001, the Commission for Poverty Alleviation and Social Inclusion Promotion was established within the prime-minister chancellery, with better prospects to influence the policy-making agenda. Until its dissolution in 2016, this commission elaborated an anti-poverty and social inclusion promotion plan (Romanian Government, 2002), a plethora of studies based on original research and various policy papers. The Government adopted the plan but no specific funding on programs was released. In this period, the absolute poverty methodology promoted by the World Bank and negotiated with the Academia (i.e. RIQL), NIS and international organizations was set as the official national poverty line and a system of social inclusion indicators was developed with the goal to monitor the most important social problems. While the strategic planning dimension was abandoned after 2006, the data analyses and reporting capacity was passed on to the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Protection and Elderly and poverty profiles are issued on yearly bases (Briciu, 2009).

The 2006-2013 period has represented a set back from the point of view of the interest of the decision-makers in anti-poverty policies. In 2009, a presidential commission for the analyses of social and demographic risks launched a report addressing the issue of poverty among other social risks (Preda, Gheţău, Stănculescu, 2009). UNDP issued in 2009 a report regarding the risks of the crises to lead to an increase in poverty levels (Crai, E., 2009). In 2014, a new Strategy for Poverty Reduction and Social Inclusion Promotion was being drafted with the support of the World Bank for the 2014-2040 programming period (MoLFSPE, 2014 b).

Poverty dynamic and profile

This section gives an overall image about the evolution and the main characteristics of poverty in Romania, using different indicators and measurement methodologies. The analyses confirm the estimation of the RIQL analyses in 1994, predicting "a highly polarized society, with highly stable chronic poverty pockets" (Zamfir, 1995: 161). Overall, the level of economic resources of the population is low. Romania and Bulgaria had in 2013 the lowest level of actual individual consumption per capita in purchasing power standards among EU countries, with Romania ranking second latest, with 57% of the EU28 level (Eurostat). In the same time, there is a rather high level of inequality: in the same year, the Gini index measured on disposable income placed Romania among the six most unequal countries, with a value of 34 while the EU28 value was 30.5 (on a scale from 0 to 100).

An increasing and overwhelmingly high proportion of the population reports difficulties in making ends meet (Table 1).

Many households have a precarious living standard with an optimized consumption, with components that are withheld and with a widespread inability to face unexpected expenses), 51,2% of the population was in this situation in 2013 compared with 39.8% at the EU28 level; Eurostat). Many of these households risk falling in /falling back in poverty with any major economic shock (like unemployment). The profile of consumption is drastically optimized: most of the resources are used for the food component and for house maintenance, including the payments for the utilities. The

high share of the food component in total consumption (40.5% of the consumption expenditures in 2013) is recognised within the literature as a proxy measure of poverty (Regmi et all, 2001). Despite the fact that Romania has the largest share of housing ownership in the EU (97% according with the 2011 Census), it is also among the countries with the highest rates of housing overburden, measured as the share of the population paying more than 40% of the income on housing: 15.4% compared with 11% in EU27 in 2013 (Eurostat).

Table 1 – The share of the households reporting difficulties in making ends meet

		2007	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
With great difficulty	**EU27**	9.1	9.7	10.4	10.4	10.1	11.0	12.1
	România	23.0	18.7	19.4	20.9	20.8	22.6	23.4
With difficulty	**EU27**	14.6	15.2	15.8	15.8	15.7	16.5	16.5
	România	26.3	29.4	29.6	28.0	27.7	27.5	27.5
With some difficulty	**EU27**	28.7	29.8	29.0	29.1	29.2	28.3	28.7
	România	34.2	37.0	36.6	39.4	39.2	37.3	36.2
TOTAL	**EU27**	*52.4*	*54.7*	*55.2*	*55.3*	*55*	*55.8*	*57.3*
	România	*83.5*	*85.1*	*85.6*	*88.3*	*87.7*	*87.4*	*87.1*

Source: Eurostat

As a result of constantly changing data sources and measurement methodologies, consistent figures on poverty throughout the last 25 years are available only using the 2 and 4 dollars per day at purchasing power parity (PPP). These thresholds are usually used for international comparison purposes only, as the thresholds are conventional (they do no bear any special significance beyond the fact that they are set at low levels in terms of the per capita welfare of the developed countries). The poverty headcount ratio at the 2 $ per day at PPP receded at 1,6% in 2012, from 6% in 2005 (World Bank data). However, the percentage of poor population is considerably higher when the 4 USD per capita threshold is used. Only 4.3% of the population had incomes bellow the 4 dollars per day threshold in 1989, yet in few years the percentage increased dramatically, with more than ¾ of the population in this situation in 2004. Another peak in the last 25 years was in 2009, with 61.2% of the population living with less than 4 dollars per day at PPP (Figure 1). It is a well-known fact, documented with other poverty indicators used at the time, that Romania faced two massive poverty waves in the '90s: 1990-1994 and 1996-1999. After 2000, the rate declined constantly, reaching 18.3% in 2012. The estimates according with the absolute poverty method confirm the trend. Poverty measured against the national poverty line decreased from 15.1% in 2005 to 4.3% in 2013. However, as a result of the already mentioned technical problems in the construction of the indicator, the estimates for the recent years have a limited significance.

Figure 1 *– Absolute poverty and the poverty headcount at 4 USD per day per capita at purchasing power parity (selected years throughout transition)*



Source: World Bank for the poverty headcount at 4 USD per day per capita RIQL compilation, 2013, using a variety of sources, for absolute poverty; From 1998 onwards the same methodology is used consistently

Figure 2 *– Poverty in Romania against the main poverty lines*



*Source: MoLFSPE for the absolute poverty rate; WB for the poverty headcount ratio at $4 a day at PPP; Eurostat for the rest of the poverty lines; * the national line ** at risk of poverty rate *** at risk of poverty or social exclusion rate*

The relative poverty rate or the "at risk of poverty rate" has been the main instrument for measuring poverty in Romania since the EU integration. This has happened despite the limits of this measure, i.e. the already mentioned fact that it measures inequality rather than poverty. These limits are even more prominent in the case of Romania, a country were an important part of the population is still unable to cover its basic needs. Moreover, the fact that income is the welfare indicator used is considered inadequate for Romania, were self-consumption makes up for 16.2% of the total consumption (INS, 2014). More than 1/5 of the population has been at risk of poverty in the last 5 years, with a 22.4% level in 2013 (Eurostat). An indicator designed to balance the relative poverty approach is the anchored poverty rate indicator, which measures poverty in consecutive years using a fixed threshold of a previous year (instead of a "mobile" yearly relative threshold). Using the 2008 threshold, a reduction in poverty is observed in three consecutive years after 2008, followed by a slight increase up to the 20.4% level in 2013 (Eurostat).

One can discern a growing concern at the EU level to expand the measurement approach in order to add more "objective" and absolute dimensions to relative poverty measures. Lately, the risk of poverty and social exclusion[1] indicator has been established as the main poverty-monitoring tool at the European level (one of the five headline targets of the Europe2020 strategy is set on AROPE). By considering matter of fact problems such as very low work intensity and severe material deprivation, as two of the three dimensions of this indicator, the EU monitoring system has a better analytical grasp on the disparities among European countries, i.e. the situation of less affluent countries, like Romania, is better reflected in statistics. The AROPE value in 2012 has been 41.7% in Romania, compared with the 24,5% rate for the EU-28 countries, mainly as a result of the critical values of severe material deprivation. It is the second highest EU value after the one registered by Bulgaria. As a result of the low level of resources, severe material deprivation[2] is widespread. This is an indicator that seems to illustrate more accurately the gap between Romania and the affluent EU countries. Romania has the highest rate of severe material deprivation among EU countries, with the exception of Bulgaria, with a level three times higher than the EU28 level. It is worthy to note that among dimensions considered, there are some that are highly relevant for the standard of living of the population. Among those dimensions, the proportion of the population unable to cover unexpected expenses and facing arrears with housing related costs display higher rates in 2013 than in 2007. However,

[1] The AROPE indicator is defined as the share of the population in at least one of the following three conditions: 1) at risk of poverty, meaning below the poverty threshold, 2) in a situation of severe material deprivation, 3) living in a household with a very low work intensity

[2] The definition of severe material is based on the inability to afford four or more items that are considered to be necessary or desirable from a list: having arrears on mortgage or rent payments, utility bills, hire purchase instalments or other loan payments; not being able to afford one week's annual holiday away from home; not being able to afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day; not being able to face unexpected financial expenses; not being able to buy a telephone (including mobile phone); not being able to buy a colour television; not being able to buy a washing machine; not being able to buy a car; not being able to afford heating to keep the house warm.

the indicator takes in consideration some dimensions that are less valuable from the point of view of the measurement of standard of living, such as a the possession of a car or of a colour TV (Table 2).

Table 2 – Dimensions of material deprivation (inability to afford...)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Meat or fish every second day	25.7	19.2	23.5	21.3	21.8	23.6	22.1
one week's annual holiday away	75.7	75.6	75.6	77.1	76.1	75.1	71.6
unexpected expenses	45.1	41.7	41.7	44.6	50.3	53.1	52.1
keep house adequaltely warm	32.6	24.6	22.0	21.0	15.7	14.6	14.3
arrears with housing related costs	10.1	25.4	27.1	29.8	30.2	31.1	30.5
A color TV	3.1	2.5	2.1	1.8	1.4	1.5	1.0
A car	56.1	48.6	46.6	43.7	41.2	39.5	39.2
A phone	17.4	12.2	9.2	7.2	6.5	5.8	5.3
A washing machine	23.0	19.9	17.7	15.5	13.6	12.8	11.6

Source: Eurostat

RIQL uses the normative methodology since the beginning of the '90s. Currently, the method allows the theoretical comparison of typical family structures with typical incomes (one or two adults working for the minimum or the average wage, retired or receiving social benefits, living in the urban or the rural area with one or two children) with a decent minimum standard or a subsistence minimum estimated on the basis of the specialists recommendations and equivalence scales determining the consumption needs according with the size of the family and the age of its members. Some results of this method (Mihăilescu, 2014) show that: in the urban area, the incomes brought by two minim wages and two child benefits placed a family of four bellow half of the decent minimum living threshold in 2011-2013; in the urban area, the single-parent families where the adult is paid the minimum wage were in recent years at the limit of the decent minimum standard, and the child benefits do not improve the situation; in the rural area, where the salary incomes are more uncommon and with a low level, the situation is even worse: a family of two adults and two children with one or two minimum wages and child benefits is placed bellow the subsistence threshold; in the rural area the average social insurance pension covers less half of the subsistence needs of a retired individual.

The poverty waves and the constant deficit of access to social services had chronic effects on the wellbeing of the population. These effects will be manifest throughout the next period:

1. A multi-dimensional social exclusion phenomenon has occurred, with lack of access to other dimensions, such as education, health and labour market adding up to the lack of financial resources; the interaction between the economic vulnerability and the vulnerability on other dimensions can lead to a situation of consolidated and almost unbreakable social marginalisation of the individuals.

2. Chronic poverty[1] *is widespread and increasing*: 18.2% of the population was in persistent poverty in 2013, more than the 16.7% level in 2012 and the 9% value at the EU28 level; 31.2% of the children were chronically poor in 2013, an increasing value from the 25% in 2011 and almost three times more than the EU28 level; 24.1% of the households with dependent children were in persistent poverty in 2013 in Romania, twice the value in EU28 (Eurostat).

3. A phenomenon of inter-generational extreme poverty has emerged; although no direct measurement on panel data is available to fully support this finding, one can safely infer with indirect arguments based on research data that inter-generational extreme poverty is widespread and the lack of education or the insufficient education is the main factor triggering the perpetuation of poverty: a recent analyses has showed that the level of household incomes and the level of the education of the mother are the main factors leading to children's lack of participation to school while a low level of education is among the main predictors of poverty (MoLFSPE, 2014 b).

4. Certain social groups constantly register higher poverty rates than the overall population: the children, the Roma, the unemployed and the self-employed, the Roma and the people with a low level of education.

Children were the most vulnerable age group during the transition. In 2013, children (0-17 years old) registered a 32.1% poverty rate, while the rate for the working age population (18-64 years old) was 21.5% and for the elderly (65+) 15%. In other words, more than 1.2 million children were living in relative poverty in Romania in 2012. Romania has been one of the countries with the most inequitable distribution of income across age groups within EU countries during the whole post-integration period. Relative poverty rate for households with dependent children was 27.2% (Eurostat). The presence of children in households significantly increases the poverty risk for any type of household structure in terms of adult members and any additional child brings significant increase in the poverty rate. For instance, the poverty rate for the households with two adults and three or more dependent children was 60.6%. The absolute poverty headcount illustrates the same disparity across age categories. Children and youth register the highest poverty risk, with teenagers being affected the most: 7.2% for the 15-24 age group compared with the 3.8% value for the overall population in 2014 (Eurostat).

Almost half of the Romanian children were poor or socially excluded (48.5%), far above the EU27 level, with only one quarter of the children in the same situation (27.7%). In fact, Romania had the second most critical level of the AROPE indicator (one of the five headline Europe2020 indicators), after Bulgaria. The analyses across tighter age spans indicate that teenagers (12-17 years) faced the highest risk (52.1%). The risk of poverty and social exclusion rises considerably for the large households with more than 3 children (73.3%) and single-parent families (59.2%).

Unemployed and self-employed have the highest poverty among all categories of economically active population (Mihăilescu, 2014: 7). The self-employed in agriculture

[1] Measured as the percentage of population bellow the 60% of the median income threshold in the current year and two of the precedent three years

faced in 2012 a 56.8% poverty risk, the unemployed a 52.1% poverty risk, while the self-employed in other types of occupations than agriculture a 39.8% risk. People fulfilling domestic tasks and care responsibilities were another occupational group with high poverty rates, i.e. 44.8%. There are strong arguments to state that in Romania the self-employed and the domestic workers, with poverty rates higher or close to those of the unemployed, are priority groups for anti-poverty policies: (i) these groups are larger than the unemployed; self-employed represent 21.4% of the rural population while domestic workers represent 9.4% of the urban population and 5% of the rural population (the unemployed are around 2% of the population within both areas of residence)[1]; (ii) they are outside the employment targets of labour market services, as they are perceived as already employed or economically inactive.

Education is a strong determinant of the poverty risk. While 43% of the people with primary and lower secondary education were in relative poverty in 2013, only 1.7% of the people who graduated a superior education were at risk of relative poverty.

Roma are 10 times more likely to be in absolute poverty than non-Roma: 20.4% of Roma were in absolute poverty in 2014 while only 3.4 percentage of non-Roma were below the poverty line (MoLFSPE, 2014, a).

5. Romania faces a long-term structural traditional poverty, with large parts of the rural areas cut off from the development dynamic of the Romanian society. Rural areas have constantly displayed a considerably higher poverty risk. The absolute poverty is 4 higher in the rural areas (6.4% compared with 1.7% in the urban areas). Relative poverty in thinly populated areas was 33.9%, compared with 10.2% in areas with higher population density (the EU-SILC survey does not take into account the area of residence; thinly populated areas, where 42.5% of the population lives, are largely rural area). The lack of decent income sources in the rural area, where most of the economic activities are concentrated in subsistence agriculture, determines this gap in the standard of living. The insufficient access to basic infrastructure and services for important parts of the population add up to poverty and result in a high level of social exclusion. At a lower territorial level, recent analyses (MoLFSPE, 2014 b) have highlighted other types of administrative units where the population faces severe exclusion from public utilities and public services: small urban localities (with a population under 20,000 inhabitants) and small and remote rural localities.

6. New types of poverty have appeared: a poverty of the income-earning population, a territorially concentrated poverty, an invisible poverty of the population outside the reach of the public social services and a total poverty of the homeless population.

A considerable part of the population is at risk of relative poverty despite earning labour market incomes: 17.7% of the 18-64 adults were in this situation in Romania compared with 8.9% of the same age group in UE28. It was the highest in-work poverty rate among the EU countries. More than 2 million persons earned in 2010 low

[1] In other words, one-quarter of the rural employed consisted of non-salaried family workers, while another third were self-employed in 2012 (MoLFSPE, 2014)

wages, below the 2/3 level of the average wage, one of the highest shares in the European Union.

Territorially concentrated areas of poverty and social exclusion have emerged both in urban and in rural areas. As overall poverty levels decreased, a new type of territorially concentrated poverty emerged as a stark social problem. A World Bank research conducted for guidance of the SOP ROP intervention in disadvantaged urban communities (SOP ROP Management Authority, 2014) found that 3.2% of the urban population, 2.6% of urban households, and 2.5% of urban dwellings belonged in 2012 to census sectors defined as marginalized areas, i.e. areas that cumulate inadequate housing with low human capital and low formal employment. It is largely an intergenerational poverty and it involves lack of access to most of the social services and to utilities. The typology of these areas is largely based on the characteristics of the dwelling stock: ghetto' areas of low-quality blocks of flats or in former workers colonies, slum areas of houses and/or improvised shelters, modernized social housing and social housing buildings in the historical city centre. The most common subtypes of urban marginalized areas being ghettos of blocks of flats and slums with houses: together, they account for over 60% of the 843 urban marginalized areas reported by Mayor's offices.

Invisible poor and socially excluded people fall outside the safety net. By definition, the dimension of the invisible poverty is not documented at the national level with systematic records. However, various qualitative and quantitative researches offer insights on the situation. A study documenting the situation in 96 communes where a UNICEF project was implemented has identified more than 3000 "invisible children" (Stănculescu, M. S., Marin, M., 2012: 36). Social workers have been engaged in a sustained outreach assessment of the community and have identified new cases, i.e. children whose situation of poverty and social exclusion was not previously diagnosed properly. The children were counted as "invisible" when found to live in poor households, improper housing, abandoned or at risk of being abandoned, neglected or abused, left behind in poverty by emigrant parents, suspected of being severely sick, teenage mothers who abandoned the school and children with no identity papers. Considering that this particular project targeted only the children living in a small number of rural localities out of the total (around 3.3% of the total number of communes), one should conclude that the total number of invisible poor and socially excluded population[1] is much higher at the national level.

Some people experience total poverty and live on the streets. A reliable assessment of the size of homelessness in Romania is not available. Only around 1.5 thousand people have been counted as homeless at the Census, while even the most optimistic earlier estimates indicate a number which is at least three times higher (Ministry of Regional Development, 2008), with some estimates suggesting as much as ten times more homeless people living in Romania (Adrian Dan, 2008)[2]. The registers of the Samusocial NGO offering emergency support for the homeless include more than 4,000 individual beneficiaries in

[1] For the adult population, other identification criteria should be used

[2] The registers of the same Samusocial NGO include more than 4,000 individual beneficiaries of the day care services for homeless in Bucharest since 1997.

Bucharest in the 1997-2013 period (Briciu, 2014). Children and youth exiting residential institutions are an important part of the homeless population according with findings of the previously quoted research findings. Other groups at risk are the poor who are evicted from public housing as a result of long-term overdue payments with house maintenance, people living institutions such as penitentiaries, hospitals, mental health and disability facilities, victims of domestic violence, divorcees, people evicted as a result of re-entitlements of the formerly nationalized houses and lonely elderly who are dispossessed as a result of property scams.

Conclusions

Poverty research has an already extensive history in Romania. Along the way, the linkage between the research side and the policy set-up has been inconstant: there were certain periods when the research data has been widely distributed within the decision-making environment and there were other periods when the two areas seemed to follow parallel tracks. It is important to re-establish long lasting institutional arrangements that would allow for research grounded governance in the area of anti-poverty policies.

In the current stage, it is important to capitalize on the impressive knowledge accumulated in the last decades of poverty research. There is a highly pronounced trend of alignment to the Eurostat statistics on poverty and social exclusion with the purpose of developing comparative analyses. The comparative study at the European level is of foremost importance in order to understand and address development needs but they might be misleading in some respects since they do not always capture the specifics of the situation at the national level. It is essential to make the adjustments in order to build a more adequate absolute poverty measure at the national level. This complementary measure would ensure the continuity with the already extensive tradition of having credible estimates according with an alternative national measure of poverty. The paper has presented a series of arguments pointing to the conclusion that larger segments of the population than indicated by the existing statistics are still unable to fulfil their basic needs.

Although absolute poverty is more widespread than apparent in the official statistics, the analyses of the long-term dynamic of different poverty indicators (the 4 USD per day per person headcount or the absolute poverty rate in question) indicate that absolute poverty has substantially diminished in Romania. Despite its limits, the measurement of relative poverty has become increasingly relevant for Romania. However, the main poverty and social exclusion indicators at the European level have a limited significance in the framework of the development needs of Romania and they should be used and interpreted bearing in mind their limits. Other complementary data should be added in order to have an adequate picture of the situation. For instance, the only dimension of the at-risk of poverty and social exclusion rate (the Europe2020 headline indicator) that seems to reflect the disparately worst situation of Romania compared with other European countries is the severe material deprivation rate. The other two dimensions considered do not reflect the gap between Romania and the more affluent EU countries. While the relative poverty rate is a measure of inequality, the low work intensity indicator returns relatively low values for Romania, as a result of the unconventional structure of the labour market, with high percentages of people

working in the informal economy. However, the severe material deprivation rate has its own methodological drawbacks since it is a multidimensional indicator in its turn and some items taken into consideration might have a limited relevance for the situation in Romania (for instance, the item regarding the ability to purchase a colour TV). Moreover, the current estimates on relative poverty fail to provide some valuable information on a series of characteristics of the population that are critical for the analyses of poverty in Romania, such as the area of residence, the ethnicity or the presence of a disability. These gaps should be corrected.

The analyses of vulnerable groups and territorially concentrated poverty and social exclusion will probably gain even more influence in the future, along with the foreseeable diminishing of mass poverty. This paper discusses some of the research carried on in this direction.

There is a special argument to be made in respect with the volatility of data, changing surveys, data collection methodologies, and data reporting procedures, a situation that affects long-term policy planning. In the event that a long-term social development construction approach becomes the new policy-making paradigm, robust and reliable data become more important than ever.

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HUMAN RESOURCE'S ROLE WITH BUSINESS RECOVERY DURING AND AFTER A RECESSION TO ENGAGE EMPLOYEES AND RETAIN TALENT

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Abstract: *A comprehensive literature review in the area of leadership development, employee engagement and talent retention to determine what does HR need to do to create people advantage in this new era of business recovery; HR's role in leadership development; if there is a shift in HR's focus from human capital to social capital; and how could organisations engage employees in decision making using their talents to help recover from the recession. While countries such as South Africa, New Zealand and Australia continue to experience leadership talent shortages, and the recession forces organisations to review the effectiveness of their leadership development programmes, meaningful change seems essential. Developing countries have similar problems. How do these developing countries prepare (crouch), develop (touch) implement (pause) and engage (involve) their employees to develop leaders for the future? Some findings are that today's business leaders need to get personally involved in mentoring future leaders and in guiding their development; leaders need to be values-centred leaders focused on building sustainable organisations that serve society; it is challenging for most organisations to make leadership development a priority while leaders face an ever growing list of challenges such as cost cutting and customer demands, strategic planning and successful innovation, and fewer resources available to achieve their goals. Human resource managers have a huge role to play in these issues and they have enormous challenges but also opportunities to put strategies in place to help to recover from the recession.*

Keywords: *Recession, business recovery, leaders, development, talent retention*

Introduction

This paper is a literary exploration of the role that HR could play in the leadership development and talent retention to help businesses recover during and after the recession. Grim reports came to light about financial instability in the US residential mortgage markets in the middle of 2007. From then on it went from bad to worse very fast. Most of us were totally unprepared for the extent of the repercussions from this

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event. It is common knowledge that around the world stock markets have fallen, large financial markets have collapsed and many governments have had to bail out their financial institutions. The global financial crisis, and the subsequent worldwide recession, has had far reaching impact on people and businesses everywhere and specifically on employees and it involved human resource management (HRM). The economic uncertainty and volatility has created a real crisis in confidence in organisations, the likes of which haven't been seen since the Great Depression of the 1930's.

As the world economies emerge from a Global Financial Recession, the focus is on preparing the workforce for growth opportunities. Many leaders are convinced that the recession is actually something of the past (Key, 2010). For employers it is not so easy to accept because they are still struggling to get themselves out of debt. Companies need to retain their employees and expect high performance from their human capital. With the economy at a low point, organisations are looking for effective ways to innovate and reinvent themselves. These are timely and important issues as New Zealand struggles to recover from this unprecedented event.

This paper first discusses a comprehensive summary of literature review in the area of leadership development, employee engagement and talent retention. In order to evaluate academic claims and findings, some definitions are required to clearly establish the areas under investigation. These topics will be reviewed to determine any common themes or critical differences. Any interrelationships between these areas will also be considered and discussed. As the literature base is immense, a broad management perspective will be taken, rather than a technical perspective. Ways in which HR can create sustainable competitive advantage will be discussed, highlighting key challenges and opportunities. Academic literature in these areas will be reviewed.

This will enable the investigation of some implications for today's human resource (HR) professionals. Based on recurring themes, the last part of the paper includes some conclusions and recommendations as appropriate. As organisations still continue to struggle to survive and thrive post-recession it is likely that changes may still need to be made in their current workplaces.

Objectives of this study

The objective of this study is to ascertain human resources' (HR's) role in whether the recession's influence in employment is becoming something of the past, leadership development and what talent retention could really contribute in an organisation on the road to recovery.

To achieve the objectives, some key questions are considered and answered in this paper:

- What is HR's role in leadership development
- What does HR need to do to create people advantage in this new era of business recovery?

- In this business recovery, will there be a shift in HR's competitive focus from human capital to social capital?"
- Will organisations engage employees more in decision making and use their employees' talents to help escape the downside of the recession?

Problem statement

Leadership development, talent retention and employee engagement could assist businesses to recover from the recession. The problem is that many organisations underestimate their employees' abilities and capabilities in this regard. Human capital could be utilised to develop new business. Suggestions of employees should be discussed, used and developed to recover what was lost during the downturn in the economy. A further problem for employers to address is that they should use and develop the talents of their employees to provide better "equipped" employees with knowledge and skills to add value in organisations (Du Plessis, 2010).

Literature review

Leadership Development

New Zealand's Prime Minister the Rt Hon John Key is of the opinion that leading a nation through a global economic recession was tough. New Zealanders needed strong economic leadership and a government that was prepared to take strong and decisive action. He said that leadership is about many things including integrity, hard work, believing in yourself, perseverance, and being part of a team with a high degree of trust (Key, 2010).

The Australian, Robbie Macpherson, Head of Social Leadership Australia, explained what the three attributes are that he would consider being essential to a leader:

- Resilience: the work of leadership is really tough and therefore you need to be really resilient – intellectually, spiritually, emotionally and physically – to survive the challenge.
- Secondly, the ability to work across difference. A leader needs a capacity to collaborate and to work across a whole range of very different stakeholders.
- Lastly the ability to learn and to help others learn. A leader has got to be a teacher and create an environment which allows others to learn and grow. A leader can't come in and impose a plan from above. The solution has to be created collectively by all the different stakeholders (Social Leadership, 2010).

On what Macpherson (2010) regarded as the greatest barriers to new leaders emerging in Australia he is of the opinion that Australia has a flawed leadership paradigm. They are stuck in an outdated notion that leadership is about hierarchy and power – very much the 'great man' theory of leadership – which is always going to be a highly elitist and limited view. The complexity of the challenges they now face requires a new way of

thinking about leadership. They regard leadership as mobilising people to face reality – both the tough challenges and the new opportunities.

He postulates that real leadership is a much more inclusive and collaborative activity. There are people right across our communities who don't have formal power or hierarchical power who are exercising leadership every day on tough issues – people who wouldn't necessarily identify with the word 'leadership' – but we continue to look to 'leaders' for the answers, and, increasingly, because of the complex nature of the world, those people fail to provide those answers and then they are being blamed. Real leadership is almost always a risky activity – and a thrilling activity – but it's not management. Leadership has that element of bringing about genuine progress and that means tackling the real, underlying issues and asking the hard questions. It's not the easy path and almost always it involves an element of real loss, or at the very least, the fear of loss.

What about countries such as South Africa, India, and other developing countries if this is the view of a developed country (Australia) with a strong economy, very low unemployment figures, very low crime rate, good economic growth and a stable government? How do these developing countries prepare (crouch), develop (touch) implement (pause) and engage (involve) their employees to develop leaders who can retain their employees and sustain their competitive advantage?

There have been some positive signs that the economy is starting to recover. Yet key questions exist. Are organisations equipped to take advantage of this? Just who will lead us out of this recession, and how do we best handle leadership development post-recession? Have our expectations of leaders changed? What have been the trends in leadership development over the past few years?

To understand the concept 'leadership' it is necessary to look at it from a few different perspectives and views. Leadership is an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes and outcomes and reflect their shared purposes (Daft & Pirola-Merlo 2009). Another view is from Bergh & Theron (2009) that leadership is a social process in which group processes and behaviours (such as communication and decision-making) play a role. Therefore leadership is an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purpose. "a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal".

As companies struggled during the recession, many companies put a moratorium on salary increases, promotions, pension changes, mandatory taking of annual leave, they are reducing work hours, imposing a hiring moratorium and cutting training budgets, which included leadership development (Strack, Cave, Thurner and Haaen, 2009; Dutra, 2009). "While lowering costs may be the short-term goal, such changes will, over the long term, inject agility, accountability, and speed into the organisation at the same time" (Strack, *et al.*, 2009: 12).

Some organisations might not have a HR department and therefore they are left without the right processes in place to identify and develop talent. They will struggle to perform and compete globally or even in their own country at a high level in the new

economy (Ogden, 2010). Yet many leaders are simply more comfortable evaluating sharply defined, easily understood initiatives such as expanding departments or making IT upgrades. Directing limited resources toward developing the so-called "soft skills" of business leadership, talent development, and employee management can appear less strategic in comparison.

Leadership development is linked to business recovery as we require leaders to propel us to a vibrant future. To move any organisation forward, key questions could include issues about what their workforce look like now, what should it look like, given their business goals, and how do they retain that optimized workforce once they've acquired it? (Baker, 2006 as cited in Kennedy & Daim, 2010).

The tough things that leaders did to keep going eroded bonds. Economic recovery offers a chance to restore them and renew a sense of pride and purpose. This isn't a matter of making it up to employees; it's the ultimate competitive advantage (Dutra, 2010). Adversity can be a chance for renewal. What is critical to this success is gathering the business together around values and vision rather than simply focusing on the transactional goal/reward relationships that so many organisations have drifted into (Carter, 2009).

Balzac (as cited in Minter, 2010) suggests that managers get rid of preconceived ideas of what leaders look like, and instead put employees in confusing or ambiguous situations and watch what happens. He advised to look for the people who build connections, who bring the team together, who focus everybody on trying out different ideas. Look for the people who essentially provide direction without having to intimidate to get it.

DDI conducts an annual survey, the Global Leadership Forecast, which provides insights on leadership practices and trends. The 2008/09 survey had more than 14,000 human resource professionals and leaders participate across 76 countries, and the findings are thought provoking. While 75 percent of those surveyed said that improving or leveraging talent was their top priority, less than half the leaders in the survey said they were satisfied with development opportunities they were provided with. Even more alarming is that successive DDI surveys have shown that confidence in leaders has been steadily eroded over the past decade (Stark Leadership Insights, 2010).

DDI asserts that leaders are not meeting the current as well as the future anticipated needs of their organisations. Organisations continue to demonstrate a reluctance to build a learning culture – despite all the evidence that shows that businesses that endure are those that learn and continuously evolve (Minter, 2010). While countries such as South Africa, New Zealand and Australia continue to experience leadership talent shortages, and the recession forces organisations to review the effectiveness of their leadership development programmes, meaningful change seems essential. A lack of quality development programmes leads to serious consequences. Many people who move into strategic roles aren't prepared for either the changes, or the demands involved. The crucial transition from one level of leadership to the next requires a significant investment and preparation by organisations because the competencies for success continue to shift and change. As people move into more complex strategic roles, they're no longer leading teams, they're leading leaders so this requires a real shift

– not only in how they need to think about the organisation and its requirements, but also in how they execute their responsibilities (Stark Leadership Insights, 2010).

Minter (2010) agrees that companies need to be sure they are assessing employees not just for the present, but for the environment in which they will be operating in the future. General Mills' Director of Organisational Development, Beth Gunderson, stresses the importance of viewing leadership development as a long-term investment. The innovation pipeline needs to be kept full so we need leaders who are going to take us down that path. So, we need to continue to invest in them.

The shifting competencies of leadership are illustrated further in the differences between 20th and 21st century leaders. George (2010) contends that organisations need leaders to lead now in a more sustainable, authentic way than many of their predecessors have done. Tomorrow's leaders need to be values-centred leaders focused on building sustainable organisations that serve society, in contrast to the "command-and-control" style of the 20th century. Tomorrow's leaders need entrepreneurial skills to grow businesses and create jobs, collaboration skills to build relationships across organisation lines to solve society's most difficult problems in a global world. These tough times may arguably be the time to change the impression in many employees' minds that the single imperative of their coming to work was to make shareholders richer (Carter, 2009).

To effectively develop these future leaders, George (2010) recommends that today's business leaders need to get personally involved in mentoring future leaders and in guiding their development. Even more importantly, emerging leaders need to be given opportunities to gain experience on the firing line. It's through experience that individuals can learn about themselves and their leadership so they are prepared for the greater challenges that lie ahead.

Toyota CIO Barbra Cooper takes this approach (Overby, 2009) that she tries to take advantage of everyday events – problems or personnel issues – and turns them into real-time learning opportunities. She just never stops trying to be a leadership developer and is thinking about it all the time. From the research several modern leaders (from leading companies such as IBM, Ford, Xerox and Unilever) are purported to understand that developing capable, authentic leaders throughout their organisations is critical to their success (as the new heads of these major corporations).

PepsiCo's Indra Nooyi commits time and energy to developing future leaders. Key objectives are growing a sustainable enterprise that will positively impact the communities Pepsi serves, steering the soft drink giant toward healthier food options, and experimenting in philanthropic initiatives.

Real changes in leadership require changing the beliefs and behaviours of everyone who thinks and acts in ways that sustain the culture (Minter, 2010). Changing the beliefs and behaviours of people in positions of authority is necessary but not sufficient to bring about changes in leadership. According to George (2010) we need leaders aligned with the company's mission and values, who can empower other leaders, and are effective in collaborating inside the organisation and externally as well.

Yet, in the aftermath of the global economic meltdown, it is challenging for most organisations to make leadership development a priority. Leaders face an ever growing list of challenges – from cost cutting and customer demands to strategic planning and successful innovation – and the resources available to accomplish them continue to contract. Many executives across a wide range of industries began to downgrade their concern about the pipeline of top talent in their organisations, as the supply of candidates was abundant in the early to mid stages of the recession. According to recent research from Personnel Decisions International, an HR consultancy, a staggering 83 percent of corporate leaders ranked pressure to cut costs as their toughest business challenge yet only five percent of survey respondents believed loss of leaders in key areas or insufficient talent to be a concern (Overby, 2009).

Senior managers live in a real and desperate fear of their organisations failing or at least being severely damaged. The instinctive reaction is to draw back, cut investments, cancel projects, retrench, retreat back to a comfort zone, but this instinct to withdraw can create a siege mentality where people reduce activity and energy levels. Carter (2009) warns that organisations can become paralysed by the enormity of the economic forces bearing down on them, and in the process fail to mobilise the increased motivation and entrepreneurial activity that is required to survive. Organisational resilience in such demanding times requires a fast, clearheaded distinction between things you cannot impact upon (usually external to the organisation) and the things you can impact upon and shape (usually internal). One of these critical internal factors is the quality of leadership.

Carter (2009) contends that challenging times will require leadership that provides clarity as to why and where people have got to change; that provides a future that engages motivation and develops the confidence that people can, within reasonable limits, shape and influence what is happening to them. He suggests that audacious leadership is required in such ambiguous times. Giving people the power and authority to make choices is psychologically empowering and has the advantage of flexibility and quick-decision making.

A learning organisation is a company that both learns and fosters learning (Erasmus *et al.*, 2007). By integrating work and learning, a learning organisation seeks quality, excellence and continuous improvement. There is an emphasis on continual transformation in order to better collect, manage and use knowledge. Learning organisations can be distinguished by their ability to continually expand their capacity to learn and transform themselves (Thomas & Allen, 2006). It is through organisational learning that companies can gain sustained competitive advantage and the emphasis on training, education and development of individuals is most important.

Training, education and development are concepts often thought of as synonymous but the differences must be understood to effectively manage training in an organisation (Erasmus *et al.*, 2007). The next few paragraphs will explore the definitions and roles of each of the three concepts. However, in practice, the concepts cannot be definitively compartmentalised, as each may have elements of the others. It is suggested that an integrated approach to achieving an organisation's training and development needs will improve performance.

Training describes the specific learning activities undertaken to improve an employee's knowledge, skills and abilities in order for them to better perform their duties (Du Plessis & Frederick, 2010; Macky, 2008). Whenever a new behaviour is needed in the workplace, a training programme is required to teach the employee the required new behaviour. Training is about giving employees the skills and knowledge to undertake their responsibilities and is related to their workplace. Training can be specific to their role, like operating a forklift, or generalised, like anti-harassment policies. Education goes beyond the restrictions of the workplace.

Education improves overall competence of the employee beyond the job they are currently performing (Du Plessis & Frederick, 2010; Dugan, 2003). In general terms, education is designed to prepare an individual for life while training prepares an individual to perform specific tasks. The range of competencies gained from education ranges from basic literacy, numeracy and interpersonal skills to advanced management programmes. Education programmes are generally outsourced to schools, colleges, universities and specialist private companies (Erasmus *et al.*, 2007) while training is usually an internal function. Up-skilling employees through education and training programs lead to employee development.

Development programmes are designed to assist in developing and fulfilling an employee's potential within an organisation (Macky, 2008). This may take many forms including training, on-the-job training, job rotation, mentoring and career counselling. Employee development is a necessary component of improving quality, retaining key employees and keeping up-to-date with social change, global competition and technological advances (Noe, 2002). Many companies use development as a means for strategic succession planning where leaders are identified early in their career and developed for higher leadership positions (Macky, 2008). Regardless of what label is given, the main thrust behind training, education or development is learning.

Talent Retention

During disruptive periods of organisational change, too many companies approach the retention of key employees by throwing financial incentives at star performers. Researchers warn that this is not money well spent as many of the recipients would have stayed put anyway; others have concerns that money alone can't address. Additionally, by focusing exclusively on "high potentials", companies often overlook those "normal" performers who are nonetheless essential for the success of any change effort (Du Plessis & Frederick, 2010).

Human resources and line managers need to work together during times of major organisational change to identify people whose retention is critical. Yet too often companies simply round up the usual suspects – senior executives and high-potential employees in roles that are critical for business success. Few look in less obvious places for more average performers whose skills or social networks may be just as critical – both in daily operations during the change effort itself as well as in delivering against its longer-term business objectives. Even if the employees' performance and career potential are unexceptional, their organisational knowledge, direct relationships, or technical expertise can make their retention critical.

Companies should tailor retention approaches to the motivations and mind-sets of specific employees (as well as to the express nature of the changes involved) because one-size-fits-all retention packages are usually unsuccessful in persuading a diverse group of key employees to stay (Cosack, Guthridge, & Lawson, 2010).

Ogden (2010) outlined three key reasons to invest in developing talent:

- enabling those organisations that are resource constrained or have had to reduce headcount in the face of increasing demand to do-more-with less,
- preventing the talent drain when economic conditions improve, and
- investing in leadership to avoid the high costs of staff turnover as the number one reason that employees give for leaving an organisation is their dissatisfaction with their immediate superior.

Getting employees fully engaged and delivering a high level of discretionary effort when headcount has been reduced or resources constrained is critical. Getting buy-in may require a visible commitment to redesigning work processes and developing staff skills for a leaner organisation. In organisations that cut back employee development programs, star performers may simply wait until the economy recovers and employment prospects improve. At that time, the most effective staff is likely to be attracted to organisations that demonstrate greater appreciation for their skills and apply more resources toward their professional development. Often staff with a high level of technical ability may be promoted to management positions without adequate training to fulfil the demands of their new position (Ogden, 2010).

A good example of a company focusing on achieving their talent retention goals is IBM. They developed a custom-base database that gave managers an end-to-end view of the company's human capital and allowed identification of skill gaps across their global workforce of over 333,000 full-time employees (Baker, 2006, as cited in Kennedy & Daim, 2010). Another company focused on retention and development is Motorola, who believe that it receives $33 for every $1 invested in its employee's education and training. Kaliprasad (2006, as cited in Kennedy & Daim, 2010) asserts that the only sustainable competitive advantage in today's marketplace comes from keeping employees educated and developing them for future challenges.

The literature continues to highlight that capable people are in short supply globally, which accounts for fierce competition between organisations to attract and retain these skilled resources. Research revealed that the most effective strategies to retain capable people in South Africa and Singapore were centred on creating a stimulating and challenging work environment, and participative management styles. The most effective strategies to retain capable people in China include: employee orientation and integration; career planning and development; employee relations and motivation; performance management; training and development; transfer and promotions; compensation and benefit programs (Kaliprasad, 2006, as cited in Kennedy & Daim, 2010).

HR's role to crouch, touch and pause

South Africa is no different to other countries in the HR field. Several studies that compared South Africa's HR activities with, among others New Zealand, (Paine, 2008; Du Plessis, 2010; Du Plessis & Huntley, 2009; Nel & Du Plessis, 2007) found that HR's role is to crouch (prepare), to touch (develop) and to pause (to be patient) while implementing strategies for organisations to develop leaders' capabilities and to retain talented employees. HR should be on the forefront in identifying talent and act pro-actively to sustain the competitive advantage of their organisation. It was explained above how crucial it is to retain talented employees and further in this paper the importance of human and social capital is discussed.

The first casualty of a downturn in the economy is people: the employees on whom, the fortunes of a company rest, according to Strack, *et al.* (2009). A cautionary message by HR practitioners is that when the good times return, employees remember how they were treated. This presents real challenges. HR managers might find it tough to inspire employee accountability, engagement, and resiliency at a time when traditional motivational "carrots," such as pay raises, are off the table. They will need to align employee efforts with changing strategic initiatives, but could find that they lack effective ways to make that essential link. And they could fall behind in retaining and recruiting top staff in a marketplace where turnover is high and qualified talent is scarce.

Companies that expect their businesses to return to historical levels sooner should explore flexible solutions to lower costs, whereas companies expecting a longer recovery or a permanently changed environment need to explore restructuring and work force reduction (Strack, *et al.*, 2009). Workers respond most positively when increases in their responsibilities do not come with an increase in stress and strain (Macky & Boxall 2006; Mackie, Holahan & Gottlieb 2001 as cited in Boxall & Macky, 2007).

Organisational (HR) responses can either aid or hinder employee engagement. Measures such as laying off temporary employees, eliminating overtime pay, shortening work hours, and relying on variable pay arrangements have been used effectively with a positive impact on employee commitment. Hiring high-performers of competitors has been effective in strengthening employee commitment (Strack, *et al.*, 2009). In contrast, cutting back on training has a relatively negative impact on employee commitment. HR's role in development and training prepares companies for the future, as an investment in long-term sustainable growth.

What does HR need to do to create people advantage in this new era of business recovery?

The current workforce is becoming more emergent and less traditional, which sees a dramatic shift in perspective. An emergent workforce is driven by opportunity, whereas a traditional work force believes that tenure dictates growth (Campbell, 2002). One of the primary challenges for HR managers today concerns motivating employees to carry

out broader and more proactive roles. HR managers will need to develop novel approaches to motivation to retain such an emergent workforce. Given the current state of the economy, it may seem that hiring and retention are simply not as important as they were thought to be several years ago. But organisations that want to be sustainable and successful over the long term need to still consider how to attract and grow high performing and committed employees (Chalofsky & Krishna, 2009).

The impending retirement of the baby boomer generation, the greater demand for work/life balance, the growth in the number of employees with caring responsibilities for either aging parents, or children, combined with younger – and smaller – generations entering their prime working years will create real challenges (Strack, *et al.*, 2009). Increased global competitiveness will require an educated and skilled workforce, and the reduction in talent pool will mean that skill shortages are likely to be even more acute. "HR has no more error margin in the recruiting process – we have to hire 100 percent quality" (Thoral as cited in Strack. *et al.*, 2009: 4).

Clare Parkes ("I'm an OK Leader", 2010) identifies several key areas for HR managers and organisations to focus on:

- Stabilise the organisation following restructure through more effective and comprehensive communication
- Identify critical skills – source and develop from within across all levels of staff
- Effectively manage poor performance and have more robust discussions with employees
- Undertake learning and development interventions for all staff – with particular focus on management skills, creating a clear career path for employees, and providing clear expectations of performance
- Understand key metrics in relation to staff turnover rates and engagement levels, paying particular attention to the cost and effort required to obtain 100% productivity from new recruits
- Review how employees are rewarded and develop clear principles for activity that will retain core skills.

HR's focus on sustainable competitive advantage, human capital and social capital

Just because an organisation uses its resources, capabilities and competencies to achieve competitive advantage, this doesn't guarantee that this competitive advantage will be sustainable. A critical element for sustainability is developing capabilities that aren't easily replicated by competitors (Sharkie, 2003).

Organisational success depends on aligning business strategy with a human capital strategy that puts the right talent in the right roles, performing in the right ways. People want to work and stay at companies that get this right. Lajtha (2010) contends that key

characteristics of a successful organisation include employees who are given a degree of autonomy to make decisions, yet also know how their responsibilities fit into the goals of the business; their leaders are strong and collaborative; their structures encourage work across functions and units and multiply the value of what any one group is doing; they tend to perform better; they are more agile and responsive to market conditions; they consider multiple scenarios and outcomes to know what workforce and organisation are needed to execute the business plan.

During a recession, traditional planning is inadequate to meet business needs. Leaders need talent and leadership strategies that help them achieve differentiation. An effective human capital strategy ensures that the right leaders are in place to source, develop and direct the right workforce talent, supported by the right culture, organisation- and operating model to achieve competitive differentiation (Lajtha, 2010).

Leaders need to develop resources and competencies to meet the criteria to provide long term sustainable competitive advantage (Du Plessis, 2010; Barney, 1998; Golden and Ma, 2003). Progoulaki and Theotokas (2010) agree that resources and capabilities constitute the base for the formation of sustainable competitive advantage. The firm should invest in maintaining its structures, systems and relationships with its employees. Changes may jeopardise the feeling of employment security, risk the employee's trust and loyalty and lead to the loss of rare human resource characteristics. In this way, sustainable competitive advantage comes from teams not individuals; from human resource systems not single practices.

Many companies are struggling with how to do more with less resources and Styhre (2008) claims that one of the most significant domains where substantial effectiveness increases are to be gained is knowledge sharing. The literature provides further support for the view that the most valuable strategic resources are socially constructed (Hall 1992; Schoemaker & Jonker, 2005 as cited in Weisingera & Black, 2006). Over the years various forms of intangible and tacit resources, which are socially constructed, have been identified as being valuable (Golden & Ma, 2003) ranging from organisational culture and organisational knowledge (Coleman, 2006) to social networks. Weisingera and Black (2006) assert that collective action and strategic goals can be achieved through social capital.

Schuller (2007) considers human capital to be essentially an individual asset, defined in terms of skills, competencies and qualifications. The literature appears to support this view that human capital is individual yet less tangible than physical capital. "Human capital is the totality of personal cognitive or embodied knowledge, learned or entrenched through practice over time" (Styhre, 2008: 945). Human capital is created by "changes in persons that bring about skills and capabilities that make them able to act in new ways" (Coleman, 1998 as cited in Styhre, 2008: 942 and Weisingera & Black, 2006: 147).

Similar to human capital, social capital is less tangible than physical capital. Unlike human capital that is confined to the individual, social capital "exists in the relations among persons" (Coleman, 1998 as cited in Styhre, 2008: 942). There is no shortage of literature on the subject matter of social capital, and several definitions exist. What

these definitions of social capital share in common is "the key idea that the networks of relationships in which people are embedded act as an important resource and thus a source of competitive advantage to the firm" (Bresnen, Edelman, Newell, Scarbrough, & Swan, 2005: 236 as cited in Styhre, 2008: 943). Social capital is a complex social event that can be seen as a resource developed through a history of interactions which differs from the interactions themselves; is distinctive to the actors involved and cannot easily be replicated, therefore representing an important source of sustainable competitive advantage (Ramsay, 2001 as cited in Bernardes, 2010).

Social capital is defined as the set of relationships between people or groups of people that can be used to develop, access and use resources. Lin, Cook and Burt (2001 as cited in Pirolo & Presutti, 2010) suggest that these embedded resources are accessed and/or mobilised in purposive actions. Social capital is productive as it "enables the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible" (Coleman, 1998 as cited in Styhre, 2008: 942). Adler (2002) concludes that there are three components which must be present within social networks in order for social capital to exist: opportunity, motivation and ability.

Social capital plays a pivotal role in mediating human capital and organisational capital. Without investing in social capital, the stocks of human and organisational capital won't be fully exploited or used. "Social capital is a term denoting a number of shared and collective emotional, cognitive, and communicative skills and resources that helps to circulate and develop the existing know-how of a firm" (Styhre, 2008: 949). It includes the collective capacity to tell stories as well as other non-verbal competencies and joint accomplishments such as trust (Czarniawska, 2004, as cited in Styhre, 2008).

Socialisation mechanisms can help reduce ambiguity and can allow for clearer and more open communication (Cousins, Lawson & Squire, 2008, as cited in Bernardes, 2010). These relationships between individuals enable the mutual sharing of personal knowledge. Social capital also regulates the relationship between the personal knowledge of the individual co-workers and the formalised knowledge of the organisation's procedures and systems (Styhre, 2008). Goebel et al., (2003, as cited in Bernardes, 2010) suggest that when organisational members perceive themselves as disengaged in terms of their strategic contribution to the value adding process, their job performance is more likely to be diminished.

Casanueva & Gallego (2010) discuss three dimensions of social capital:

- structural dimension (social networks involved),
- cognitive dimension (shared meaning) and
- relational dimension (trust and norms) .

Resource embeddedness is a new dimension of social capital. Granovetter first set forth the distinction and importance of both concrete personal relations (relational embeddedness) and the structure of the collective arrangement of those relations (structural embeddedness) (Granovetter, 1985 as cited in Bernardes, 2010). Structural embeddedness plays a larger role in explaining execution-oriented tasks whereas

relational embeddeness plays a larger role in explaining innovation-oriented performance (Moran, 2005 as cited in Bernardes, 2010).

There are two types of social capital – bonding and bridging – bonding social capital is good for mobilising solidarity, while bridging social capital is good for linkage to external assets and information diffusion (Weisingera & Black, 2006). Social capital underlines the collaborative and collective nature of social existence. It is a result of the shared and mutual trust that individuals develop in their joint collaborations (Styhre, 2008). Coleman (2006) suggests that social capital influences the creation of human capital in subsequent generations.

Social capital affects the innovativeness of a firm as it is tied to flows of communication, information and knowledge that take place across personal and organisational networks (Burt, 1992, 1997, as cited in Casanueva & Gallego, 2010). HR managers and organisations that neglect the social side of individual skills, and don't create synergies between their human and social capital will be unable to maximise performance. They are unlikely to realise the potential of their employees to enhance organisational innovative capabilities, (Subramanian & Youndt, 2005, as cited in Styhre, 2008). Shared values, such as the rules of the game and standards in the network, can also improve innovativeness. A shared vision facilitates freer and more fluid communication and sharing of other non-informational resources, which reduces fears of opportunistic behaviour (Tsai & Ghoshal 1998 as cited in Casanueva & Gallego, 2010).

Cohen (2007) advises HR managers that the essential elements of social capital creation are:

- To provide time and space to meet and work closely together in order to develop mutual understanding and trust;
- To build trust by demonstrating trustworthiness and delegating responsibilities;
- To ensure equality in terms of opportunities and rewards and to foster commitment and cooperation;
- To examine existing social networks to see where valuable relationships can be preserved and strengthened.

Employee Engagement (involvement)

Employee engagement is largely about managing discretionary effort; when employees have choices, they will act in a way that furthers their organisation's interests. An engaged employee is a person who is fully involved in, and enthusiastic about, their work. Du Plessis (2010) agrees that engaged employees feel passion about their work, provide drive and innovation, and feel that their contribution helps in moving the organisation forward.

HR managers and organisations seem to be increasingly recognising the importance of employee engagement with a growing number of large and medium sized organisations now measuring employee engagement. Shell, a global group of energy and petro-

chemicals companies with around 101,000 employees in more than 90 countries and territories, is one such organisation that takes this seriously. Shell encourages employee participation and engagement, and views employees as core to its success (Young & Thyil, 2009).

There is now considerable evidence from many sources that high employee engagement generates higher employee productivity, business unit performance and profit; along with lower shrinkage, accident rates and employee turnover. JRA's research shows 'engaged' employees generate a return on assets 95% higher than their less-engaged workforce counterparts, generate sales per employee 68% higher, and are 29% more likely to stay with their current organisation. Loehr (2005) contends that full employee engagement is a win for everyone.

Executives must be concerned about the level of engagement in the workplace. According to JRA's "Best Places to Work" Survey in 2009:

- Only thirty-five percent of employees are actively engaged in their jobs. These employees work with passion and feel a profound connection to their company. People that are actively engaged help move the organisation forward.
- Fifty-seven percent of employees are not engaged. These employees have essentially "checked out," sleepwalking through their workday and putting time, but not passion, into their work.
- Eight percent of employees are actively disengaged. These employees are busy acting out their unhappiness, undermining what their engaged co-workers are trying to accomplish

Further findings showed that confidence in leadership became more important during the recession, and a fun and enjoyable work environment became less important as a key driver of employee engagement. More intrinsic drivers such as understanding how one contributes to the success of the organisation, and feeling valued also become more important during the recession (JRA, 2010). A total of 245 companies took part in the JRA "Best Places to Work" Survey in 2010, (up from 216 companies in 2009).

The ratio of engaged to disengaged workers is what drives the financial outcomes and impacts profitable growth. Disengaged employees create disengaged customers. The reasons people typically give for being disengaged at work involve negative work conditions, insensitive bosses, divisive office politics, and lack of constructive performance feedback. Removing toxic work conditions simply gets employees into neutral. Moving from neutral to high engagement requires something different. Loehr (2005) stresses that becoming fully engaged at work, is the pathway for igniting talent and skill and for making a real difference. When you are fully engaged, you are less likely to be terminated or laid off and are more attractive in the job market due to your positive energy, dedication, and resiliency.

John Robertson, Managing Director of JRA stresses the importance of employee engagement; whether there is a recession or not, sustainable workplaces are the ones that will survive where people turn up for work because they want to, that go the extra

mile to help you succeed, and are constantly looking for better ways of doing things (JRA, 2008). Strack, *et al*., (2009) contend that employees respond best to the challenges of a recession when leaders are honest, direct and empathetic about the difficulties, yet can still create excitement about the opportunities. A focus on motivation and accountabilities can foster and encourage an environment of innovation that will support the company's goals. Research by JRA (2010) suggests that three leadership styles exhibit the strongest correlation with employee engagement. These styles are:

- achievement oriented (with a strong focus on excellence and high quality work),
- development oriented (with emphasis on coaching, mentoring and training) and
- relationship oriented (with emphasis on team affiliation, relationship building and effective communication).

Employee engagement and employee retention are crucial to business success. HR management should bear responsibility for measuring the elements of engagement and retention. After all, HR management is all about making things happen. A good HR manager is a student of cause and effect; it is not good enough to be aware of what is happening around you; you have to know and understand why it is happening. Then you have to roll up your sleeves, and get in the trenches and do something about it – touch it (develop strategies) according to Kennedy & Daim, (2010).

While budget cuts have been a fact of life in recessionary times, ideas of fun, play and laughter have been recommended as a means to involve and empower employees. The last decade has seen a growing emphasis on the notion of fun at work as a way to increase employee engagement. It has increasingly been recognised that play and laughter can create a sense of involvement, as well as unleash creativity and raise morale and so, management often ignore, tolerate and even actively encourage playful practices (Nel & du Plessis, 2007).

Several situations will interfere with our ability to be engaged. In stressful situations, it is challenging to maintain connectedness and caring, and this compromises our ability to remain engaged. It is impossible to remain fully engaged continuously. The HR manager and the leader (manager) need to guide high performance and recovery times to make sure people can sustain a level of engagement that is fulfilling. Energy comes from knowing that you are significant, that your work is important, and that you can work in an environment that fosters and supports your passions. The HR manager and leader who are engaged and passionate about the work will communicate this to staff who will then feel the contagious level of excitement (Kerfoot, 2007).

Some challenges and opportunities for HR in the recovery stage during and after the recession

The way forward for HR and HRM is as it has been for some time that is smart employment and business decision making. What has changed though, are the focus areas, and the increased complexity of the employees as well as the business environment. With a renewed focus on the importance of sustainable relationships,

audacious decision making and effective communication, businesses should be on the right track. HR has the opportunity to engage employees and get them committed to the organisation so that they can aid business recovery. Another key challenge for HR is to get employees to high levels of social capital and a collaborative approach that will encourage differentiation and aid business recovery.

HR managers and organisations have the opportunity to allow employee input into decisions, share information, and to treat employees with respect that will definitely enhance commitment. These organisations strengthen shared perceptions of congruence between employee and organisational values, integrate employees into the life of the organisation, and increase employees' identification with the organisation (Arthur 1994; Long 1980; Meyer & Herscovitch 2001 as cited in Wright & Kehoe, 2008). Empowering HR practices involve teamwork and social interactions and this creates a sense of community, strengthens the forces of social cohesion among group members and in turn, the commitment to the organisation (Morrison 2001; Osterman 1995 as cited in Wright & Kehoe, 2008).

In organisations with high levels of social capital, the co-workers interrelate; paying attention to others' needs and are willing to share their insights and know-how with one another. In this way knowledge is collectively mobilised and used in everyday practice. Yet, relying exclusively on social capital is risky because it takes time and effort to maintain social relations (Bresnen, Edelman, Newell, Scarborough & Swan, 2005 as cited in Bernardes, 2010). In addition, social capital may be eroded if new competencies are not brought into the system and this is a major challenge for HR in the future (Maurer & Ebers, 2007 as cited in Styhre, 2008).

CONCLUSIONS

This has definitely been a time of business as unusual, and we are looking for more than ordinary actions to get us through such challenging times. There is increasing pressure to deliver more in the same time frames, to do more with fewer resources, to generate more return on investment, to sift through increasing volumes of data and information. Driving performance has become the key focus for many. It also seems likely that competition for talent will continue to increase in the face of changing demographics such as an aging workforce.

During uncertainty such as the recession, organisations try to get their costs under control rapidly and many organisations today are still making tough decisions about how to allocate their time and money. There is no shortage of pressing needs – capital construction, technology upgrades, and facility expansion, yet fewer resources are available to address those needs. Faced with a harsh economy and the need to conserve cash, many companies slashed severely or even eliminated their leadership training programmes in the past couple of years. Plenty of other companies have no real programme for identifying and developing talent. But growing evidence shows these companies are putting themselves at a competitive disadvantage as leadership development and talent retention have been linked to business recovery. In addition, confidence in leadership as well as an organisation's commitment to training and development, have been linked to higher levels of employee engagement.

Expectations of our leaders have changed due to a series of events, such as corporate scandals, which have left us less accepting of blindly following leaders. In the changing environment, leadership learning seems to be most effective when it occurs in the context of specific organisation situations and specific organisation demands. Exposing managers to senior leaders has also been highlighted as necessary for effective leadership development. Leadership succession and development have been highlighted as a priority for most organisations, yet many organisations are failing to move beyond good intentions and translate into action. This is having an impact on employee engagement in some organisations.

Employee engagement has a lot of similarities to organisational commitment, but unlike organisational commitment, levels of engagement seem to fluctuate more often within the employee due to a range of factors in relation to organisational culture, shared vision and values, a focus on performance and development. The literature seems clear, that both organisational commitment and employee engagement are highly correlated to business performance. A focus on these areas would be a key investment for organisations wanting to take advantage of the business recovery.

Sustainable competitive advantage will be gained from effectively leveraging social capital as our global economy continues to become more complex and more collaborative. As human capital is restricted to the individual, the knowledge creation capacity of social capital is of greater importance in ensuring a sustainable competitive advantage for the organisation. There needs to be a commitment from HR to develop both human capital and social capital, and this will lead to greater synergy across the business, and more sustainable outcomes.

As the environment has become more uncertain, engaged employees want more than to know the organisation will survive. They want to know how the organisation will best respond to challenges and capitalise on opportunities. Those organisations that have been in sheer survival mode, will have a tougher time restoring the trust than those organisations that from the outset have communicated their strategic direction.

The leaders in times of adversity certainly need to lead from the front. Relationship building is important, and it is also important for leaders not to project their own doubts and discomfort onto their employees. Considerable personal strength is required to get through, and the notion that we now require audacious leaders to take advantage of opportunities does seem apt. HR practitioners cannot wait any longer to prepare (crouch), to develop (touch) and to be patient (to pause) but they should engage employees and implement strategies in their organisations to develop leaders' capabilities, to retain talented employees and to add value in their organisations by helping to recover from the recession.

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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS REGARDING THE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN ROMANIA

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Abstract: *The aim of this article is to provide structured information on the level of development and spatial distribution of collective organizations in Romania. Collective organizations are analyzed based on social economy theory. Building on the empirical research, the article identifies and highlights some regional disparities in the development of social economy entities. The comparative analysis regarding the level of development and spatial distribution of collective organisations in Romania draws on the secondary fiscal data analysis. The analysis of the regional profiles of Romanian social economy entities reveals that their socioeconomic power is bigger in the developed regions of the country.*

Keywords: *Collective organizations, social economy, cooperatives, mutual aid associations, non-profit organizations*

Collective organisations are characterised by members who share and work towards a common goal/interest, jointly owned assets and participative decision-making. Non-profit organisations (including commons, agricultural associations, mutual aid associations) and cooperatives also fall in the category of collective organisations. This paper tackles collective organisations based on the social economy theory which focuses on the organisations set up by a group of individuals through a participatory process to pursue business activities for the good of citizens, not for profit. The scope of social economy covers collective organisations which aim for both social and economic goals.

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Social economy is a key public policy area in which active social inclusion measures have been formulated in Romania over the past years. As a welfare provider, social economy makes a connection between service delivery and self-reliance and builds individual and community capacities and social integration for it is not a passive provider, but it makes interventions conditional on the individual's active participation in welfare achievement (Amin, 2009). Nevertheless, social inclusion is just a piece of the greater social economy puzzle that includes non-profit organisations and cooperatives which pursue both economic and social goals, are set up and governed by their members in a participatory manner and don't share profits based on economic criteria. The numerous social economy analyses conducted in Romania (Achimescu et al., 2011; Cace and Stănescu, 2011; Stănescu et al., 2011; Cace et al., 2010; Cotoi and Mateescu, 2013; Lambru, 2013; Lambru (b), 2013; Constantinescu, 2013; Cozarescu, 2012; Ilie, 2013; Neguţ et al., 2011; Nicolaescu, 2013; Nicolaescu and Nicolaescu, 2012; Nicolaescu, Cace and Cace, 2012; Popescu, 2011; Stănilă et al., 2011; Petrescu, 2013; Petrescu (b), 2013; Petrescu (c), 2013; Stanescu, 2011; Stănilă, 2013; Stănilă et al., 2011) have also explored other relevant areas of intervention such as local development, employment, types of social economy entities, or even corporate social responsibility. Social economy is enhanced by the economic, social and institutional contexts in which it operates and state support is crucial for its development. In order to further any line of action, the areas of intervention or the characteristics of various entities need to be explored alongside their spatial distribution and level of development across development regions so as to devise interventions that are adapted to different local needs. Regional disparities related to the development of social economy may indicate the need for "customised" interventions in the eight development regions of Romania. This article seeks to analyse the development of social economy entities in Romania based on their regional distribution. For each of the eight development regions, data has been examined with respect to the number of employees, revenues and the number of entities pertaining to the three major social economy players – cooperatives, mutual aid associations, and non-governmental organisations – for the period 2000-2010. The progress made against these indicators over the said period allows for the design of intervention models adapted to local needs and favourable to the development of these entities.

Collective action and social economy

As action is required to identify a "third path" that responds to the different needs resulted from the failure of the centrally planned (state-controlled) economy and also of the capitalist one, academic and political communities have started to give more thought to social economy. The concept refers to economic activities carried out by organisations to cover social needs, not for profit maximization, and it is considered a marginal component of the economy (Amin, 2009) that can boost the economic potential of various social initiatives (Nicholls, 2006). According to the three economic systems developed by Pearce (2003), social economy fits into the third one which is marked by social and mutual aid goals. This economic system includes social enterprises (cooperatives, mutuals, social businesses, community businesses, and fair trading companies), voluntary organisations, and family businesses. Thus, social economy

comprises a wide range of organisations lying on the borderline with the private sector (cooperatives or social businesses), the charity sector (NGOs with economic activities) or the public one (community businesses).

Social economy provides the framework for the analysis of organisations with features that are specific to an original form of entrepreneurship: the pursuit of both social and economic goals and the prevalence of the former, member participation in the governance process, limited profit-sharing based on participation in activities and not on the capital injected, independence from other public or private institutions (Bidet, 2010, Defouny and Nissens, 2012, Anheier and Salamon, 2006). To these characteristics add cooperation between members as the share capital is crucial for organisational development, and subsidiarity, meaning that decisions are made at the bottom in order to take into account members' needs and interests (Pearce, 2009).

As per their definition, social economy organisations are cooperatives, mutual societies, and associations/foundations (NGOs). Whether these organisations fit into the social economy category is highly debated since the non-profit nature (cooperatives) or democratic governance (foundations) is sometimes missing, but each one of them manages to gain these characteristics to a greater or smaller extent (Bidet, 2010; Pearce, 2009; Borzaga and Spear, 2004).

Non-profit organisations (NGOs) are characterised by institutionalised activities (legal recognition), independence from the government, non-distribution of profit to members or directors, autonomous governance and volunteering (voluntary participation of members in the establishment process, as well as in activity implementation and management) (Anheier and Salamon, 2006; Ishkanian, 2010; Anheier, 2005). These organisations are defined from a legal perspective (institutionalised entities different from informal groups), an economic perspective (non-distribution of profit) and a functional perspective (the functions performed by these organisations). According to the economic theory, the main characteristic of these organisations is the constraint of not distributing the profit/surplus to members, directors, etc. since this may be exclusively used for running the activities (Hansmann, 1980). Also, great importance is attached to the structure of revenues in these organisations, namely from donations and/or service delivery. As for the functions performed by these organisations, they seek to meet the "public interest" for the smooth functioning of society. Thus, the main functions are: democracy facilitation through civic and political involvement, provision of different services (education, healthcare, social services, culture, sports), expression of values and beliefs, and social entrepreneurship (the innovative means to actively respond to various social needs) (Frumkin, 2002). The non-profit category includes associations and foundations. In Romania, associations as a legal form of incorporation also comprise commons and employees' and pensioners' mutual aid associations.

Cooperatives are voluntarily set up to meet the economic interests of their members and are marked by democratic member control based on the "one person-one vote" principle, limited profit-sharing and risk distribution among the members who are also "the owners" (Anheier, 2005, Altman, 2010, Hansmann, 2014, Petrescu, 2013). These organisations are collectively owned by their members who may be workers (worker

cooperatives), customers (consumer cooperatives, credit cooperatives, housing cooperatives), or producers (agricultural cooperatives or producer cooperatives). The most widespread forms of cooperatives in Romania are worker cooperatives, followed by consumer, credit and agricultural cooperatives.

Mutuals are voluntarily established organisations intended to cover collective insurance-based economic interests (Anheier, 2005, Archambault, 2010, Lambru, 2013). Hence, sickness, death, or financial exclusion risks are shared by the members through their contribution to a joint fund. Mutuals are classified into mutual insurance companies (life and property insurance) and mutual benefit societies (protecting their members from social risks – financial exclusion, sickness, etc.) (Archambault, 2010, Lambru, 2013). The mutuals operating in Romania are employees' and pensioners' mutual aid associations, which fall in the category of mutual benefit societies.

All social economy organisations are voluntarily set up to cover the collective interests of their members. Members are the "joint owners" of these organisations which help them meet their different needs and trust is one of the core values they share (Anheier, 2005, Hansmann, 1980, Ostrom and Ahn, 2009).

Methodology

The comparative analysis regarding the level of development and spatial distribution of collective organisations in Romania draws on the secondary fiscal data analysis. Exploratory research was conducted on Romanian social economy entities to set the profile and dynamics of these types of organisations – non-profit organisations, cooperatives, and mutual aid associations. To this end, these entities were subject to a secondary analysis of relevant fiscal data using the REGIS database of the National Institute of Statistics (NIS). REGIS is the NIS database which comprises fiscal information about all types of organisations in Romania and includes indicators related to revenues (types of revenues), expenditure (types of expenditure), employees, and geographical distribution. Data analysis covered the years 2000, 2005, 2009 and 2010 and examined the evolution of these entities in each development region. Data is presented cumulatively for each of the three types of entities – cooperatives, mutual aid associations, and non-governmental organisations – while also looking at their sub-types (worker cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, employees' mutual aid associations, and pensioners' mutual aid associations).

Social economy entities in Romania – evolution and dynamics, 2000-2010

Drawing a complete picture of social economy in Romania requires looking at the developments and dynamics of this field, first at national level and then at regional level. The analysis of relevant developments and dynamics took into account indicators like the number of entities, revenues, and employees. Revenues and profit/surplus are significant indicators for the economic dimension of an organisation, whereas the number of employees is a major indicator for the social dimension.

The analysis of the balance sheet data corresponding to the activities carried out in 2010 by Romanian social economy entities points to a number of 29,226 entities, with non-governmental organisations holding the biggest share (26,332) (these also include agricultural associations and commons), followed by cooperatives (2,017), and mutual aid associations (887). These entities count 116,379 employees, with more than half working for non-governmental organisations (Table 1). From a social economy perspective, NGOs engaged in economic activities are extremely important since they pursue economic goals alongside social ones and they account for approximately 10% of all NGOs in Romania. The analysis of the other economic indicators for NGOs with economic activities shows that they employ 38% of NGO staff in Romania, they earn 39% of total NGO revenues and 31% of NGO surplus.

Table 1. Social economy actors in Romania – number, profit/surplus, revenues, employees in 2010

2010	No of active organisations	Assets (EUR)	Revenues (EUR)	Profit/surplus (EUR)	Employees
NGOs	26,322	1,288,910,314	1,261,105,288	186,877,976	60,947
NGOs with economic activities	2,730	605,167,631	493,998,528	58,388,661	22,860
Mutual aid associations	887	285,205,941	33,376,955	6,927,047	17,268
Employees' mutual aid associations	684	135,391,923	15,249,338	3,755,874	15,962
Pensioners' mutual aid associations	203	149,814,018	18,127,616	3,171,173	1,306
Cooperatives	2,017	216,668,249	360,152,899	9,559,347	38,164
Worker cooperatives	857	131,583,002	166,660,447	6,553,880	25,109
Consumer cooperatives	958	44,267,516	125,564,271	1,346,501	7,485
Credit cooperatives	75	25,716,271	41,137,487	1,261,032	2,003
Agricultural cooperatives	127	15,101,460	26,790,693	397,934	3,567
Total	29,226	1,790,784,504	1,654,635,142	203,364,370	116,379

Source: NIS, REGIS database, 2012

Looking at the 2010 total number of employees in Romania, social economy entities employed 2.54% of the salaried workforce nationwide, a significant share if we think of the very few measures taken by public authorities to support this sector. The average number of employees in these entities varies from 29 employees in worker cooperatives to 2.3 employees in NGOs. Given the average number of employees, which indicates

that these entities conduct small- to medium-scale activities, we can say that earned revenues are significant especially that in 2010, a year of economic crisis, over 55% of cooperatives, more than 60% of mutual aid associations and over 46% of NGOs reported profit at year-end. This also demonstrates that these entities hold a great capacity to adapt to economic crisis challenges.

The past ten years' dynamics show a huge increase in the number of active non-governmental organisations and mutual aid associations. The number of non-governmental organisations increased from 10,494 entities in 2000 to 26,322 in 2010, and mutual aid associations grew from 380 entities in 2000 to 887 in 2010. Whilst non-governmental organisations showed constant growth, the highest increase in mutual aid associations occurred between 2000 and 2005, namely from 380 to 742 entities. As far as cooperatives are concerned, we could say that their number remained relatively constant in the last ten years. If we were to also analyse changes in the number of employees working with these entities, we would see that it has tripled in non-governmental organisations (from 19,172 in 2000 to 60,947 in 2010), it has increased in mutual aid associations (from 12,320 in 2000 to 17,268 in 2010), and it has dramatically dropped to almost one third in cooperatives.

Data analysis for each type of entity reveals fewer profit-making cooperatives in 2010 compared with 2000, with a constant fall in the past years among worker and consumer cooperatives especially due to business contraction; worker and consumer cooperatives reported a dramatic reduction in the number of employees once again due to business contraction, whilst the drop in the number of credit cooperatives is a result of their association as an effect of BNR (The National Bank of Romania) rules on capital increase. As for employees' mutual aid associations (EMAAs), they have witnessed staff growth despite a reduction in the number of surplus-making EMAAs; pensioners' mutual aid associations (PMAAs) saw their staff headcount fall between 2005 and 2010 as fewer PMAAs made surplus earnings. As for NGOs, agricultural associations have made outstanding progress in the last 10 years as regards both their number and their staff headcount, an increase which is also due to public policies on farming and rural development which foster association; the same increase in the number of entities and employees is also found in commons (which are also NGOs) due to the restitution of property rights to former owners under Law 1/2000.

Regional profiles of social economy entities in Romania

The analysis presented in this article has started from the brief overview of Romania's regional profile in order to see how regional development influences the socioeconomic power of social economy entities. Romania is comprised of eight historical regions, each of them including counties with different levels of socioeconomic development as intraregional disparities are deeper than interregional ones. The analysis first presents indicators like poverty rate, GDP per capita and unemployment rate (Table 2), which show that the most developed regions are Bucharest-Ilfov, the North-West, the West, and the Centre. Social economy entities are unevenly distributed across these regions, with a more significant NGO presence in the developed regions of Romania, whereas cooperatives and mutuals are found in greater numbers in the poorer regions of the

country (North-East and South-East). Although the largest number of cooperatives has been identified in the North-East region (432 entities in 2010), their staff headcount and economic power are rather small, with an average of 10 employees/entity and average revenues of EUR 110,000/entity (Prometheus project data). As for mutuals, most of them operate in the South-East region, where the average staff headcount is one of the lowest (10.8 employees in 2010) and average revenues amount to EUR 26,000/entity. Those with the highest number of employees and greater economic power as reflected by total revenues earned in 2010 are located in two of the developed regions, namely Bucharest-Ilfov and the North-West. The greatest number of NGOs is found in the North-West, the Centre and Bucharest-Ilfov. The average number of NGO employees is 2.3/entity.

Table 2. Regional context of Romania, 2010

Region	Poverty rate (%)	GDP (million EUR)	GDP/ capita (EUR)	Unemploy-ment rate (%)	NGOs	Coope-ratives	Mutuals
North-West	14.6	13324.16	4904.99	5.9	4980	284	119
Centre	19.4	13285.42	5264.79	8	4875	271	89
North-East	29.5	12509.89	3374.11	7.8	2977	432	132
South-East	26.3	12660.56	4511.64	8.1	2046	267	150
South Muntenia	22.2	14857.26	4559.15	8.8	2396	207	121
Bucharest-Ilfov	3.1	29568.36	13064.49	2.4	4362	81	109
South-West Oltenia	30.7	9424.99	4210.13	9.2	2023	150	95
West	17.6	11906.36	6211.24	5.9	2663	198	72

Source: NIS, Territorial Statistics, 2013; NIS, REGIS database, 2012

Cooperatives

The regional distribution analysis conducted on Romanian cooperatives reveals that the greatest number of cooperatives is found in the North-East region (432 organisations) and the smallest in Bucharest-Ilfov (81 organisations). Between 2000 and 2010, the number of organisations fluctuated across the regions, with a small increase in the North-East, the North-West and the West, whereas the other regions reported a slight reduction in the number of organisations due to closedown or merger. Looking at the average number of employees per entity, we see that Bucharest-Ilfov with an average of 47.9 employees is followed by the North-West with 22.5 employees and South Muntenia with 21 employees. The smallest number of employees is found in the North-East, with an average of 10.8 employees/cooperative. All the regions of the country reported a drastic reduction (by almost 70%) in the average number of employees between 2000 and 2010 (Table 3).

The analysis of average revenues per entity indicates that the highest revenues are earned in Bucharest-Ilfov, followed by the North-West and the West, whilst the North-East has the lowest average revenues per entity. Although they have increased since

2000, between 2005 and 2010 the average revenues earned by Romanian cooperatives stayed relatively constant, with a slight decrease in 2010 versus 2009. Given all these, we can say that the most developed cooperatives in terms of workforce and earned revenues are located in Bucharest-Ilfov, followed by the North-West (Table 3).

Table 3. Regional dynamics of Romanian cooperatives, 2000-2010

Region		Cooperatives				
		2000	**2005**	**2007**	**2009**	**2010**
North-West	Number	260	291	285	273	284
	No of employees/entity	79.2	44.0	31.4	23.1	22.5
	Average revenues/entity	916795.4	1074276.7	1122346.9	1077820.9	1042460.1
Centre	Number	291	270	252	246	271
	No of employees/entity	57.6	34.5	22.5	54.2	15.4
	Average revenues/entity	560141.1	821927.5	773818.8	851876.1	750137.1
North-East	Number	347	349	380	381	432
	No of employees/entity	29.8	20.5	14.9	11.8	10.8
	Average revenues/entity	420777.4	529526.6	528655.1	514643.9	491665.6
South-East	Number	270	259	250	246	267
	No of employees/entity	38.3	27.5	21.5	17.8	15.9
	Average revenues/entity	893494.7	588968.8	699707.5	724180.3	672834.0
South Muntenia	Number	263	228	218	196	207
	No of employees/entity	42.1	31.6	25.8	21.7	21.0
	Average revenues/entity	441772.5	683781.6	789285.1	838309.3	808580.3
Bucharest-Ilfov	Number	90	88	87	80	81
	No of employees/entity	101.0	65.1	54.9	50.2	47.9
	Average revenues/entity	892804.0	1502398.2	1867159.4	2307764.7	2006179.3
South-West Oltenia	Number	171	166	157	145	150
	No of employees/entity	48.1	32.8	25.9	19.5	19.8
	Average revenues/entity	389727.0	654418.3	749254.5	719436.3	762843.0
West	Number	173	193	190	180	198
	No of employees/entity	39.3	28.2	23.3	20.8	19.7
	Average revenues/entity	850164.9	760953.8	904108.2	852016.4	830187.3

Source: NIS, REGIS database, 2012

Looking at the three types of cooperatives separately – worker, consumer and credit cooperatives – we note that the greatest number of worker cooperatives is found in the North-East (243 entities), but the most economically potent (average revenues) and socially strong (average number of employees) are those from Bucharest-Ilfov, the West, the North-West and South Muntenia; the greatest number of consumer cooperatives is also found in the North-East (176 entities), followed by the Centre (169 entities) and the North-West (159 entities), but the economically and socially strongest ones are in the North-West (11.5 employees/entity); as for credit cooperatives, the economically strongest ones are those from Bucharest-Ilfov, followed by the ones located in the Centre.

Mutual aid associations

The 2000-2010 evolution of mutual aid associations indicates an increase in the number of both employees' and pensioners' associations across all regions. The greatest number of mutual aid associations is reported in the South-East (150 entities), North-East (132 entities) and South Muntenia (121 entities). Economically speaking (average revenues per entity), the most developed mutual aid associations are found in Bucharest-Ilfov, the West, the North-West and South-West Oltenia, whereas the greatest number of employees is identified in Bucharest-Ilfov (an average of 35.7 employees/entity), South Muntenia (an average of 20.6 employees/entity) and the North-West (an average of 20.6 employees/entity). (Table 4)

Employees' mutual aid associations report the highest increase in the number of entities, with a growth of up to 500% in the period 2000-2005. After 2005, the increase in the number of entities slowed down and 2010 witnessed a reduction in their number in the Centre, the South-West and Bucharest-Ilfov. Pensioners' mutual aid associations reported a constant growth in the number of entities between 2000 and 2010 in all the regions of the country. As for the employees of these organisations, their number grew in the period 2000-2005 and later dropped until 2010 in most of the country's regions, except for the North-East and the West. The number of employees decreased in the both types of mutual aid associations active in Romania. This drop in the number of employees while the number of entities continued to grow may suggest both a contraction of the activities conducted by these organisations and a consequence of the high-performing new information technologies that were introduced, which simplified activity performance and made some employees redundant. With respect to the average revenues registered by mutual aid associations, we see a huge increase between 2000 and 2009, followed by a fall in 2010 in most regions, except for the North-West, Bucharest-Ilfov and the South-West. (Table 4)

Table 4. Regional dynamics of Romanian mutual aid associations, 2000-2010

Region		Mutual aid associations				
		2000	**2005**	**2007**	**2009**	**2010**
North-West	Number	55	80	102	111	119
	No of employees/entity	14.8	12.9	34.2	21.0	20.6
	Average revenues/entity	46200.3	116710.8	124960.9	192359.3	226372.7
Centre	Number	42	79	90	96	89
	No of employees/entity	5.6	43.2	34.4	20.1	15.5
	Average revenues/entity	33084.4	137577.0	180473.3	234048.5	73017.2
North-East	Number	61	105	116	125	132
	No of employees/entity	4.4	10.2	13.2	17.3	25.8
	Average revenues/entity	37328.6	229506.0	281267.2	359045.4	156754.6
South-East	Number	58	137	130	144	150
	No of employees/entity	3.2	20.2	15.9	12.2	10.8
	Average revenues/entity	38485.6	90315.6	111775.9	255519.3	118323.3
South Muntenia	Number	60	81	108	120	121
	No of employees/entity	17.5	6.8	22.1	19.6	20.6

Region		Mutual aid associations				
		2000	2005	2007	2009	2010
	Average revenues/entity	46699.6	162593.0	186433.2	279518.7	106873.4
Bucharest-Ilfov	Number	15	115	131	122	109
	No of employees/entity	0.9	60.9	48.7	48.6	35.7
	Average revenues/entity	26971.7	219245.2	239598.2	211592.9	255392.4
South-West Oltenia	Number	55	85	105	106	95
	No of employees/entity	3.5	29.7	17.3	6.8	6.1
	Average revenues/entity	27801.1	114070.0	133350.7	207465.8	217583.4
West	Number	34	60	61	72	72
	No of employees/entity	2.5	12.2	14.2	14.5	20.1
	Average revenues/entity	77144.8	247123.0	289219.6	334424.8	234436.4

Source: NIS, REGIS database, 2012

Non-profit organisations

As regards NGOs, the period 2000-2010 witnessed a spectacular growth in their number across the country, even by 400% (South-East region) or 800% (Bucharest-Ilfov). The largest number of NGOs is found in the North-West (4,980), the Centre (4,875) and Bucharest-Ilfov (4,362), and the smallest in the South-East (2,046) and the South-West (2,023). The average number of employees per organisation grew in the period 2000-2007 in most regions of the country, except for Bucharest-Ilfov, later followed by a slight drop. Even with a falling average number of employees per organisation, the increase in the number of NGOs has led to a rise in the total staff headcount in these entities in each region of the country. As far as economic power is concerned, we note that average revenues per entity grew across all regions between 2000 and 2010, with the exception of Bucharest-Ilfov and the South-East where it reported a slight drop in 2010 versus 2009. The regions with the biggest 2010 average revenues per organisation are Bucharest-Ilfov and South Muntenia. (Table 5)

Table 5. Regional dynamics of Romanian NGOs, 2000 – 2010

Region		NGOs				
		2000	2005	2007	2009	2010
North-West	Number	3167	3487	3780	4324	4980
	No of employees/entity	1.2	1.9	2.2	1.8	1.8
	Average revenues/entity	27371.7	94312.5	120607.8	128547.7	186254.1
Centre	Number	2013	3288	3640	4637	4875
	No of employees/entity	1.5	2.5	2.3	1.8	1.9
	Average revenues/entity	39139.0	91835.8	106533.0	120059.9	171474.4
North-East	Number	1476	1430	1975	2422	2977
	No of employees/entity	0.8	2.9	2.8	2.3	2.3

Region		NGOs				
		2000	2005	2007	2009	2010
	Average revenues/entity	31784.4	106452.5	152896.4	149245.4	164724.9
South-East	Number	531	994	1322	1717	2046
	No of employees/entity	3.3	3.7	3.3	2.6	2.9
	Average revenues/entity	61682.6	103869.8	177121.8	217924.2	206616.2
South Muntenia	Number	1024	1323	1644	2039	2396
	No of employees/entity	1.8	2.2	2.4	1.9	2.2
	Average revenues/entity	47434.8	67728.8	95353.1	126474.6	241841.0
Bucharest-Ilfov	Number	524	3178	3692	3387	4362
	No of employees/entity	7.7	4.3	3.6	2.9	3.2
	Average revenues/entity	138047.6	701752.6	317736.7	355368.7	347263.0
South-West Oltenia	Number	839	1314	1484	1757	2023
	No of employees/entity	0.9	2.5	2.0	2.1	1.9
	Average revenues/entity	16136.8	64769.3	93878.1	113265.1	170531.8
West	Number	922	1521	1816	2309	2663
	No of employees/entity	3.1	3.6	3.0	2.2	2.5
	Average revenues/entity	50687.0	126944.6	119227.2	119464.3	210035.3

Source: NIS, REGIS database, 2012

Conclusions

Social economy is considered the "economy of the poor" because its public discourse focuses on the social inclusion of vulnerable groups, but the analysis of the regional profiles of Romanian social economy entities reveals that their socioeconomic power is bigger in the developed regions of the country. Social economy entities show regional disparities – the most developed cooperatives, mutual aid associations and NGOs operate in Bucharest-Ilfov, the North-West and the West, whereas the North-East features a larger number of entities which are however less economically and socially potent.

Romania's developed regions have fewer social economy entities, but their socio-economic power is bigger, which gives them a competitive edge and greater sustainability. In these regions, cooperatives have chosen to merge their activities and create economically stronger structures able to compete with small- and medium-sized enterprises on the economic market. Also, mutual aid associations have chosen to join forces and create stronger structures in terms of membership, which helps them gain more economic power and deliver more financial and socio-medical services.

As regards the number of employees, the most developed social economy entities are found in Bucharest-Ilfov and the North-West – cooperatives in Bucharest-Ilfov, the

North-West and South Muntenia, mutual aid associations in Bucharest-Ilfov, South Muntenia and the North-West, and NGOs in Bucharest-Ilfov, the West and the South-East.

The analysis of the data on earned revenues indicates the presence of the economically strongest social economy entities in Bucharest-Ilfov, the North-West and the West – cooperatives in Bucharest-Ilfov, the North-West and the West, mutual aid associations in Bucharest-Ilfov, the West, the North-West and South-West Muntenia, and NGOs in Bucharest-Ilfov, South Muntenia and the West.

Given these major regional disparities in the development of various social economy entities from Romania, the types of interventions in this area should be reconsidered (subsidies, tax incentives, grants, etc.). Supportive interventions need to be adapted to the socioeconomic development of these entities.

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DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT. CASE STUDY: VALEA JIULUI

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Abstract: *The paper is based on the preliminary results of the research project "Deindustrialization and under-development in the Romanian Transition. Individual/Collective Strategies and Reply Policies. Case study: Valea Jiului", that will be done within the POSDRU project "Plural and interdisciplinary in doctoral and post-doctoral programs".*

This paper intends to analyze the complex relation between economic development, social development and modernization. The basic hypothesis of the proposed analysis is that the economic development is not an irreversible process not even when it leads to social development as part of a modernizing program. Valea Jiului represents an example of how the economic and social development built on weak basis, become unsustainable. The collapse of this weak basis initiated after 1989 when the economy and the society changed and after a transition period produced a major negative social impact started with the restructuring of the mining. In less than 10 months, the number of the miners was reduced to half and the reduction continued. Today in Valea Jiului is only 15 % of the number of employees in 1989. The social effects of the mining restructuring were at communitarian level the underdevelopment, return to pre-modern occupations like the subsistence agriculture. A good example that will be deeply analyzed in this paper is the town Aninoasa, the first Romanian town in insolvency since 2013.

Keywords*: deindustrialization, social development, social change, the modernization theories, underdevelopment*

1. Introduction

The modernization theories suggest *the development paradigm as modernization* according to an evolutionist scheme. The social development, defined from such evolutionist perspective represents a process connected to another process – the modernizing one.

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The two socio-economic processes imply an evolution of the social system placed in an undesirable stage that might be improved in order to become desirable. Hence, the two process are irreversible- is interesting to notice that for the two terms *development*, respectively, *modernization* there are no antonymic formulations.

The analysis I suggest refers on one side to the social development and modernization relation and on the other side to the circumstances when the effects of the two processes may become reversible.

Romania experiments for the past two and a half decades a process of social changing with effects within the entire economy and society. One of the basic desiderates of the post-communist transition was the passage from the centralized economy to the market economy. This change of paradigm had a strong impact on an economic system designed to function according to a different economic and social logic. During the first years after 1989 existed a certain inertia and a certain precaution manifested by the authorities in undertaking concrete measures in this respect and this leaded to the aggravation of the economic problems generated by the inadequate structure and functioning of the state economy within the new socio-economic context.

Beside the economic pressure generated by the inefficiency of these economic objectives registering great loses, the option to totally restructure the economy was influenced by the adoption of the new-liberal ideology promoted by the "external agents of the development" (MIF, World Bank) correlated with the new paradigm sustained by the "political elites of changing" whose influenced increased in the second half of the '90s as an antagonism to the inertia manifested at that time.

I do not debate here the correctitude of this option based mainly on a more or less accurate evaluation of the situation and the economic evolution in the first post-communist years. The lack of vision and strategically orientation and not the change itself is responsible for the negative impact on the social development that will be analyzed.

The analysis I suggest starts from a case illustrating a model of failure of the social policy of reducing the shock of the economic impact of the transition – the restructuring of the mining in Valea Jiului.

2. Theoretical and methodological frame. Data sources

The social development paradigm was developed from two types of approaching the underdevelopment based on the relative importance of the endogen and exogenous factors as determinants of the underdevelopment. These are based on two competitive theories: *the modernization theories* and, respectively, *the dependence theories.*

The modernization theories suggest *the paradigm of development as modernization* according to an evolutionist scheme. According to this scheme the societies progress from the traditional to the modern stage, that represents the phase of their maturity. While the traditional societies, mainly agrarian, are characterized by a low efficiency of the agrarian activity, technical progress and industrialization and created what Rostow calls

the preconditions of the growth. The process of industrialization is considered one of the basic conditions of the appearance of the capitalist system(Cace, 2004: 28)

The sociological perspective on modernization introduces as determinants factors of modernization the social and cultural factors together with the economic ones. Beyond the different perspectives on the modernization factors and their manner of action, "the modernization theories lead to a common conclusion: underdevelopment is the common characteristic of the societies placed in an incipient or intermediary point on the road to modernity, in contrast with the developed societies that reached this point" (Preotesi, in Zamfir, Stănescu, coord., 2007: 565).

The dependence theories developed by Frank, Cardosso or Wallerstein emphasize the role of the extern factors as determinants of the underdevelopment marking the unbalanced and inequitable power relations that sustain the difference between the developed and underdeveloped countries.

The paradigm of social development has a certain specificity – the theoretic approach is subordinated to a strong practical orientation; it takes steps in a planed social change. The so called post-communist transition represented the context for **the social change**.

In the sociological literature dedicated to transition authors like (1994,1999), Cătălin Zamfir (1994, 2007), Vladimir Pasti (Pasti, 1995, 2011), Lazăr Vlăsceanu (2001, 2007), Catherine Verdery (1996/ 2003), present explanatory models for the social processes and mechanisms that characterize the post-communist period in Romania. The differences of approach in the transition analysis refer to the focus either on the changing/social development processes or on the analysis of the impact on the population, or on the analysis of the mechanisms and factors involved. One of the directions of analysis well represented in the sociological literature dedicated to transition is that focused on the so called *external agents of development*. Within this category are organizations like the World Bank, Monetary International Fond, European Commission; these analysis approach both the ideology of the social development promoted by these organizations and the impact of their programs.

As regards the development strategy promoted by the World Bank and MIF for the European countries in transition – this was based on reducing the role of the state in the effort of eliminating of underdevelopment and reducing the differences comparing to the developed countries and increasing the role of other actors of development like the local communities and the NGOs.

The failure of some organizations like the World Bank in implementing some development programs leaded to a rethinking of the importance of the social capital as precondition of the successful implementation of the economic development programs (Preotesi, in Zamfir, Stănescu, coord., 2007: 565-566).

The newer approaches of the underdevelopment offer an increased importance both to the social capital and the human capital, on one side as indicators and on the other side as predictors of social development.

In the analysis model proposed by Dumitru Sandu, the human capital is operationally define on three dimensions:

- the education stock on community level;
- the number of employees on local level;
- the percentage of population occupied in agriculture (this is correlate negative with the degree of social development within the Romanian context where the main form is the subsistence agriculture).

Even if this analysis is referring to the rural communities, and my analysis is referring to an urban space, the mono-industrial area Valea Jiului, the post communist evolution of this zone balances the report among different aspects of the rural and urban.

Such an ilustrative exemple regards the local budget of some small towns like Aninoasa, which have under 3 million lei while most of the counties have an average budget of the rural localities of 3-4 million lei (21 counties, according to Mihalache,2013: 135).

On the other hand, the topic of the social development of the towns is approached in the specialty literature from different perspectives – the economic perspective, the urban sociology perspective, the anthropologic perspective or the urban geography perspective.

The case of the mono-industrial towns is interesting for this project; the area of Valea Jiului is an area with a constant presence of the mono-industrial towns since the first half of the last century. (Dumitrescu, 2008). The accelerate restructuring of the mining in the second half of 1997 represented, due to its socioeconomic effects, a field of interest reflected in an well represented scientific literature. Reference papers elaborated from an economic perspective, like that of Mircea Coşea (Coşea, 2000), or from sociologic perspective, like that of Dâncu, Rotariu, ş.a., 2000, are added to the constant preoccupation of the research teams from the University of Petroşani and the Social Institute of Valea Jiului (Krausz, 1999, Stegar, 2007, 2014). All these represent basic sources in the research I made for this project.

A deep analysis of the impact of the socioeconomic changes associated to the post-communist restructuring of the mining, made from a mainly anthropologic perspective, is one of the research directions for the Valea Jiului mining, (Kidekel, 2010).

Will be presented preliminary results of the secondary analysis of data based on reference papers, like those mentioned above, on outcomes of some researches made in Valea Jiului on representative samples or even on the entire statistic population of restructured, or soon to be restructured miners, or employees in the still functional mines.

The results of this secondary analysis of data will represent the basic premises that will shape the evolution of this research project.

3. From unsustainable development to underdevelopment .The mono-industrial areas

The concepts of mono-specialized town and that defining the particular case of "mono-industrial towns" are elaborated from the perspective of functional classification of the towns, as a tool used for defining the socio-economic profile of a town or a net of

towns-Valea Jiului is representing such an example of net of towns that create (except for Petroşani) a zone with mono-industrial characteristics.

From the functional perspective the towns (according to Dumitrescu, 2008), can be contained in the categories:

- industrial towns (over 50% of the occupied population is in industry and constructions);
- agrarian towns (over 50% of the occupied population is in agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing);
- services towns (over 50% of the occupied population is in third sector);
- mixed towns (none of the economic sectors has 50% of the occupied population).

In Romania, according to quoted authors, the general criterion for a town to be industrial is to have over 50% of occupied population in the second sector.

The mono industrial towns are those where the economy is based mainly on a single industrial branch; the inclusion within this category is based on the so called index of mono-specialization.

Resuming our study-it is interesting to notice that- 4 years after the massive re-structuring of the mining in Valea Jiului the extent of extractive industry exceeded half of the occupied population in Lupeni, Aninoasa, Uricani and Petrila, with a value close to 50% in Vulcan also.

The towns in Valea Jiului continue to have even after the massive dismissals in mining sector a mono-industrial character (except for Petrosani, which has a more diverse economic base).

The number of the employees in the mining sector is only a fifth of its 1990' value and this is representative and illustrative as regards the economic (under) development of the area where no viable economic alternatives were developed. This is a negative premise for the dismissals that will start next year as a result of closing the mines Petrila, Paroşeni and Uricani.

4. The zone context. Mining towns in Valea Jiului: small towns, without development possibilities, with low qualified labor force

The negative effects of the massive restructuring of the mining initiated in the second half of the 90' were amplified by the existence of some characteristics of Valea Jiului, which define the socio-economic context of the zone.

On one side, the mining towns in Valea Jiului are small towns (the smallest of the mining towns built in the communist space, according to World Bank, 2003), deprived not only of economic alternatives, but also of economic potential (including consumption).

On the other side, the labor force, concentrated on mining was mainly poor educated and low qualified, with low chances and limited possibilities of professional re-conversion.

Being a category of relative highly paid employees the miners waiting to be dismissed had unrealistic expectations considering the wage offer available for them. According to data provided by a research made during the period of dismissals in 1997-1998, over 50% of the dismissed said that they would not accept a salary under that medium on economy and only 10% would accept a salary between 1-1,5 of minimum wage (Stegar, 2001).

Another specific element in this mining area refers to the structure and division of the roles in the miners families, which are traditionally constructed and the family provider status of the husband was consolidated by the relative high salary.

Considering that the miners families were rather numerous (according to a traditional reproductive model applicable mainly to the families that came from Moldavia after 1977 – Kidekel, 2010) and the women were reduced to the status of wives and mothers, when the dismissal started the percentage of house wives without any professional training or experience was very high.

The fact that the husband could no longer provide for the family had a traumatizing impact on the family and the changing of roles between spouses was very hard accepted.

The precarious job offer was addressing mainly women and consisted mainly in jobs on "black" and paid with the minimum wage, with no security and open to employers' abuses.

According to Kidekel (Kidekel, 2010) for the recent dismissed miners such kind of jobs were considered unacceptable, but after they spent their compensatory salaries they had to accept these jobs, mainly the wives of the former miners. This change of roles in the family was difficult to accept and manage by the miners; the psychological and social effects were obvious in the evolution of some socio-economic indicators like the increase of the alcoholism rate, of the divorce rate and of the suicide rate (Kidekel, 2010).

The effects of the massive dismissals from 1997-1998 were disastrous on economic and social level.

An illustrative image based on a research made in 1999-2002 is elaborated by David Kidekel (Kidekel, 2010). Here are few elements of this image:

- Depreciation of the localities and houses' infrastructure
- Dissolution of the social nets
- Increase of the divorce, suicide and crime rate
- Desperation caused by the perception of the lack of alternatives- the only viable alternative: external migration- a successful alternative until 2009.

Hence, the evolution from a secure and relative highly paid job to unemployment and precarious occupation is reflected from the socio economic reality towards the subjective reality, in people's expectations on psychological, individual, family and community level.

5. Closing of the mine Aninoas in 2006. The multiplication of the effects of the dismissals from 1997-1998

Disregarding the disastrous effects of the massive dismissals from the mining industry at the end of the 90's, the closing of the mine Aninoasa in 2006 was made according to similar pattern, which leaded to similar effects.

Aninoasa town is located in the South of Hunedoara County, in Valea Jiului. It is documentary mentioned since 1453 and became town in 1989 and the mine was closed in 2006.

Even though the town was declared disadvantaged area by the Govern Decision no. 992/29.12.1998, this statute did never really encourage the investments; the only important economic objective was, until its closing, the Mine Aninoasa.

Certain elements of local context functioned as aggravating premises of the effects of the closing of this mine.

Aninoasa has the lowest number of inhabitants of all the towns from Valea Jiului (5423 in 2006) and the highest percentage of employed people (Stegar, 2014).

Hence, the closing of the mine leaded in less then 7 years to the declared collapse of this town, which is now in insolvency.

The insolvency as is defined by the Govern Order of Emergency no 46/2013 regarding the financial crisis and insolvency of the administrative territorial units was caused by several factors among whom are mentioned (in H.G no 804/2014):

a. over indebted of the public institution by contracting a credit for investments of 2.783.992, 98 lei in 2006 and the lack of necessary resources to cover the rates and the interests

b. unsatisfactory degree of covering the debts from own incomes, which in 31st of March, 2013 represented 4,28%;

c. low degree of collecting taxes and imposts;

d. difficult economic situation on zone level considering that the budgetary incomes diminished considerable because many companies in the area entered in insolvency and the chances to obtain the debts were very low and the percentage of these debts represented 66,95% of the total incomes at 31. 03.2013.

e. the debts at 31.03.2013 represented 6.599.872 lei and the degree was of 100,20%

f. decrease of the amount receive from the county council budget for balancing the local budget due to difficult economic situation on national level;

g. high percentage of expenditure for employees of the total budgetary expenditures caused by the high number of employees comparing with the real need of the administrative territorial unit, which in 2010 had 126 employees, in 2011-2012 had 94, respectively 78 and now has 47 employees.

The main contributor to the local budget of Aninoasa was the mine Aninoasa until its closing in 2006.

The closing of the mine in 2006 had numerous negative implications over the budget of the town, like, according to the same H.G.

- significant reduction of the incomes of the local budget, the mine being the main contributor;
- increasing of the unemployment rate;
- decreasing of the degree of collecting of the taxes caused by the decrease of the inhabitants' incomes and also of the amount received from the County Council budget.

On 10.10. 2006 a loan contract was concluded with the Romanian Commercial Bank – Petroşani Branch that offered to Aninoasa a reimbursable investment credit of 3. 000.000 lei for 10 years. Later, on 22.10.2007 was concluded an additional contract that diminished the initial loan to 2.783.992,98 lei.

In this analysis illustrative for the lack of vision and strategically orientation on local level is the destination of the credit. Disregarding the fact that the main employer of the town would be shot down that year, the Mayoralty of Aninoasa loaned money for modernizing the administrative headquarter, repair churches, sport complexes, and consolidate land of Arena Sport Complex, among others.

According to the quoted HG all these investments financed by the contracted credit were to a certain extend finalized, "except for the towns' natural gases net".

Due to the lack of financial resources the credit' monthly rates were not paid on time and its value at the moment of insolvency was of 3.400.080, 79 lei, later after the reimbursement plan it decreased to 2.380.056,55 lei.

The highest level of debt was reached in 2011 – 10,561,927.00 lei. These decreased at the moment of insolvency to 5.488.791, 98 lei and all of these were old debts**.**

6. Instead of conclusions: failed experiences, unlearned lessons?

The failure of the policy of closing the mines without any correlative measures configured by a sustainable local development plan leaded to socio-economic effects like those mentioned above.

The closing of Aninoasa Mine 8 years after the restructuring started in 1997-1998 are made according to a similar pattern both as regards the socio-economic measures and the disastrous effects on socio-economic, individual, family and community level.

Analyzing the correlative social measures of the mining sector restructuring we may observe the prevalence policy of the passive support measures meant rather to calm the social tensions created by the un-popular restructuring of the mining than to offer solutions on long and medium term for this community on declared insolvency.

The purpose of declaring the so called disadvantaged areas was to balance the negative effects of the massive restructuring of the un-profitable state economic objectives; this restructuring was accelerated in the second half of the 90's.

Since 1998 the state offered different facilities for potential investors in these disadvantaged areas. In this category were the areas that fulfilled at least one of the following conditions:

- to be mono-industrial
- to be mining areas where at least 25% of employees were dismissed by collective dismissals;
- areas that by liquidation, restructuring or privatization of some companies collective dismissals were operated and affected over 25% of the inhabitants;
- areas with an unemployment rate 30% over the national rate
- isolated areas, without communications and low developed infrastructure.

The mining towns in Valea Jiului fulfilled at that time all, or at least 5 of these conditions, hence the area gained this statute.

In these disadvantaged areas the companies had different fiscal facilities for new investments, like exemptions from custom taxes and VTA for equipments, return of custom taxes, exemptions from income taxation during the disadvantaged statute.

Even though all these facilities were offered in order to absorb the dismissed labor force and for the economic development of the area, these did not have the expected impact as regards the new jobs nor as regards the economic development of these areas. According to an EFOR report (2011) at the moment of joining EU, when these disadvantaged areas disappeared, only 15.000 new jobs were created at a population of 1 million inhabitants and the unemployment rate continued to be 30% over the national rate.

The causes of the inefficiency of these measures were presented by numerous journalists that wrote about cases when the personal interest of some opportunistic investors that benefit from these "fiscal paradises" without externalizing the expected collective correlative benefits.

Another explanation would be that, in spite of all these fiscal facilities, these areas where not so attractive due exactly to the reasons they were declared disadvantaged and to the socio-educational profile of the labor force.

As I mentioned above, the profile of the labor force dismissed from the mining industry in Valea Jiului was characterized by precarious education and professional training, unrealistic salary expectations in reference to the education level and with the average age favoring un-dynamic behavior, lack of flexibility and adaptability to total different professional situation than those familiar.

Even after "Aninoasa experiment" the decision makers continued to disregard these very important elements of socio-educational context. The policy of closing mines without a viable strategy of development continues. This year the mines Petrila, Paroseni and Uricani will be closed.

The analysis of the comparative data of the local context 2011-2012/1998 (synthesized in Preotesi, 2014-data source: Stegar, 2014) shows that there are premises of a socio-economic disaster in each of these 3 mining localities and in Valea Jiului in general.

The data collected in 2012-2012 (presented and analyzed in Stegar, 2014) on a representative sample of miners in Valea Jiului containing over 60% of the total reference statistic population offer several interesting conclusions compared with the data collected in 1998:

- even thou the average age of the miners is increasing, the percentage of those over 50 years is one extremely low (under 10% on total and under 7% in the case of the mines to be closed). Almost three quarters of the miners from this mines which will be closed are between 36-50 years. "The natural exit from the system by retiring does not represent a valid alternative for most of those to be dismissed and the high percentage of those over 45 years emphasized the vulnerability of those dismissed towards the integration on the working force market" (Preotesi, 2014: 212).

- the average level of education is higher than in 1997, the percentage of those without high school education is still important (almost 50%, a little higher at Petrila and Uricani and only 35% at Paroşeni);

- less than half of the miners said that they would search for a job if they would be dismissed and over a fifth would be involved in their own household, mainly in subsistence agriculture (Stegar, 2014);

- more than a third of the miners would search for a job only in Valea Jiului and over a fifth would search for a job abroad. Even if the percentage of those that would get a job anywhere in the country (31,95%) revels "a high opening towards the mobility within the national context, if we consider that 50% do not search for a job – this alternative can not be considered major" (Preotesi, 2014: 212).

The closing of the 3 mines will cost the state budget(according to the site of the Ministry of Energy) 143,475 millions lei only the next year Almost two thirds of this amount will be allocated for the coal from the units that are in process of permanent closing in order to cover the losses from the current production. The works for the mines' closing will cost about 24 millions lei.

The compensatory payments for the dismissed employees will be about 26 millions lei.

Considering that these 3 mines function with an average cost of 1600 lei for each one thousand lei goods production (Stegar, 2014), the costs for the closing of the 3 mines may seem small comparison with the cost to maintain them functional.

But this is not the issue; the problem is the manner how this restructuring was designed and implemented and the correlative socio-economic effects.

The first mines in Valea Jiului started to be closed since 1994 (Lonea Pilier), others in 1998 (Câmpul lui Neag, Petrila Sud), in 2003 and 2004 (Dâlja, Valea cu Brazi) and 2006 (Aninoasa).

Hence, for the past 20 years the closing of mines and restructuring of the mining sector represented a constant presence in the socio-economic landscape of Valea Jiului.

Even so, these restructurings were not accompanied with preventive measures, like educational programs of professional reconversion, entrepreneurship for the future dismissed, which had been left to doubt until the last moment of the imminence of these dismissals. An illustrative example is offered by the data collected in 2011-2012 at the 7 mines still functioning in Valea Jiului that reports the technical and economic validity of the 7 mines, calculated by experts, referring to the perception of the menace of loosing the jobs. The 3 mines to be closed have the lowest technical-economic score and the lowest score of the perception of menace to loose jobs. In other words, the employees of the most un-profitable mines, with the highest losses, perceived the lowest menace. It is interesting the explanation offered by the quoted author: "the danger was not been really seen by the employees and the prejudice and legends ("Uricani can not be closed because an entire town will die", "Petrila will never be closed) fully functioned" (Stegar, 2014, p.76-77).

The expectances of those who took these measures of economic restructuring regarding to the socio-economic evolution of the area were based on suppositions that turned out to be unrealistic.

Once partial solved the problem of social tensions generated by dismissals (by compensatory wages) several potential alternatives were available for those dismissed, but these turned out to be unusable:

1. Opening business and transforming the former miners in successful entrepreneurs. Beside the insufficient capital and the lack of business experience, these start-ups should have functioned in the absence of a real local market with a potential consumption.
2. The return to the origin places. The miners came after 1977 mainly from poor areas in Moldavia and these areas were even poorest after 1989 and had no local development opportunities. A significant part of those that choose to return were received with reticence and this reintegration can not be considered a success or a viable alternative (Kidekel, 2010);
3. Professional requalification/reconversion was not an accessible alternative for the dismissed miners over 45 years. On one side, the existent job offers corresponding

to their professional level and education were not corresponding to their salary expectations.

Synthesizing these expectations those making the decisions assumed that some of the dismissed will become entrepreneurs, some will be re-qualified and get hired, some will return to the origin places and all these options will comprise a significant part of those dismissed.

In reality, that part was relative small and the successes case were very few in reference to the number of those who did not choose any of these alternatives. Their post-dismissal evolution is illustrated be the mechanism mentioned above of underdevelopment/social declassification on the route: employee-dismissed-beneficiary of compensatory salaries-beneficiary of unemployment- social assisted.

The evolution from a stable and relative well paid occupation to non-occupation and precarious occupation is reflected on one side from the socio-economic reality towards the subjective reality, in the people' s horizon of expectation on psychological plan, on individual, family level towards community level.

On the other side, the mechanism functions as implacable on the reverse route from individual, family and community level, closing the circle started with the unsustainable economic development to social underdevelopment.

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DEFINING MIGRATION POLICIES FROM ORIGIN COUNTRY PERSPECTIVE[1]

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Abstract: *The role state plays in international migration gathers more and more attention in migration studies, across different disciplines. Policies implemented in order to manage migration are a point of high interest in the space of destination countries. Yet, even though our knowledge from destination perspective has constantly increased, origin state is still under the shadow of a biased research agenda. We have little insights on the way migration policies at origin are built, enforced or on their effects on international movements. This paper addresses the gap, proposing a definition and a subsequent operationalization of migration policies at origin. Building on the few papers approaching the issue (de Haas & Vezzoli, 2011; Weinar, 2014), it advocates for a general definition, encompassing three fields of intervention: emigration, diaspora and return. The endeavour is part of a larger effort directed to evaluate migration policies in the case of origin liberal democratic states, origin of international migration, using policy on paper approach.*

Keywords: *origin state, emigration, diaspora, return migration, migration policies*

Introduction

The role state plays in international migration has come back as high interest topic in the research related to the phenomenon by the end of the last century (Massey, 1999, Hollifield, 2008, Hollifield & Wong, 2013).

In 1997, in an article devoted to the immigration theory, Portes (1997: 812) was discussing a "sampler of themes" he considers relevant for the advance of the research and theory in the field of immigration studies. One of the fives was *the state and state-systems*. Portes was arguing that, even though "Detailed accounts of the process leading to major legislation (...) do exist, but they have not been transformed into a systematic theoretical analysis..." Portes (1997: 817)

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Two years later, reviewing the literature about the role of the state in migration to date, Massey (1999: 303) was noting down the lack of attention the theories of international migration pays "... to the nation state as an agent influencing the volume and composition of international migration".

If, at the end of the millennium, the role of the state did not have the proper/desirable place in migration studies, there was also a big discrepancy between the attention assigned to the origin state and destination state. In the previously quoted article, Massey was writing: "To the extent that state policies have been mentioned at all, attention has focused primarily on immigrant-receiving countries. Little has been written about the regulation of emigration in countries of origin" (*ibidem*).

Fifteen years after Massey's paper publication, Weinar (2014:5) was writing: "While it seems obvious what immigration policy is, emigration policy represents an enigma." Letting apart the obvious exaggeration (Weinar starts her study reviewing the literature on the issue), the problem exists: we do not have a consistent knowledge and a consistent debate about the role of the origin state in international migration in the current literature.

And if different papers treat diverse facets of the interventions from origin in migration, there are only few systematically addressing the migration policy at origin, and fewer defining it or addressing the conceptual issues related to it. If in the case of destination state, defining migration policy, operationalizing it, quantifying and (newly) evaluating comparatively and on quantitative basis define a consistent current research stream (APSA, 2013), in the case of origin state similar efforts are pretty inexistent. Just recently, within the frame of some research projects (e.g. DEMIG, Oxford University), the interest for migration policies extended to incorporate the origin dimension.

The present paper, part of a larger endeavour to understand the way migration policies at origin are built, contributes to the current effort of filling the gap of knowledge about migration policy at origin by discussing the issue of defining and operationalizing it.

As the field of research is still "under construction", numerous terminological confusions are present in the literature. Terms as migration policies, emigration, and sometimes diaspora policies are used interchangeably, all referring part or the totality of origin state intervention in relation to emigration, to the own migrants (while abroad), return migration or the consequences of migration. Here I have opted for *migration policies at origin* as designating the totality of origin state interventions related to emigration, the own migrants (while abroad) and return migration.

The paper starts reasoning that, in historical perspective, there are consistent arguments to consider the origin state as an important player in international migration (Massey, 1999). The lack of attention paid to the issue in the current literature is probably (mainly) the result of two factors: one related to the fact that democratic origin states have limited power in controlling the exit/re-entry of own citizens and another one related to the "bias" of migration studies towards destination countries (de Haas & Vezzoli, 2011).

The next section of the paper maps and discusses conceptualizations of migration policies at origin (or of its different components) in the current literature.

Unfortunately, the lack of attention paid to define seems to be the rule and very few papers systematically approach the issue. Two definitions are kept (de Haas & Vezzoli, 2011 and Weinar, 2014) and used as a basis for developing the own, more general definition, and operationalize it, in the section four of the paper. The end part mainly discusses the possible ways of validating the definition and its subsequent operationalization.

The paper is built under the strong conviction that there is a need of documenting the process of policy evaluation and to clarify the concepts used (see also de Haas et al, 2014a, Czaika & de Haas, 2013 on this). "Conceptual confusion" seems to be, at the end, the reason of apparently contradictory views of the effects of immigration policies (Czaika & de Haas, 2011: 5). Defining as precisely as possible is, from this perspective, the first step to be taken in the effort to investigate migration policies at origin.

The role of origin state in international migration and research agenda in migration studies

As already stated, one may discuss about a lack of conceptualization in the case of origin state interventions in international migration. Yet, the simple fact of noticing *a lack* does not mean that *the subject of that specific lack* deserves (in scientific value) to be, as this paper does, investigated. The state of the art may reflect the marginality of one phenomenon (origin state intervention in international migration, in this case), consequently displayed by research agenda. If this is the case, an effort to understand migration policies at origin will be, in its turn, also marginal. In our opinion, this is not the case and the main argument is related to the pretty consistent literature documenting the origin state interventions in international migration.

If one looks in historical perspective, restrictions related to exit seems more present than we perceive them today. De Haas & Vezzoli (2011: 7) discuss about the tendency of mercantilist modern states of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries to value their population. This stance towards population as resource is maintained during the nation state building period (Mau et al., 2012), even though processes like industrialization and the growth of population changed the perspective on emigration as a population pressure relief (de Haas & Vezzoli, 2011; Castles & Miller, 2009). Talking about "exit revolution", Zolberg (2007) suggests a change, in the mid of nineteenth century, of the weight in controlling, from exit to entrance. Even under these conditions, the twentieth century was witnessing large forced movements of population generated by the origin states (Fassman & Munz, 1994, Castles & Miller, 2009). During the post World War II era, the communist states were drastically limiting the international freedom of movement for their citizens (Massey 1999). No longer than two and a half decades ago, the fall of these regimes and the subsequent lift of exit ban created a huge hysteria in the Western democratic world (Fassman & Munz, 1992).

If all these can be considered proofs of the consistent role origin states play in international migration, the tendency to associate them with totalitarian regimes of the past influenced the current perception of loss of power of origin state in regulating the flows of people (Weinar, 2014). Yet, systematic inquiries proves exit restrictions are not

entirely stories of the past: in 2005, McKenzie enumerates 17 countries imposing restrictions on women ability to obtain a passport and identifies countries requiring an exit visa or government permission to leave the country, as well as restrictions related to the achievement of compulsory national service.

Even though the function of regulating the exit consistently diminished in the contemporary world, an increasing number of origin countries have adopted policies to promote emigration, and (or) to encourage the migrants connections and investments at the origin (Massey, 1999, Agunias, 2006; Agunias & Newland, 2007; Gamlen 2006, 2008 etc.)

This image of origin countries involved in migration is confirmed by the view expressed by the governments. One of the UN World Population Policies longitudinal databases[1] offers an interesting view on this point. Working on it, de Haas & Vezzoli (2011), estimates that 27% of the governments responded in 2009 to the need of managing migration with policies, the most part of them (22%) taking actions to encourage migration, and only 5% to discourage it (p. 34). Contrary to the well spread view that emigration countries are only interested in raising their outflow of people (Gibson & McKenzie, 2011), de Haas & Vezzoli identifies a ascending trend of the views that emigration is "too high" (an increase from 13% to 30% in the number of countries surveyed) (p. 30)

This lack of conceptualization related to origin state intervention in international migration seems particularly odd under the consistent recent increase of interest for destination state interventions. The latest decades are witnessing a continuous raise in efforts to define, conceptualize, measure in quantitative and comparative manners the whole pack of policies associated with destination space (on an attempt to provide a synthetic view on the efforts related to defining immigration policies see APSA (2013)).

If there are arguments to suspect the origin state is a powerful player in international migration and the interest for conceptualizing the role of the state in migration (in general) is increasing, then the current state of the art becomes suspect to be mainly the result of a specific dynamic of research agenda in migration studies. Figure 1 displays possible interplays between facts and bias in research agenda. As some other authors suggest (see de Haas & Vezzoli, 2011), current situation can be assigned to the Case D, describing the research in the field as profoundly affected by the bias of migration studies towards receiving countries, approached in a Eurocentric perspective (p. 32)

[1] Details on UN World Population Policies Databases can be retrieved at http://esa.un.org/PopPolicy/about_database.aspx

Figure 1. *Interplay between the role of the origin state in international migration and research agenda in migration studies*

		Research agenda in migration studies	
		Non-biased research agenda	Biased research agenda
Role of the origin state in international migration	Marginal	No conceptualization on the role of origin state in migration *(case A)*	Conceptualization on the role of origin state in migration *(case B)*
	Important	Conceptualization on the role of the origin state in migration *(case C)*	No conceptualization on the role of origin state in migration *(case D)*

More than having a long history of intervention and currently contributing to the shaping of current flows, the origin state seems to have a consistent potential to increase its role in international migration in the future. At least two different sets of arguments may be invoked:

First, the current forms of migration seem to privilege the retention of migrant's links to the origin space (Portes et al, 1999). The double anchoring of a transnational life is stimulating the reciprocal interest of migrants and authorities in origin to be involved together in international migration.

Second, the current optimism, even moderate, related to the migration-development nexus (de Haas, 2010) creates serious incentives for the origin states to involve in relations with its migration generated diaspora and to find ways to extract the benefits of migration.

The role of the origin state in migration and migration policies at origin

If a consistent number of papers approaches or documents the interventions of the origin states in international migration, only a scarce number of them explicitly deals with migration policies at origin, whatever the term used, and even a scarcer number defines migration policies at origin. There is a huge variety in this literature, and one can hardly speak about consistent main directions. Starting from the analysis of Weinar (2014) and de Haas & Vezzoli (2011), we have identified five major topics coagulating the interest for the interventions of origin states in international migration: one discussing the border/exit restrictions/passport as ways to manage migration; one discussing migration-development nexus usually in relation to less developed countries; another one discussing the interventions of the origin state in relation to its disapora, one approaching interventions of the origin state in terms of foreign affairs goals and, newly, one approaching the topic in transnational terms. Same type of origin

interventions may be approached from different perspectives (e.g. interventions related to diaspora may be approached in the frame of international relations, transnational perspective or development perspective), and, in the most cases, the global view on origin country as a whole is lacking. Yet, classifying in this way and briefly discussing every directions allow a first look on the huge heterogeneity on the way origin interventions are approached and on the consistent effort needed to be done in order to recompose – from an origin perspective – this heterogeneity into the homogeneity associated with defining interventions as a policy.

Border/exit/passport

Directly controlling emigration through the means of borders/passport regulations seems to be considered mainly an affair of the past. As Weinar (2014) pertinently notices, especially the restrictions related to exit are currently connected with totalitarian (or less democratic) regimes and placed in opposition to the core principles guiding the liberal democracies. As Mau et al. (2012) argument, once the UN's General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights in 1949, with its 13th article guaranteeing the right of free leaving of any country and the free return to own country, "...Western liberal democracies in particular proved highly committed to the right of exit..." (p. 23) As far as more and more countries in the World can be assigned to (at least to some degree) to the category of (liberal) democracies, the studies committed to border tends to concentrate on controlling the entry and to link the issue to immigration policy aspects (the entire literature developed on the US border enforcement/its effects on Mexican migration is one illustration). From this perspective, the discussions pay attention (more) to cases of solid liberal democracies and developed countries as destination spaces.

Migration and development nexus

The current environment of moderate optimism towards migration and development relation (de Haas, 2010), seems to generate a constant concern for the intervention of origin states in international migration. Starting timidly in 1990s "...the interest in the impact of migration on development has burgeoned into somewhat organized international debate" (Newland, 2007).

Remittances (and the way of managing them in the advantage of origin country), brain drain (and the way of managing it to extract benefits for origin or to diminish the loses), and beneficial forms of migration (e.g. circular migration) seem to be the main points of interest. Centring the interest in the developing world, irrespectively if one country related or general approaches, the main tendency is to describe the interventions and to evaluate/discuss their impact on development.

Diaspora related interventions

Probably few topics experienced lately such a big increase in interest as diaspora and for few there are so many discussions about defining, specifying the meanings... (Brubaker, 2005) This increase of interest was reflected also in a continuous expansion of concern

in migration – as one of the fundamental processes leading to the diaspora making. Discussing about diaspora policies, Weinar (2014) identifies two broad lines of coagulating the origin state interventions in this direction: one aiming at influencing the destination states decisions through the pressure of migrants and the other aiming to attract diaspora members in the process of development at origin (in this case there is an obvious overlap with the previous identified topic.) From the consistent pool of articles that in a way or another touch upon the issue, it seems that only few papers are systematically trying to identify, discuss and analyze *diaspora policies* as a whole pack of measures related to the origin country (Gamlen, 2006, 2008)

Using interventions in migration for foreign affair purposes

Another new body of literature investigates the interventions of origin state in international migration from the perspective of foreign affairs (Teitelbaum, 1984). In this case, migration is not the dead end of interventions, but the mean internationally used to pressure in negotiating some controversial points or obtaining benefits. (The similarity with diaspora intervention in order to influence destination country decisions through the pressure of migrants is obvious, but in this case the level of negotiation/ pressure is inter-governmental, not directly involving migrants, but affecting migrants.)

Transnational approaches

The emergence of transnationalism and its surge in academia is also reflected in the way the origin state interferences in international migration are approached in the literature. Generally the type of interventions approached on this label are similar to those analyzed under the umbrella of diasporic studies (e.g. Smith, 2008 approaches external voting rights in the case of Mexican in terms of diasporic institutionalization; Lafleur, 2013 approaches the same issue, of external voting, under the head of transnational politics) but with more emphasis on migration/migrants related aims.

Apart from these approaches, there is also a mainly descriptive literature, especially developed under different international organization interests in the area of migration, documenting the origin state interventions. Usually, they are centred on one dimension of intervention and may refer several countries (e.g. OECD, 2004 – on bilateral agreements) or refer one country trying to describe the entire array of intervention (e.g. Biao, 2003 – on China interventions in migration).

It is difficult to catch a sense of migration policies in this entire diversity. The papers approaching the issue of origin state interventions in terms of *policy* are only few and those providing a definition are even fewer. Massey, in 1999, discusses about role of the migrant-sending states, but he does not use a specific term (emigration policy/migration policy at origin/migration and diaspora policy etc.) and does not provide a definition. In his view migration policies seems to deal with increasing/decreasing the volume and changing the patterns of migration as consequence of origin decision (p. 310-312; 317). As concrete measures, exit restrictions (in the past), and the efforts to stimulate migration (viewed as a beneficial process for origin countries) seem to be the main components of sending state interventions.

Years later, from a completely different perspective, Gamlen (2006) defines *diaspora policy* under the declared interest in comparative analysis and the caution of mentioning that interventions related to diaspora are highly heterogeneous and consequently suspected of not being "policy" in a classical definition of the term. He does not provide an encompassing definition of diapora policy, but identify three large dimensions of it: "*capacity building* policies, aimed at discursively producing a state-centric 'transnational national society', and developing a set of corresponding state institutions; *extending rights to the diaspora*, thus playing a role that legitimate the sovereign, and *extracting obligation from diaspora*, based on the premise that emigrants owe loyalty to this legitimate sovereign"[1] (p. 4-5).

In the same direction, oriented to conceptualize, quantify and compare policies, de Haas & Vezzoli (2011), within the framework of a large research project (DEMIG), propose a definition of what they call "emigration policies". de Haas & Vezzoli discuss about emigration policies, as "...laws, rules, measures, and practices implemented by national states with the objective to influence the volume, origin, destination and internal composition of emigration flows" (:6) adding that they "... might also include laws, rules and practices on the protection of rights and conditions of citizens abroad, and in that context, they sometimes regulate conditions upon return" (*ibidem*). In the subsequent analysis, they accentuate the encouraging/discouraging orientation of emigration the policy, and extend the term to include "no intervention" as a type of policy (i.e. *laissez-faire*[2] policy in their words). Based on this definition, they discuss three types of emigration policies: minimal regulation and laissez fair; encouraging emigration, and restricting emigration. The definition provided in 2011 was used in the subsequent analyses of DEMIG project of migration policies (as including emigration and immigration policies) (de Haas et al., 2014a, de Haas et al., 2014b)

Within the frame of another research project (CARIM EAST), Weinar (2014) proposes a change in the perspective we are used to have about the European Union, by looking at the supranational structure not as an immigration, but as an emigration space. She discusses about "emigration and disapora policies", including, as the collocation suggests, the two dimensions in a whole. The new unity is not discussed as a specific type of policy (thus any reference to the heterogeneity of the construct is avoided), but is treated consequently. In her view, *emigration policies* denote "all policies that facilitate or curb mobility (outward or return) across international borders" (p. 5), while *diaspora policies* include two components: diaspora building policies ("which establish a link with the individuals and communities abroad" (*ibidem)*) and diaspora engagement policies, which "...provide emigrants and diaspora members with a set of rights and obligations..." (*ibidem*)

An operational definition of migration policies at origin

Our attempt to propose a definition of migration policies at origin is based on several assumptions and interests that guided and influenced the way we define and

[1] My emphasis
[2] Emphasis in original

operationalize. It is underlain by the assumption that *policy on paper* may be meaningfully analysed as proxy for policy (Czaika & de Haas, 2013; Helbing et al., 2013). Even if the implementation of laws and regulations may be far from their *on paper form*, yet, the mere existence of *the paper* form is giving the shape and creates a space of potential actions. Additionally to this assumption, the paper is built under some specific research interests guiding the way of defining and operationalizing.

The *first* interest is to produce a definition (and a consequent operationalization) to be used for comparative purposes. Setting this standard raises, in our opinion, the level of comprehension (i.e. capacity to include) of one definition and lightens the efforts to identify the concrete laws, rules and regulations associated with migration in specific origin countries. The *second* interest is to produce a definition/operationalization that could be used on large time-scale. This aim is particularly relevant in investigating the way policies develop in time and to identify their connectedness with the development of the phenomenon in itself. This is also related to the *third* interest of creating a data base of laws of regulations, subject to a primary codification allowing just basic checks on the validity of the definition/operationalization.

Under these specific assumption/interests, starting from the (only) two definitions identified in the literature (de Haas & Vezzoli, 2011; Weinar, 2014), we define *migration policies at origin* as *the laws, rules and regulations adopted by the origin states in order to influence the volume, trajectories, destinations/origin, and composition of the out-flows and return flows; to modify one of the own migrants' statuses or to support the own migrants while abroad [sic!]*.

Defining migration policies at origin in this way raises several points of discussion.

The *first* one is including the *intentionality* towards migration/migrants in definition. If justified in theory, this is raising a lot of problems in practice. Castles (2004) discusses about the difficulty of identifying the aims of policy, and to make distinction between the open stated and hidden ones. This general problem of identifying may be accentuated in the case of migration by the divergent interests in relation with the development of the phenomenon. Mainly this is the case of immigration policies (see Freeman, 1995). We do not have a clear view on how migration policies at origin are elaborated, but some authors (de Haas & Vezzoli, 2011) argument this is also their case. Solution proposed by the above mentioned authors – taking into account the official stated goal of interventions – will also be adopted in this case. Yet, and this is making the transition towards *the second* source of confusions: some of the laws, rules and regulations affecting migration/migrants are not directed towards them, but towards larger categories to which migrants/migration belong. This is the case of diaspora (or whatever other term one origin state may use to refer what it recognizes as being its population living abroad). If the measures addressing diaspora are not directly related to migrants, but to other component of diaspora (e.g. "accidental diaspora" in terms of Brubaker, 2000), the inclusion of these measures in migration policies at origin will, at a first glance, unjustifiably extend the extension of the term. Yet, not including them in migration policies at origin may hinder the unravelling of some mechanisms of policy creation: it is possible to have a simple "de facto" extension to migration/migrants in implementation not notified by another piece of legislation. The inclusion of diaspora policy into migration policies at origin seems to be rather a subject of controversy.

Weinar (2014) discusses about it as part of the efforts to manage migration at origin, but she simply juxtaposes it to emigration policies, talking about emigration and diaspora policies; de Haas & Vezzoli (2011), discussing only about emigration policies, let opened the possibility to include "the protection and rights of citizens abroad" in emigration policies; Gamlen (2006, 2008) approaches diaspora policy as distinctive and unrelated to other policy areas. We clearly assume here the inclusion of all policies aiming to support or to grant rights/obligations to migrants (while abroad) in migration policies at origin. The main argument is related to the possible influence of these policies on keeping the contact with origin (see Heisler (1985) comments on the influence of bilateral agreements during guest workers phase in European migration) and probably influencing the probabilities or smoothing the process or return (and thus inclusively the emigration policies). The second argument is related to the way return (a flow) is approached: encouraging return is a process addressing the migrant population, not the stayers or returnees. Inclusion/exclusion of migrants (while abroad *sic!*) need to be, in our view, consistent on the whole spectrum of measures considered.

At least as complex as about diaspora, it is the discussion about inclusion/non-inclusion of the policies aiming to manage the effects of migration. Theoretically, they can be excluded as being more part of the development policies (de Haas & Vezzoli, 2011). Yet, the link migration – development may be easily invoked to implement policies aiming to influence the volume, and especially the trajectories and composition of the flows. Signing bilateral agreements, for example, opens or enlarges the channel of contract work and, if the agreements concern low qualified workers, influences the composition of the out-flows. This means that some of the interventions in migration aiming in fact development are implicitly included (by any of the discussed definitions) into emigration policies. (Or the reverse: if one state explicitly aims through all of its interventions in international migration the development of the country, then there is no emigration/migration policy left aside.) Because of this overlap between different segments of the policy, we have decided to keep the interventions taken in order to manage the consequence of migration outside of our definition.

The discussion about including/non-including diaspora policy and development related interventions in international migration into migration policy at origin, also opens the space for another related debate about how to make a clear distinction between migration and non-migration policies and where to draw the delineating line, as far as some of the policies regarding labour, education etc. may also (powerfully) influence the process of migration (de Haas & Vezzoli, 2011). Here we have excluded all policies that do not *directly* target migration, irrespectively of the magnitude of their effects on the process of migration.

The definition we propose is then one very large, covering three fields of interventions: interventions directed to the process of emigration (aiming to change the volume, trajectories, destinations, composition of the out-flows), interventions directed towards migrants (while they are abroad) – extended here to the entire diaspora policy, and interventions related to the process of return migration (aiming to change the origin, volume or composition). (Figure 2 presents three fields and associated interventions in a schematic manner.)

Emigration related interventions include, in our approach, three large sub-fields of intervention: those related to exit; to opening new channels for migration and, finally, those related to securing the international migration.

Exit restrictions are considered under two facets: direct exit restrictions – meaning any kind of conditions that one origin state may require to be fulfilled before according the right of exit and indirect exit restrictions – following from changes in regulations related to the passport as a fundamental mean to exercises the right to travel.

Opening new channels for migration is fundamentally related to facilitate the departure abroad, offering alternatives to the private companies acting as recruiters, by establishing public structures to deal with (labour) migration abroad. The establishment of such public structures is often related to signing bilateral agreements, but, as far as bilateral agreements usually includes (also) other provisions (see OECD, 2004; Heisler, 1985) we have prefer treat them under the sub-dimension of securing migration.

Securing migration refers actions taken in the direction of building a safer environment for migration. Signing bilateral agreements, regulating/controlling the activity of private recruiters and making efforts in order to assure the portability of rights are the main categories identified.

In the case of *Diaspora related interventions,* we have mainly worked with the operationalization proposed by Gamlen (2006, 2008). Yet, the Gamlen's proposal is not entirely fit for a "global" approach from the origin perspective. There are several types of measure excluded here by comparison with Gamlen's operationalization: media coverage was converted into public media institutions (public TV channels or newspapers dedicated to diaspora) – the reason behind this being that in our approach policies are actions (towards); commissioning studies or reports as far as improving statistics (dimension recognizing diaspora were also excluded because of their very general character); Moreover, for the excluded type of measures, there is a low probability to be suited to the policy on paper approach (i.e. to have dedicated laws or regulations). For obvious reasons (they are more reflectign the emigration dimension than diasporic one) providing pre-departure services and extensive bilateral agreements were excluded from the dimension

Return migration interventions are kept separately, even though the general tendency is to include them into emigration policy, as Weinar (2014) and de Haas & Vezzoli do. Yet, it is obviously that, event referring a flow oriented towards origin; return migration has a different meaning. Theoretically, return related intervention may appear once the emigration matures. Moreover, in our opinion, placing the regulations concerning return in the category of emigration policy is suspect of distorting time related analysis of the different dimensions considered here.

***Figure 2**. Fields of the migration policy at origin*

Emigration related interventions	***Diaspora*** related interventions	***Return migration*** related interventions
I. Exit restrictions: ***I.1. Direct exit restrictions***: requirements for exit visas or government permission; exit restrictions for women; exit restriction for persons of the age of national compulsory service; exist conditions related to the type and costs of travelling abroad ***I.2. Indirect exit restrictions***: passport used as a mean of restricting or enabling the movement: allowing the passport to be obtained by mail or in person; while abroad or only in the origin country **II. Extending the channels for international migration**: public structures on the departure market **III. Securing international migration**: bilateral agreements; regulation of the private operators on the departure market; international portability of social security rights;	**I. Diaspora building policies:** ***I.1. Cultivating diaspora***: celebrating national holidays honouring expatriates with awards; convening diaspora congresses; proclaiming affinity with and responsibility for diaspora; issuing special IDs/visas; national language and history education; public media dedicated (newspapers, TV channels) ***I.2. Recognizing diaspora***: expanded consular units; maintaining a diaspora program, bureaucratic unit, or dedicated ministry **II. Diaspora Integration** ***II.1. Extending rights***: permitting dual nationality, dual citizenship or external voting rights; special legislative representation; consulting expatriate councils or advisory bodies; intervening in labour relations/public structure dedicated to this aim; supplementing health; welfare and education services support; upholding property rights ***II.2. Extracting obligations***: taxing expatriates; customs/import incentives; special economic zones; investment services, tax; incentives, matching fund; programs, diaspora bonds &financial products; facilitating remittances; fellowships; skilled expatriate networks	**I. Encouraging voluntary return**: return migration policies **II. Accepting forced return**: re-admission agreements

Concluding remarks and further developments

The paper addresses migration policies from the perspective of origin country, with the aims of defining and operationalizing. Our endeavour is motivated by the intention to investigate the stance liberal democratic origin countries take about migration. Even thought a consistent number of studies document the interventions of sending states towards migration, the literature pays little attention to conceptualizing the issue. As de Haas & Vezzoli (2011) suggest this is probably mainly the result of a biased research agenda toward destination country perspective. There are only few papers approaching migration policies from an origin country perspective, and even fewer defining and operationalizing them. Starting mainly from two identified attempts (Weinar, 2014, de Haas & Vezzoli, 2011), we propose our own definition. In comparison with the previous works in the field, it goes in the direction of extending the scope of definition, including interventions related to emigration/diaspora and return, but excluding those aiming to manage the consequences of migration. Having a proposal of the definition and a tentative operationalization of it does not equate, in our view, to the final step. We started this paper with the assumption that there is a policy aiming to regulate international migration at origin and, by consequence, it is meaningful to talk about it. The danger with this approach is to attach an umbrella concept to realities not belonging together. There is yet little information about the consistency of the field and the *pitfall* in this case is to create a reality (by defining) to which to attach a label (migration policy at origin, in this case) and to study it as a "promising field of research" (Portes, 1997). Reformulating the problem: here we have assumed a general stance of origin states towards international migration and some actions associated with it and we have defined this general stance as assuring coherence to the way origin states manage emigration, the relations with diaspora and return migration. If there are arguments to hypothesize the things are going this way, the only valid proof is the confrontation of the definition/operationalization with "the reality" of laws, rules and regulations of at least one origin country. This further step is not going to tell the story of the migration policies in that origin country, but it will just test the capacity of our definition/operationalization to produce meaningful results. To the end of this second step, the initial process of construction may be taken again under scrutiny and adjustments made to the initial model of defining migration policies at origin.

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COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS AND ACTIVISMS REGARDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: PERSPECTIVES FROM RURAL BANGLADESH

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Abstract: *Community is a basic unit of social organisation, which influences many aspects in our lives and patterns of actions. The aspect of community is seldom addressed in the realm of domestic violence initiatives, although community's perception and role, who are within women's close network, is important in curbing domestic violence since members of the community easily see and hear what is happening against women. My research aimed at exploring community's perceptions and activisms with regard to domestic violence against women at different rural settings of two Bangladeshi districts namely Netrokona and Mymensingh. Using interpretative qualitative approach, I excavated the perceptions and activism of the majority Bengali community as well as indigenous matriarchal Garo community. Living in strict patriarch rule, Bengali women usually are the easy victims of different forms of violence, but matriarchal structure also does not preclude Garo men to condone violence against women. Both the communities have some intervention mechanisms. Shalish or local arbitration is the most widely used community intervention in rural area although it has some in-built shortcomings. This study has significant implication in generating new knowledge and providing guidelines for future course of actions in redressing domestic violence.*

Keywords: *Bangladesh, community, domestic violence, Bengali community, Garo community, patriarchy, matriarchy, women, shalish*

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Introduction

Domestic violence or violence that takes place at home against women accounts for a major portion of the violence that occurs worldwide against women (Perillia, et al. 2011). It imposes enormous burden for women throughout the world and transcends in all social, economic, religious and cultural groups (Kyu & Kani, 2005). Specifically, domestic violence which is perpetrated by the husband or intimate partner is the major form of violence in the world and happens in all countries, cultures and social classes (WHO, 2002). Domestic violence against women by their husbands is widely prevalent and deep-rooted problem in Bangladesh although it is frequently misinterpreted as a private issue. It has been estimated that 50% of the murders of women in Bangladesh are committed by women's husbands (Heise, 1993 quoted in Khan, 2005). Different available empirical studies in Bangladesh also reported high rates of various forms of wife abuse ranging from 39% to 79% (Bates et al., 2004; Schular et al., 1996; Salam et al. 2006; Koenig et al., 2003; Naved, 2013). Studies on domestic violence in Bangladesh have the examined number of issues including forms and practices, causes and consequences, help-seeking and coping strategies particularly from victims' perspectives. Nevertheless, none of the study in Bangladesh has ever attempted to explore community perception and activism with regard to domestic violence. My research is an attempt to fill-in that gap in the existing literature.

Community is defined as a local social arrangement beyond the private sphere of home and family (Crow and Allan, 1994). Community may be small in scale but solid in structure and responds at the grassroots to fundamental human problems (Nisbert, 1960 quoted in Poplin, 1972). Community influences many aspects in our lives and patterns of actions including violence against women. Preventing domestic violence requires commitment from and engagement of the whole community (Michau, 2005). The aspect of community who are within women's networks rarely studied in relation to domestic violence, yet in the long run it may prove to be a key resource not only in establishing safety for women but also in beginning to decrease the prevalence of domestic violence (Kelly, 1996). Community networks know about domestic violence long before any outside agency. Community can either recognise it as a problem, can support women who are abused or ignore it (Kelly, 1996), and the risk associated with domestic violence even increases when the cause of the abuse is seen 'legitimate' by the community (Rao, 1997). However, community attitudes and actions with respect to domestic violence provide valuable information about the environment of domestic violence in a particular social setting (Abeya, et al., 2012).

Under the contextual premises mentioned above, I was strongly motivated to conduct a research in order to explore the perceptions and activisms of rural community in Bangladesh with regard to domestic violence. The main research question was; what are the perception and activism of the majority Bengali rural community with regard to domestic violence against women? The sub-question was; what are the perception and activism of ingenious *Garo* community with regard to domestic violence against women? The reason to bring *Garo* community's perspective was find out the similarities and differences patriarchal community perspective and that of matriarchal community perspective. Notably, *Garo* is the only matriarchal indigenous ethnic group in

Bangladesh. By domestic violence, I meant violence that is directed against women by their husbands, and by community members, I meant only the important members of a rural setting who are involved in different community matters and community problems.

Research Design

I conducted the study through interpretive qualitative research approach. Researchers in interpretive approach assume that there is not just one empirical world; everyone has their own personal views and perspectives of reality (Thiel 2014). Interpretive research typically tries to understand the social world as it is from the perspective of individual experience. Hence, all interests extend over subjective worldview (Rossman and Rallis 2012). The interpretive paradigm broadly manifests itself in phenomenological study through which individuals describe their experiences (Moustakas 1994 quoted in Creswell 2013). I broadly employed semi-structured phenomenological in-depth interviews to explore the experiences and perceptions of the participants. Semi-structured interview gives opportunity to capture more in-depth information; giving more depth to the reasoning and meaning (Jupp 1995). I also conducted a focus group discussion (FGD) with members of the indigenous *Garo* community. On the other hand, I developed one case study on a community intervention called *shalish* (informal dispute resolution) based on observation and interview with a victim. Another case study was developed on community NGO activism based on interview with a concerned NGO official, and documentary evidences. Case study is used to thoroughly describe complex phenomenon in ways to unearth deeper understanding of the phenomenon (Moore et al. 2012), and helps to present unique and unusual situation (Creswell 2013). Observing *shalish* was an emerged event in the study, and was appropriate to frame it as a case.

In selecting participants, I paid utmost emphasis concerning the participants who were 'information-rich' (Hennink et al. 2011) in accordance with the objectives of the study. I employed both purposive and snowball sampling techniques in selecting participants. I selected participants through an array of networks from different rural settings of two Bangladeshi districts namely Mymensingh and Netrokoa. I conducted interviews with twenty-nine (26) community members from majority Bengali community. My participants were local public representatives (8), Muslim religious leaders (3), Hindu religious leaders (3), village elderly (2), Muslim marriage register (1), Hindu marriage register (1), Teacher (1), NGO official (1), other local leaders and social workers (6). On the other hand, all the seven (7) FGD members of *Garo* community were from of Tribal Welfare Association (TWA).

Participation in the study was voluntary. All interviews were conducted in the local language *Bangla*, and were recorded by a recording device with prior permission from the participants. While translating into English, I made myself deeply engaged over each narrative verbatim so that originality is maintained and errors are kept minimal. I employed thematic analytical framework in analysing data. Thematic analytical framework identifies and analyses themes and puts them together to form a comprehensive picture of the collective experiences of research participants (Braun and

Clarke, 2006). The data analysis followed the following consequential but interrelated procedures such as; organising data, generating categories, coding, collating codes into potential themes, defining and refining themes, and finally presenting the overall story the different themes revealed (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). The textual presentation of the finding is done in first person "I" which articulates attention to my authorship and expresses my reflexivity and involvement as researcher. I conducted the study during August 2014 to November 2014.

Finding of the Study

Perceptions regarding the forms of domestic violence

With regard to various forms of domestic violence, participants from the majority Bengali community put forward following observations.

Not only physical but also has other forms

Most of the participants opined that domestic violence against women is not only physical but also psychological/emotional, sexual and economic. A local public representative said;

> "Mostly women come to me with complaints of physical violence of their husbands, but when I inquire into their history of abuse, I find they are the victims of many forms of abuse, and some of them are even more pervasive than that of physical violence."

Some participants said that the perception regarding domestic violence has changed significantly over a span of time. Specifically, the village elderly opined that in earlier days only physical violence was treated domestic violence. Even certain amount of physical violence was not considered as domestic violence and no woman was bothered about husband's verbal abuse, forced pregnancy and practice of polygamy. They used to assume these practices as part of their lives. Today, domestic violence is being treated in a holistic manner. Women are more concerned about other forms of violence.

Sexual violence

With regard to sexual violence community members said that it is, of course, difficult to trace how a husband sexually abuses her wife since it is her very personal matters. Nevertheless, they had had information about forced pregnancy, forced abortion, miscarriage. Notably, all the female community members in the study specifically informed that some women had shared their experiences sexual violence by their husbands including forced sex, sex during pregnancy and menstruation, abortion, forced pregnancy etc. Women now consider sexual violence as a part of domestic violence. A female public representative said;

> "A girl who was married at the age of twelve evaded from her husband's residence just after two days since she got scared about physical relations with her husband. Her mother came to me for suggestions---."

Psychological/emotional abuse

Community members perceived that psychological/emotional abuse has become a part of many women's lives. They are frequently verbally abused or name-called by their husbands and in-laws, often threatened to remarry, divorce or drive away from home. Some of them are the victims of husbands' practices of polygamy and extra-marital relations which also cause psychological/emotional abuse.

Economic abuse is the new form

In their opinions, economic violence is a new addition to the list of domestic violence. Over the years, the extent of economic abuse has taken a pervasive form. Many rural women now a days are engaged in many small-scaled income-generating activities by borrowing money from the NGOs. However, quite often, husbands snatch their incomes, borrowed money, and also put pressure on how and where to spend the money and income. One local leader commented;

> "Women borrow money from the NGOs. Quite often, their worthless husbands snatch their money. It is a problem for those women who want to earn independently."

Physical violence still dominates

Although, community members viewed domestic violence as a combination of many forms, some community members considered physical violence as the most inflicting form of violence against women in the community. One participant cited the rural proverb, "if you want to control your wife, you have to batter her thrice in a day: morning, afternoon and at night", and added physical violence against wives is the most frequent and the routine activity.

Perceptions regarding the factors of domestic violence

Patriarchy is the main cause of domestic violence

Participants explicitly stated that patriarchy is extensively prevalent in the society. Being rigidly socialised as superior than women, men in the community use this institution as a means to control and dominate their wives. Patriarchal mechanism put women in such a position that they become the easy prey of male domination and violence. A Hindu religious leader said;

> "Men consider women as subordinate and subdue women in all respects. Perpetuating violence is an effective means to subdue a wife in the family."

Early marriage: the gateway to domestic violence

Most of the participants opined that early marriage is a harmful practice, which often leads to many forms of domestic violence. Moreover, it brings many detrimental and long-term effects on the physical, sexual and mental health of a young girl. Early marriage is one of the old customs in Bangladesh society. Parents always strive to get married off their under aged daughters even when they are not physically and mentally prepared. Although law outlaws early marriage, such marriage is registered through unfair means. One female public representative said;

> "Majority of the girls become married before while they are adolescents. Their husbands perpetuate sexual violence against them. They cannot perform familial activities properly. Failure to comply the expectations of their husbands and their families, they become the victims of domestic violence."

Dowry demand: the stubborn custom leads to domestic violence

Community members considered dowry demand (groom price) as the major source of domestic violence. There was notable consensus amongst the participants to consider dowry demand as a stubborn custom in the community. Dowry exists in the all levels of the community. A village elderly said:

> "This is the unwritten custom in the community. Although government has enacted Dowry Prohibition Act, this Act is of no use. No one can think of getting her daughter married off without paying sufficient dowry. It is an evil but a necessary condition during marriage."

Specifically, participants said that the problem associated with dowry demand is often not a one-time shot. Husbands and their family members continue with demands even after marriage. Women encounter violence if they fail to bring dowries for their husband. One public representative commented:

> "Demand for dowry is often endless. If a woman can bring dowry her situation remains stable, but if she cannot bring dowry it worsens largely."

Involvement of and conflicts with mother-in-law

Involvement of and conflict with mother-in-law was considered as a dominating cause by most of the participants for perpetuation of violence. Interestingly, not all the community people made directly liable the mother-in-law for perpetuation of domestic violence rather few of them also made responsible the daughter-in-law for their own fate. The relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law is a woman versus woman game. Each one is the enemy of another. One public representative shared a very interesting experience;

> "A mother-in-law forgets that once she was a daughter-in-law and was abused by her mother-in-law as well. I received many complaints of daughter-in-laws against their mother-in-laws. Interestingly, these mother-in-laws, when they were daughter-in-laws, also complained me against their mother-in-laws."

Mother-in-law makes considerable amount of impact on perpetuation of domestic violence against her daughter-in-law by creating troubles between her son and his wife. One community leader said;

> "Naturally, a son is closely attached to his mothers. Whatever her mother says, he just carries the order. He does not verify what is true or untrue."

Apart from the facets of involvement of mother, there were also aspects of conflicts with mother-in-law which also act as instigating factors of domestic violence. According to this line of thought, many daughter-in-laws do not like their mother-in-laws and do not pay respect to them. By doing so, they invite troubles for them since their husbands always expect them showing respects and honour to their parents. A village leader commented;

> "Daughter-in-laws consider their in-laws as burden. They do not show respect to them. However, husbands punish them for their ill behaviours."

Extra-marital relations, practice of polygamy and inability to give birth to child/male-child

Extramarital relations, women's inability to give birth to child or male child and practice of polygamy act as instigating factors for perpetuation of domestic violence, opined by some participants. Extramarital relationship has been widespread in the rural community. Some of them viewed it as an erosion of social values as well as religious values. It is a deterioration of trust between a husband and a wife. One community leader commented;

> "Extramarital relationship is problem in the community. When a married man engaged in extramarital relationship, his wife obstructs him in many ways. He becomes angry at his wife's interventions and perpetuates violence."

Interestingly, few community participants blamed women for being engaged in extramarital relationships. A husband always prefers faithful and devoted wife and never allows any illicit relationship of his wife. A local woman writer remarked;

> "Chastity is a rule placed on women by patriarchy. There is no problem for a man if he is engaged in adultery or practices polygamy, but if a woman does something wrong, she must be prepared for dire consequences."

Not only women are physically and mentally abused due to their interference into their husbands' extramarital relationships, but also, quite often, they become the victims of husbands' practices of polygamy, which invites troubles in the family. Sometimes women are divorced or abandoned for that. The most commonly reported factor of polygamy is associated with current wife's inability to produce any child or male child. In that case, husband divorces or deserts his wife and gets married again. Women are usually blamed for childless or sonless state, husbands condone violence for that. A social worker observed;

> "Still in the rural area, failure to bear a child or male child is considered a problem with a wife. A husband is reluctant to go to doctor. If ever a wife requests him to go to doctor, he abuses his wife."

Domestic violence is associated with poverty and low-income

Many participants in the study related poverty and low-income as aggravating factors for domestic violence. The widespread prevalence of poverty and low income in the family often act as a source of conflict between a husband and a wife. Poverty and low-income create frustration and tension among the breadwinners and instigate them to condone violence. A village leader expressed his opinions;

> "There is a proverb, when poverty comes in at the door, love escapes through the window. Many families in the rural areas live in extreme poverty state. When wives ask husbands about their low income, they become angry and use violent means to stop them."

On the other hand, few participants also blamed women for creating troubles concerning the matter of poverty and low-income. In their opinions, women often fail to understand the ability of their husbands and the opportunities available for income.

Perceptions regarding the consequences of domestic violence

Community participants opined that domestic violence makes multifarious effects on women, children and on the overall state of the society.

Effects on women

There was a consensus amongst the participants with regard to the effect on women caused by various physical assaults. One village leader said;

> "Many women in the community sometimes are seriously injured because of physical battering by their husbands. Sometimes husbands intentionally assault their wives in a grievous way, sometimes they are not aware of the consequences of assaults."

With regard to sexual and reproductive health impacts, the dominant perceptions of the participants included complications during pregnancy, lack of nutritional and physical care during pregnancy, forced pregnancy or multiple-child bearing and various troubles associated with sexual/physical relationships with husbands. Some participants categorically mentioned about early marriage and the impacts related to pregnancy and the physical relationships.

Some participants pointed out number of issues with regard to mental health consequences on the victims. Women suffer from serious emotional and psychological disturbances and dejection due to domestic violence. A female writer said;

> "In our society marriage is so important to a woman, when her husband threatens her to divorce or abandon her, she really gets scared and suffers from mental agony concerning her future."

Another participant informed;

> "When women fail to cope with domestic violence, some of them might develop suicidal ideation. In our area, a woman failing to comply with abuse, wanted to commit suicide by hanging from a tree."

Domestic violence also economically disturbs women as many husbands grasp women's money borrowed from the NGOs or even direct them on how to spend it. Moreover, husbands also sell or misappropriate women's income earning sources. Husbands create many barriers to women's economic empowerment. Many women in the community are indebted with numbers of NGOs to adjust their loans that captured by their husbands. One community leader informed;

> "Women borrow money to become self-reliant or to help with family expenses, but when the money is captured by their husbands, they fall in deep trouble. Sometime women become burdened with numbers of borrowings."

A handful of participants informed that women who opt to seek recourse to either formal or informal agencies also confront many bitter experiences. In their opinions, many women do not get proper justice through informal means, and formal justice system is cumbersome, lengthy and requires financial involvement. Moreover, if they seek recourse living within the marital relationship, they have to confront more violence from their husbands and in-laws. Women's decision to help-seeking often adversely affects them. A village elderly commented;

> "There are few examples of divorcing or abandoning women in the locality by their husbands after they made complaints with the community people about their problems. Their desire to make things normal turns into worse."

Social dislocation

Social dislocation as an effect of domestic violence was treated as a consequence of domestic violence. In their opinions, finding no other alternatives many abused women decide to go to Dhaka or some other cities to work as garment workers. Sometime they cannot take their children with them. Many families finally break downs. Women also get disconnected with the villages. The following excerpt of one participant contextualises the fact appropriately;

> "The trend of going to Dhaka and other cities by the poorer abused women for seeking garment jobs is escalating, and family break-ups are the ultimate consequences. Despite our efforts, we cannot tackle this trend."

Impact on Children

Some participants were very concerned about the impact on children due to domestic violence against their mother, and with issues like divorce and abandonment. They said that the conflicts between father and mother adversely affect children in many ways. Children get scared of their father and, often, develop negative image about their father. Proper upbringing of the children is impossible in a violent environment.

Perceptions regarding the coping strategies and help-seeking practices

Under this theme, I have brought participants' perceptions with regard to issues related to women's coping strategies and help-seeking practices.

Disclosing is not the prime option

According to most of the participants, abused women usually do not want to discuss and disclose about their experiences of domestic violence. They try to cope with violent experiences within themselves. Only in extreme cases, they disclose their experiences with others including parents, relatives and community people. There was a general consensus amongst the participants that usually women from lower socio-economic background disclose their experiences of domestic violence, women from middle-income and upper-income class hardly share their experiences with others since they consider disclosing is humiliating for them and their families. However, some issues such as; future of the children, stigma associated with divorce and separation, personal consequence also preclude many women not to speak out about their experiences of abuse to others. Under this milieu, women try to tolerate the abusive relationship so as to maintaining the family relationship. One female public representative said;

> "Domestic violence is an endurance test for many women. They want to cope with the test."

Coping strategies and help-seeking practices of women from Hindu and Muslim community vary quite significantly. According to most of the Hindu community leaders, the "no-provision of divorce" in the Hindu community has made the fundamental differences with regard to expressing the experiences of domestic violence. A Hindu community leader said;

> "A Hindu woman hardly speaks out of her experiences of domestic violence to the public. As there is no provision of divorce amongst the Hindu community, a Hindu woman knows that she must maintain the relationship."

Help is sought by those of who have no sense of honour and dignity

Very interestingly, some participants viewed that help-seeking is preferred by those women who do not have any sense of shame and dignity. In their opinions, domestic violence is not a matter that should be frequently discussed with others rather it should be solved through familial means. They blamed that the lower class women lack in the sense of shame and dignity. Therefore, they bring their personal matters to the public. In so doing, they degrade themselves, their husbands and their families. One village leader opined:

> "The poorer women do not have any shame. On and often, they get engaged in altercation with their husbands and abused by them. If they are abused in the mooring, they would tell people at noon, but in the afternoon, they would go

> back to normal relationship with their husbands. They would do the same thing in the following morning."

In the preceding few sections I discussed the various perceptions of the community people regarding domestic violence concerning issues related to forms, causes, consequences, coping strategies and help-seeking practices. In the following section, I have brought various community activisms concerning domestic violence.

Community activism against domestic violence

Shalish- the most powerful community intervention

Shalish (informal arbitration) is a very important community dispute resolution process through which local disputes are resolved very quickly. It is organised by the *shalishkars* (arbitrators). However, there is no definite rural structure and size of *shalish*. It usually comprises local leaders, local elites, local public representatives, religious leaders, and the elderly etc. This system in the village has been in place for centuries. It also helps the poorer people to avoid the hassles associated with seeking recourses with the formal justice system. Most of the participants had had the experience of working with this informal justice system. Participants said that when they act as members of *shalish* they always try on how to bring amiable solution between the parties. They impose fine and give minor punishments. Some participants admitted that in order to bring solution to a problem they deliberately do not highlight the problems of the victims rather force the victims and their families to accept their settlement. A public representative said;

> "I admit that not all decisions on domestic violence are made fairly. During *shalish* we try to minimise the problems. We do not want to highlight women's problems largely."

Another village leader said;

> "Often women do not get accepted justice from us. We make them understood that if they do not accept our solutions, their conditions might be worse."

The decisions taken during *shalish* are highly male-biased, female public representatives are hardly invited to act as members in the *shalish*. On the other hand, participants also mentioned that at any cost they want to come to a decision in the *shalish* in order to help the poorer victims to avoid the hassles associated with the existing institutional support mechanism such as; the court and the police. Some participants also admitted that *shalish* process is not only male-dominated or male-biased, but also corrupt. Women's husbands mange people involved in the *shalish* through unfair means and pull the decisions towards their favour. A village elderly said;

> "Today's *shalish* process is absolutely corrupt. Young village leaders dominate the whole process and they do whatever they like through unfair means. Victims cannot expect proper remedies for their problems."

Interventions of religious leaders and other community members

I was informed sometimes victims also seek informal recourse with religious leaders. Although, the frequency of seeking recourse with the religious leaders has been reduced, still it is practiced. Similar to *shalish* arbitrators, religious leaders said that they try to bring some amiable solutions to family disputes. Muslim religious leaders said that their religious means include apprising men and women the messages of Quran and *Hadis* (teaching of prophet) regarding their responsibilities as husband or wife. However, Muslim religious leaders admitted that they have no absolute power like *shalish* organisers to impose any decision regarding family violence. An Islamic religious leader commented;

> "When the victims or their family members bring to our notice issue of domestic violence, we just suggest them to have patience and pray to Allah. We suggest husbands to behave properly with their wives. Swear upon Allah! Without this, we can do nothing."

On the other hand, imams of local mosques said that quite often they give message people regarding the rights of women in Islam and teaching of Islam against the harmful practices against women. One Imam said;

> "During Friday *khutba*[1] I sometimes deliver lecture against violence. I do not know how much lessons people receive, but I try my best."

Other than religious leaders, victims sometimes approach to other important members of the community such as; teachers, village elderly, rich people, land lords, higher caste and lineage members since they have considerable amount of importance over general villagers. Their approach to dispute resolution is also suggestive.

Case study: community shalish failed to solve problems of a victim

During October 2014, I was in my village for the purpose of my research. One afternoon, a young woman named Ritu came to me and sought help against violence of her husband and in-laws. Ritu, hardly around 17 or 18 years old, was from a nearby village and married just four month back. After marriage, her husband and in-laws pressurised and abused her in a number of ways for dowries. Failing to cope with violence at one stage she even wanted to commit suicide. On that day, her husband battered her seriously. Then, she decided to come to me with a hope that I could help her out. She knew about me from her neighbour. I was motivated to help Ritu. I decided to organise a *shalish* for her. Moreover, for the purpose of my research, I thought it would be good to observe a *shalish* process. At this stage, I adopted observation method. Village leaders who have experiences in conducting *shalish* were requested to conduct the *shalish*. Leaders listened to the complaints made by Ritu first, and then after, listened to the statements of Ritu's husband and in-laws. They arbitrators ordered Ritu's husband and his father to promise not to condone any violence against Ritu and take her back home. Ritu's father-in-law promised to follow the order of the arbitrators. Suddenly, Ritu's husband said that is not interested to

[1] The guidance sermon that imam of a mosque delivers on *Jumma* (Friday) prayer.

continue the relationship and cannot promise not to condone violence. Everybody got surprised at his remarks. Ritu really got nervous, and said she would not return. If she returns, her husband would kill her. Suddenly, Ritu ran away for his family of origin and disappeared quickly from the scene. At the same time, Sumon also disappeared. This is how the *shalish* ended without any solution.

Analysis of the Case

Within a very short span of marital life, Ritu became a harsh victim of domestic violence perpetuated not only by her husband, but also by her in-laws. Most strikingly, by this time, she had developed suicidal ideation. She was in desperate need of supports. While listening to her history, I thought a *shalish* might have been an effective means to help her out. *Shalish* that I organised was heading to attain some fruitful results for both the parties. Arbitrators conducted the *shalish* professionally. Earlier, while I had discussions with some arbitrators, I came to know that the prime objective of a *shalish* is to minimise the problem, particularly the problems of women. I also noticed a similar tendency in this *shalish*. Members of the jury board specifically suggested Ritu to calm down with her complaints. I also came to know earlier that a *shalish* could be ended in failure if any of the parties does not agree to the decisions. It happened to this *shalish* as well. While everything was getting normal, suddenly a few haughty remarks capsized the process. So the earlier experiences of the community members with regard to failure of a *shalish* just repeated in this case.

Case[1] *on community legal services (CLS): a community based programme to combat violence against women in mymensingh district*

Community Legal Services (CLS) is programme of Bangladesh Woman Lawyers' Association (BNWLA). BNWLA is one of the oldest human rights organisation in the country founded in 1979 and its main goal is to ensure access to justice for all women & children particularly for the most disadvantaged women and children in Bangladesh. BNWLA launched Community Legal Services (CLS) to achieve the goal of protecting women from violence through community legal services by December 2016. The programme covers 16 sub-districts of 12 districts in Bangladesh including the Gofargaon sub-district of Mymensingh district. The key services of CLS include: i) work as grass root level legal information centre; ii) deliver legal services including counselling, complaints receiving, fact findings, mediation, rescue, victim and witness preparation, case filing, client follow up, access to safe shelter homes, long term social rehabilitation and reintegration.; iii) provide telephonic advice to the victims. Conducting yard meeting is one its core activities through which rural women are being aware of various forms and practices of violence, and available legal remedies. Initially,

[1] This case was developed based on personal interview with Tasnina Ferdous Tanu, Solicitor, BNWLA, Gofargaon, Mymensingh. Information about the programme was also collected from Bangladesh Women's Lawyers' Association (BNWLA) website available at http://bnwlabd.org/mwlr/.

the project team received massive resistance from the local community particularly from the rural *shalishkarks* (arbitrators) since there is a huge vested interest lies with *shalish* at the local level. One official of CLS programme remarked;

> "When we first launched our programme, many *shalishkaroks* (arbitrators) resisted us. They even said if CLS works here, they would have no activity. In traditional local *shalish* bribes are exchanged, and the arbitrators are benefitted out of the *shalsih*. Moreover, there were political pressures, pressures from the husbands and religious leaders. Over a short span of time, CLS has attained people's confidence. Rural women now do not want to go to the arbitrators to seek recourse for their family problems, many of them come to us."

Since inception to until October 2014, the four CLS centres of Gofargaon sub-district received considerable number (575) of complaints from the victims. Usually, upon receipt of a complaint, respective CLS centre organises *shalish* between the parties. One of the problems CLS face is that often the defenders do not respond to their notices, and they do not comply the decisions made in the *shalish*. Many *shalish* arrangements of CLS ended in vain. Moreover, the policy of filing legal case at its own cost is also insignificant since there is an instruction from the top just to file one case per year from each centre.

Up to now, I have discussed the perceptions and activisms of the majority Bengali community concerning domestic violence from two rural areas of Mymensingh and Netrokona districts. In the following section, I shall shift my focus on to indigenous matriarchal Garo community's perceptions and activisms.

Shift from Patriarchy to Matriarchy: Perceptions and Activism of Garo Community

Summarised findings from the focus group discussions with Garo community members are as follows.

Perceptions about the forms domestic violence

Most of the Garo community participants opined that despite being a matriarchal and matrilineal society, domestic violence in Garo community is not an unknown event. Women in the community also experience physical, mental, sexual and financial violence by their husbands. However, the prevalence of violence is not so pervasive than that of the greater Bengali society. For example; none of the participants in their lifetime heard of any incident of murder of a wife by her husband.

Perceptions about the causes of domestic violence

Men's tendency to dominate leads to perpetuation of violence

Garo social structure is very complicated. Women are the owner of the property, and the kinship system follows the matrilineal line, but men normally assume the formal roles of

leadership and authority. Men dominate the broader social organisation especially the public sphere. At the same time, they also want to dominate private spheres, which leads to conflict between men and women. One community member said;

> "Matriarchy is often an abstract concept in Garo community. Women are only the owners of property, but social power lies with men. Garo men not only play dominant roles in public spheres, but also want to do the same in private spheres."

Land is the main cause of conflict

Garo women are mostly the victims of financial abuse. Land is a source of financial abuse against Garo women. Most of the conflicts between men and women derive from issues related to management and ownership of lands. Although women inherit land from matrilineal line, men want to manage it. In most cases, men sell the lands without taking consent of women and force them to register. One community leader commended;

> "Quite often husbands verbally sell lands, and pressurise their wives to transfer lands to the buyers. If they do not agree to register, husbands condone physical and mental torture Many Garo women have become landless due to this practice."

Alcohol consumption

Consumption of alcohol is a part of Garo culture. Both men and women consume indigenously prepared alcohol. On this point, participants opined that excessive consumption of alcohol ignite various forms of violence against women.

Influence of patriarchal Bengali community

Over the years, the Garo community has become minority in their own territory by the deliberate infiltration of the patriarch Bengali community. They have tactfully and forcibly captured the land and property of the Garo community. However, there has been an influence of Bengali life style on Garo community. Their patriarchal ideologies and values are penetrating infiltrating the ideologies and values of Garo community. Most of the participants opined that this is one of the reasons as to why men, being not traditionally the head of the family, want to dominate women like their Bengali neighbours. One participant said;

> "The Bengali people have migrated to our area from many parts of the country. Garo community is influenced by Bengali patriarch culture. It is a reason for familial conflict. Men want to dominate over their wives as they see men in Bengali community dominate their wives."

Perceptions about the consequences of domestic violence

Participants also said about various impacts on women caused by domestic violence. The most serious impact is due to losing their property and land. When women lose

their property, they become helpless and destitute. Their honour and dignity in the community also go down. To cope with the effects, they go to Dhaka or some other places and start working as domestic helps/household servants, and they also work as garment workers. Sometimes they also become sexually abused. Many Garo women are now completely dislocated from their roots, and sometimes with their children as well. One participant commented;

> "Social dislocation of women is ruining our social fabric to the extreme. Once they go to Dhaka, they usually do not come back."

Perceptions about the coping strategies and help-seeking practices

With regard to coping strategies and help-seeking practices, participants informed that usually Garo women try to cope with domestic violence within themselves. As there is no provision of divorce amongst the Garo community, many women silently indulge domestic violence. Moreover, women mentally weaker and modest. They do not want to make their problems public. Nonetheless, in extreme cases, Garo women seek help with their family members, *Mahari* (family clan) and also with Tribal Welfare Association (TWA). They never go to any community NGOs and do not seek recourse to any formal institutional mechanisms.

Garo Community Activism regarding Domestic Violence

Community activism in dissolving conflicts is very strong in the Garo community. *Mahari* (family clan) is the first stair of community intervention. *Mahari* is a group of people descending from mother's lineage. *Mahari* head is a male, and usually the maternal uncle of women. Each *Mahari* resolves small social and family related problems in its own ways. On the other hand, there is a Tribal Welfare Association (TWA) and the members of TWA are elected through direct voting by different indegenous communities. If problems are not resolved through *Mahari* intervention, women might seek recourse with TWA. Upon receipt of a complaint, TWA follows the usual process of conducting *Shalish.* Participants said that TWA at any cost tries to resolve the family problems so that women do not need to go to formal institutional mechanism.

Discussion

This chapter brings the perceptions and activisms of the local community with regard to domestic violence. I selected community participants who were strongly associated with local problems. Although, community perceived domestic violence in many different ways, in this discussion section, I shall limit myself only around the key points of their discussions. Participants' ideas with regard to forms, causes, consequences, coping strategies and help-seeking practices are consistent with almost all the earlier studies in Bangladesh which have focused on these issues. It is said if community does not view domestic violence as a problem, it would not take any action in favour of women since community attitudes and actions shape the social environment of domestic violence (Abeya et al. 2012). It is good to note that most of the community members recognised domestic violence as a problem for their community, and there are

certain intervention mechanisms in the community as well. Moreover, their apparent perceptions about the whole gamut of domestic violence indicate that community pays a close eye on this social problem.

There were some unique features of community perception about domestic violence. Although domestic violence is widely prevalent in Bangladesh society, community members broadly viewed that women from lower and poor socio-economic strata seek recourse, either formal or informal. Although, such perception is strongly opposite to western experiences where women with higher status and education seek more help (Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Gelles, 1977; West et.al. 1998 quoted in Naved et al. 2006). Community also viewed that Muslim women seek more support than Hindu women do. In my opinion, it is an attempt to breaking typical patriarchal ideology of *purdah* (seclusion[1]) which is largely levelled with Muslim women. On the other hand, one of the important features of community perception is that it identified a change in people's perception with regard to understanding domestic violence in a holistic manner. It is not merely a physical violence, but a combination of many. It indicates that in rural areas, domestic violence issue is gradually becoming a matter of concern, and a matter of discussion and analysis. Notably, in domestic violence literature, physical violence is only a part of domestic violence, it has many other forms such as; psychological, emotional, economic sexual and emotional (e.g. The Advocates for Human Rights, 2010; WHO 2005). Although, community members identified various factors of domestic violence, I think, identification of patriarchy as a cause of domestic violence has valuable implication. Patriarchy is invariably linked-up with violence again women. It is the origin of women's oppression (Stacey, 1993), and the fundamental mechanism to historically maintained discriminatory practices against women (Dobash and Dobash, 1992). Early marriage, dowry demand, practice of polygamy and demand for male child are the reflection of women's subornation in patriarchal culture. Even the involvement and conflict with mother in law is a reflection of women's subjugation in patriarchal structure. With such a tendency, women becoming the enemies of women (Ganguli and Rew, 2011), and unknowingly acting in favour of the structure and system of patriarchy since their conflict surround men and they take advantage of this situation. On the other hand, by identifying economic violence as form of violence and its relation with micro-credit borrowing, community members cast doubt to the proposition of empowerment of women in Bangladesh. Notably, Bangladesh is globally recognised as the breeding home for empowering women through micro-credit financing, but obstructions created by the husbands on matters related to independently using women's credit money from NGOs questions the validity of such proposition. Since community members are closely associated with local problems, I think, validity with regard to women's empowerment is subject to examination. On the other hand, with regard to impacts of domestic violence, both Bengali community members and Garo community members identified social dislocation as an impact of domestic violence. In Bangladesh, many women and girls are employed in garment industries, and becoming economically sufficient. It is also considered as a source of women's empowerment in academic literature in Bangladesh. But the question is if some women leave their villages due to domestic violence, will mere

[1] Is a practice assumed to protect women from men. In many societies value is placed to separate women from unrelated men by practicing *purdah*.

economic emancipation help them to overcome emotional distress, detachment from family and children? I think future research must study these aspects with critical insights. On the other hand, community members, identified many impacts on children due to domestic violence. On this point, I am equally concerned with them since studies found witnessing domestic violence by children might lead them to be fearful and anxious (Harne & Radford, 2008), and there is a powerful association between childhood experience of domestic violence and that of being potential perpetrators (Buzaza & Buzaza, 2003; Naved & Persson, 2005).

Shalish is the most widely used system of community intervention in rural areas for violence against women which is used by community NGOs also. It is interesting to note that in one hand, community perceived patriarchy as a cause of domestic violence, and on the other hand, the structure and process of *shalish* is notoriously male-dominated, male-biased and often acts in favour of the perpetrators. Women's problems are deliberately minimised in the *shalish* process. Such finding is consistent Khan's (2001) observation that states that money and male power play a role in influencing decisions of the *shalish*. Moreover, this mechanism becomes no effective if any party does not comply the decisions. One of the most unexpected incidents happened while a victim came to me to seek recourse for her domestic violence experiences. The *shalish* that I organised ended in failure due to non-compliance of the decisions made in *shalish* by her husband. Result of this *shalish* cast doubt whether this patriarchal system of rural dispute resolution has absolute authority to bring solutions for domestic violence incidents? On the other hand, there were evidences of failure of *shalish* arranged by the community NGO as well. Perpetrators often did not attend to NGO call. It indicates the stronghold of patriarchy amongst perpetrators and disregarding women's support mechanism.

In addition to that, I also did not find any significant differences between matriarchal Garo community's perceptions with that of patriarchal Bengali community's perceptions regarding domestic violence. Although women are traditionally the head of the family, but men dominate women in every respects which is similar to Bengali community. Their coping strategies are almost similar to Bengali community; but with regard to help-seeking, Garo women never seek support to formal institutional mechanism unlike the Bengali community since they have their own support system. Similar to my findings, previous studies on ethnic minority women in USA, confirmed that ethnic minority women seek support only from ethnic specific support services (Abraham, 2000). The influence of patriarchy also prevalent in Garo community. However, due to prevalence of patriarchy with relation to domestic violence, I term this community as 'pseudo matriarchal'. Women of Garo community are equally vulnerable to their Bengali sisters. Such assumption is consistent with the observation which states that women of all ethnic groups are equally susceptible to domestic violence (Gonzalez, 2010).

Conclusion

Since it is a qualitative study, I do not generalise the findings of this study in the whole context of Bangladesh, but specific to the study areas. Nevertheless, this research has important implication in the literature of domestic violence in Bangladesh since it has

opened up new issues which never touched upon before. Finally, I suggest community can be an important gateway to redress domestic violence since community commonly indentifies domestic violence as a problem, and there are certain community mechanisms to redress violence against women. If community's positive perception and their mechanisms can be properly mobilised and activated, redressing violence in the society would be easier. Government and non-government organisations must strive how to use community's positive perception in to transform it to better service delivery system.

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FAMILY POLICIES IN ROMANIA WITHIN THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK[1]

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Abstract: *Despite attempts to harmonize social policies, EU countries differ greatly in the support they provide. Social policies have different traditions that emerged and developed in different social and historical contexts, so there are considerable differences in terms of resources, organization and coverage. As a result, family policies are even more heterogeneous than is suggested by the standard welfare state regimes.*

Despite the fact that it was one of the few expansionary welfare areas from the European Union in the last years, family policy is characterized by a small degree of institutionalization. This paper studies the cross-country differences of state family support, using secondary data analysis on statistical indicators and legislative or formal documents information. The accounted types of support are financial transfers, leave entitlements, and provision of services. The study analyzes the specific features of these instruments and how they merge to form a more or less comprehensive policy package, with a special focus on Romania. The results reveal a scarcity model of family policy, with a familialisation trend doubled by the passive and rather reactive support.

Keywords*: models of social policies, family policies, leave entitlements, childcare*

Social policies at EU level

Despite attempts to harmonize social policies, EU countries differ greatly in the support they provide. Employment policies are always mentioned as a central element in social policies, but social measures almost never played a major stake in economic policies. Social policy has been rather sidelined from the beginning of the common EU policies. Moreover, after the financial crisis, social policy is built around a rather economic vision in which key elements are "social security", "pensions", "labor

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market", "and structural reforms". "Social Europe" has not progressed much since the advent of this goal (Ferrera, 2005; Barbier, 2012a). "Social justice", "redistribution" and "social protection" have always hit the barrier of the national implementation level, remaining rather metaphors in general political discourse than political realities. The main target of the social programs – reducing poverty – is still very difficult to reach and the success of the implemented measures is rather limited.

Social policy at the EU level can be seen more as a political discourse rather than a set of programs with actual results. Social spending at EU level is negligible compared with the national ones, the authority of political decisions being placed almost exclusively at national level. The innovative Open Method of Coordination of the late 1990s is a matter of political speech, without effective power of coordination (Barbier, 2012b). The very concept of social policy in its traditional sense seems inappropriate when applied at European level, with a rather vague and "elastic" meaning (Barbier, 2012b). We are facing a paradoxical situation: "policy without politics" at European level and "politics without policy" at the national level (Schmidt, 2006:5). Social policies continue to be implemented by each country, despite EU regulatory efforts, and so path dependency and cultural differences lead to different design of the policies.

Great diversity in social and family policies

The modern state has consolidated a number of social functions as an instrument of development (Zamfir and Zamfir, 1995). In spite of commonalities, there are considerable differences between countries in terms of resources, organization and coverage. Social policies have different traditions, that emerged and developed in different social and historical contexts (Flora, Heidenheimer 1995; Pfau-Effinger 1999). Even within the same country, social policies can bring together different measures, partly incoherent, as adaptive responses to problematic situations.

Simplifying, we can divide the classical models of social policy in two opposite orientations: an institutional redistributive model with universal social services and generous benefits versus a minimalist model, with targeted and residual benefits. The classification is more theoretical, whereas empirical studies reveal the difficulty of treating social policy as a coherent and unified body.

Before the EU admission of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the most common classification was in 4 distinct classes: the northern, the continental, the Anglo-Saxon and the Mediterranean ones (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Ferrara, 1998). The classification corresponds not only to models of social policy, but also to specific geographic areas, dividing Europe into regions politically and spatially coherent. This classifications originate from the ones developed by Esping Andersen in 1990, based on the degree of decomodification, the redistributive impact of social benefits and services and the degree of private sector involvement in the provision of benefits (Esping-Andersen 1990: 22). The Social Democratic Europe (Nordic countries) has universal and homogeneous social programs, aiming the independence and social equality of individuals together with a decent standard of living. The Liberal Europe (Anglo-Saxon countries) encourages individualism based on the labour market and on the welfare schemes developed by

market principles. Social benefits are usually granted based on means testing and target the poor. The Conservative Europe (continental and Mediterranean countries) has highly differentiated insurance programs by occupational status, social benefits being provided according to the contribution to insurance schemes. The Southern European countries are considered part of the conservative regimes but the emphasis placed on family make them to be considered as a different model (Ferrera 1996; Esping-Andersen 1990).

Most studies classify the former socialist countries into a single category, treating them in bulk, although neither their transition process to the capitalist market, nor their history before 1989 was not identical. Romania was ranked in all typologies as part of the former communist bloc. But the socialist countries had to opt for various protection actions, as punctual responses to social problems that appeared in the transition to a capitalist society, so that can be considered hybrid arrangements, with a variety of interim solutions (Kovacs, 2002; Tomka, 2006). After joining the EU, under pressures to harmonize policies, social options have become closer to old models (Wisniewski, 2005). The latest typologies place Romania in the category of countries with high social inequality along with Italy, Spain, Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria (Knogler and Lankes, 2012). In Romania the state social intervention was modest, complementary and compensatory with the economy; active employments policies have not proven to be capable of significantly compensating the deficit of employment opportunities. For 25 years Romania has had a sinuous poverty path corresponding to the dynamic of the economy (Zamfir, 1995; Zamfir, 2001).

Family policies have gained a great importance in Europe over the last decades due to important challenges such as ageing, heterogeneity of families or work and family reconciliation. Despite that these challenges have made it one of the few expansionary welfare areas, family policy is characterized by a small degree of institutionalization (Family Platform, 2010).

Family policies are more heterogeneous than is suggested by the standard welfare state regimes. The attempts to categorize the family support did not strictly reproduce the categories of countries derived from the well-established classification of welfare state regimes or from previous cross-country comparisons of family policies (Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997; Gauthier 2002). Moreover, current studies indicate that in recent developments and reforms of family-support policy, some countries have switched to more mixed forms of support in order to achieve additional objectives. For example, Thevenon (2011) finds 5 types of family welfare: the Nordic countries (based on substantial help to combine work and family for parents with young children), the Anglo-Saxon countries (focused on support for poor families, single parents, and households with preschool children), Southern Europe (with very limited assistance), Continental European countries (with an intermediate position between the above patterns, France being the positive "outlier" with high public spending on families with children and high support for working mothers) and Eastern Europe (with policies in transition).

Former communist countries put down the individualistic and de-familialisation option, previously imposed by the communist state, and "tried to reintroduce the traditional

familisation regime […] moving back toward the path of re-familisation" (Saxonberg & Sirovatka, 2006: 186). Typically, the obligations of extended families are strong, while state responsibilities are weak and, revealing the lack of coherency of the family policies and a "legacy of social dissatisfaction with state intervention in family life" (Appleton & Byrne, 2003: 217). Recent and local studies place Romania in the non-interventionist category based especially on the recent austerity policy drive delivered cuts in the benefits (Stănescu I., 2014)

Policy aims and research dimensions in analyzing family policies

Family-support policies have a large range of goals that are difficult to categorize. Because of its intersectional character, they gathered objectives from different areas, related to income maintenance, labour market, education, health, social care, and so forth. I choose to resume the large variety of the possible objectives in three categories, as following:

- *Income maintenance*: this aim is typically addressed by allocating economic benefits to the most disadvantaged families or certain categories of families considered to be more vulnerable (single parents, large families, low-income families) (Maitre, Nolan, and Whelan 2005).

- *Provision of a work-family balance*, especially for women: parental leave after birth with guaranteed security of income and employment; childcare services, flexible working hours for parents with young children; incentives to work for the parents through the tax system and so on.

- *Support for childhood development, especially in early life:* compensating the cost of children, benefits to families aiming to alleviate the gap in standards of living between the families with children and the ones without children. A special focus comes on children's enrolment in formal childcare and education, thus a large variety of care and educational services are developed.

Other objectives – like the pro-natalistic one or the protection of women from gender discrimination and domestic violence, the protection of other vulnerable groups like elderly or other dependants – are less explicit and less common, being a subject of debate. However, I consider that *alleviating the demographic imbalance* – even if it is not a stated goal for most of the countries, represents the foundation and the stake of the family policy. Population aging due to the persisting low fertility rates represents a major concern for the most European countries because of the long-term consequences for social and economical development and for the sustainability of the welfare state itself. Raising fertility has rarely been an explicit policy objective, but it is considered as a positive potential and implicit result of the support offered by other objectives.

Taking into account these categories of objectives, I opt for the following areas of analyzing European family policies: public expenditures, leave policies, childcare and educational services.

I look at cross-country differences in state family support using the Mutual Information System on Social Protection Database, the Council of Europe Family Policy Database, and the OECD Family database. The types of support accounted for are financial transfers, leave entitlements, and provision of services. I analyzed the specific features of these instruments and studied how they merge to form a more or less comprehensive policy package, with a special focus on Romania. At the beginning of the investigation I identify the regulatory frameworks of the family policies, sorting out the declared policy objectives in EU states.

Regulatory frameworks and stated policy objectives

Regulatory frameworks did not represent an interest topic in family policy research even though there are significant differences between countries.

The Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries have less family policy explicitness, being more preoccupied by the child protection and individual protection in general. The Mediterranean and Post-Socialists countries (Romania also) have more policy explicitness, the protection of the family unit being usually written in the constitutional law. Moreover, there is a great variety in the legal recognition of family diversity, from the Nordic countries which put the same sex marriages on the same position with heterosexual marriage, to the Mediterranean and Post Socialist countries where this form of family is not yet recognized.

There is a growing trend of institutionalisation of family policies. Even though measures may be drawn up and implemented by several departments, in the majority of countries (21 out of the 28 EU members) family policy is coordinated by a single institution (on a regular basis a Ministry). Furthermore, 7 countries (Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) have the name "family" in the title of the designated ministries. Only in 7 countries (Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Ireland, Netherlands and the United Kingdom), the institutional framework for family policy is inter-ministerial, having various institutions involved in policy design and implementation (annex, Tabel 1) .

The Council of Europe family policy database reveals that there is a great variety in policy objectives, but common trends can be identified. Based on the information provided by the ministries responsible for family affairs, the most common objectives for national family policies are: 1) financial support for families, 2) reconciliation of work and family life (in the aspect of gender imbalance) and 3) service provision for children. Other frequent objectives encountered are legislation and other measures for the protection of children in general (namely children in Institutions) and parenting support (annex, Table 2). The reconciliation of work and family life in the aspect of care for dependant people and measures for the protection of women are less common. For the protection of women only Romania and Germany have a specific objective.

Romania has an interesting pattern compared to the European trend: it is clearly oriented on financial aid (financial support especially for poor families, but also for families in general or specific types of families) and at-risk groups – children (in institutions) and women. The majority of European countries have also the objective of

financial aid for families, but the second interest is in the reconciliation of work and family life and the provision of services. Hence, if the EU pattern in family policy objectives is less passive, considering the focus on work/life balance and services provision, the Romanian policy is just reactive, focusing on the passive support of money and on the protection of at-risk groups.

Expenditures on family support

The highest expenditures on family benefits are shared by the UK together with Denmark, Ireland and Hungary, all of them have a share of 4% of GDP or more. Romania is among the poorest, with only 1.7% of GDP spending, reaching only 60% of the EU average.

Chart 1. *Public spending on family benefits, in percent of GDP, 2011*



Source: OECD Family database

If the EU is spending an average of 557 PPS per capita on the family social protection, Romania is at a third – 181 PPS, ranking the second lowest in the EU (surpassed only by Latvia).

Romania differs from the former socialist countries which in all classifications are usually grouped together. Most of them have much bigger financial efforts: Hungary over two times higher and the others set around 2.5% of GDP. Besides Romania, only Poland has family expenditures below 2% of its GDP. The similarity with the Mediterranean model is obvious, having a level of expenditures comparable with Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece.

Leave policies

Leave policies are between the most investigated areas of family policy research. There is vast disparity in the structure, length and payments, but some common trends can be identified though (Family Platform, 2010):

- Introducing a short paternity leave in addition to short health oriented maternity leaves
- Introducing non transferable periods for each parent within parental leaves (partners' months or "daddy months") on the basis of a more equal share of work and family balance between both parents.

Chart 2. *Paid maternity and parental leave in EU Member States (in weeks), 2014*



Source: OECD Family database

Maternity leave varies from 59 weeks in Bulgaria to only 6 weeks in Portugal, with an EU average of 20 weeks. Romania offer 18 weeks, being around average, in the dominant category of countries which provide a paid leave of 16-20 weeks (half of the countries are in this category).

Paid parental and home care leave varies from 144 weeks in Finland to 17 weeks in Belgium, several countries not offering such a benefit at all (UK, Ireland, Poland, Cyprus, Malta, Spain). Romania has 10 weeks above the EU average, showing greater support.

Cumulating both types of leave, the most generous countries are Slovakia, Finland, Estonia and Hungary with a length of over 3 years of paid leave. Romania is slightly above average, but it can be placed in the dominant category with a length of 42-62 weeks (half of the countries are in this category).

There are 2 aspects for which Romania exceeds the majority of European countries: the payment rate for parental care and the father's involvement in childcare (see annex, table 3). Romania pays 85% of the previous earnings for the parental leave, being surpassed only by Lithuania (100%) and Slovenia (90%). The proportion of men in parental leave (6.2%) is at huge distance from the rest of the countries (with values below 1%). Only Finland has a notable value of 4.2%; Luxembourg (1.7%) or Slovenia (1.4%) being the other countries above 1%.

Chart 3. *Proportion of employed parents with a child under age 1 on leave, 2011*



Source: OECD Family database

Leave policies put into debate the classical categorization of countries and especially the socialist block of countries, which have very diverse positions. Considering the leave structure, the lengths and the imbursements, Romania belongs to the category of countries with bigger efforts. It is not the most generous, but is above the EU average at all indicators and does not have any similarities with the Southern very austere model, as in the case of public expenditures.

Care services

Childcare has been one of the crucial family policy issues in the EU during the last years. There is plenty of research of the childcare services on comparative grounds. Common trends are: increasingly introducing the legal entitlements for childcare and making the last pre-school year compulsory and free of charge, but these expansionary efforts vary between strong, moderate and virtually non-existent (Family Platform, 2010).

***Chart 4**. Expenditure on childcare as a percent of GDP, 2011*



Source: OECD Family database

Denmark and Sweden have the greatest expenditure on childcare at quite a big distance from the other countries. France, UK and Finland have also made some financial efforts with over 1% of GDP. Romania has a slightly above average position with 0.8% of GDP expenditures and surpasses the former socialist countries (except Bulgaria which has the same level of expenditure).

Despite the financial effort, the participation in formal care is one of the poorest in EU. Only 10% of the children under the age of 3 are enrolled in crèches or kindergartens, three times lower compared to the EU average. For children of 3-5 years the participation rate is 73%, still below EU average, but not at the same distance.

***Chart 5.** Participation rate in childcare and pre-school services among children aged 0-5 years, 2010*



Source: OECD Family database

***Chart 6**. Use of informal childcare arrangements during a typical week by children's age, 2011*



Source: OECD Family database (using EU-SILC 2011)

Former socialist countries are typically placed below EU average, confirming the "re-familialisation" trend in opposition with their past. The explanations for this tendency are related to cultural changes (growing influence of religion, re-valorization of family and traditional values) but also to the lack of state involvement. In many cases children are staying home with their parents, grandparents or other relatives as a strategy of adaptation to the lack of resources and services. Over 40% of the Romanian children, no matter what age they have, are involved in informal care arrangements.

Conclusions

Considering the 4 aspects (regulatory frameworks, expenditures with family policies, leave entitlements and childcare services) the classical typologies of social policies are not entirely confirmed. The most coherent group is the Southern countries, with the lowest state support. The most difficult group to agree on is the former socialist countries, with the greatest variations in the solutions they provide. Romania itself has an incoherent situation, with a conservative regulatory framework, a lack of financial effort and a scarcity of childcare services but with pretty generous leave policies.

Overall, we can say that Romania, as some of the former socialist countries, has moved to a "familialisation" regime (Saxonberg & Sirovatka, 2006). The Romanian family is protected by the constitutional law; many benefits are dedicated to the family unit, not to individuals, the state policy generally encourages the classical nuclear family unit as base for the protection system. The familialisation trend is doubled by the passive support option. The main objectives in family policy are the financial aid (especially for poor families) and the protection of at-risk groups (children without families and vulnerable women).

Leave entitlements are the positive aspects within the Romanian family policy, being quite generous in lengths and imbursement. In addition, men are involved in parental leave at the highest rate in the EU. This data could be a sign of a better work life balance and gender equality, but other indicators say the opposite. Men are involved in parental leave as a strategy of adaptation to the lack of resources and services.

The "familialisation" development indicates in fact a scarcity in the model of policy. Not only does the state recognize and reinforce, through legislative and policy measures, the traditional family values, but it also places a greater responsibility on it.

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***Council of Europe Family Policy Database, www.coe.int/familypolicy/database ***MISSOC – Mutual Information System on Social Protection, http://www.missoc.org ***OECD Family database, http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm

ANNEX

Table 1. Institutional Framework of Family Policies, 2014

	Main coordinating institution	Various institutions
Austria	Federal Ministry of Family and Youth	
Belgium		Federal public service Social Security, National Office for social security, Institute for Sickness and Invalidity Insurance, Federal Agency for Child Benefits the child benefits funds
Bulgaria	Ministry of Labour and Social Policy	
Croatia		Ministry of Social Policy and Youth + Ministry of Health
Cyprus	Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance	
Czech Republic	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs	
Denmark		Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs + Ministry of Employment
Estonia	Ministry of Social Affairs	
Finland	Ministry of Social Affairs and Health	
France		Ministry of Labour, Work and Social Dialogue + Ministry of Finance and Public Accounts + Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
Germany	Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth	
Greece	Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Welfare	
Hungary	Ministry of Human Resources	
Ireland		Department of Social Protection + Department of Health
Italy	Ministry of Labour and Social Policies	
Latvia	Ministry of Welfare	
Lithuania	Ministry of Social Security and Labour	
Luxembourg	Ministry for Families, Integration and the Greater Region	
Malta	Minister for the Family & Social Solidarity	
Netherlands		Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment + Ministry of Health, Welfare & Sport
Poland	Ministry of Labour and Social Policy	
Portugal	Ministry of Solidarity, Employment and Social Security	
Romania	Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Protection and Elderly	
Slovakia	Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family	
Slovenia	Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities	
Spain	Ministry of Employment and Social Security	
Sweden	Ministry of Health and Social Affairs	
United Kingdom		Department for Work and Pensions + Department for Business, Innovation and Skills + HM Revenue & Customs

Source: Author's classification based on MISSOC – Mutual Information System on Social Protection, Organisation of Social Protection Country-specific Tables, http://www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COUNTRYSPECIFICDESCS/ORGANISATION/organisationSocialProtection2014.htm

Table 2. Family Policy Objectives across EU Member States

Countries	Pro-natalist objective	Financial support				Reconciliation of work and family			Service provision		Strengthening family		Legislation and other	
		poor families	families in general	large families	specific types of families	recon-ciliation / gender imbalance	father's role	care for dependents	for children	for elderly	parenting	domestic violence	protection of children (namely in institutions)	protection of women
Austria		X	X			X	X		X		X			
Belgium	X				X	X			X	X	X	X		
Bulgaria	X	X				X	X		X		X		X	
Croatia	X					X			X	X	X	X	X	
Cyprus		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	
Czech Republic						X	X		X				X	
Denmark		X			X	X			X				X	
Estonia	X	X									X		X	
Finland		X	X			X	X		X		X		X	
France		X	X		X	X			X		X	X		
Germany			X			X	X		X		X			
Greece	X	X				X			X	X			X	X
Hungary	X	X												
Ireland		X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X			
Italy	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	
Latvia	X		X		X	X			X				X	
Lithuania	X				X									
Luxembourg			X			X			X					
Malta						X			X		X			
Netherlands		X	X			X			X		X	X	X	
Poland		X		X	X								X	
Portugal	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	
Romania		X	X		X								X	X
Slovak Republic	X		X		X	X			X		X		X	
Slovenia	X	X	X			X	X	X	X					
Spain			X			X	X		X	X		X		
Sweden		X	X		X	X	X		X					
United Kingdom		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Sum	12	18	15	5	13	23	12	4	23	8	15	8	16	2
		51				39			31		23		18	

Source: Council of Europe Family Policy Database, http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/familypolicy/Source/Comparative%20table_Family%20Policy%20Objectives.pdf

Table 3. Summary of paid leave entitlements. Full-rate equivalent paid maternity, parental and father-specific leave, in weeks, 2014

	Paid maternity leave (weeks)	Average payment rate (%)	Full-rate equivalent paid maternity leave	Paid parental and home care leave available to mothers	Average payment rate (%)	Full-rate equivalent paid parental and extended leave available to mothers	Total paid leave for mothers	Average payment rate (%)	Full-rate equivalent total paid leave for mothers	Paid leave reserved for fathers	Average payment rate (%)	Full-rate equivalent paid leave reserved for fathers
Austria	16.0	100.0	16.0	44.0	56.4	24.8	60.0	68.0	40.8	8.7	56.4	4.9
Belgium	15.0	63.0	9.4	17.3	20.3	3.5	32.3	40.1	13.0	19.3	25.7	5.0
Bulgaria	58.6	90.0	52.7	51.9	43.1	22.3	110.4	68.0	75.0	2.1	90.0	1.9
Croatia	30.0	100.0	30.0	26.0	34.4	8.9	56.0	69.5	38.9	8.7	34.4	3.0
Cyprus	18.0	75.3	13.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	75.3	13.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Czech Republic	28.0	70.0	19.6	82.0	44.2	36.3	110.0	50.8	55.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Denmark	18.0	53.3	9.6	32.0	53.3	17.1	50.0	53.3	26.7	2.0	53.3	1.1
Estonia	20.0	100.0	20.0	140.3	46.2	64.9	160.3	52.9	84.9	2.0	100.0	2.0
Finland	17.5	78.4	13.7	143.5	20.1	28.8	161.0	26.4	42.6	9.0	70.7	6.4
France	16.0	100.0	16.0	26.0	18.4	4.8	42.0	49.5	20.8	28.0	24.2	6.8
Germany	14.0	100.0	14.0	44.0	47.0	20.7	58.0	59.8	34.7	8.7	47.0	4.1
Greece	17.0	75.4	12.8	26.0	40.7	10.6	43.0	54.4	23.4	0.4	100.0	0.4
Hungary	24.0	70.0	16.8	136.0	39.3	53.5	160.0	43.9	70.3	1.0	100.0	1.0
Ireland	26.0	34.7	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.0	34.7	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Italy	21.7	80.0	17.4	26.0	30.0	7.8	47.7	52.7	25.2	0.2	100.0	0.2
Latvia	16.0	80.0	12.8	78.0	50.8	39.6	94.0	55.7	52.4	1.4	80.0	1.1
Lithuania	18.0	100.0	18.0	44.0	100.0	44.0	62.0	100.0	62.0	4.0	100.0	4.0
Luxembourg	16.0	100.0	16.0	26.0	39.1	10.2	42.0	62.3	26.2	26.4	40.0	10.6
Malta	18.0	86.6	15.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	86.6	15.6	0.4	100.0	0.4
Netherlands	16.0	100.0	16.0	26.0	18.1	4.7	42.0	49.3	20.7	26.4	19.3	5.1
Poland	26.0	100.0	26.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.0	100.0	26.0	2.0	100.0	2.0
Portugal	6.4	100.0	6.4	23.7	58.9	14.0	30.1	67.6	20.4	21.3	54.2	11.5
Romania	**18.0**	**85.0**	**15.3**	**43.0**	**85.0**	**36.6**	**61.0**	**85.0**	**51.9**	**1.0**	**100.0**	**1.0**
Slovak Republic	34.0	65.0	22.1	130.0	23.6	30.7	164.0	32.2	52.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Slovenia	15.0	100.0	15.0	37.1	90.0	33.4	52.1	92.9	48.4	2.1	90.0	1.9
Spain	16.0	100.0	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.0	100.0	16.0	2.1	100.0	2.1
Sweden	8.6	77.6	6.7	51.4	72.1	37.1	60.0	72.9	43.7	10.0	18.9	1.9
United Kingdom	39.0	30.9	12.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	39.0	30.9	12.1	2.0	20.2	0.4
Average	**19.65**	**82.65**	**14.95**	**32.35**	**37.83**	**17.19**	**52.00**	**68.19**	**32.15**	**6.63**	**61.50**	**2.82**

Source: OECD Family database

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IS QUALITATIVE RESEARCH GENERALIZABLE?

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Abstract: *Many qualitative researchers are faced with the everlasting question of generalizability of their findings, especially when trying to support their research in front of quantitative researchers. Despite this state of affairs qualitative researchers rarely discuss generalizability of their data and argue that a deeper understanding of the phenomena is the goal of their endeavour and not statistical generalization. Furthermore, quantitative researchers usually dismiss the results of qualitative research based on the lack of generalizability. I argue that this state of affairs is a crude simplification of reality based on either a misconception about what qualitative data is or on a misconception of the aspects of qualitative data analysis that lead to generalizability like: the purpose of the research, the sampling method, the data analysis method and the coding strategy. The paper suggests that discussions on generalizability should become the standard for reporting qualitative report if the research question is phrased to demand a general answer.*

Keywords: *qualitative research; generalization; external validity; non-probabilistic sampling; coding; grounded theory.*

What is generalization

The most important standards of research are validity and reliability. Still, the definitions of validity and reliability are sometimes considered to differ for qualitative and quantitative research. In quantitative research, reliability is the "consistency of a measure of a concept" (Bryman 2008: 140), while validity is a measure of "whether an indicator (or set of indicators) that is devised to gauge a concept really measures that concept" (Bryman 2008:151). Generalizability is also known as external validity (Bryman 2008; Chelcea 2001). Also, the distinction between external and internal reliability and external and internal validity may be adapted to the purposes of qualitative research. While external reliability refers to the replicability of a qualitative

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study, internal reliability refers to inter-rater reliability if multiple coders or observers are used for qualitative coding or observation. On the other hand, external validity is used to refer to the degree to which a research is generalizable to other settings, while internal validity is concerned with the link between theory and observation or coding. Some researchers use the term validity with the meaning of internal validity (see for example Hanson 2008: 107) while others use the term reliability with the meaning of external reliability (see for example Potter and Levine-Donnerstein 2009: 261).

Generalization is not accepted by many researchers as the purpose of qualitative, interpretative research. For example, by looking at the qualitative research literature Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2009) argue that in qualitative research statistical generalization is usually replaced by "analytic generalizations" – generalizability to theory instead of population based on how concepts relate with each other – and "case-to-case transfer" (p. 883) – generalizing from one case to other similar cases from a chosen set of points of view. This conclusion is shaped by Firestone's (1993, cited by Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2009 and by Polit and Beck 2010) models of generalization, namely statistical, analytic and transferability. Analytic generalizations are thus meant to generalize "from particularities to broader constructs or theories" (Polit and Beck 2010: e4). Hanson (2008) on the other hand points out that the notion of *universe* that is used in generalizations based on quantitative research has the same role in generalizations based on qualitative research as the notion of *context*. Other researchers point out that the standards of qualitative research should be trustworthiness, instead of internal and external reliability and validity. It should be measured as credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Guba and Lincoln 1994, cited by Bryman, 2008).

Nevertheless, generalization is defined in many ways. For example, Polit and Beck (2010: e2) think of generalization as "an act of reasoning that involves drawing broad conclusions from particular instances – that is, making an inference about the unobserved based on the observed. In nursing and other applied health research, generalizations are critical to the interest of applying the findings to people, situations, and times other than those in a study". On the other hand, Payne and Williams (2005: 296) think that "[t]o generalize is to claim that what is the case in one place or time, will be so elsewhere or in another time". They see generalization as an inductive reasoning process. Bryman (2008: 187) argues that generalization is not only concerned about drawing conclusions from a sample to a population, but also from one period of time to another.

More than this, Polit and Beck (2010) argue that what is considered to be statistical generalizability is either a myth or an ill applied theory. They point out that most random sampling is extracted from a conveniently accessible population, like students at the university, while the population to which the generalization is to be made is usually poorly defined in most quantitative research (Polit and Beck 2010: e4). This means that the starting point of constructing a sample is usually the sample and not the characteristics of the population (Polit and Beck, 2010). Nevertheless, generalizability is mainly a standard and especially a high standard which cannot be judged to be appropriate or not by arguing that most researchers do not follow it.

In this paper I will argue that generalizability should be considered as a standard of evaluation if the research question reveals the need to generalize, and if the sampling method and the data analysis method allow generalization. In the first part of this paper the practice of generalization in qualitative research will be shortly investigated. Then sampling requirements for generalizability will be pursued within the literature, such that in the third section the connection between data analysis methods and generalization may be analyzed. The final part of the article will draw some conclusions about the conditions in which qualitative research is generalizable.

The practice of generalization in qualitative research

The main argument against using statistical generalization for qualitative studies is that their purpose is not to generalize. In support of this claim, researchers have studied the types of generalization that are usually employed by qualitative researchers. While some researchers from interpretive sociology reject the standard of generalizability altogether, others use "*moderatum* generalization". *Moderatum* generalization means that results of qualitative inquiry "are not attempts to produce sweeping sociological statements that hold good over long periods of time, or across ranges of cultures", but conclusions that are "open to change" (Payne and Williams 2005: 297). The conclusions of such *moderatum* generalizations may be further tested statistically, but this is considered to be a different topic. On the other hand, qualitative research should ensure "transferability" by providing as much contextual information as possible in order to aid future researchers to identify the relevant characteristics that should be transferred to a different study (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, cited by Bryman 2008).

A study on research published in volume 37 of *Sociology* (journal of the British Sociological Association) from 2003, showed that scholars do not discuss generalizability, but make generalizations in different ways (Polit and Beck 2010). From 17 articles which employed qualitative methods, all have made generalizations, but only 4 tried to back up their claims openly (Polit and Beck 2010). These authors backed up their general claims either by "later feedback from a conference with a wider range of informants", by "call[ing] for more studies", by "claim[ing] moderatum status for their position" and by "deny[ing] to make them [generalizations]" (Polit and Beck 2010: 300). Similarly, generalization practices have been studied from articles published between 1990-2006 in the journal *The Qualitative Report*. From 125 empirical studies there were only 8 justified generalizations and 45 which have made generalizations (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2009). Although there are no such studies available for Romanian sociology journals, it is easy to find qualitative research that gives general conclusions without discussions of how this is achieved with respect to sampling or coding method (see for example, Ecirli, 2012, Gheondea-Eladi, 2013) or research that neither gives general conclusions nor a discussion on the generalizability or transferability of the findings (see for example, Tufa, 2011). It is also easy to find qualitative research that does not require such discussions, since the population discussed is very small (see for example, Alexandrescu, 2010; Mihalache, 2010).

At the other end, researchers who employ quasi-experimental studies do not differ so much in their practice from their qualitative counterparts. Shadish, Cook, and Campbell

(2002) looked at how researchers make generalizations from quasi-experimental studies that do not abide to sampling theory due to various causes like: lack of resources, logistics, time constraints, ethical constraints or political ones or simply because "random sampling makes no clear contribution to construct validity" (p. 348). Their study provides some examples for the claim that quantitative studies rarely abide to the random sampling requirements that support statistical generalization, proposed by Polit and Beck (2010). Shadish et al. (2002) argue that researchers use five principles in order to ensure generalizability:

- *surface similarity*, which is based on "surface similarities between the target of generalization and the instance(s) representing it" (p. 378). For example the identification of the characteristics of the target population to which a generalization is sought. In this way generalization can be made from treatments or outcomes or persons for which the study has been undertaken to other treatments, outcomes or persons which share these same surface similarities.

- *ruling out irrelevancies*, which is based on the "identif[ication of] those attributes of persons, settings, treatments, and outcome measures that are presumed to be irrelevant because they would not change a generalization and then to make those irrelevancies heterogeneous (PSI-Het [purposive sampling for heterogeneous instances]) in order to test that presumption" (p. 380)

- *making discriminations* between "kinds of persons, measures, treatments, or outcomes in which a generalization does or does not hold. One example is to introduce a treatment variation that clarifies the construct validity" (p. 382). For example discriminating between two levels of a construct for which the two levels lead to substantial changes in the direction and the size of the causality.

- *interpolation and extrapolation* by "interpolating to unsampled values within the range of the sampled persons, settings, treatments, and outcomes and, much more difficult, by extrapolating beyond the sampled range" (p. 354). For example, the use of more than one level of a treatment or of a response, instead of using dichotomous variables for their estimation brings about the possibility to make inferences about the levels of the treatment or of the responses that have not been captured in the study. Extrapolation means making inferences from a range of treatment levels to those outside the range. Interpolation means making inference from a range of treatment levels to those within the range, despite the fact that they were not captured in the study.

- *causal explanation* which is employed by "developing and testing explanatory theories about the target of generalization" (p. 354), for example by testing whether the same stimulus has different effects in different settings. In this case, to generalize would be to say that all different effects have the same cause.

These generalization principles, as can be seen are very similar to those employed earlier for qualitative studies, except for the causal explanation which cannot be assessed through qualitative research. Nevertheless, generalizability is also dependent

on the sampling method, and the data analysis method. The following sections will address the link between these two elements of research and generalization.

Sampling methods for generalizability

In a very simple and generally accessible account, qualitative studies are studies that look at words as data instead of considering numbers as data (Bryman 2008). In qualitative studies research and theory are linked in an inductive manner as opposed to the deductive one from quantitative studies (Bryman 2008). Also, the epistemological view in qualitative research is interpretivism and the ontological one is constructivism (Bryman 2008). Quantitative studies depart from a theory that potentially answers the research question of the study, formulate hypotheses, choose a research design, select sampling units, collect data and analyze the data in order to formulate some conclusions that will answer the research question. Qualitative studies also depart from a research question, but collect data that will later be interpreted in order to formulate a theory that will lead to an answer to the research question. Nevertheless, this overly simplified view does not reflect the complexity of either qualitative or quantitative research. In practice, quantitative studies may depart from the data to look for a "problem" that may be explained by several theories which will be tested against further data or start from a theory that explains the research question and test the particular theory against the data. In a similar manner, qualitative studies may interpret data in light of a chosen theory (top-down analysis) or build a new theory from the data (bottom-up analysis).

In light of these general differences, sampling for qualitative and quantitative analysis is also performed differently. Usually, sampling is performed in order to "estimate the true values, or parameters, of statistics in a population, and to do so with a calculable probability of error" (Russell 1988: 79). While quantitative studies employ probabilistic samples, qualitative research is usually concerned with non-probabilistic sampling: quota sampling, haphazard (convenience) sampling, snowball sampling, purposive sampling and theoretical sampling (Russell 1988). While quota sampling requires previous knowledge about the population to which generalization is to be made, the other types of non-probabilistic sampling requires little or no previous knowledge about it. Convenience and snowballing sampling is mostly employed in qualitative research for pilot tests or for populations that are very difficult to reach, like drug users or some vulnerable groups. This is why only the last two non-probabilistic methods will be of interest in order to study the generalization potential of qualitative research.

Purposive Sampling

Purposive sampling was originally a probabilistic sampling technique which described "a random selection of sampling units within the segment of the population with the most information on the characteristic of interest" (Guarte and Barrios 2006). There are two types of purposive sampling (p.s.): p.s. for typical instances and for heterogeneous instances (Shadish et al. 2002). P.s. for typical instances is based on defining and randomly selecting typical cases and their characteristics. Generalization in this case is possible only for units that share the selected characteristics. P.s. for heterogeneous instances is based on defining typical cases and randomly selecting units in order to

obtain the widest variation possible for the sample. The logic of this type of sampling is that if relationships are validated despite the wide sample variation, then these relationships will be very strong. In general this type of sampling differs from the one performed for quantitative studies in that it seeks to replicate the mode of the desired population within a sample with the widest variation, instead of replicating the mean of the population in the sample. For qualitative sampling this method is usually performed without random selection from the population with the most amount of knowledge.

Theoretical Sampling

Theoretical sampling is a recursive type of purposive sampling that stops when theoretical saturation is obtained (Bryman 2008; Strauss and Corbin 1998). This means that new data are no longer obtained, that each category for which a sampling session has been organized is developed in a way that is satisfactory and that the relationships between categories have been shown to be stable and valid (Bryman 2008; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Data is analyzed after each sampling session and new sampling units are defined according to the theoretical needs of the developing theory. Generalization from theoretical samples thus infers from some particular descriptions to a general theory. Particular descriptions are based on the identification of typical characteristics and irrelevancies, just like in purposive sampling. The transfer from particularity to theory is performed by means of abstraction or conceptualization. This is the point in which data analysis becomes an issue. But data analysis cannot be performed unless sampling units are defined properly.

Sampling Units

Defining sampling units is the main starting point in any sampling endeavor. But this is not a linear process, but an iterative one between the universe, context or theory to which the generalization is performed and the potential sampling units. It is important to decide what kind of outcomes are desirable at the end of the research. In order to provide an explanation for this, I will describe two sampling alternatives for a research I conducted. This research was aimed at studying the decision-making models employed by patients with chronic Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) infection. The main research question of the study was: *how do patients with chronic HCV infection (CHCVI) decide between treatments for their illness?* Two logical structures of the methodology for such a study could be envisaged:

1. If a sample is extracted from the population of *patients* diagnosed with CHCVI, then the characteristics of the structure of the decision-making process employed by these patients should be generalizable to the population of all HCV infected patients.

2. If a sample is extracted from the population of *decision-making situations* of patients diagnosed with CHCVI, then the characteristics of the structure of the decision-making process employed in such situations should be generalizable to a general theory of decision-making for patients diagnosed with CHCVI.

In other words, one may use as sampling units *people diagnosed with CHCVI* or the *contexts* in which these patients decide. Also, it is possible to generalize to the population of people diagnosed with CHCVI or to a theory of decision-making

applicable to this type of patients. For the first type of sampling units, purposive sampling is required because patterns of decision-making will be followed in patients' accounts and inferences will be of the type "most patients decide in this way". If enough data is sampled, inferences can then be refined to "most patients with these characteristics decide in this way". Purposive sampling in this case means that patients should be randomly selected from the population of patients with CHCVI. For the second type of sampling units – decision-making situations or contexts – a theoretical sampling is required because patterns of decision-making will be pursued within particular contexts and inferences will be of the type "in most situations, patients decide in this way". If enough data is sampled, inferences can also be refined to "patients in this type of situation decided in this way". Thus, knowing that both context and patient characteristics influence the decision-making structure of patients with CHCVI, it is possible to sample one or the other, since neither can be held constant. If contexts are sampled, the underlying assumption is that patients employ the same decision-making structures irrespective of their internal characteristics (like education, intelligence, etc.). If patients are sampled, the underlying assumption is that patients employ the same decision-making structures irrespective of the context they are in (family support, medical support received, stage of illness at diagnosis, etc.). Clearly, both assumptions lead to a simplified representation of reality.

As mentioned before, the purposive sampling method requires previous knowledge about the population, while the theoretical sampling procedure does not. In our case, the purposive sampling method requires knowledge about the cases in which the decision-making structures differ, like: (1) the characteristics of the decision-making situation which cause patients to adopt a decision-making structure or another; (2) characteristics of the diagnosis which cause patients to adopt a decision-making structure or another. The theoretical sampling procedure requires an iterative data collection strategy and data-driven re-sampling and data collection. It is based on purposive sampling on various concepts of the developing theory.

Qualitative data analysis for obtaining general results

Many times it is assumed that in qualitative research coding is the data analysis, but this is only an intermediary step that facilitates analysis (Saldana 2009). Still, coding takes the most amount of the time spent to analyse qualitative data and it may also lead to differences in the latter data analysis, since different coding schemes will lead to different results. This is why qualitative researchers have given it great priority when discussing qualitative data analysis. On the other hand, the validity and reliability of a qualitative study depend on the validity and reliability of the coding scheme (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein 2009).

Coding can be performed in two separate ways: top-down and bottom-up. In top-down data analysis, the researcher departs from theory and uses predefined coding schemes to pursue this theory within the data. This type of coding scheme should be followed by analysis which may use either quantitative measures (e.g. frequency tables) or qualitative measures for the main concepts (e.g. a synthesis of contextual elements that provide answers to the research question or differences in the meanings of the main

concepts of the research question, etc.). In bottom-up data analysis, the researcher departs from the data and uses abstraction from particularities to pursue the theory that would emerge from the data. After the coding scheme is built, hypotheses that provide an explanation for the research question are tested against further sampled data.

Top down data analysis

Top-down data analysis departs from a theoretically driven coding scheme in which the concepts and categories of the coding scheme are pre-established with respect to the driving theory. Extensive rules for applying the codes need to be designed in order to ensure the consistency of their application. Potter and Levine-Donnerstein (2009) point out that reliability and validity are constructed differently depending on the "locus of meaning" (p. 261). Moreover, they argue that the "the locus of meaning" leads to "manifest" content, "latent" content and "projective" content, each one of them having different relationships to theory and different ways to construct reliability and validity. "Projective" content leads to particularly difficult tasks for coders since codes are attributed by "constructing interpretations" (p. 261), while for "latent" content the task requires the recognition of patterns. The easiest task for coders is given for coding manifest content, when the accurate recording of content is the only task required (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 2009).

The internal reliability and validity of a top-down coding scheme are given by the consistency with which the coding scheme is applied (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein 2009) and by prior testing of the coding scheme against data. External validity on the other hand, depends on the degree to which the coding scheme reflects the theoretical concepts of the driving theory such that they will be transferable to other settings. For example, if a coding scheme is very much particular to the setting it is applied to and has little links to the theory, then it may be more difficult to find common grounds to transfer it to other settings. On the other hand, if the coding scheme is too abstract and has little connection with the data, while being strongly theoretical, it will be very difficult to explain why a certain fragment of text should be coded in one way and not the other. Some trader-off or middle way should be achieved.

Bottom up data analysis

Bottom up data analysis is usually performed as part of grounded theory. Grounded theory aims to construct a formal theory that would answer the research question, but emerges directly from the data and not the other way around. Bryman (2008) gives a very intuitive scheme for the work-flow of grounded theory (Figure 1).

Grounded theory is based on *open coding* which is "an analytical process in which concepts are identified and their properties and dimensions are discovered within data (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Open coding is also an iterative process in which data is transformed in either *in vivo* codes or concepts which are then classified – thus forming classifications – and then grouped into categories. Passing from data to concepts or from *in vivo* codes to concepts requires a process of abstraction. In open coding, concepts and classifications are then interpreted by means of *memos,* to form categories

(Strauss 1987). The links between different concepts, classifications and categories are used to form the *substantial theory*. Strauss and Corbin (1998) differentiate between (1) coding *in vivo* which means labeling a part of text by using the words of the responder; (2) *conceptualizing*, which means labeling a phenomenon by means of abstraction; (3) *classification*, which means the identification of types of a certain concept; (4) *categorization*, which means the interpretation and/or clustering of concepts into categories. Strauss and Corbin (1998) point out that it is always possible to classify the same content in different ways, just as a pen, a paper knife and a press-papier can either be tools for writing or weapons.

Figure 1. *The work-flow in grounded theory*



Source: Bryman (2008)

After a substantiated theory has been built, the research is replicated in other settings such that several other substantiated theories will yield. After a satisfactory amount of replications have been performed, a formal theory may emerge from all substantiated ones. In terms of validity and reliability of this theory, it is now easy to see that the consistency of concepts and categories of each substantial theory should be preserved in order to ensure a reliability of the formal theory. Also, the accuracy of the coding should be controlled to preserve the internal validity of the theory. Replicability in

different settings, on the other hand should ensure the external validity of the final formal theory.

Coding and data analysis

As mentioned before, coding and data analysis are not the same procedure (Basit 2003; Saldana 2009). Some coding may be analyzed quantitatively, by counting frequencies for example while the same coding may be analyzed qualitatively, by uncovering underlying meanings or links between concepts. Open coding or top-down coding does not give the research a qualitative or quantitative orientation. It is the actions that are performed with the resulting codes that provide such an orientation. Clearly, the choice of the data analysis depends on the research question.

In which circumstances is qualitative research generalizable?

In this paper generalization has been discussed with respect to qualitative methodology. After discussing some differences in defining generalizability with respect to qualitative and quantitative research, the results of several studies on the practice of generalization have been presented. Further on, the link between generalizability and sampling methodologies characteristic to qualitative studies have been presented and an example of choosing among alternative sampling units and sampling methods for one study has been discussed. Furthermore, top-down and bottom-up coding techniques were presented with respect to their subsequent data analysis method and their contribution to external validity. In this way, this paper argues that some qualitative research can be led by the standard of generalizability.

Since the main parts of a research which provide external validity are the sampling method, the coding strategy and the data analysis method, qualitative research is generalizable when the appropriate sampling, coding and data analysis methods are employed. Moreover, if the sampling method is either purposive or theoretical, generalizations can be performed either to the typical population represented by the sample or to a theory. Further attention should be given to the identification of the characteristics of the typical population and to those characteristics deemed irrelevant, in case of purposive sampling or to the provision of enough data that would allow replication and transfer of the research to different settings in case of theoretical sampling.

The implications of this study on generalization for qualitative research are primarily concerned with the general practice of reporting of qualitative research results. Since qualitative research can be generalizable, an open discussion on generalizability should become the standard in reporting qualitative analysis if the research question is phrased in a way that demands a general answer. An open discussion on this topic should address the issues of the relationship between the sampling method employed and external validity as well as between the coding method and external validity. Any qualitative data report should also discuss its potential for transferability and replicability of the research.

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