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Rea, A., Tripier, M. (2008). *Sociologie de l'immigration*. Paris: La Decouverte

Koh, H. K. (2010). A 2020 vision for healthy people. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 362(18), 1653–1656

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## MIGRATION AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION. THE CASE OF ALBANIA AND GREECE

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Rifat DEMALIJA<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** *Migration has become a very sensitive issue for the society not in Albania, but in Europe and beyond it last twenty years. The development through migration seems to be a political issue, therefore it's still regarded a social problem which needs to be controlled. Migration has played a big role within the social order, bounding societies with high cultural differences and beliefs. The case of Albania and Greece, after 1991, helps me to claim that migration has not only influenced the development of both countries, but it has also transformed the social life.*

*This paper aims to take into account two important issues; social transformation and human mobility and its relationship with migration and development, observing the case of Albania and Greece 1991-2013. The paper will answer the question about the social integration and benefits of both social groups involved; migrants and hosting communities.*

*Globalization (especially after the collapse of the communist regime in Albania), represents an important development in social, economical and political life in both countries, Albania and Greece. The migration of Albanians denied for more than forty years by the communist regime, was reflected with the wave of migration after 1991 initially in Italy and Greece. Within two years, more than 300,000 Albanians emigrated, seeking for a better life, while after 20 years more than 1 million Albanians are living abroad. Albanians are by far the largest groups of foreign workers in Greece, estimated at 650,000 to 800,000. With the economical crises in Greece the situation has changed and many of migrants have decided to return home. What they bring home is not only their money and experience, but they bring most the social transformation.*

*Focusing on the social transformation and human mobility, this research brings into the attention not only benefits of economical developments, but also the social transformation, through exchanging skills and attitude, brain circulation from which benefits both countries.*

**Keywords:** *Social transformation, migration, development, brain circulation.*

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## 1. Introduction

After 1991, Albania has faced with one of the great emigration of modern times in Western Balkans comparing Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. Between 1990 – 2013, roughly 800,000 people have migrated out of Albania, where more than 650,000 of them are settled in Greece, where Albanians make up 60% of immigrants (INSTAT, 2002). After the fall of communism in the early 1990, a large number of economic emigrants arrived in Greece to seek employment. Although our attention is focused on the migration after 1991, we should be aware that migration in Greece is not a new phenomenon for Albanian. The *Arvanites* in Greece, are the historical legacy of such Ottoman migration, and constituted a significant part of the tiny population of Athens at the birth of modern Greek state in 1830. A wave of Albanian migrations started in 1912 after the Balkan Wars and continued until 1945 when the new post-war regime prohibited emigration (Philip & Susan M. and Ferruccio, 2002) Although the initial entry of Albanians in Greece in 1991 until 2000 was through mountains by walk, after this time it seems to have been by visas for those who had relatives in Greece.

This paper, interprets social transformation and human mobility and its relationship with migration and development, focusing not only on economical benefits, but also the social transformation, through exchanging skills and attitude, brain circulation from which benefits both countries. It answers the questions about the benefits of both social groups involve; migrants in one side and hosting communities in the other side.

From the very arrival of Albanian migrants in Greece were stigmatized as “dangerous people” by Greek media. There were repeated claims such as that reported in a leading newspaper, *Kathimerini*, in January 1996 that 60% of all recorded crimes were committed by foreigners, mostly Albanians (Lazaridis and Wickens, 1999). In fact, as demonstrated in some reports and analyses of immigrants and crime in Greece, the statistics cited that immigrant crime is largely confined to robbery, theft and beggary, whereas serious crimes (murder, rape) are committed overwhelmingly by Greeks (Baldwin-Eduards, 1998). After the first wave of Albanians migration, where most of them were engaged on different sectors of Greek economy, there is evidences that Greeks have increased personal contacts with Albanian immigrants and have changed the negative stereotype.

An important dimension of the relationships between immigrants and Greek families has started to appear after the integration of their children in schools. Both immigrants’ children and Greek have studied in same classes, bringing so the culture differences in a setting that young people get over the stereotypes created in the past.

Because of the fact that Greek economy is suffering during last four years, the migration towards Greece is reduced. After 20 years of migration, as it has appeared the Greek crisis in its economy, many of Albanians have been thinking to leave Greece. Some of them are already returned to Albania with their families, while many others have migrated to other developed countries. In the period 1990–2003, an estimated 45% of Albania's academics emigrated to Canada, USA, UK and other EU countries, as did more than 65% of the scholars who received PhDs in the West in the period 1980–

1990. 22,395 Albanians live in Canada, while 113,661 is the current Albanian population in United States<sup>1</sup>.

In this paper I argue that we need to think more clearly what social transformation and development has happened due to the migration of Albanian in Greece. The reason why the relationship between migration and socio-economic development has attracted so much the public attention is because of the returning back in their home country and the need to adapt with the new environment. One of the questions that I want to raise, is how could we offer a better environment for repatriated emigrants? What are the social transformations that they bring back in Albania, and if we are ready to make them feel at home? What are the skills and attitude they bring back, and the government could develop policies for this group of people? In this context, I think that it is important to recognize the impact that returned migrants will have not only in the economy but also on social life.

Human mobility, is likely to have both positive and negative consequences for both countries, in the social transformation and development, thus it is quite challenging to analyze those.

Recent studies on relation between migration and development are focused mainly on international migration and its impact on economic growth, poverty as well inequality in sending countries. The debate on migration and development has tended to bring different perspectives from the 1950s as a theory of development-alism, moving later during 1980s towards views influenced by the new economics of labour migration, while after 1990s migration theories are focused on a transnational approach. During last four decades, the impact of migration on development in migrant sending countries has been the subject of heated debates. This debate is reflected on recent studies, targeting Albanian migration and immigration towards Greece and other Western countries.

The debate between migration and development has two different approaches, those who are optimists which are inspired by neo-classical theory and others who are pessimists which are drawn by structuralism social theory. Optimists see the migration as a tool that develops the economy and generate remittances and investments as well knowledge and skills to be invested in the economy and directly stimulate the development (Taylor, 1999), while pessimists tend to address migration as a negative phenomenon contributing to the “development of underdevelopment” instead of the reverse (Lipton, 1980, Rubenstein, 1992). Migration pessimists have also argued that remittances were mainly spent on investments such as houses a rarely in productive enterprise (Lipton 1980).

Remittances are considered a vital source for the development of the economy. However the current debate on migration, remittances and development suffers from a number of shortcomings. Sen (1999) offered a more comprehensive approach to development by conceiving it as the process of expanding the real freedom that people

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<sup>1</sup> Migration Policy Institute. <http://www.migrationinformation.org/article/albania-looking-beyond-borders/>

enjoy. His understanding of development includes elements such as social well-being, poverty alleviation, income inequality, gender equality and universal access to primary education, health care and meaningful employment.

These debates on migration and development seem to be influenced by the paradigm shift in social theory in which social scientists harmonize the debate interaction between migration and development.

## 2. Methods

The research methodology involves the collection and the analysis of materials relevant to the study. The basic way deals with: data collecting, data analyses and the analyses of the findings from the field work. To answer the main question, the study implies the method of analyzing theories and empirical work. Theoretical work is based on former studies related to immigration and development, and critics towards this perspective, analyzing the experience of migration of Albanians after 1990 in Greece.

The empirical task is focused on the field work, using thirteen interviews with returned and seasonal emigrants. All these data collected are analyzed qualitatively.

## 3. Migration flow

This paper is mainly focused on the migration after 1991, which is still continuing nowadays. In 2000, the Albanian migration scholar Kostab Bajraba published official of the total number of Albanian emigrants living abroad in 1999. The Albanian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs estimated 800,000 emigrants with 500,000 in Greece and 200,000 in Italy. Other countries hosting significant numbers of Albanians included Germany (12,000), United States (12,000), United Kingdom (5,000), Canada (5,000), Belgium (2,500), France (2,000), Turkey (2,000), Austria (1,000), Switzerland (1,000) and Australia (1,460). Some of these latter figures are likely to be underestimates, given the mobility of Albanian migrants, especially within Europe, and the rapid evolution of new migration channels and routes in recent years. Indeed, recently the new wave of migration of Albanians is towards U.K. (Bajraba, 2000).

The publication of the results of the 2001 Albanian Census (INSTAT, 2002) enabled new estimates of the scale of emigration during the 1990s to be made. Moreover, some estimates of its regional incidence could also be inferred. The Census revealed an estimated net loss due to emigration of more than 600,000, calculated by the census residual method. This figure is somewhat less than Bajraba's (2000) slightly earlier estimate of 800,000; but again, as noted earlier, the two figures are not incompatible since the census explicitly excluded short-term migration of less than one year's duration.

Whilst most authorities concur that Albanians in Italy number around 200,000, possibly 250,000 (Pittau & Forti, 2004), quantifying the much more fluid movement and presence of Albanians in Greece is more difficult since its cross-border, to-and-fro nature challenges the very meanings of migration and residency. However, the 2001 Greek census figure of 443,550 Albanians tends to confirm previous estimates which

were generally in the range 450,000 to 500,000, since the census will probably have missed some Albanians present in Greece (King, 2003).

#### 4. Challenges and barriers of migrants

Migrants from Albania, with a diverse language and cultural background, from the very beginning have faced obstacles to gaining host community acceptance, which limited their ability to participate, contribute and settle in Greece. Some of the barriers faced are related with language, negative stereotypes, discriminatory attitudes, negative and stereotypical reporting by media, which have led directly to the access to employment, education, health and housing.

Living in these new realities, to adapt to these cultures developed or consolidated civilization, as the case of Greece, adaptation it has been undoubtedly necessary; to know the culture, language, habits, to become part of the fast development, competitive and dynamic modern life there. In this respects, Albanians have demonstrated extraordinary vitality, power and energy as a result of long suppression during 45 years of dictatorship, but also as a reflection of the fact that it is a young population with 60% of population under 30 years (Pango, 2013).

With the exception of immigrants from Greek minority of Southern Albania, all other immigrants did not have knowledge of Greek language. This used to be a serious disadvantage in terms of matching the professional skills and experience of them with the available jobs openings. Lack of language courses for immigrants have created the missed opportunities to benefit from high professional qualifications.

The socio-cultural adaptation of emigrants is a matter of cultural differences and their daily contacts.

*‘New migrants sufficiently motivated to move forward appear aggressive for success at work and in school. They preserve ethnic identity, but also develop strong ties of solidarity and of social groups. In the other side, we must not forget that during the process of adaptation, there is assimilation, but also marginalization. Although many of Albanian migrants with university education, they have worked in common with hosting communities and other migrants without proper education’.*

This is the impression of new comers, as for the rest of the new generation – the children of these families – the life become more interesting. The adaptation of migrants is highly depended on their age. Adaptation of migrants in a very small age is easier, comparing adults, which have their roots on memories, habits, relationships, emotions and everything else is more vivid at present. A typical case for the aforementioned claims is of the family *Simani* from Kukes, which emigrated to Greece at early 1993.

*We have emigrated to Greece on March 1993, following the path of other Albanians and our relatives. By that time, we had two children, our daughter 11 years old and the little son 4 years*

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with Sh. Gashi, 7 February 2014. He has worked and lived with his family in Larissa, Greece for 13 years.

*old. The adoption of our daughter to Greece life was really difficult, while for the boy was easier. After we decided to come back in Albania, we have faced more difficulties than when we went in Greece. Children are feeling foreign and have no affections, or connection. For us as parents, we it is easier, since we have relative and memoires here, and we were employed and stabilized. Children are looking forward to go back while we never think about this<sup>1</sup>.*

For the majority of migrants who arrived in the early 1990, these experiences were unexpected, while for the others arriving later these became normal norms. Many migrants believed these barriers had arisen as a result of a lack of understanding within host communities about the intended outcomes of immigration policies and the mutual benefits for all Greek population. Observation of real social practices shows that Albanian migrants are adapted and integrated in the hosting communities, and have played a key role in the social economical life.

Additionally, migrants are put in difficult situations when faced with the border experience, which include stories of maltreatment, death, rape and destruction of identification documents. Below is a case faced by a migrant crossing the Greek border;

*“...crossing the border was the worst experience, full of fear not only from the Greek military, but also from Albanian gangs, that waited to rape or rob migrant people. I was going back for the third time to Greece illegally to work with a friend of mine, and just we crossed the border we faced a band that took us everything we had.”<sup>2</sup>*

Another important issue not mentioned yet is related to the migrants without documents. The majority of migrants were illegal and without proper documents, to work, thus for this reason, most of them have find employment in the informal economy. Despite the missing data regarding undocumented migration, labouris founded in the sectors of construction, agriculture, hotels, restaurants and domestic work. Reports regarding undocumented migrants, assess the undocumented migrant workforce as complementary to the formal economy, but others have notes that settled migrants could be competing with undocumented, as the later are willing to accept more precarious working conditions due to language difficulties, nationality, non recognition of their qualification and general experience of discrimination.

Access to services for illegal migrants, such as health and education has been very difficult from the beginning. The situation has changed over the years, and nowadays children have the right for education and health services. In 1998, an amnesty bill was passed by Greek parliament which intended to regulate illegal migrants in Greece and migration policy in general. This bill intended to regulate illegal migrants that were already living in Greece by application of ‘white card’ and ‘green card’. During 2001, a new migration policy named as Law 2910, ‘Entry and residence of aliens on Greek territory’ was the most important law passed in the Greek parliament regarding regularization of migrants, because for the first time migrants could get citizenship (Castles, 2006).

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<sup>1</sup>Interview with S.H. 13 February 2014.

<sup>2</sup>Interview with Lulzim, on 12 February 2014, returned migrant from Greece.



## 5. Economic impact and social transformation of immigrants in Greece

Contemporary trends to global economic and political integration lead to processes of social transformation in all types of society. Social transformation drives emigration from poorer countries, but it is also a process that affects richer countries, shaping the conditions for immigration and incorporation (Castles, 2007). There is a reciprocal effect in economy and social life, based on the intercommunion of migrants and hosting population. Understanding migration as an integral part of social transformation is not possible to be covered in this paper; however, there are evidences and interviews that claim the importance of these relationships.

According the report on Immigration to Greece the immigration flow to Greece after 1990 has been really huge. According this report, 57% of all immigrants come from Albania. Most of the immigrants were male while their average age was approximately 34 years. It is largely accepted that immigrants have had a great contribution to the Gross Domestic Product of Greece, with a net contribution up to 1.5% of GDP (Lianos, 2004).

An important issue with regard to the presence of immigrants in Greece, is the extent to which they causes unemployment of native workers, although it is difficult to prove that immigration has affected in a positive or negative way the level of unemployment of native workers. However there is a common belief that immigration has caused unemployment in disqualified and semi-qualified section of the labour market.

A substantial proportion of incomes earned by immigrants are remitted to their families. In the case of Albania, the development of this country has been highly depended on remittances from Albanians working abroad, playing a great role in its economy. Remittances sent from Albanian emigrants to their origin households have reached record levels: the Bank of Albania reports that Albanian emigrants' remittances have reached \$1,028 million in 2004, which is twice the size of the foreign exchange revenues from export and about 13.7 per cent of official GDP (Castaldo and Reilly, 2007). Recent studies assert that most of the remittances are mainly spent on basic consumption, such as food and consumption or on building and improving housing (Cerruti, 2000).

Regarding Social impacts, one of most evident difficulties remains their integration in the Greek society. The majority of studies analyze the conditions of social exclusion, arguing that the source of this phenomenon is the nationalistic. Immigrants are seen in many cases as the cheap manpower, as well as people whose "inferior" cultural origin necessitates the assistance of more privileged societies (Lianos, 2004). Immigrants' activities and behavior haven't corresponded to the norms of the mainstream society, since Greeks perceive themselves as a cultural homogeneous group, identifying "others" with no potential for creative action and changes. An important issue related the economic impact of immigration is related with the welfare services and other social benefits that immigrants consume. Based on the observation and findings during this study, it is true that seasonal migrants have not benefited from social welfare, while residential emigrants have benefited after three or four years of their settlement.

However, concerning the amount of social support received, it is concluded by that immigrants have used less social benefits than natives

Stephen Castles has argued for a social transformation approach to migration. It is simply not plausible to take migration in isolation as though it were not impacted by globalization and development, social and political struggles. For Castles, social transformation would be conscious of the complexity of social relation, interdisciplinary and comparative, always set in the broader context and historically grounded (Castles, 2000). In this perspective, I would rather bring in the attention the social transformation approach to trade unions, allowing us to view them as social movements. Although immigrants unions are not very well organized, they promote social movements, as a part of community, household, gender and cultural relations. Being able to organize different event, they can be seen as potential citizens and bearers of individual rights that can articulate collective grievances.

Among a variety of public portrayals, news representations play a significant role in the way people, culture and social life are represented in the public eye. News coverage is a means for all social groups to make their voice heard and communicate their agendas. Van Dijk, (1991) argued that immigrants were mainly represented in the print media in association with crime, violence, social welfare and problematic immigration, claiming that it is through newspapers that elites may affect what ordinary people think, therefore giving racist views popular currency.

## 6. Albanians returning from Greek migration

Recently there is a big attention regarding migrants returning from Greece, because of economic crisis they are facing. Their re-integration and broader sustainability has become an important issue last few years. As was previously seen, many of Albanian migrants in Greece have traditionally been temporary in nature of seasonal migration (Azzarru & Carletto, 2009). According recent studies, the returning of immigrants from Greece, particularly of those settled with families and for a long time, has started after the social-economical crises and political situation in Greece.

Many of these returned emigrants, after a long period of working and living in Greece with their family had decided to continue their life in Greece, because their children have started their education there and their language is better than Albanian, while there are also a category of migrants that had planned from the beginning their return to Albania, thus their integration in the Greek society has been very difficult. Some of the reasons found during the interviews with returned migrants are described as below:

*Because of unemployment; problems of integration; poverty and others to start a business; or a few of them who are return after having satisfied their initial ambitions such as saving enough money to buy a home.*

Living for a long time abroad, and especially for the new generation, young people who are educated in Greek, the Albanian society and sometimes even the Albanian language is unfamiliar to those young people. Being not prepared to return and having high problems to reintegrate in a country without experience, it has become a social problem

for their families and for the community as well. A teacher from the primary school in Kukes, explains the difficulties of integrating a pupil returned from Greece.

*“...In my class I have a girl who is eight years old returned from Greece and she speaks not very well Albanian. For me it is very hard to work with this category of pupils, as we are not used to work in the past. They need separated time, and the environment also seems to be very different with what this child is used to have in Greece. There is a lot of difficulty for her and for us both in the integration”<sup>1</sup>.*

There are other cases of returned migrants, such as of young people, who have studied in Greece. This category, believes that it is easier to penetrate to Albanian labour market than abroad, thinking that the labour market have more opportunities, especially in undeveloped areas. In this regard, many questions could be raised. What happens to a return migrant when they face the new reality? According to media in Albania, there are cases where returned people have become depressed, stressed or frustrated, because of big changes faced either by their children or by adults too. Professor Ylli Pango, explains this phenomenon as the case of their reasons for motivation; relationship between that is earned abroad and what is lost regarding cultural identity, individual personality and the ability to accept the reality (Pango, 2013). Regarding the fact what the migrant gained or lost is related with well-being in general in one side and social relations and contacts in the other side.

*“...Economically I was very well, but something else was missing in my life. My relatives, friends and all my life are strongly connected with Albania. Although I was well adapted in Greek society, my mind was to come back in Albania”<sup>2</sup>.*

The fact of getting the attention within their friendship circle is likely the main reason for Albanians, particularly for those who migrated in an adult age, to return back. Nostalgia for oriental customs, such as chin or gossip, are typical for most of the people and migrants seems to miss them a lot. In most of the cases, returning back home from the emigration is as difficult as the time when they migrate abroad. Many of returned migrants are still living with their savings, which can produce a real social problem, while there are other cases that they have started new businesses. Their contribution to Albanian economy has been very significant, thus they deserve to be well treated in order to be re-integrated very well in the society.

## **7. Benefits from exchanging skills and attitude, brain circulation**

Migrants coming from poorer countries are likely the source of their country development, because money remittances ensure a potential source of the investment. Another important discussion identified by different scholars recently is related with the idea of replacing ‘brain drain’ with brain circulation. Many migrants from countries in development, like Albania, are enhancing their skills through migration and after some years they are coming back home with more skills.

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<sup>1</sup>A.D. Teacher of primary school, interviewed on 13 February 2014, Kukes.

<sup>2</sup> Interview with Gezim, 15 February 2014. He is 45 years old, and he is a musician.

During the transition period 1991 – 2013, the tendency of migration to Greece has involved in the most cased migration of low level of education, while the migration of education people has been oriented mostly towards Canada or USA. The trend of migration by low educated people to Greece is because of the short distance, traveling without documents and the job market, where most of Albanian migrants are employed in construction, industry, agriculture and farming.

Although the level of education, it appears that both countries, Albanian and Greece have benefited from exchanging skills and attitude. Regarding the hosting country, migration provides a large pool of skilled labour, benefiting especially from the availability of skilled workers without the associated cost of worker training and education. Greek businesses, farming and agricultural families or cooperatives have benefited cheap labour force, getting a very positive impact on their outcomes, while Albania has benefited not only the remittances to its economy, but also brain circulation will be an asset for the development.

Another important element that needs to be mention is the new generation. As aforementioned in this study, many of migrants have already established their families in Greece and it is likely that their children born in Greece will not move back to Albania, since their homeland, unlike from their parants, is not Albania but Greece. In this case Greece is benefiting from the new population.

*Arben, a householder migrant in Greece states that his children born in Greece don't like the idea of coming back in Albania. They are born in Greece and educated in these schools, speaking mostly Greek, while Albanian is spoken only at home. Their childhood and memoirs will remain of Greek environment.*

This case illustrates far better the benefits of the new age, which has derived from the immigration.

The phenomenon of migration has produced also some costs for hosting communities as well for the sending ones. Sending communities have lost their human capital; deterioration of local economy as a result of migration of skilled labour; break up of many families, where many of them are divorced, or in some other cases elder people are living alone. The last concern is often faced on the southern part of Albania, where many villages are with empty housed and only some elder people live there. Another concern for sending countries is related with economic costs. The sending country loses the income tax revenue that they would have received if the workers had stayed in their country. However, this could be justified with the remittances.

Regarding the brain circulation, the discussion has changed in recent years, seeing the migration not only as a brain drain, but more as a brain circulation. Analysts such as Solimano (Solimano, 2006) note that “the emigration of talent can also have a positive effect for the source countries as well in terms of remittance flows, mobilization of fresh capital, accumulated by emigrants when they return home, exposure to new technologies and managerial techniques and contacts abroad...”. In the case of Albania, the success of emigrants is not only the remittances, but also the brain circulation, through the results of economic learning and bringing back to Albania. There are many cases and examples of returned migrants from Greece that have started different

businesses, based on their previous experience and background they have practiced in Greece. Being in these conditions, the sending country, in this case Albania government has to prepare the social and legal infrastructure for the integration of the returned emigrants with a proper attention to those educated people that aim to invest in the country.

## 8. Conclusion

Based on our observation and findings, and other studies regarding migration and development, it is obvious that migration has played a big role within the social order, bounding societies with high cultural differences and beliefs. Despite the problems of integration, or other difficulties that migrants face either in hosting communities or sending ones, it is clearly accepted to state that migration still affects very much social changes, bringing social transformation and development for both societies, hosting and sending ones. It is clear that different immigrant groups - depending on their number in a country – perform very differently in the social life, but in this case where Albanian migrants are the largest number in Greece, it is obvious their impact on the social cohesion. This refers to how migration has affected the hosting communities, their neighbourhoods where they are settled and local policies.

The social transformation is achieved through exchanging skills and attitude, brain circulation from which benefits both countries. The benefits from returned migrants have been underestimated and largely neglected by Albanian authorities and institutions, since the national and local authorities are moving very slowly in seeking ways to use the potential benefits from returned migrants. Most of the studies and reports have been focused on remittances rather than the human capital of returned migrants. Their impact in the economy is also through the transfer of knowledge, market information and sharing best experiences. Returned emigrants should not be seen as a problem for the economy, as it is mostly argued regarding the lost of remittances or if they can affect the rate of unemployment. What they bring back is not only their money and experience, but they bring most the social transformation.

What is it very important about migration and especially for the returned emigrants, it is related with the promotion of programs dealing with brain circulation and preventing the remittance dependence. In order to bring desired social changes, Albanian government should not only prepare appropriated policies and reforms, but it is important to foster the community about the social impact of returned migrants and their re-integration on the society. Social integration of migrants requires active participation and commitment in the communities where they live. Our observation explores that highly skilled migrants are returning in Albania with more human, social and financial capital and will play an important role on establishing businesses. Others who are not able to establish a business will bring a high impact on work environment of smaller companies, as they are experienced in a developed country.

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## FROM EUROPEAN MIGRANTS TO EUROPEAN CITIZENS: AN UNFINISHED PROCESS

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**Abstract:** *The present article explores the Europeans' change of status, from economic migrants to European citizens. In the beginning, Europeans were mainly seen as economic migrants empowered by law to freely move and reside within the territory of the European Community. The subsequent advancements within the European project and the European political context have consolidated the status of European migrants and have acknowledged them as members of a political community. Whereas this process can be seen as a sign of constitutionalism emerging within the European system (Simon, 2000), we can still wonder if the European citizenship is a real issue or merely a tool used by the adepts of the political union to build their arguments (Labayle, 1992). Whatever the answer, the European citizenship has been chosen as the appropriate argument to strengthen the sense of belonging to the European Union and, at the same time, to reinforce its legitimacy.*

*The European citizenship replaces the political dimension associated with the notion of citizenship (as stated by the classical theory) with an economic dimension; this breaks the foundation of our identity, as defined by the Nation State (Deloye, 2004). If the European perspective goes beyond the traditional approach which states that identities are organized around the State, the question is what type of new identification the European Union puts in place and how could the European citizenship become a status that allows for the separation between civil belonging and other forms of social affiliation (Leca, 1996).*

*This article describes the gradual conversion of a heterogeneous community of European economic migrants into a more-or-less homogeneous community of European citizens. It claims that, despite the consecration of the concept of European citizenship, the social ties that should underpin it and transform it into a reality are slow to emerge. The paper also presents some possible approaches that could push forward the debate and, why not, lead to a bottom-up transformation carried by those European migrants who need or want to see themselves first and foremost as European citizens.*

**Keywords:** *European Union; free movement of persons; economic migration; right of residence; European citizenship*

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## 1. Introduction

The "European migrant" is recognized as an effective reality and stated as such from the very beginning of the European process. The Treaty of Rome, article 48 (now 45) guarantees the free movement of active people (employed, self-employed) and of their families within the European Community. By virtue of this article, the European Community fostered and prompted a dynamic geographical and occupational mobility in the Member States.

The new "European migrant" (the person practicing a remunerated activity in another member country) is granted three freedoms - the freedom of movement, the freedom of residence, and the free movement of services (for services providers) - and one single principle - the principle of non-discrimination (the article 48§2 EC states that the free movement of workers *shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of employment*).

*Ratione personae*, the freedom of movement is limited to the employed and self-employed persons, without any reference to their nationality. However, practice has shown that this right was recognized only to the nationals of the Member States<sup>1</sup>, who are also the beneficiaries of the freedom of residence and the free movement of services.

*Ratione materiae*, the freedom of movement is granted for economic purposes, to promote economic integration on the Internal Market. Nevertheless, the notion of freedom of movement can not be limited to its economic significance but it should be addressed from a dynamic perspective.

The Community law has this distinctive feature of conferring rights directly to individuals. Certainly, the development of international law also reinforces the place of individuals in the international arena, but the self-executing provisions are however rare in international law. The right of free movement established by the Treaty of Rome became effective quite swiftly, its provisions being implemented in November 1968.<sup>2</sup> Since then, the principle has a direct effect in all Member States. Even if the scope of these rights is confined to the economic framework, with their coming into effect, one can assert that a new generation of rights is specifically created for citizens of the Member States, influencing the rights attached to their national citizenship. The status of European migrant begins to grow beyond a simple economic status.

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<sup>1</sup> The workers from third countries, refugees and asylum seekers residing in a Member State are excluded from this right. Their status is regulated by the Regulation (ECC) 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community.

<sup>2</sup> See Regulation (ECC) 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community and Council Directive (ECC) 68/360 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families.



## 2. The European citizenship - theoretical considerations

The European citizenship and its evolution over time are central debate topics of an abundant literature and have generated vast controversies. Examined from the viewpoints of different disciplines (for instance, political theory or constitutional law) it acquires different meanings. As a general rule of thumb, we could state that across disciplines, the evolution of the European citizenship is addressed from three main theoretical perspectives: legal, political and sociological, all of them more or less impregnated with philosophical reflections. In relation to these approaches, we will tackle thereafter some points that will support the position taken by this article

The legal perspective is essentially focused on topics such as the link between citizenship and nationality, the rights attached to the European citizenship and their scope, the access to the European citizenship or the delicate issue of a European *demos*. The legal perspective makes room for, among others, the concept of European citizenship as a still unshaped legal right, an unidentified legal object (Blachèr, 2000).

The idea of a progressive citizenship is encouraged by the European Court of Justice itself through its audacious case law in the sixties and seventies<sup>1</sup> (Chaltiel, 2008; Magnette, 1999) and the extension of the rights attached to the free movement of persons.

Afterward, despite the fact that the European citizenship introduced by the Maastricht Treaty is not dependent on the fulfilment of certain economic criteria by its beneficiaries, but granted to the all citizens of the Union (Kovar and Simon, 1993), the free movement of persons remains the main prerogative of European citizens (Chaltiel, 2008; Blachèr, 2000) and has, in European law, a constitutional significance (Blachèr, 2000). It is the European migrant who claim and exercise the rights attached to this new citizenship (Fontaine, 2001).

Furthermore, the European citizenship puts together the concepts of “nationality” and “citizenship” in an ambiguous way: one cannot speak of European citizenship without using the notion of nationality of Member states while, at the same time, one cannot link it to a specific European nationality (even virtual). This ambivalence has led to different legally grounded approaches of the European citizenship, be it the trans-national citizenship approach (Withol de Wenden, 1997) or the European citizenship based on residence approach (see later on this article).

The political approaches of the European citizenship are mainly built around the so-called “democratic deficit”, the need for a reinforced legitimacy of the European Union, and a more active participation of citizens to the decision-making process and the political life of the European community. If one can see in the creation of the European citizenship an answer to the criticism of the democratic deficit (Magnette, 1999), the European citizen is not a very committed actor on the European stage and its attitude towards Europe is not very enthusiastic. Participation in European elections

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<sup>1</sup> In the judgment of *Van Gend en Loos* of 5 February 1963, the Court states that European law not only engenders obligations for Member States, but also rights for individuals. Individuals may therefore take advantage of these rights and directly invoke European acts before national and European courts.

is declining<sup>1</sup>, the representative institution is little known, and the information of European citizens concerning their rights remains quite vague<sup>2</sup>. Even if the European citizen has the opportunity to multiply its ways of expression (see, for instance, the literature on the benefits of public consultations and debates), the European public space is not able (yet) to produce a substantial democratic debate and the identification with the European project is still weak. If the right to vote and to be elected is (should be) the most significant of the civil rights, in the European Union only 2% of the possible European (migrant) voters are concerned by this right and less than 15% of the (migrant) electors are registered: *much ado about nothing* (Strudel, 2008).

The lack of involvement of European citizens hinders the emergence of those social ties between individuals that express their support to common values, their will to live together and to adhere to a common vision of society. The forms of identification to Europe (Gosser, 1996; Duchesne and Frogner, 2002), the mobilisation of social actors for Europe (Dacheux, 1999; Weisbein, 2000, 2000a) the effects of the European citizenship on the representations and modes of action of social groups (Deloye, 1998; Saurugger, 2002; Girod, 2004) are some of the key elements in the sociological approach of this new institutionalized social reality.

Our article offers a progressive perspective across these different components (legal, political, social) of the European citizenship aiming at finding - halfway between what this citizenship is and what it could be - the changes it has brought upon the status of European migrants. At the same time, the article questions the chances that migrants could mobilize to strengthen the European citizenship as well as introduces some perspectives on a possible evolution of the reality of the concept.

### 3. From economic citizens to political citizens

At first, the European process is certainly essentially economic. The rise in the migration of EU nationals across the European Community area is mainly triggered by the introduction of the rights to work and reside freely in any member country. However, even if these new rights came into force grace to a new **common law**, it is hard to imagine that its beneficiaries perceived this new reality as a form of a new social tie. Nevertheless, despite the absence of a political project defined at European level, the discourse of some European leaders was starting to gather more and more political overtones. Europeans were portrayed as not only nationals of Members States moving from an economic territory to another, but also as members of a new community (not strictly political) characterized by specific rights, such as fundamental human rights, consumer rights or environmental protection rights (see, for instance, the *Tindemans Report*<sup>3</sup>).

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.cvce.eu/obj/rates\\_of\\_participation\\_in\\_european\\_elections\\_1979\\_2009-en-7dc3cc1c-13f3-43a6-865f-8f17cf307ef7.html](http://www.cvce.eu/obj/rates_of_participation_in_european_elections_1979_2009-en-7dc3cc1c-13f3-43a6-865f-8f17cf307ef7.html)

<sup>2</sup> The Flash Eurobarometer 365 (Winter 2013) shows that the respondents are most familiar with their right to free movement and their right to petition EU institutions: 88% are aware that a citizen of the Union has the right to reside in any Member State of the European Union and 89% are aware that a citizen of the Union has the right to make a complaint to the European Commission, European Parliament or European Ombudsman.

<sup>3</sup> European Union, "Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European Council", *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/76.

The election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, in 1979, is the event that brings upon a considerable shift into the perception of the status of European migrant. Since then, the discussion has switched from “the European as an economic migrant” to “the European as member of a new and somewhat political community”.

For the European migrant, free to move, reside and work within the Community, a new era is coming...

Once the transition from appointed assembly to elected Parliament takes place, the European political discourse toughens. Some talk more generally about European identity, democratic institutions, respect for human rights, solidarity, diversity, participation of local communities and regional authorities in the European construction, others engage into a somewhat more direct discourse using syntagms, such as the “European citizens” (see the *Spinelli Project*<sup>1</sup>) or a (very symbolic) “Europe of citizens” (see the *Conclusions of the Presidency* of the European Council meeting at Fontainebleau, in 1984). From the 90s, we can even speak about the “acceleration of the European political time”, since any serious discourse on Europe can not be carried without references to the European citizens.

The Maastricht Treaty (1993), with its will to give a new impetus to a more political Europe and, at the same time, to bring common Europe closer to its citizens, represents the climax of the consecration of the European citizenship. Its provisions will be clarified and completed by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). Both treaties represent not only key moments in the configuration of the current notion of the term “European citizenship”, but also the “rerun” of a series of ambiguities that have marked its evolution, confirming a permanent balance between real progresses and vague rhetoric. The bottom line question is: does the every-day European citizen perceive itself significantly different from the economic migrant of the 60s? Not so sure. But let's not anticipate!

Starting with the Maastricht Treaty (articles B, 8 to 8D, 138 D and 138 E of this treaty), citizens of EU member countries have become the beneficiaries of a new legal status - that of European citizens - including both new rights and mechanisms to ensure their protection.

There are four categories of specific provisions and rights attached to notion of European Union citizenship: freedom of movement and residence throughout the Union, the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections and in elections for the European Parliament in the state where he/she resides, protection by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State where the State of which the person is a national is not represented in a non-member country, the right to petition the European Parliament and complain to the Ombudsman.

By its amendments to the articles 17 and 21 (ex-articles 8 and 8 D), the ambition of the Amsterdam Treaty is double: first, to clarify the links between European and national citizenship and second, to extend the rights attached to the European citizenship. Thus, the treaty states in its article that “the citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship”. At the same time, the Amsterdam Treaty has

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<sup>1</sup> Article 3 of the Spinelli Project introduces the concept of Union citizenship in parallel with national citizenship, the two being closely connected.

established a new right for the European citizens. Every citizen of the Union can now write to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions or the Ombudsman in one of the twelve languages of the Treaties and receive an answer in the same language.

Apart from the rights set out in the dedicated articles, the European citizenship is also linked to other provisions of the EU treaties (for example the article 6 CE on the non-discrimination based on nationality) and jurisprudential elements (different judgments of the Court of Justice on the free movement, non-discrimination, respect for human rights, etc.). As regards the rights that are specifically attached to the European citizenship, they are, on the one hand, rights belonging to the *acquis communautaire* (right of free movement and residence, the right to petition) and, on the other hand, new rights granted to EU nationals.

Looking at all these rights, we can easily observe that the manner in which they have been defined, the dependence of the status of European citizen to status of the national of one EU country, the absence of any obligation, the mixture between ancient rights and new rights, between specific rights (but incomplete) and non-specific rights (such as working, residing, travelling in another country) show that the European citizenship is rather fragmented and its name is more bewildering than its content.

The most important progress made by the European citizenship remains the consecration of political rights. The European migrant is no longer only an economic citizen but a citizen who has been given the opportunity to participate in the political life of a new community. This is what the new citizenship promises, at least.

The citizenship is a matter of territorial and identity belonging to a space where the community members perceive each other as such. The European citizenship rewrites the concept of citizenship and puts forward a new form of belonging, implying a status equally accessible to different categories of citizens (the European citizens first benefit from various rights recognized by domestic laws) but also rights and privileges that are no longer attached to the national territory. If the legal perspective states, *grosso modo*, that the citizenship establishes the (legal) recognition of the belonging of a person to a specific and sovereign political community, the European citizenship seems to propose other elements to legitimize this affiliation, without specifying and clarifying them.

#### **4. The European citizen between "it is" and "it could/should" be**

The legal framework of the European citizenship shapes new approaches to the very complex link between citizenship and nationality. National citizenship is considered as a prerequisite to obtain the status of European citizenship. This leads to an ambiguous positioning of the European citizen who is given the opportunity to integrate into new political and social project/community but, at the same time, cannot detach completely from the socio-political community built at national level. One of the main roles of the citizenship (at least from a classical perspective) is to act as a key resource for the development of a collective will, to live together and to build the identification mechanisms. What type of social links could the European citizenship create? What is

the specific element that could give rise to an *affectio societatis* at European level? What type of identification do we have at European level?

Most of our modern democracies have a common perception of the steps needed to create a collective identity at the European level. These steps include identifying the matrix that enables individuals to perceive themselves as belonging to the same group and building a common project. But the preoccupation for a possible or desirable European identity proves to be rather a theoretical and intellectual endeavour, instead of concrete projects.

Thus, if some authors can envision the creation of a future European political community from shared legal and political cultures in the European countries (Padoa-Schioppa, 2005), or from common moral and political values (Todorov, 2005), others prefer to speak about a new form of belonging to a trans-national community named the constitutional patriotism. This new concept has a different understanding about how a political community could be nurtured. According to it, a new political community could be formed through the appeal to common values such as the respect for human rights, instead of using subjective links that swirl around the idea of national identity (Rambour, 2006).

The constitutional patriotism allows for a universalist approach of the political participation, based on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. Past appeals to linguistic, ethical and cultural particularities are replaced by universal appeals to democracy and human rights (Habermas, 1997). The constitutional patriotism "designates the idea that political attachment ought to center on the norms, the values and, more indirectly, the procedures of a liberal democratic constitution" (Muller, 2007).

As for the European Union, the constitutional patriotism requires a two-step process: first the dissociation between culture and political commitment and second the re-composition of an identity for a European political culture based on peaceful confrontation of national elements (Rambour, 2006).

Beyond the undeniable appeal of the concept or the criticisms brought to this theory, lays the question of how to develop a patriotic attachment to a set of intellectual principles?

The new citizen portrayed by this supra-national vision should prioritize the European universal values over its national identity in order to connect, with the other Europeans to the European democratic institutions. Detached from its national particularities, the new European citizen would be able to engage himself/herself in a democratic action as member of a new supra-national community built on a shared political culture.

From our point of view, it is not easy to gathers citizens with different national and cultural backgrounds around a same idea of solidarity or unity defined by the "philosopher" as being rightful or acceptable. If it is difficult to fall in love with an internal market (as Jacques Delors said), it is also difficult to fall in love with legal principles and procedures. If we want Europe to be the name of a real community of citizens, the European framework should not be only a neutral space for a critical and reflective production of norms and standards, but also a place where citizen's passions are turned into norms and collective actions.

At the 1st January, 2011, 33.3 million people living in the EU were non-nationals (they do not have the citizenship of their country of residence). More than a third (12.8

million people) of these non-nationals was citizens of another EU Member State (see Table 1).

Table 1

	Total immigrants			Nationals, 2011		Total			Non-nationals, 2011				
	2009	2010	2011	(1 000)	(%)	(1 000)	(%)	(1 000)	(%)	(1 000)	(%)	(1 000)	(%)
	(1 000)	(1 000)	(1 000)										
EU-27	1 609.2	1 747.8	1 671.5	18.4	12.7	125.9	87.0	61.4	42.4	64.5	44.6		
Belgium		131.2	144.7										
Bulgaria													
Czech Republic	75.6	48.3	27.1	8.1	30.0	19.0	70.0	10.7	39.5	8.3	30.5		
Denmark	51.8	52.2	52.8	18.3	34.6	34.6	65.4	18.1	34.3	16.4	31.1		
Germany	346.2	404.1	489.4	89.4	18.3	388.9	81.5	226.4	46.3	172.5	35.2		
Estonia	3.9	2.8	3.7	2.0	54.8	1.7	45.1	0.1	1.7	1.6	43.5		
Ireland	37.4	39.5	52.3	19.7	37.6	32.4	61.9	20.2	38.6	12.2	23.2		
Greece		119.1	110.8	60.5	54.5	50.4	45.5	19.1	17.3	31.2	28.2		
Spain	499.0	485.2	457.6	42.1	9.2	415.5	90.8	142.1	31.0	273.4	59.7		
France		251.2	267.4	107.3	40.1	160.0	59.9	70.0	26.2	90.0	33.7		
Croatia			8.5	4.7	55.3	3.8	44.6	1.1	12.3	2.8	32.3		
Italy	442.9	458.9	385.8	31.5	8.2	354.3	91.8	113.8	29.5	240.5	62.3		
Cyprus	11.7	20.2	23.0	2.1	8.9	21.0	91.0	13.1	57.0	7.8	33.9		
Latvia (*)	2.7	2.4	7.3	1.5	20.4	5.8	79.6	1.1	15.0	4.7	64.6		
Lithuania	6.5	5.2	15.7	14.0	89.3	1.7	10.7	0.5	3.2	1.2	7.5		
Luxembourg	15.8	17.0	20.3	1.2	5.7	19.1	94.1	15.0	73.8	4.1	20.3		
Hungary	27.9												
Malta (*)	7.2	8.2	5.5	1.8	32.3	3.7	67.7						
Netherlands	128.8												
Austria	73.3	73.9	104.4	8.1	7.7	96.1	92.1	64.5	61.8	31.6	30.3		
Poland													
Portugal	32.3	27.6	19.7	12.5	63.6	7.2	36.4	2.0	10.3	5.1	26.1		
Romania													
Slovenia	30.3	15.4	14.1	3.3	23.6	10.8	76.4	2.0	14.1	8.8	62.3		
Slovakia (*)	15.6	13.8	4.8	1.1	22.3	3.8	77.7	3.2	65.5	0.6	12.2		
Finland	25.7	25.6	29.5	9.1	30.7	20.1	68.3	8.4	28.6	11.7	39.8		
Sweden	102.3	98.8	96.5	20.6	21.4	75.5	78.3	25.1	26.0	50.4	52.3		
United Kingdom	568.5	591.0	566.0	78.4	13.9	487.6	86.1	174.1	30.8	313.5	55.4		
Iceland	3.9	3.9	4.1	1.9	45.9	2.2	54.1	1.6	38.9	0.6	15.2		
Liechtenstein	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.2	24.9	0.5	75.1	0.3	44.8	0.2	30.3		
Norway	56.0	69.2	70.3	7.6	10.8	62.7	89.1	40.0	56.8	22.7	32.3		
Switzerland (*)	160.6	161.8	148.8	24.1	16.2	124.7	83.8	87.6	58.9	37.0	24.9		

Source: Eurostat, 2012

These "migrant Europeans" are also, thanks to the European citizenship, European voters, at both national and European level. But, paradoxically, being a European citizen does not entitle you to have a say in the country you live in and work (and pay your taxes). In some cases you don't even have a say in your own country. The Great Britain, for example, withdraws voting rights after fifteen years of residence outside the country. Ireland does not grant an external franchise and in Italy people born abroad who inherited the Italian nationality are allowed to vote in Italian elections but not those who have kept their residence in Italy and are merely temporarily absent on election day. So a British teacher living in Germany for more than 15 years cannot participate in national elections either in Germany or in Britain. Not that simple to be a European citizen, after all.

The Treaty of Lisbon (2007), aiming at increasing the participation of European citizens in the political life of the EU, introduces the European Citizens' Initiative which allows 1 million citizens from at least one quarter of the EU Member States to invite the European Commission to bring forward proposals for legal acts in areas where the Commission has the power to do so. One of the citizens' initiatives registered quite early after the entry into force of this new right is the *Let Me Vote* initiative whose aim is to provide all European citizens with the right to vote in regional and national elections in their country of residence.

The idea of giving more weight to the right of residence to consolidate a true European citizenship is not a new one. However it is quite interesting to see that, despite the political rights attached to the European citizenship, it is the European migrant and its freedom to move to and reside in another country that could really boost-up the idea of "belonging to a European community".

A first better use of the right of residence (as implied in the affirmation of a let's build a "more European" European citizenship) would be to grant access to the European citizenship based on residence. The scope *ratione personae* of any legal system is based on two criteria: the nationality that binds an individual to a state and the residence - the territory where the individual lives. The fact that the residence has not been used as a criterion for obtaining the European citizenship has raised some criticism, drawing attention to the loss of the European dimension in the definition of this new citizenship. Garot and Staples (1999) consider that the Union should give the European citizenship its glory by founding it not on the nationality of the Member States, but on the residence on the EU territory. This idea of unlinking nationality and citizenship and of placing more emphasis on the notion of residence is also present in the American theoretical reflection: for Rosenberg (1997), resident people drive on the same highway as American citizens, pay the same taxes, breathe the same air, and send their children to the same schools. Denying them the voting rights means leaving them voiceless in public affairs that significantly affect their lives.

The realities of the everyday life as pointed out by Rosenberg led to a second European approach to the notion of residence: talk is being carried on about the need to extend the right of EU citizens to vote in regional and national elections in the country where they reside. Going back to our British teacher living in Germany for more than 15 years, for those European with democratic expectations it is pretty disappointing to

notice that some political rights have been limited in the country of residence and have been lost in the country of origin.


This perverse effect of the Europeanization certainly requires concrete solutions. It does not encourage the European process in general, or the European citizens to move on.

A European citizenship granted on the basis of residence would certainly present the advantage of clearly confirming the European dimension of this citizenship, and it would be a chance for the Union to start building its own citizens. However, this implies a broader and much deeper debate around both legal and political aspects such as the availability and the willingness of the Member States to break through this stage of the European process (whose political symbolism is still very strong) or the legal mechanisms to put in place. At the same time, the mere existence of voting rights cannot generate by itself the genuine ties between the electors and the political community, even if the rules of this community directly impact upon their life.

Wrapping up, the proposal to grant citizenship based on residence has had no major feedback from the European decision-makers, until now. If the *Let me Vote* initiative succeeds in collecting 1 million signatures, its first win will be to provide the European Commission, the national leaders and the civil society with a reason to open a debate on how to overcome it.

For the time being, the European citizenship remains moderately integrated in the individual system of political and civic affiliations. As shown by a recent Eurobarometer (Standard Eurobarometer 79, Spring 2013), although the notion of European citizenship has some meaning for a slight majority of Europeans (62%), just under a quarter consider that they are “definitely” a EU citizen and only 7% of respondents see themselves in the near future first as European citizens and then as nationals (see Tables 2 and 3).


**Table 2**



Source: Eurobarometer (Standard Eurobarometer 79, Spring 2013)



Table 3



Source: Eurobarometer (Standard Eurobarometer 79, Spring 2013)

In our opinion, these numbers show that the European citizenship is still far from strengthening the feeling of belonging to a community that shares common values. At the same time, they bring out the gap between the ambitions of the European citizenship and its concrete outcomes.

Looking for the deep signification of the European citizenship, the European citizen continues to migrate from one territory to another.

#### 4. Conclusions

The European citizenship is a progressive concept. Its developments are far from coming to their end, and its meaning still needs clarification. At first sight, the “ride” of Europeans begins with the right to freely move and reside in the other Member States and ends with the creation of a European citizenship and the recognition and protection of the rights attached to it. The *de facto* existence of this new reality – the attachment of individual to the new political community and their active participation to its democratic life – is yet to be completed. Furthermore, a gap in the system needs to be addressed: this post-modern citizenship (Chevallier, 2004) is still very much dependent on the nationality, a status that only Member States can assign. For some authors, this maintained dependence is the proof of the willingness of Member States not to substitute a supra-national citizenship to the national one, but rather to add additional rights that promote and reinforce the free movement of people within the Union (Blachér, 2000). Certainly, the European citizens of today have more rights than the European migrants of yesterday. Nevertheless, the rights of European migrants seem to be the most significant for the European citizens too. For us, it is the proof

that the European citizenship has not exhausted its intellectual and empirical resources and the European citizen is a status under construction. This, of course, if the European citizenship is meant to be a true citizenship.

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## ROMANIA – EMIGRATION’S IMPACT ON FAMILIES AND CHILDREN

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Monica Elisabeta PĂDURARU<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** *After 1989, Romania was confronted with international migration, which resulted in a diminishment of the stable resident population. Between 1989 and 2012 the stable population of Romania decreased by more than 3.1 million. More than 77 % of the negative growth of the resident population (stable) during this period was due to migration.*

*The migration phenomenon has stirred controversy not only in political circles, but also at societal level, at interpersonal level, causing physical and emotional fractures between communities, friends and families. The effects on the families were, among others, an imbalance between the importance given to some its fundamental functions: the economic function is valued above the social and educational function.*

*Parents going abroad (in most cases due to economic factors) may have negative influences on children. Children left in the care of a guardian or worse, left home alone by parents who went to work, to seek a better life in another country will face social problems caused by joining entourages that will have a negative effect on their school results, sometimes culminating in dropping out of school.*

*Based on these issues, in this paper we propose an analysis of works and studies on migration and its effects on families and the children left behind. From the methodological point of view, we chose to analyze reports of public or private institutions, studies and articles, so that we can better grasp the phenomenon and potentially lay down some conclusions and recommendations.*

**Keywords:** *international migration; family; economic difficulties; children left behind.*

### 1. Introduction

Migration is a phenomenon which consists of the movement of large numbers of people from one area to another, followed by a change of residence and/or employment upon arrival (Zamfir and Vlăsceanu, 1993: 355). The migration is driven by economic, social, political or natural factors. To emigrate is the act of leaving one’s country to settle in another country.

After 1989, Romania was confronted with international migration, which resulted in a diminishment of the stable resident population. The country’s resident population

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reached 20.01 million inhabitants on January 1st 2013, approximately equal to that of the year 1969. Between 1989 and 2012 the stable population of Romania decreased by more than 3.1 million. More than 77 % of the negative growth of the resident population (stable) during this period was due to migration. In 2002 the number of migrants per 1,000 inhabitants of the resident population of Romania was 48.6, while in 2012 this indicator increased to 116.5. The largest share of the migrating population is represented by people aged 25-64. In 2012, this age group represented 74% of the total immigration, as opposed to 2002 when this indicator was 65% (Institutul Național de Statistică, 2014: 1).

**Table 1:** Resident population of Romania on January 1st, during 2002-2013, by gender

Year	Total	Men	number of people
			Women
2002	21723710	10566277	11157433
2003	21627509	10515783	11111726
2004	21521142	10468871	11052271
2005	21382354	10401382	10980972
2006	21257016	10343704	10913312
2007	21130503	10284720	10845783
2008	20635460	10007552	10627908
2009	20440290	9910000	10530290
2010	20294683	9836634	10458049
2011	20199059	9791269	10407790
2012	20095996	9746592	10349404
2013	20020074	9761480	10258594

Source: Institutul Național de Statistică, 2014: 5

Migration has both positive and negative effects in terms of attitudes as well as on a social level. Among the positive effects are local economic developments, entrepreneurship and increased tolerance in some areas with high migration rate, whereas the negative effects include dependence on revenues from migrant communities, abandoned children, human trafficking. Children are the most affected party in terms of family relationship, school status, public perception, and especially their emotional balance (parting with a parent causes extreme stress, emotional deprivation, shock, etc.).

Parents going abroad (in most cases due to economic factors) may have negative influences on children. Children left in the care of a guardian or worse, left home alone by parents who went to work, to seek a better life in another country will face social problems caused by joining entourage that will have a negative effect on their school results, sometimes culminating in dropping out of school. There may be situations where the migrants who managed to establish themselves in the destination countries

take their children to the new foreign households, so that Romania loses an important echelons of children and consequently, social values.

Based on these issues, in this paper we propose an analysis of works and studies on migration and its effects on families and the children left behind. From the methodological point of view, we chose to analyze reports of public or private institutions, studies and articles.

## 2. Literature review

The total movement of a population consists of natural and migratory movement. The population of a country is not only a result of inputs and outputs that are determined by births and deaths, but also a result of immigration and emigration. Migration can change not only the population but its structure by age, gender, and other characteristics. People can move out of the country or even move countries, for short duration or permanently.

When referring to a national territory, we can talk about internal migration, which concerns people who move into the national territory, but we also talk about foreign or international migration, where the country's population move into another country (Cruceru, 2010). The international migration can be due to natural disasters (forced migration), lack of employment opportunities (labor migration), or reuniting with family members who have migrated previously.

Population migration is the main form of geographical mobility of the population. Residential migration is a permanent relocation to another residential area, with a resulting change in the residential status. The concept of migration does not cover such phenomena as commuting, trips or various seasonal movements etc. (Rosca, 2007: 97-98). Also, the following two terms are used: immigration and emigration. Immigration is migration seen from the point of view, of the destination country, it's commonly found within international migration and the people who change their residence are called immigrants. Emigration is migration seen from the point of view of the country of origin and it's also found within the international migration. In this case, the moving population consists of emigrants.

Several underlying causes of population migration have been depicted in specialized literature (Rosca, 2007: 99-100), including:

- A first issue is that cities began to be overcrowded, a fact that was even worsened by the unbalance between the number of the inhabitants and the resources available which in turn reduced the income and consequently the degree of satisfaction in the relation to consumption. Overpopulation is determined by the increased number of births especially in less developed countries;
- The development of transportation which led to industrial expansion determined the migration of the work force in those areas;

- These migratory movements are also determined by numerous political, religious causes or historical reasons, the occurrence of diseases which led to massive emigration and immigration;
- We can also identify ecological causes of this type of migration being called environmental migration. The causes that triggered this type of migration are often natural environmental changes and pollution which create a great discomfort to the population.

Some of the specific reasons for which people choose to emigrate from Romania could be:

- Dissatisfaction related to the professional opportunities offered by the country of origin;
- Search of better living standards for children and the rest of the family;
- The destination country offers higher wages for the same work performed in the country of origin;
- Few, underpaid jobs for college graduates;
- Better health and social services in the destination country.

The number of foreign workers has increased in recent years in most developed countries in Europe. On average immigrant workers are younger than the workforce, medium age and they are distributed in a wide range of activities through the economy: agriculture, construction and civil engineering, light industry, tourism, hotel and catering, domestic personnel or any other services, including IT services.

The European Union has established the right of free movement for all the citizens within the member states. The treaty of Rome has guaranteed the right to free movement of workers within the European Community. After 1957, many EU regulations, international conventions and EU treaties have contributed considerably to facilitating the movement of people within European Union. Migration and asylum have become a predominant political agenda of the EU and Member States by 2000. Through the Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999, the European Community efforts focused on establishing common policies on asylum and migration.

Migration of Romanians kept under strict control during the communist regime, has increased considerably in the '90s, in terms of volume, diversity of destination, reasons and socio-economic status for the migrant population. Migration followed an upward trend and involved all levels of society, becoming one of the most important migration flows in Europe. In recent years, external migration seems to have become one of the defining phenomena for the Romanian society.

At economic level the consequences are both positive and negative. An example of positive consequences is the fact that migrants finance part of the trade deficit and the current account deficit while helping the general economic growth. An example of negative consequences is the fact that part of the money supply is not sustained by production which leads to inflation. Another negative effect is the fact that sending money from abroad on regular basis to the family left behind encourages the supported

family members to develop a culture of dependency. And last but not least, one of the most important consequences of emigration is the influence on the families left behind (Bulai, 2006).

### 3. Emigration’s impact on families and children


#### 3.1. Emigration’s impact on families

In migration there are several types of distance, not only geographical distance: there is a technical distance (influenced by the available means of transport and communication), there is a social distance (the migration phenomenon is related to the family situation, to the experience of migration, the social context and the available capital).

The migration phenomenon has stirred controversy not only in political circles, but also at societal level, at interpersonal level, causing physical and emotional fractures between communities, friends and families. The effects on the families were, among others, an imbalance between the importance given to some its fundamental functions: the economic function is valued above the social and educational function.

The analysis of international migration of Romanian citizens was deepened through the process of breaking down of data by gender, which gives us a more clear view on the subsequent evolution of the families who stayed behind. More recent data provided by the National Institute of Statistics (2014: 9) show a greater flow of female migrants than male migrant; however this data do not consider the marital status or the parental status of the subjects. Data on the gender distribution of Romanian citizens who left the country are presented below:

*Chart 1: The flow of emigrants in 2012, by age and gender*



Source: Institutul Național de Statistică, 2014: 9

The analysis shows that, in recent years, over 60% of the total number of people who left Romania to establish residence in another country is represented by women. This can be credited to the increased numbers of job opportunities for them in most European countries.

In terms of geographical spread, the data show that the regions most affected by this phenomenon are the west (Banat, Crisana, Maramureș), where the percentage of middle school students with parents abroad is 27% of the total number of students and Moldova where we can find a similar percentage (25%). On a national level, there are no differences between rural areas and urban areas in relation to the number of children whose parents migrated, but, there are such differences within certain geographical areas. Thus, in regions like Banat-Crișana-Maramureș and Oltenia we noticed a larger share of children left behind by migrating parents in the urban area than in the rural area (Soros România Foundation, 2007).

The relocation of family members for extended periods of time may lead to changes in family roles and functions: one of the family members left behind takes over as head of the family. The effort to substitute the departed parent is often negatively perceived. According to a study conducted by the Soros Foundation Romania in 2007, more often than not, the missing parent is the father. The study indicates that there are approximately 115,000 secondary school students whose fathers are abroad. Of these, 21% live without their father for a period of 2 to 4 years, and 28%, even more than 4 years. In the majority of cases in which only the father is departed (94%), children left behind are in the care of their mothers. In the case of mothers leaving to work abroad 15% of children live without them for more than 4 years, and 21% for a period of 2 to 4 years. Half of the departed mothers are away from their children for one year. For students whose mothers are away, the extended family is an important reliance. Only 58% of them live with their fathers. The data show that out of the children who have both their parents away to work in another country, 34% live without their parents for at least two years and 54% for less than one year. This means that within 10-14 years age group, nationwide, approximately 12,000 children live at least two years in the absence of both parents, and almost 19,000 in the same situation for one year. 65% of these students are in the care of grandparents, 24% are cared for by aunts and uncles, and the remaining 11% are in the care of other people (Soros România Foundation, 2007: 8).

Data provided by the Department for Child Protection at the end of the first quarter of 2013 indicated that in Romania there are 82,073 children whose parents work abroad. Of these, 23,312 children have both parents abroad, being left in the care of relatives or in some severe cases, even in foster care. However, the actual number of children affected is much higher, considering that not all parents declare they are working abroad. Separation from parents makes children vulnerable and at risk of dropping out of school and delinquency (Asociația Salvati Copiii, 2014). On the other side, it is recognised that in the case of the prevention of the human retraffication, the family is the most important factor for child recovery of child victims (Nicolaescu D., 2009: 62).

Emigration of one or both parents may lead to family crises, thereby understanding the advent of stress situations within the family, tensions and frictions among the family



members, all of which threaten the family's ability to function and sometimes even result in its disbandment. An effect of external migration is the changing of family structure through divorce which may affect children profoundly (Bulai, 2006).


### ***3.2. Emigration's impact on children left behind***

The Romanians' emigration for work has a far greater impact than the authorities might have acknowledged as they are only beginning to monitor the phenomenon "home alone". The first victims of this phenomenon are children whose fragile emotional state exposes them to high risks. Two out of three children who have parents working abroad feel they are deprived of their affection. Those children, according to psychologists and sociologists, develop dissonant personalities and therefore it is possible that, once they reached adulthood they will develop social and emotional problems (Hudițeanu, 2001: 112).

Being successful in school is partially influenced by the child's family resources (financial, educational, environmental, the care and attention given to the child during school years, emotional support and guidance). The departure of one parent or both abroad for an extended period of time can affect school performance, shouldn't anyone take on the functions and responsibilities, usually performed by the migrant parents. It is, however, possible that the negative impact of the parent's departure abroad can be mitigated by the potential positive effects such as: higher living standards, increased opportunities for traveling abroad and the contact with another culture. The most disadvantaged group, in terms of school performance, is the group of children whose both parents have emigrated, a situation that can cause a far greater negative effect than just a lower social status or a broken family.

Children whose parents are working abroad feel very much their absence. Many children have trouble sleeping, low self-esteem, aggressive behavior, and all these because they lack guidance and role models. Older children start to lie, to be aggressive, to keep bad company, to skip classes, or even dropout of school completely. Psychologists feel there is a possibility that some of these children will grow up to be delinquents (Iluț, 2005). Also, insufficient control or supervision from the other adults in charge of their welfare, as well as the emotional distress caused by the lack of parental affection and considering that an increased income gives them access to various opportunities, all of the mentioned can potentially develop inspire certain deviant tendencies (Soros România Foundation, 2007: 29). Of course, the children are a vulnerable category to human trafficking because they have a higher probability for fraudulent border crossing, because they are much more exposed than the adults and therefore much easier to manipulate (Nicolăescu, D, 2011: 115).

Another element that can be considered very important in the analysis of international migration of Romanians is the age at which they migrate. Data show an increased percentage for the age group 25-64 years. The situation can be considered as a potential risk factor for children who remain in the country because, in most cases, they are left unattended by the family during adolescence, a period which is considered to be the most difficult in the psychological development of a minor.

**Chart 2: Structure of migrants in January 1st - by age**

Source: Institutul Național de Statistică, 2014: 13

In the absence of frequent visits from migrant parents, the communication tools are the main way of keeping in touch with children left behind. 92% of children with both parents working, and 82-83% of those with only one migrant parent, talk on the phone with them on weekly basis. The Internet is less used for communication: in 10-15% of cases children communicate through email or messenger programs with their parents who are living abroad (Soros România Foundation, 2007: 18). Studies do not indicate a negative effect of the separation on the health of the children left home, but confirm the existence of a direct link between the absence of both parents / the mother and the occurrence of depression symptoms in children.

The lack of parental affection is a phenomenon experienced by most children whose parents have emigrated. Many families tend to perceive the consequences of migration solely in terms of benefit-cost ratio, as in money and other material benefits vs the distress of the children left behind. Children left home often feel abandoned, and this has long-term negative consequences such as: the difficulty of forming and maintaining lasting attachments, introversion and self-questioning due to the lack of attachment to the most important role model – the mother; difficulties in relating to others; aggressive behavior (Bulai, 2006).

## 4. Conclusions

International migration - temporary or permanent – of Romanian citizens is a real phenomenon that has grown in recent years and has affected family structure and functionality in general, but it has a considerable impact on minors who remain in the country in the care of just one parent, other relatives or foster care.

Solving problems faced by children whose parents are working abroad are left in the hands of state institutions. The first step towards solving this problem should be creating a legal framework in line with the existing reality - children with parents working abroad are a vulnerable group.

Among the measures that need to be taken at national level are providing decent incomes for struggling families, financial incentives, but also increasing the number of social workers who can reduce the effects of the migration on the children left behind (Mihailescu, 1999: 176).

Also, the development and implementation of coherent public policies that can identify and monitor children whose parents have emigrated, while increasing the local social workers network capacity could reduce the negative effects of emigration.

Within the educational system a solution for this problem could be strengthening the relation between school institutions and the social care system by designing effective methods and procedures of communication between teachers, head teachers, school psychologists and social workers. The role of the school counselor could also be increased by a deeper involvement in identifying and solving crisis situations, especially in rural areas. In a case of a child who has been identified as a child left behind, social workers should conduct an initial assessment, followed by a service plan, should they find that the child is at risk. The service plan should include ways to maintain personal relationships with the parents of the child left behind and the identification of those counseling services that will best help the child. The service plan may include individual / family counseling for the adults that are in charge of the child's care and also it should provide support services for everyone responsible for the child left behind.

After school programs' and opening day centers and clubs for children could be another solution for this problem. Within these institutions, children could socialize and spend time in a safe environment (Diaconu, 2004).

Within the families is important to inform the parents about the risks assumed by leaving to work abroad and to highlight important issues that need to be taken into account during their temporary absence from home (how to communicate with children, how to maintain contact the importance of involving children in taking decisions that concern them, etc.)

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## EU INTEGRATION: ADDRESSING THE YOUNG GENERATION. THE ITALIAN CASE

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**Abstract:** *In the last years Italy saw its immigrant population growing up to more than 4 millions. Among them, the increased number of children touched deeply the educational system, where nowadays 9 pupils out of 100 are foreigners. To face this rapid change the government developed the Italian way to integration, based on intercultural exchange and dialogue. However, the Peninsula school system proved till now unable to deal properly with foreigner pupils, both at human and bureaucratic level. An analysis of the current trends and a comparison between the Ministry of Education guidelines with their concrete implementation at the local level shows us the deficiencies of the system and indicates where efforts should be concentrated more. Furthermore, the Italian case suggests us to reflect on the bilateral aspect of integration, where commitment and dialogue play a determinant role. Xenophobic feelings are unfortunately still widespread in the Union and the task of integration policies should rather underline how migration and a multicultural environment are important in contemporary world. Immigrants could not only be source of wealth for European societies, but would eventually provide a unique opportunity for the development of human being. And what better starting point than education?*

**Keywords:** *immigration; integration; young generation; education; Italy.*

### 1. Introduction

Migrants in the world reached nowadays 232 millions, 31.3% of which lives in the European Union (IDOR, 2013). Italy, for its geographical position, is the main European door for immigrants, acting both as a transit country and as a final destination. The latter role grew especially in the 2000s, when many migrants decided to set roots in the Peninsula. In the year 2013, foreigners residing officially in Italy were 4.387.721, 334 thousands more if compared with the previous year (+8.2%) (ISTAT, 2013). This number augmented not only due to new arrivals, but also to foreigner babies' births, 80 thousand just in 2012. This incredible growth touched deeply the educational system, which had to face a considerable challenge to welcome and integrate the new comers. School is an essential passage in the construction and sharing of common knowledge, identity and rules, and it sets the roots of common living and

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sense of belonging, with the task to create a new integrated and multicultural generation. Scholars share this idea with members of the government, but legal and political framework as well as immigration ties with criminality and job availability has always been preferred to a deep analysis on cultural integration and especially on the situation of young foreigner. Institutes as Caritas and Migrantes, UNAR and ISTAT developed indicators and wrote report on this issue, but a consistent literature is still lacking, especially when we consider primary school. In fact, if the presence and integration of non Italian pupils touches every step of compulsory schooling, the number of new born and statistics show us how the main weight is on primary school. Nowadays foreigner children attending Italian first part of schooling are few more than 276 thousands (Caritas e Migrantes, 2013). To face this rapid change, the Italian government developed its own model to promote integration in a context of a dynamic development both at the social, cultural and educational level, in a legal framework not always adapt to answer urgent questions as we will see in the second part of the essay. Moreover, often good intentions remain on the paper and the different guidelines, suggestions and action plans do not find a concrete application in everyday life, for a number of reasons as lack of funds, local disinterest or incomprehension and unsuitableness of means. The third part is dedicated to an analysis of the current situation and to the difference between proposals and reality. The aim is to individuate the points where efforts should be concentrated more and especially on which topics dialogue should be deepen. Integration is a process and this means it has to be constantly updated and improved as the Italian case shows us.

## 2. Literature Review

The growing presence of foreigners in European societies lead to a deeper reflection on the significance of this phenomenon, on the effect it could have had at the social and economical level and on the policies needed to deal with it. Many scholars as Joppke and Morawska (2003), Carrera (2005), Van Tubergen (2004), Berry (2001), Castles (1995), Entzinger (2000) and Soysal (1994) analysed the factors influencing immigrant integration and the typologies nation states developed to respond to the immigration flow. However, as Ersanilli and Koopmans (2011) argue, more attention has been given to the socio-economic rather than to socio-cultural integration. It is true that the labour market was at the beginning the main canal of integration, but with the increasing presence of foreign children and the settlement of the second and third generation the concern with socio-cultural aspects of immigrant integration rose. Elements as language skills, interethnic relations, identification with the host society, and the role of religion gained primary attention. As Joppke (2007) and Michalowski (2007) highlight, mandatory civic integration and language courses for recent immigrants became part of the policy innovations of the recent years.

However, the several theoretical perspectives on how integration policy approaches may affect immigrants' ethnic and religious retention and host culture adoption lead to disagreement among scholars. The first point of view (e.g. Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2002) considers policies that accommodate diversity as stimulating participation in the institutions of the host society - by allowing expressions of particularistic identities in

the public sphere – and creating a sense of belonging to the adoptive country. The second opinion (Barry 2001; Koopmans 2002; Meyer 2002) believes that the creation of a platform for ethnic cultural and religious life where immigrants can have access to services in their mother tongue will incentivize them less to learn the host country language and to seek interethnic contacts with host country natives.

Considering the Italian experience, the debate on the unsuitable legal framework promoted different analysis on the history of migration in Italy and the development of immigration policies (Rusconi 2010; Zincone 2006; Triandafyllidou 2003 and others). Among them, also policies of integration at school where an increasing majority of foreign pupils takes part to everyday classes. Unfortunately, still few studies consider deeply the effect multinational classes have on the society and the effectiveness of the policies implemented by the government. Catarsi (2013) in his recent essay reflects on how a higher number of immigrant students offer a greater number and a wider variety of intercultural initiatives. Moreover, he highlights how intercultural education is adopted mainly on behalf of teachers rather than of head teachers and other school personnel, an important aspect of our analysis. Other important data and reflections come from Caritas and Migrantes, IDOR and UNAR reports, which are constantly monitoring the evolving of immigrants' situation in the country. The same Minister of Education established a special observatory on scholastic integration, which is producing reports and guidelines. However, while the most difficult task relapse on primary school - as we will see later – studies and reports concentrates more on secondary education (Mussino and Strozza 2012) and on the need to help parents and pupil choosing the suitable school rather than dedicate more efforts to the first part of compulsory schooling.

### 3. Legal Framework

Since 1999, the European Union has been seeking to manage immigration in a coordinated manner under the auspices of the Treaty establishing the European Community and now under the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. However, the Commission believes that achievements reached till now have not been sufficient and a Europe-wide common policy is needed to provide a framework for coherent action. A vision for this policy was presented within the Commission communication “Towards a Common Immigration Policy” on 5 December 2007 and in 2008 the Commission presented 10 principles on which the common policy will be built upon and the necessary actions for implementing them. Nevertheless, a joint regulation is still missing, and each member state regulates immigration with internal laws.

In Italy the situation was more complicated if compared to other countries as France, Switzerland or Germany. In fact, till the end of the 1970s Italy has been a source of emigration rather than immigration and, consequently, lacked a proper legal framework to regulate it. The number of foreign residents increased from 143,800 in 1970 to about 300,000 in 1980 and by 1985 it reached half a million (Rusconi, 2010). However, the first attempt to design a comprehensive migration policy was only in 1986 with the Act 943 and the first immigration law, *Legge Martelli*, was approved in 1990. This law was firstly an attempt to adapt to the membership requirements and to assure other

European members that Italy was able to prevent the entry of unwanted immigrants into the *Schengen* space, but it is important also because for the first time some aspects of the Italian asylum-seeking procedure was reformed, making it possible for non-Europeans to seek asylum in the country.

Nevertheless, soon this law showed its deficiencies, especially with the wave of migrations following the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia and in 1998 the first systematic Italian migration law, the *Legge Turco-Napolitano* was passed. This legislation considered new repressive measures and more effective repatriations to make clandestine entries more difficult, authorizing also the opening of the *Centres for Temporary Detention*, but also equated legal immigrants to Italians with regard to all social rights. Moreover, it guaranteed access to education and to the National Health System for all immigrants, included irregular immigrants, and instituted a *Found for Migration Policies* to finance integration and multicultural initiatives.

Unfortunately, this open policy was not destined to last, and the central-right coalition tightened measures both for illegal and legal migration. The first measure was the *Bossi-Fini* law in 2002, followed by the so-called “Security Package” (*Pacchetto Sicurezza*) of the Interior Minister Maroni in 2008. This period was characterized by a strong xenophobic campaign by the *North League* party – to whom both Bossi and Maroni belong to – which spread the visions of immigrants as cause of crime and security problems, creating concern and worrying among the population. The law of the Security package implied such a substantial reduction of foreigners’ rights that they practically clashed with the same fundamental rights guaranteed by the Italian constitution. Moreover, efforts have been concentrated mainly on the repression of irregular immigration – the crime of illegal entry was introduced in the Penal Code and the *Centres for Temporary Detention* have been meaningfully renamed *Centres of Identification and Expulsion* – and barely any consideration has been given to the integration of foreigners (L. 30 luglio 2002, n.189). Regarding education, some deputies proposed to introduce differentiated classes for immigrant children, raising harsh debates in civil society, but the proposal has not passed. This law is still valid but the previous and the new governments are considering a substantial review of its main points, especially the crime of illegal entry and the rejection policy.

Nevertheless, education of immigrants’ children seems to have followed a different path. From the very beginning it has been regulated according to ONU Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by Italy in 1991 and included in the internal norms of that period. In 1998 the article 38 of Decreto Legislativo n. 286 officially stated that foreigner minors are subjected to compulsory schooling and the following year the *Regulation on immigration* included that they have the right to receive education independently from their legal or illegal status. However, the increasing number of non-Italian pupils and students posed new challenges to their integration. The Cultural Committee of the Chamber of Deputies is frequently undertaking cognitive surveys to monitor the evolving of the situation, also compared to the educational policies of other EU member states. These reports resulted in the developing of the Italian way to integration and in a series of guidelines and proposals for teachers, professors and school heads and on the establishment of a watch unit for the integration of foreigner




students (Osservatorio Nazionale per l'Integrazione degli alunni stranieri) inside the Ministry of Education.

#### 4. The Italian way to integration: intercultural exchange

At the beginning, the incorporation of immigrants in Italian society took place through the labour market but in an unregulated framework. The *Turco-Napolitano* law was the first to consider the necessity of a policy of integration, and together with the National Commission for the Policies of Integration of Immigrants set the first outlines for its development. The outcome was called “reasonable integration” and was based on the rejection of the assimilation model and on the recognition of cultural pluralism, fostering an intercultural approach to promote the exchange between immigrants and Italian society. However, the funds and efforts allocated to develop effective projects, also in collaboration with local NGOs, have been noticeably reduced by the centre-right coalition, which considered immigration only from the perspective of public order and economy, and which returned to the assimilation model.

*Figure 1: Foreigners living in Italy in the years 2011, 2012, 2013. ISTAT*




Subsequently, the essential aspect of education of young immigrants or sons of immigrants has been neglected. Through the 2000s the presence of foreign pupils in the classes became a permanent figure of compulsory schooling but often teachers lacked the essential training to deal with them or had insufficient tools as specific educational materials or translators. It is true that, from the very beginning, the Italian law considered the presence of foreign students in an integration perspective and developed around principles as universalism, common school, intercultural exchange and centrality of the individual in interpersonal relations, but unfortunately these beautiful words often have not been applied to everyday reality.

When we talk about immigrants in Italy, we have to consider that the change in the Peninsula has been extremely rapid (Figure 1), and that the distribution of foreigners is

not homogenous at all, consequently influencing the distribution of pupils in the schools. Figure 2 shows us how a great majority of foreigners is concentrated in the North of Italy (61.8%) while only 14% lives in the Southern part of the country. Moreover, according to the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) the number of new born from foreigners is augmenting while new Italians are diminishing as figure 3 explains. So, at school the number of foreign students grows and in the academic year 2012/2013 they reached 786.650 peoples (8, 8% of the total), 30.691 more than the previous year. On this point, it is useful to remind that in Italy is in force the *ius sanguinis*, which means that a child acquires Italian citizenship only if one of the parents is Italian, independently from the place of birth. This aspect can create some misunderstandings in the count of non-Italian minors, who sometimes are foreigners only on the paper: in fact, of the current foreigner students 47, 2% was born in Italy.


*Figure 2. Foreigners living per region*



If the *ius soli* should be preferred to the *ius sanguis* goes beyond the aim of this paper, but what we can consider is if the born in Italy are more integrated that the pupils arriving directly from abroad at the school age. Few official data are available on this point, but everyday experience and confrontation with teachers, professors and students from different part of Italy can partially supply. For instance, one of the growing minorities in Italy is the Chinese, who work in different sectors from

foodservice to textile. However, their children often are born in Italy, but then spend their childhood with grandparents in China, coming back to Italy at the age of 9 or 10. These pupils not only didn't grow up in Italy, but they do not even speak the language, a serious threat to their integration with Italians. Facing the lack of personal contact is even more difficult due to the inability to understand and to interact both with the teacher and with the classmates, obliging the pupils to live separately from the others. Moreover, if the family speaks only its mother tongue, the only occasions for the pupil to learn Italian are everyday classes and the activities eventually organized by the school.

*Figure 3. Italian and foreigner birth rate*



Two points rise from the above consideration. Firstly, that integration is a bilateral process. Without the will of both parties to move towards mutual understanding and rapprochement, state policies are ineffective. At the same time, and this is the second point, the government needs to make its actions comprehensive – for instance not generating a fear of assimilation through the destruction of the culture of origin – and effective, dedicating concrete and continuous efforts to promote integration. It is true that projects and activities have a considerable weight on the budget, but it is also true that education has often been considered a secondary question by different governments.

The question of the mastery of the local language is an essential point in the development of the pattern of integration. European countries have found several ways of organizing life at school for immigrant children resident on their territory, but we can summarize them in two main models. The first one is an **integrated model**, in which immigrant children are allocated to classes consisting of children of the same age (or younger depending on circumstances) in mainstream education. There are no differentiated classes for them, but they should benefit of measures for support, essentially linguistic in nature, implemented on an individual basis for each pupil during normal school hours. The second is a **separate model**, implemented or through transitional arrangements where immigrant children are grouped together separately from other children for a limited period or through long-term measures when special

classes are formed within the school for one or several school years, and often group immigrant children together in accordance with their competence in the language of instruction (Eurydice, 2004).

Italy chose the integrated model adopting an intercultural perspective to promote differences, to free pupils from stereotypes, to move towards understanding of the other and to promote dialogue. However, beyond initiative and good intentions, a consistent and systematic commitment to sustain initiatives at the national level is strictly necessary. Too much has been left to local decision and implementation, resulting in a dispersion of funds, efforts and time while lacking a common concrete guideline from the centre. Italian as a second language is essential, and official documents frequently highlight it, but ‘the creation of organizational models’, ‘the definition of the role of internal and external linguistic mediators’, ‘the development of materials and resources’ (MIUR, 2007:12-13) are at the same time too abstract in concept and too narrow in application. It is always on the shoulder of the teaching body, which has not only to examine each case, but also to apply for state resources, organizing meeting and eventual courses following the long timing of bureaucracy. Moreover, to have a language course started, a minimal number of students are required, and the same linguistic and cultural mediators can dedicate few hours for each case. As Catarsi (2013) explains, a high number of foreign pupils not only help them to feel less threatened and more followed, but increase also the level of acceptance in the Italian part of the class. These kind of studies are really important as they help understanding the situation and developing the appropriate means to address this young generation in a continuous and necessary dialogue of professors, scholars, politicians and families.

The role of cultural mediators is important not only to establish a dialogue between the pupil and the teacher, but also between the teacher and the parents. His figure not only can help overcoming the linguistic gap, but also identifying and explaining behaviours or attitudes which can create incomprehension or even cultural clash. In fact, if government’s guidelines for actions consider the adequate training of professors and school heads, we cannot pretend that the teaching body can quickly and easily adapt to multicultural classes. This issue reflects an endemic problem of Italian school: the age of professors. Despite the recent hiring, they have an average of 50 years old and with the age of retirement raised up to 67 years current professors have still many years of teaching ahead. The Ministry organizes conventions and seminars to make a balance of the achieved results, to exchange materials and researches on intercultural exchange, but these common moments cannot substitute an entire life of living and working. People who are now 50 and even more those who are 60 grew up in a complete different environment. Their generation was the first who decided to stay in the country and to build a life there. It was a period of stabilization, with lowering emigration and practically no immigration, with a consequent lack of intercultural confrontation, together with a minimal international mobility and a few knowledge of foreign languages. Of course education, openness and personal efforts could have helped to overcome the initial gap, and it would not be fair to include all Italians professors and teachers in a generalization, but sometimes it is helpful to generalize to individuate where our efforts should be concentrated more. Furthermore, many of them were almost at the age of retirement when the last pension reform obliged them

to be active workers for quite some years more, considerably undermining their enthusiasm and efforts for a system disappointing them once again. It is undoubtedly that a teacher of 60, 65 years old encounters difficulties to deal with the exuberance of a 6 years old child and that he can understand less and less the references to the latter's environment – from cartoons, to games, to all the electronic devices children now use – imagine the ones of a foreign pupil! And here again the language is a determinant point. Empathy can help establishing a good relation, but it cannot be enough for one or more school years. In many cities there are groups of motivated volunteers which teach Italian language for free after mainstream classes – and we should be really grateful to them – but the educational system cannot rely only on their efforts.

A younger generation of teachers will probably be more open, sensitive to cultures and adaptable both to answer the needs of foreigner children and to rethink the teaching method, moving towards a critical understanding and the inclusion of multicultural perspective in normal school subjects as history or geography. The creation of courses of intercultural pedagogy at university, after a fruitful confrontation between teachers and the Minister of Education, would provide future educators with the necessary tools to promote an effective integration among Italian and future Italians pupils. The same European Union should encourage and support meetings and exchange among teachers facing the same threats in different member states, or forums where old immigration countries can give concrete hints to their colleagues of compulsory schooling in difficulty. Mobility and exchange should concern also – and especially – primary school teachers, which should do a training period abroad. I consider that this should be really helpful for them, also to open their mind to diversity.

The last aspect I think we should consider deeper is the involvement of the pupils' family in a different range of activities. Considering Italian's government guidelines, but also Eurydice (2004) report, it seems that the main issue is to help pupils and parents in the choice of a suitable school. I am not denying it is an important step in the life of the children, but I argue that before facing the option of high school, there are many years of primary and, in Italy, of middle school<sup>1</sup> and especially reminding that the majority of foreign pupils in Italy attend primary school. The task given to teachers is, once again, not an easy one: sometimes families not only do not speak Italian, but they also live in their own environment, not willing to interact with locals and in this way not facilitating the integration of their children. However, it is also true that Italian families may not want a cultural exchange with these peoples 'coming who knows from where'. It is undeniable that a fear of the other shackled Italian society in the past years and it is still present in many milieus, also as a consequence of the xenophobic campaign of the centre-right coalition. Worries about a possible loss of quality in the Italian schools rose both from parents and teachers when classes started to count more than one or two foreign pupils. This is another sign of the ineffectiveness of government's actions and effectiveness of parties' campaign, showing once again the growing mistrust among Italians towards central institutions. Guidelines should be more than lines on a paper, and a concrete conjunct action with cultural mediators to develop a proper set of after school initiatives should be on the top of the agenda to promote the encounter between pupils and families in an informal and intuitive way. Activities as games, movies,

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<sup>1</sup> Middle school comprehends three years between primary and high school.

cooking lesson and at the end – why not – setting a theatre performance would help to create a relaxed and friendly ambiance and to overcome stereotypes and prejudices through dialogue.

I am aware funds are lacking, this is why a close cooperation between ministries, private NGOs and the European Union as well as a direct and conscious engagement both of the families – foreigner and local – and of the schools is necessary to start the creation of a various, rich and multicultural society.

## 5. Conclusions

The way to integration, especially that of children is a path paved with good intentions, but as we saw they often remain only this: ideas. In a country where every 100 pupils 9 are foreigners, the development of tools for a concrete intercultural exchange should be a primary concern both for the government and for local entities. On the contrary, Italian school system appears negatively characterized by a lack of economic and professional resources, with old and untrained teachers; high bureaucratic obstacles lowering the effectiveness of figures as cultural mediators; few courses of Italian as a second language, both for new comers and residents; unsatisfactory results from foreigner pupils, also due to the linguistic gap and, probably related to this, a higher choice among them of technical and professional high schools (80,7 % according to UNAR, 2013); low communication and involvement with foreign families in extracurricular activities.

If it is easy to individuate the deficiencies of the system, it is less easy to implement a suitable action plan. However, participation, commitment and believe, both at the local, national as well as European level – preferably in the framework of a common law on migration – should provide the ideas, cooperation and, especially, funds to help Italy developing its reasonable integration model through intercultural exchange and understanding of the other. Addressing migrants' integration as always been a process, a constantly evolving system of decisions and policies, and this is even truer for the young generation. The EU should play a more significant role in verifying the allocation of the funds it accords to each state – 37 millions was the amount destined to Italy – as well as the effectiveness of the policies implemented. The Union has also an important role in fighting and preventing xenophobic feelings among the population, which are unfortunately still present as the European parliamentary elections campaign shows. Actually, the same elections can demonstrate how migration and integration can be sources of wealth for the European society, from the economical to the cultural point of view, and how foreigners offer a unique opportunity for the development of the human being.

## Acronyms

EU – European Union

IDOS – Immigrazione Dossier Statistico

ISTAT – Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

MIUR – Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca

NGO – Non Governmental Organization

UNAR – Ufficio Nazionale anti-discriminazioni Razziali

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# THE EFFECTS OF DUTCH LINGUISTIC INTEGRATION POLICY ON MIGRANTS' FEELINGS OF BELONGING, AS MEDIATED BY DUTCH SOCIETY

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Daniela TRIFU<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** *The linguistic integration policy in the Netherlands is following a trend of toughening immigration stances along economic - neo-liberal and cultural dimensions. The paper tries to identify and track its discursive effects on migrants' subjective feeling of belonging, as it is mediated and further propagated by the Dutch society. In doing so, it follows the framing and problem-setting of the policy focusing on language, the media through critical discourse analysis, and migrants' insights through semi-structured interviews. Following this triangulation of methods, the paper will show how the immigration discourse gives rise to power issues and what migrants' coping strategies are.*

**Keywords:** *language integration; belonging; misrecognition; frame analysis; critical discourse analysis; migrants; identity; the Netherlands; Dutch.*

## 1. Introduction

The assimilationist requirements and tone of the Dutch integration policy have intensified since the 2000s, and its discourse has attracted the Dutch population consensus by increasingly focusing on cultural difference. Through policy frames several attempts have been made by the government to define “ideal integration” or, subsequently, “the ideally integrated migrant”. It is uncommon however that migrants and their subjective experiences be accounted for in the policy process. Through this research and its critical stance, I will seek to bring migrants’ belonging (subjective experience of integration) onto the concrete map in which the policy and society function, seen through the magnifying glass of language. In order to achieve this, I will investigate the power centres and ideological discourses that create linguistic subjects.

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By dispersing a national image, which recently is contoured around common Dutch values, culture and language, the policy implies a complementary image of migrants through “othering”. I propose to research the way in which these two images and the interaction between the Dutch society and migrants that is informed by them shapes the identities of the latter, which are central in their belonging.

In this complex process, language operates as a gate keeper: by being the object of a linguistic regime which operates through an assimilationist policy, and by being the medium of speech acts, through which people’s identities are constantly negotiated and practiced in social interactions (Piller, 2011). Through its kaleidoscopic dimensions, language can link the micro and macro levels of discussion and become relevant at social, cultural and economic levels in migrants’ lives.

The Dutch linguistic integration policy, in its assimilationist character, has set categorical collective goals for the population it addresses, therefore is incompatible with the notion of a “liberal society which adopts no particular substantive view about the ends of life”, that allows each person to determine for themselves a view of the good life (Dworkin, 1989, in Taylor, 1994: 56-7), which I take as my normative standpoint. When a tension emerges between undistorted self-identification and assigned identity (Honneth, 1992, in Martineau, 2012:164), when one is rendered invisible via authorities, the ensuing misrecognition affects one’s self-esteem, self-respect and consequently, well-being (Fraser, 1995:71).

The paper will try to understand some initial tensions between the image of Dutch society as tolerant, liberal and progressive, on the one hand, and the assimilationist mode of the integration policy and increasing authoritarianism – social convergence around common values (Duyvendak, 2011: 89-92), on the other hand. Furthermore, the neoliberal principles by which the policy operates (Bjornson, 2007; Schinkel and van Houdt, 2010; Demmers & Mehendale, 2010) - market primacy, responsibility and self-sufficiency – may limit migrants’ real opportunities for action. Furthermore, accent stigmatization and an institutional taxonomy that labels migrants as “allochtoon” for generations are initial indicators that recognition and a feeling of belonging are harder to achieve.

The paper will thus examine the over-arching question: what are the effects of the Dutch linguistic integration policy, as understood and further propagated by the Dutch society, on migrants’ feeling of belonging?

The next sections will deal with a literature background on related concepts (the Dutch policy with its linguistic ideology and constructed image of the good, integrated citizen; the Dutch society and how discourse portrays it in relation to migrants; and a conceptualization of belonging in relation to identity formation, symbolic inclusion or exclusion and the potentially ensuing misrecognition. Furthermore, the analysis will result from methodological triangulation: problem setting and frame analysis on the policy, critical discourse analysis for the media as illustrative of social discourse, and semi-structured in-depth individual interviews with migrants and Dutch volunteers who take part in a language teaching/learning couple within the policy framework.

## 2. Literature review

An extensive literature is available on the Dutch integration policy and how it defines membership in the context of its assimilationist turn. Shifting policy frames in the last four decades demonstrate that multiculturalism was an image without foundation as the policy evolved from defining membership as socio-economic citizenship (1970s and 1980s) to socio-cultural citizenship in the 1990s, to active, common and moral citizenship in the 2000s (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2012: 274; Schinkel & van Houdt, 2010: 701). Common citizenship's prerogatives recognize members based on common traits and values, the Dutch language standing central (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2012). Taking the policy evolution to dimensions of home and belonging, Ghorashi & Vieten (2012: 725) criticize the policy approach which imposes standards of identification with the nation through "language acquisition and domestic Leitkultur values". They add to the policy review by identifying underlying assumptions such as a sedentary bias and a static understanding of home and belonging.

The policy understanding of national membership indeed has become culturalized and politicized (Duyvendak, 2011). The neo-liberal turn has helped facilitate this transformation, as it replaced the national economy with a global one, making Dutch merchantness, a national icon for centuries, symbolically redundant. In this context, culture has become the main battleground for politics and opened new spaces for sameness and othering (Demmers and Mehendale, 2010: 61-3). The linguistic aspect of integration is implemented in a neo-liberal, market-based framework as well (Bjornson, 2007), as the policy focuses on the economic importance of speaking Dutch and forces integration candidates, through the choice of material and by coupling the courses with vocational programmes, thus achieving a de-skilling of migrants and reducing them to a limited understanding of their capacities and aspirations.

The scholarship of linguistic integration in the Netherlands has focused, until recently and in line with neo-liberal principles of responsabilizing individuals, on personal factors and decisions (age, education, use, ethno-linguistic composition of neighbourhood) affecting linguistic acquisition (van Tubergen & Kalmijn, 2008; Extra and Yagmur, 2010; van Tubergen, 2010). This approach is criticized by critical language planning authors (Tollefson, 1991 in Ricento, 2006; Blommaert, 2006, in Ricento, 2006). In this line of analysis they acknowledge that power is implicit in all social relations and that language is a means to sustaining the privilege of native speakers (Pennycook, 2002, in Ricento, 2006: 46). It criticizes the neoclassical approach that grounds linguistic achievement on individual decisions and counter-proposes a historical-structural approach which draws attention to constraints on individual decision-making (Tollefson, 1991: 22). Critical language planning aims to unveil ideologies in their connection to power, as the omnipresent undercurrent of language policies. At this level, symbolic domination allows dominant groups of native speakers to maintain control by establishing their view of reality and their cultural practices as the most valued and as the norm (Heller, 1995: 373). Due to these power relations, and acknowledging that the symbolic value of the dominant language determines "who has the power to speak and impose reception", the assumption that all speakers choose when and to who to speak is challenged (Norton, 2000: 5-8).

The current discourse would have Dutch society as typically tolerant and liberal, although such an image is increasingly being questioned (Delanty, Wodak and Jones, 2008; Schinkel and Friso, 2010; Ghorashi and Vieten, 2012; Schinkel, 2013). Moral, secular, individualistic, egalitarian and enlightened are traits that unproblematically run through the discourse (Schinkel & van Houdt, 2010: 700). There is a remarkably strong consensus on values and goals of integration (Bjornson, 2007: 65) and at the same time a strong demand that migrants share the modern and progressive Dutch values, crystalized in the concept of authoritarianism (Duyvendak, 2011: 89-92). Images of society become observable in the production of images of integration (Schinkel, 2013: 1147). “Hardly a day goes by without Dutch politicians or other spokespersons problematizing immigrant ethnic groups. Dominant discourse on racial-ethnic groups is almost exclusively about “cultural” problems” (Wodak and van Dijk, 2000, in Essed and Trienekens, 2008: 56). As shown by the literature on (linguistic) ideology, the Dutch national identity and its values are constituted as the norm. Social problems are located, by opposition, within individuals deemed cultural or traditional as opposed to the modern Dutch.

To link in with the images of Dutch society members and non-members, Ralph and Staeheli (2011: 523) advance the idea that categorization, which the Dutch social imaginary performs through discourse, has effects on the inclusion and exclusion of people, which in turn influences belonging, understood by the authors as a hurdle to membership imposed by Dutch society. Essed and Trienekens’ findings (2008: 66) show that the condition of being claimed as member by society is crucial for one’s own feeling of belonging.

Apart from the ideological construction, but not independent from it, belonging is constituted in everyday life through practices and experiences, to which the emotional dimension is central (Anthias, 2006, in Ghorashi and Vieten, 2012: 726). Brubaker further signals a discrepancy between the practice of identification and belonging, exclusion and inclusion, and the official, legal membership (2010: 65). These lead to the idea that belonging has a performed quality, that it is an achievement (Essed and Trienekens, 2008: 59) as opposed to the natural, genealogical belonging of “real Dutch” people.

It is important to discuss identity here since it is constantly (re)negotiated in social relations (Piller, 2011: 260-1; Norton, 2000:6). It is also shaped by the structural limitations of such systems, since who one is or becomes depends on what one is allowed to do and the structures which regulate such opportunities (Norton, 2000: 8). Language learning, in particular, is a good embodiment of this view, as theorized by Bourdieu: the relationship between identity and symbolic power depends on the symbolic resources one has and the structures which influence their use. The power to speak and to impose reception assigns a value to speech but also to its speaker (Bourdieu, 1977 in Norton, 2000: 9; Tollefson, 1991: 36). The linguistic value of the speaker and the quality of speech are grounds on which in- and out- groups can be formed, affecting (self-) identification.

A body of literature takes into account migrant agency in the power negotiation process, focusing on resistance strategies. Language can become a weapon to mock

sites of power, an example of which is taking pride in one's mother tongue (Butcher 2008: 380), despite policy prescriptions. Similarly, Pennycook shows how re-localizing, re-contextualizing language practices challenges the legitimacy of the institutions which regulate those practices (2010: 34-39).

### 3. Data collection

Based on a critical theory stance, the research relies on three methods. For policy frame and problem-setting analysis, 41 policy documents have been identified on the Dutch government's website ([www.Rijksoverheid.nl](http://www.Rijksoverheid.nl)), under Integration and naturalization, by searching with "language" as a keyword. They range from 2007 until the present day, adding thus to previous research on policy framing. The social discourse on linguistic integration has been analysed in the media available on LexisNexis Academic NL database, around a key event, namely the 2007 state-led campaign "It starts with language", which is part of the integration policy programme. To ensure continuity of measurements, 6 semi-structured, qualitative interviews have been conducted with participants in a language project which is part of this campaign. The Taalcoach<sup>1</sup> project couples Dutch and migrants with the purpose of teaching/teaching Dutch.

### 4. Policy Analysis

The title of the campaign this research focuses on, "It starts with language", and its specific Taalcoach project, deploys a clear imagery about the centrality of language in the integration process of migrants. It is part of the 2007 strategy "Delta Plan Integration", which accompanies the freshly entered into force Integration Law (adopted 2006, into force 2007). The Delta Plan aims at improving the quality of integration as well as at increasing the number of naturalization applications from 35.000 to 60.000 per year. With 250.000 foreigners under the obligation to naturalize that year, according to the Integration Law which came into force the same year, the Delta Plan came as a response to "deficient results in integration", as in 2006 only 56% of naturalization candidates reached a basic level of Dutch as a foreign language, (Deltaplan intergation, 2007: 5).

It seems that with the passing of time, the policy is adding more requirement layers, at the same time shedding its "mantel of love" or multicultural understanding, a metaphor common to several policy documents. The departing point is migrants' responsibility for their integration, which, together with the practical approach (job-market participation and education), corresponds to a neo-liberal mind-set (Schinkel and van Houdt, 2010: 696; Bjornson, 2007). "Integration and participation are inextricably linked together", reads the programme's vision statement (Deltaplan integration, 2007: 6-7). The lagging results of the integration test (56% pass rates) are attributed to personal circumstances (lack of flexible childcare for parents, distance between home and school, rigid class timetables), but described as only affecting the *ability* to socially participate (italics in original, Delta plan integration, 2007: 7). The policy silence and

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<sup>1</sup> Language coach, in Dutch

implication about the *willingness* (emphasis added) to participate starts to contour a portrait of disinterested migrants. The programme further proposes the Taalcoach project as a means of teaching Dutch to foreigners by natives, in an attempt to bring about the much needed practical approach. However, it is assumed that any Dutch person can become a language trainer (taalcoach), and is qualified to teach the Dutch language and culture to foreigners. This creates an image of Dutch society as uniform and unproblematic (Schinkel & van Houdt, 2010: 700; Schinkel, 2013: 1146), an image which will be reinforced throughout many policy documents further.

In 2009 the discussion moves attention towards the problematic actors. Parliamentary debates focus on the growing diversity and segregation in large cities, in a narrative of fear, “invasion”, loss of values and stagnation of development (Answer to Chamber’s question about autochthones in Rotterdam almost forming a minority, 2009). As the number of successful integration tests decreased since 2007, from 85% to 74% in 2009, (Regioplan, 2013), migrants are urged to participate more and take more responsibility for their integration, work and education, which are seen as essential requirements. The new layers added to the policy this time are the characterization of the integration process as asymmetrical (whereby immigrants need to put more effort into reaching towards the Dutch society, compared to the effort the society should make to welcome them in (Integration letter, 2009). Furthermore, the nation becomes symbolically impersonated, and identification with the image of the Netherlands as a “fatherland” becomes a policy requirement (*ibidem*). Aspects of culture and identification are measured through intervention in migrants’ personal sphere, through mother tongue use within the home. This is a good example of how discourse operates by expansion into adjacent fields, by occupying and colonizing them (Norton, 2000: 14). The policy frames migrant diversity and cultural difference as threats, leading to a loss of trust between population groups. The assumptions here are that the migrant group is the one not initiating contact, since the injured party is the native population (Integration letter, 2009: 2). This assumed rootedness of the Dutch also feeds into the allochtoon- autochtoon differentiation, an almost metaphorical taxonomy with origins in geology (Yanow and van der Haar, 2012, p.11). Integration is now officially presented as an asymmetric process, with migrants owing more effort to integrate than the Dutch society does to receive them, and declared a moral obligation (Integration letter, 2009: 5). By officially taking a step back from considering integration a two-way, reciprocal process, the Dutch policy creates a clear hierarchy of those who are supposed to integrate and those who set the integration standards. Identification with the Netherlands is set as normal, and whenever this is not the case, the SCP declares it a problem classifies it as “disloyalty” (SCP, 2012a: 84). Just as described by Duyvendak (2011: 94), “politicians tell immigrants how to feel, - above all, to feel at home in the Netherlands”.

Discrimination is acknowledged as affecting some migrants, and is measured as individual experience, by the increasing number of registered cases. Further on this issue, the policy is largely silent as to who is discriminating and why. The Dutch society is defended by discrimination accusations by turning the other side of the coin: presumably Dutch people are blamed too easily on this ground, when in fact they may only be defending themselves against the deviant behaviour of migrants (Integration letter, 2009: 8).

In line with the stricter stance, the 2011 vision on integration calls for a more categorical tone of the policy, as “living together won’t happen by itself” (Vision on integration, 2011). Several government agency reports follow in 2012, assessing segregation and the identification of migrants firstly with groups of origin, which are seen as a function of language knowledge and belief internalization (SCP<sup>1</sup>, 2012a, 2012b). “Leaning towards the Dutch society” and “feeling Dutch” are now part of the policy wording (Chamber letter on the Participation Declaration, 2013). The participation frame remains central, and language continues to be the main doorway to successful socio-economic participation, as well as a partial fix to cultural distance.

In 2013 the Agenda Integration summarizes the importance of language in a problematization that brings together both the socio-cultural gap and the job-market participation. It is through language that people can become self-sufficient and participate in society (Integration Agenda, 2013; Chamber letter participation declaration, 2013). Discrimination towards migrants is again acknowledged, but this time specifically as a personal experience. The reason why this should be countered is to achieve a broader economic participation (Integration Agenda, 2013: 1). Discrimination is thus framed as an individual experience, strictly located in the individual, and problematized only inasmuch as it hinders a good economic functioning, ignoring its structural aspects or the human rights perspective. The Dutch society, unlike in the 2009 documents, is left outside this problem.

In line with having made it clear that the integration process is asymmetrical and the burden of integration is to fall upon migrants, the policy is silent about the moral obligations of the Dutch society. An important framing effect of the declaration itself (Draft Participation Declaration, 2013:1) is that the Dutch society, through the policy silences, is portrayed as being uniform and with unproblematic contributions, as an ideal of tolerance, equality, solidarity and participation. Participation in turn is presented as the cornerstone of the policy argumentation and closely related to language competence. However, it is given the shape of “giving”, as opposed to a balanced contribution or exchange. This asymmetrical construction of concepts suggests that coming to the Netherlands creates a feeling of indebtedness and places conditions on the freedom of living and of movement in this EU state. The created obligations are presented as conditions for residence (albeit symbolic, to counter the legal gap posed by the EU legislation). Very importantly, this leads to the creation of a hierarchy of rights and freedoms, with the freedom of migrants to move and reside freely at the bottom, dependent on the freedoms, rights and respect for the values of Dutch citizens

## 5. Discourse analysis

By determining and limiting who who gets to speak, who is mentioned as a character or participant, who is an authoritative enough source to be mentioned or quoted, and the portraits of speakers and characters, the media sets the bases for a control of public discourse (van Dijk quoted in Schiffrrin, Tannen and Hamilton, 2001: 356).

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<sup>1</sup> Sociaal-Cultureel Planbureau, The Netherlands Institute for Social Research

The Taalcoach project goals are understood in a multitude of ways in the media: from encouraging the allochtones to speak Dutch, to being an add-on for the integration policy or, on the contrary, cleaning the negative image of the integration policy, *really* making migrants become part of society and encouraging social participation and self-sufficiency, to informing migrants of their obligations. Aiming for maximum results is a special concern, considering the unsatisfactory results of the language and integration tests. The campaign emerges on the one hand as a playful, informal tool of language teaching (perhaps as a volunteer recruitment strategy), but at the same time, as a coercion instrument which should be compulsory for certain ethnic groups.

Diverging from the policy, language is described in the media mostly along social dimensions, as a difficult obstacle to overcome – influencing the practical side of life, the ability to make social contacts and the possibility of falling into social isolation. In this latter sense, contact with the Dutch people is seen as a hard requirement for learning Dutch. In the article descriptions, the language is taught with particular view to pronunciation, with corrections of some Taalcoaches and the use of schoolbook materials creating an impression of primary education for children. This might lead to an important implication for the depiction of learners of Dutch: being treated as little children by their Taalcoaches, helpless in getting their message across, shy in front of strangers, the migrants are exposed to a subjectification effect that constructs them as powerless.

Many articles consider that the current level of the language test requirements is very low, which leads to implications that sustained efforts are not made by migrants to speak the language and maintain their competence level after the integration test as well. This lack of sustained motivation creates extreme feelings of frustration among the interviewees. Pressure on the learners is also reinforced by direct speech acts from the article authors, such as “Stop meowing, learn the language” (De Pers, 14 December 2009), and “Compulsory for everybody, conclude countless reactions who plea for extra motivation: whoever refuses [to integrate] should be kicked out of the country” (De Telegraaf, 27 August 2009: 6).

A peculiar mention to mother tongue in relation to Dutch is made in the media, similar to the presentation of the same topic in one of the policy reports (SCP, 2012b). The article in question (Noordhollands Dagblad, 16 October 2009) presents the campaign as a “conversation lesson in your new mother tongue”. It seems that here the intrinsic adoption of the Dutch language is assumed to change, in addition to the extrinsic priority of languages and values, one’s intrinsic, subjective identifications as well.

Another instrument the media makes use of is the control of establishing categories. The way events are defined, how they are situated in a context, who participates in them, what are the on-going actions (van Dijk, in Schiffrin et al., 2001: 356) determine how the reality is produced in the media representation. A focus on Dutch people’s expectations and migrants’ lacking motivation shows the balance of power between the giver and receiver: Dutch society is portrayed as payer of the language and integration programmes, while the migrants are depicted as lacking sufficient motivation or ambition.

The Dutch expectations are clearly contoured around participation: *“from the new Dutch we expect that they commit to participate in our society and that they take the chance we offer them”* (ANP, 25 August 2009). A local newspaper which moves further than quoting the minister’s policy letter re-translates its message as *“the point is that all foreign newcomers, even if they live in the Netherlands for twenty years (sic!), should really become part of our society”* (De Stentor/ Deventer Dagblad, 22 December 2008). This paradoxical formulation shows to a certain extent the impossibility of “real” integration, or at least the impossibility of meeting Dutch society’s expectations. A long dwelling does not make one Dutch, since the status of “newcomers” sticks on indeterminately in migrants’ assigned identity. Migrants’ expectations are, on the other hand, cut off short, in an article that admits how employers do not wait around for integration candidates to improve their language skills”. (De Volkskrant, 28 October 2009: 2). The lack of recognition of the integration diploma on the job market is also a recurring point in the articles (De Volkskrant, 23 October 2009: 2; 28 October 2009: 3).

The integration programme in general is seen as expensive and bureaucratic, and for some integration candidates obliged to follow it, even unnecessary. For other candidates however, the articles show less flexibility: “the first ten years [should offer] no social security” (De Telegraaf, 27 August 2009: 6); “allochtones who need a translator have to pay for it themselves, says PVV<sup>1</sup> MEP Sietse Frisma. The taxpayer shouldn’t worry about it”. (De Gelderlander, 21 March 2009). Reproducing the policy message, the articles depict participation as the cornerstone of integration, along with work and social contact with the native Dutch.

Categories, in turn, define participants. Migrants defined with reference to their language skill or background (“people who have been in the Netherlands for a while but still don’t speak the language sufficiently”, “people who have difficulty with the Dutch language”, “people with a different language”. This kind of attribution of identity in relation to language not only shows the crucial importance of the national language for the state and society and the direction of integration norms (who should do what) but also offers the media the chance to place people in the boxes of helplessness and inability. The aspects of this category gravitate around questioning whether migrants are putting enough effort and motivation into learning Dutch. The insufficient motivation of some migrants to follow language or integration courses is paired with syntax-level devices such as sarcasm (“Stop whining and participate, learn the language.” (De Pers, 14 December 2009: 11).

The portrayal of Taalcoaches has exclusively positive tones, as they believe in volunteering, are social system contributors, comfortable visiting teachers, helpers for getting a job, playful partners in learning the language, support providers, good company against loneliness, and “a beautiful example”. The media applies predicational strategies by defining actors according to their duties and roles (Wodak and Reisigl in Schiffrin et al., 2001: 386), therefore a gap arises between the active Dutch society and the passive migrant learners.

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<sup>1</sup> PVV is the right-wing Party for Freedom, currently led by Geert Wilders.



Fundamental political and normative standpoints form the basis of ideology, which is considered here in the sense offered by van Dijk - “social representations shared by members of a group” (in Carvalho, 2000, p. 26). Retrieving these values across the selected articles, one notices the belief in volunteering as a form of social contribution, mostly exemplified by the Dutch Taalcoaches and demanded from the migrants. The obligation of integration through (language) learning is one of the strictest norms expressed. “Integration is learning. Agree 71%, Disagree 29%” - an all-encompassing and thus simplistic poll placed at the end of an article is a powerful discursive strategy (Carvalho, 2000: 23). Through its narrow framing, the poll unites readers around the value of learning for integration, at the same time making a strong point about shared beliefs (De Pers, 14 December 2009: 11). Similar authoritarian statements come to reinforce this: “whoever doesn’t master the Dutch language encounters many problems” (De Limburger, 26 June 2010, p. 2); “You can have it simpler: who lives here must speak and understand Dutch. Everybody agrees about this”; “Anyone who wants to live and work here should know our language and society, no exceptions! Not even for football players” (De Telegraaf, 27 August 2009: 6).

Around another Dutch value, volunteering, which the Taalcoach project taps on, one article declares that “People want to help other people build a new life. That is greatly inspiring” (Nederlandse Dagblad, 3 April, 2010: 3); “According to the Cabinet native citizens and businesses have the “moral obligation” to help these people” (De Limburger, 17 June 2008: 4). The last quote comes in contradiction with later versions of the integration and language policy, when language learning and economic participation are supposed to fall in the sphere of self-sufficiency and responsibility of the migrant. Also, this view does not match the later stance of the policy whereby integration is asymmetrical, with the Dutch society having fewer obligations than the migrants. However, this stance may serve the purpose of recruiting volunteers for the Taalcoach project.

A second media control device proposed by van Dijk (in Schiffrin et al., 2001: 357) is control of the mind –that is, a way to reproduce hegemony and dominance. Recipients accept beliefs, knowledge, opinions from authoritative, trustworthy sources. In the 55 articles analyzed, the opportunity to speak is given to the migrants (be they current or former students of integration) only in 5 articles, although all the topics involve them directly as their subjects. This turns the discourse into a discussion about migrants, but to which the main character is silenced and does not have the power to contribute. In contrast, the most quoted sources are local and central government staff and NGO project leaders in charge of implementing the Taalcoach initiative or recruiting integration candidates. Referential or nomination strategies (Wodak and Reisigl, in Schiffrin et al., 2001: 386) create a clear-cut difference between “the positive self and the negative other”, between the migrants and the Dutch, in the way that these social actors are represented.

## 6. Interviews

Language is described in a majority of instances within a strong, normative context, equally by refugees and language teachers. When speaking of Dutch as one in a system

of many existing languages in the Netherlands, a hierarchy of languages becomes visible. While all interventions place Dutch at the top, taalcoaches consider the use of mother tongue as acceptable, but not necessarily conducive of a better social integration. By following the policy normativity, Z's family consciously chooses to either omit their mother tongue from the future socialization and education of their expected child, or to leave this decision ambiguous, at least for the interview moment: *"The children...they're always busy with a new language"* (M, refugee, my translation). English, however, has a special status within this hierarchy. While for refugees it is a way to have more social contact (*"It gives me more space to make friendships"*- I, refugee), taalcoaches express contradictions between socially acceptable, tolerant attitudes towards the global use of English, and normative attitudes about using Dutch exclusively.

For migrants, language-related goals seem to gravitate around social relations, similarly to the media message. A. remembers his experience with the Dutch language and integration course, which only occupied a few hours a week out of many of isolation at home.. R's answer on this question on a more abstract, political level: he wants to learn Dutch in order to stop feeling *"lonely, like an outcast, an outsider"*, and to *"feel like you're a part of a community, a nation, a country"*. For taalcoaches, language is important for slightly different reasons. They believe it is a sine-qua-non condition for communication, which will slowly lead to integration, and an important piece for access into culture. Language impedes their student, as they see it, to become self-sufficient and take responsibility for their social and family duties. On the other hand, as these are implicitly seen as Dutch values which need to be acquired through integration, some taalcoaches prefer not to get involved in related activities as part of the interactive language project.

Another view distinguishes between language that is sufficient for communication, and language that is perfect - the kind that helps one to emulate the Dutch, each offering a different degree of access to Dutch society. This taalcoach strongly encourages his students to strive for this "perfection": *"but after 10 years you're still...the foreigner, you know, everybody understands, he's a nice guy, but...I mean, he makes a lot of mistakes"*. A different taalcoach refers to language as something that needs to be internalized, following in the policy discourse footsteps, and presents it as a condition to social integration: *"but also you have to learn your new language [...] otherwise you have a problem"*.

On the issue of using one's mother tongue some respondents explained that they avoid speaking it, implying that speaking Dutch instead connects them more to the public sphere. Speaking anything but Dutch outside the home is also implied as forbidden: *"that's why we don't speak too much, never outside...speaking only our language, that's a little [laughing] [...] impolite."*(A., refugee, my translation).

Getting to the core of the matter, I traced the concept of belonging from my theoretical framework by interpreting respondents' responses to direct questions about its meaning, but also related answers around notions of home, future plans, description of their new life and sense of self, difficulties encountered, the real opportunities for action that immigrants actually have. In doing so, misrecognition emerged as an important issue, confirming that this piece of the theoretical puzzle for this paper was accurately identified.

Belonging was described in one instance as a continuous journey, as a form of social acceptance and "assimilation". The respondent also warned about its perceived

dangers: “*Just be mindful of everything that’s going on around you. Don’t feed into anything too much, cause you’ll become a part of that [...] once you become a part of that, and you no longer feel accepted. Or like you belong there...*”. This is one of the coping strategies against the assimilationist tone that integration has taken on in the Netherlands.

Other testimonies contour belonging as feeling heard and recognized. In fact, responses laid heavily on accounting for misrecognition and discrimination. The integration diploma ultimately does not play a role in employment, nor do previous foreign qualifications, as they are not recognized, although this topic is mentioned as a problem in some policy documents. Furthermore, indirect discrimination practices take their toll (“*First question! Do you have a driver’s licence? Yea, a little weird, right?!*” (M, refugee, speaking about employment agencies, my translation). This is a conspicuous question, charged with issues of race-nationality and class. M. further explains his conviction that a Dutch person with the same work experience would get the job instead of him: “*I have this experience and this and that [...]... 100% the Dutch man will get the job first*” [at this point in the conversation Z., his wife, starts practicing her Dutch reading aloud again, as a passive interruption or attempt at covering the topic] “*M:...that’s why I [don’t] understand... D: Why do you think that happens? M: what is it? what – is – it?! [that they have and I don’t]*” (original emphasis). This illustrates a vicious circle created and sustained by the integration requirements. The example given shows a deep misrecognition of the migrant and the impossibility that he make a contribution to society according to his own capacities and strengths: (on working in his domain - “[...]and then I [would] pay taxes, [...] and maybe I help someone, maybe... my arms are healthy, I can work hard, and maybe I can help someone”- M, my translation. Another charged moment in the conversation with this family was when they brought up the issue of N. Center, a work re-integration facility for petty offenders(respondent’s description; the municipality website does not specify who the centre employs). M. is forced to “volunteer” here by sorting pieces of glass trash in order to receive social assistance. He expresses frustration, and feels like he needs to clarify he does not belong there: “*I don’t make trouble, I am not a bad person. [...] Why do I go to N. Center and can’t [do meaningful] work?*” M’s way of coping is patience: a “step by step” approach combined with compliance and optimism are balancing the injustice that he has been experiencing.

For refugees as well, work is central for belonging, similar to what the policy has envisaged, and a primary locus of misrecognition. Being accepted and acknowledged for who one is, for one’s strengths and capacities can be achieved through recognized work. In this context, refugees reduce their feeling of home to being happy with the family, being in a safe place, where one can manifest their full identity. However, I. defines home as something immaterial, an emotional space: “*this [home, in Dutch] is only material, you know, material is nothing. [...] you can make material anywhere*”; “*Yea....so for me, I think home it’s...there, where- somebody is waiting for me*”.

The content and direction of change in migrants’ identity might also indicate their feelings of belonging. Feeling less worried, more at ease about the future of one’s family, and even being able to have the family together in a safe place, may help facilitate this feeling, irrespective of the language or integration requirements. Integration requirements may also be experienced as having opportunities for self-

development (literacy). On the other hand, “sounding different” in Dutch may make one feel vulnerable within one’s circle of friends.

This part of the research also examines the correspondence between the image of Dutchness/otherness and respondent’s self-descriptions, as well as their description of their counterparts in the couple. Taalcoaches define themselves in terms of their profession, family composition, family choices and decisions for migration within the Netherlands, age and hobbies. They all see themselves as helpful people, and their students confirm this in unanimity as they express gratitude for their work.

As opposed to the portrait of the Dutch teachers offered by language students, the Dutch people’s description of particular migrants, their language students, on the other hand, is anything but unproblematic. Their portraits cut across all spheres of life and identity markers: their intelligence, degree of motivation, language skills, social skills and literacy levels are assessed bluntly. Duties are also contoured as part of what one ought to be, in terms of hard work, language learning and gender roles.

Migrants’ view of Dutch society is important as it represents a dimension of belonging, reflected in feelings about a society or nation (Liu, 2013). Tolerance of homosexuality and sexual education for children as a way to prevent child molestation were praised. Other accounts about Dutch people are not so positive, though. One respondent emphasizes the pervasive role of history and describes the Dutch jokingly as “pirates”, hinting at their colonial past of repression. Another respondent questions the fact that such a wealthy country has so many undereducated people, and recalls inequality and a lack of solidarity in everyday life. Employment discrimination is also mentioned. These statements contest the policy image about the Dutch and signal barriers in real opportunities for action (such as further study or dependable and meaningful social ties).

Looking back at the tensions in the conceptual puzzle, the sedentary bias seems to undermine any migration project, according to a taalcoach: the migration project is seen as abnormal, cultural differences making it impossible to ever be happy: *“yea, but yea, but here it’s very difficult, so here in the Netherlands you cannot bring your family like...that. No, I don’t think... and then there’s the problem, are they happy when they’re here? Because of this cultural difference? Are they really happy? I don’t know.”*(A., taalcoach). Further empirical impediments in achieving integration are an almost non-existing job market for people who don’t speak Dutch, employment discrimination, and the ultimate uselessness of the integration diploma in obtaining employment. Prior qualifications obtained abroad are not recognized and the subsequent lack of support for adults in starting education all over again makes it impossible to move on. Also, in migrants’ words, rather than being solely a matter of motivation, hard work or intellectual capacity, (linguistic) integration is more a matter of luck, help and self-mindedness. Another coping strategy is illustrated by I., who thinks overcoming shyness and being assertive (which also happen to emerge as basic Dutch values from the interviews) is a good way to feel more at home.

## 7. Conclusion

The policy elements gain new dimensions as they are transmitted further to migrants, via media and social discourse. While the three analytic levels attributed to language in

the policy (economic, through work participation and education; social, not causing segregation, making contacts; and cultural, identification and loyalty; replacing one's mother tongue with Dutch; overcoming the cultural gap by speaking the Dutch language) remain present throughout their discursive dispersion, their ranking will vary. The media acts as a promotion tool for the policy, therefore it emphasises the social participation dimension of language, while not neglecting its economic importance. Taalcoaches, however, choose to talk about the social and cultural dimensions of language – its role in creating social ties as a way of acquiring local knowledge.

The mother tongue is repressed by the policy. The delay that speaking it can bring to one's integration is incorporated in the media as a short, but sharp hint about the necessity of internalizing Dutch as your "new mother tongue". Taalcoaches are ambivalent on this topic – the mother tongue is tolerated for expressing sensitive feelings. This however doesn't diminish the importance of speaking Dutch. Migrants express spontaneous consent to this view on the mother tongue, an agreement with the imposed direction of social life (Tollefson, 1991: 10).

The suggested hierarchies contoured by the policy are being transmitted in further discourse. The media polarizes the language couple into admirable teachers and passive migrants, thereby enhancing the entitlement of Dutch society. Taalcoaches internalize this message in turn and their privilege reflects in how they portray and criticize their students. The policy and media silencing of migrants is further internalized by migrants themselves, as they recognize the unproblematic nature of their teachers. However, criticism is present when it comes to their view of society, which signals an uneasiness about "being there".

The constructed categories populate both policy and media hierarchies, as images of "givers" and "takers" reinforced; The way that taalcoaches and refugees speak about each other and the extent to which they allow themselves to dive into and assess each other's personal features reflects the asymmetry of power and entitlement. Identities are formed in this interaction in a polarized manner.

Belonging has never been a goal of the policy. However, the personal dimensions it reaches into leads me equate the policy's understanding of belonging (as emotional attachment) to loyalty, which can be reached through cultural identification. Cultural affiliation seems to be actually a low priority of migrants, who feel at home with a restricted circle of the family, an environment that appreciates them for their own qualities, a climate of holistic acceptance. This shows a lack of synchronicity between discourse and migrants' goals.

The lack of recognition discussed with migrants (either in participation according to one's qualities and aspirations, or as being heard and listened to) emerges as a major impediment to belonging.

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## BRAIN DRAIN IN ROMANIA: FACTORS INFLUENCING PHYSICIANS' EMIGRATION

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Irina BONCEA<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** Brain drain in the medical sector is not a new phenomenon, Romania facing this issue since the fall of the communism. Before the integration in the European Union, the warning of an acceleration of the phenomenon was raised, but, until today, no measures were adopted in order to diminish the exodus. Between 2007 and 2010, 8131 medical doctors leaved the country. With some of the poorest health indicators among EU countries, Romania cannot afford to lose more physicians.

The first step in the attempt of stemming the emigration of medical doctors is the identification of the reasons behind it. This study aims to identify the main determinants of the decision to emigrate. The research design includes literature review and a questionnaire which was distributed among Romanian physicians with an international work experience.

The conclusions confirm one more time that the gap in levels of payment between Romania and destination countries is not the most important cause of migration.

Although this gap is significant, a policy measure proposing the increase of the physicians' salaries would not solve the emigration issue. The main reasons behind the decision to emigrate are the working conditions and the availability of facilities. Opportunities for career development and continuing education instigate Romanian physicians to emigrate. Economic and political stability or personal factors have a lesser influence.

The major preoccupation among policy makers in the health system should gravitate around the implementation of a set of adequate measures to stem the emigration.

**Keywords:** brain drain; Romania; push factors; pull factors; medical sector

### 1. Introduction

Brain drain in the health sector is not a new phenomenon and its evolution became a global growing concern. The effects on developing countries attracted the interest of research studies, starting from 1960 until today. However, research on the determinants of the migration process is still insufficient and inconclusive. Recent evolution of the

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emigration of medical doctors and the disastrous consequences reported in countries severely affected requires an understanding of the main factors behind it.

Romania has been facing this issue since the fall of the communism. Before the integration in the European Union, the warning of an acceleration of the phenomenon was raised, but, until today, no measures were adopted in order to diminish the exodus. The consequences should be disastrous, not only for the medical system, but also for the national security, even more in the context of a weak health system.

Romania has some of the poorest health indicators among EU countries. Health care expenditure as a share of GDP represented, in 2011, 5.84% GDP while in European Union 9.59% GDP. Moreover, health care expenditure PPP\$ per capita represented in 2011, in Romania, 902 USD/inhabitant, while in European Union 3231.02 USD/inhabitant (European Health for All Database).

Although the number of physicians per 100 000 inhabitants followed an ascendant trend in the years, from 188.13 physicians per 100 000 in 1999 to 238.53 in 2011, Romania still lag behind the EU average (to 346.1 physicians per 100 000, in 2011). Other parameters confirm the idea of having some of the poorest health indicators among EU countries: in 2011, Romania recorded a number of 68.15 general practitioners per 100 000 inhabitants (79.14 at EU level), 62.13 dentists (66.79 at EU level) and 550.84 nurses per 100 000 inhabitants (in EU the value of this indicator is 835.53) (European Health for All Database).

The total number of physicians followed an ascendant trend in Romania, from 42251 physicians in 1999, to 51153 physicians in 2011. Another indicator that followed the same trend in Romania is the number of physicians graduating in given year: in the last 20 years, this indicator increased from 2006 graduates to 3031 graduates in 2011 (European Health for All Database).

Infant mortality rate is among the highest in Europe, although a decrease is observed over time: in 2010, in Romania, there were 9.79 infant deaths per 1000 live births (compared to 4.04 in EU (European Health for All Database).

In Romania, life expectancy at birth was, in 2012, 78.1 for females (71.0 for males). EU 27 average was, in 2012, 83.1 years for females (77.5 for males) (Eurostat).

In addition, an increasing number of medical doctors who leaved the country (according to Romanian College of Physicians President, Prof. Vasile Astarastoie, between 2007 and 2013 a number of 20.000 medical doctors leaved the country) and a decreasing rate of enrolment in medical schools (the number of applicants at the University of Medicine and Pharmacy Carol Davila decreased from 8 candidates per place in 1990s to 0.9 candidates per place (WHO, 2011), only last year an increase was registered at 3 candidates per place), an ageing population (in 2007, only 21% of all medical doctors were in the 25-35 age group (WHO, 2011)) contribute to the worsening of the already weak health system.

In this context, a better understanding of the magnitude of the brain drain in medical system is required in the attempt of implementing a set of adequate and urgent measures. The first stem in this process is the identification of the reasons behind it.

## 2. Literature review

Theories explaining the international migration evolved over time, however, no coherent theory has been established due to the complex nature of this phenomenon and to the level of analysis each theory focused on.

The oldest papers (neoclassical theory of migration) explained the international migration as a consequence of the geographical differences in the supply of and demand for labor (Massey et al, 1993:433). At microeconomic level, the rational individual takes the decision to migrate based on a cost-benefit calculation leading him to expect a positive net return from movement. People will move where they can obtain the maximum benefit from their skills. However, some costs are associated with the decision of moving: material cost of travelling, the cost of maintenance while moving and looking for work, the effort involved in learning a new language and culture, the adaptation to the new labor market, the psychological costs of emigration (Massey et al, 1993:434).

The new economics of migration theory brought in the approach according to which the decision to migrate is not taken by isolated individual actors, but by larger units of related people. Acting collectively leads to the maximization of the expected income and also to the minimization of risks associated with market failures (Massey et al, 1993: 436).

The neoclassical theory and the new economics of migration theory lead to divergent conclusions, however their common point is that they are micro-level decision models (Massey et al, 1993:440).

The dual labor market theory argue that the international migration is determined by a permanent demand for immigrant labor that is inherent to the economic structure of developed nations. Pull factors in receiving countries (the need for foreign workers) are the main determinants of immigration, and not the push factors in sending countries (low wages or high unemployment (Piore, 1979, in Massey et al, 1993:440).

The world systems theory link the international migration with the development of the world market, considering it a natural outgrowth of disruptions and dislocations occurring with the progress of the capitalism (Massey et al, 1993:445)

From another perspective, the theoretical approach on the determinants of migration has its roots in Ravenstein's "*laws of migration*" (1885, 1889). The push-pull theory of migration, proposed by Lee (1966) and identifying four factors that influence the decision of emigration: factors associated with the area of origin, factors associated with the area of destination, intervening obstacles and personal factors became the most popular migration model, in spite of its limitations.

### ***2.1. Push and pull factors of migration***

Literature on brain drain evolved over the past 60 years, passing through the early stage of research works to the new economics of brain drain theory, from the nationalist to the internationalist approach attracting the interest of economists, sociologists or

anthropologists, geographers or historians. The particular case of physicians emigration attracted the interest of research community.

Recent studies focus on the identification of the main determinants of the decision to emigrate among medical doctors from different countries. The majority of them target low- and middle-income countries, mainly from Africa, situation that is not fortuitous, as it represents the continent the mostly affected by medical brain drain phenomenon. Most important recipient countries include USA, Canada, UK and Australia - 40% of the international medical graduates in Australia and 75.2% in United Kingdom are from lower income countries (Mullan, 2005:1813). The percentage of foreign-born medical doctors practicing in OECD member states is 18% and the tendency in the last 25 years is of continuous growth (OECD, 2007).

Also, another trend identified in the last 5 years is the diversification of origin countries: India, Philippines and Pakistan still play an important role, but more other countries became important exporters of health professionals (OECD, 2007). The most affected countries are Grenada, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Ireland, Liberia, Jamaica and Fiji (Docquier and Rapoport, 2009). Dominica has an emigration rate of health professionals of 98.1% (2 doctors out of 100 educated will remain in the country), followed by Grenada – 97.9% and Santa Lucia – 69.8% (Docquier and Schiff, 2009). Beside Africa and Latin America, the emigration of medical doctors from Central and Eastern Europe also recorded an increasing trend (OECD, 2007).

Regarding the push and pull factors of emigration, an unanimous conclusion is that the financial aspect (level of payment) is not the most important factor in the decision making process, but the professional one, confirming that highly skilled emigrants are attracted to emigrate by career development possibilities and working conditions that are unavailable in their destination countries. The conclusions of some studies identified the following determinants of the decision to emigrate:

- professional factors: 88% of a total number of 74 Libyan medical doctors declared their initial leave was based on the desire to have access to education and research and 50% of the respondents stated the professional reason as the main factor influencing them to remain abroad (Benamer et al, 2009); the professional factor influenced primary migration among surgeons from LMICs (low- and middle-income countries) to United States – valid number responses being 66 (Hagander et al, 2012); the lack of opportunities for career advancement ranked second (73%) in a study conducted on 115 Zimbabwean medical doctors practicing worldwide, while unsatisfactory working conditions ranked fourth (63.5%) (Chikanda, 2010)
- economic and political situation: this factor was mentioned as the most important in a study conducted among 39 international medical graduates practicing in Ontario, Canada (Lofters et al, 2013), 31% of the Libyan doctors questioned mentioned that the economic reason influenced their decision to stay abroad, bad political environment is the most important factor identified among medical doctors from Zimbabwe (73.9%), poor economic conditions in Zimbabwe was ranked third (71.3%).

- Family-related issues: this factor was ranked second in the study conducted among medical graduates practicing in Canada, 19% of the Libyan doctors mentioned it as one of the most important factors influencing their decision to stay abroad)
- Financial factor: this factor ranked third in the study conducted among medical doctors practicing in Canada, only 12% of the Libyan doctors mentioned the better income and living standard as the main reasons for having gone abroad initially, inadequate remuneration and benefits ranked fifth among medical doctors from Zimbabwe (61.7%)
- Infrastructural factor: unsatisfactory working conditions ranked fourth (63.5%), while the collapse of healthcare system (52.2%) was ranked sixth among medical doctors from Zimbabwe, healthcare system funding, quality of primary healthcare system, quality of facilities and equipment, patient load/work hours were mentioned in Lofters's study)

The authors of all of the studies recognize the limitations due mainly to the low response rate, which may not conduct to representative results for the entire population. However, the target population – physicians – is considered a sensitive one, with a response rate between 14%-34% (Lofters et al, 2013). The sensitive topic and the distribution of questionnaires among emigrants contribute to the decrease of the likelihood of obtaining a sufficient number of responses. Online distribution, using electronic email, became a popular technique for surveys distribution, eliminating the costs associated with printing. Studies concluded that the response rate of email based surveys is of about 20% (Kaplowitz et al, 2004, in Chikanda, 2010). The recruitment of participants is also a challenge in this field, as in most of the cases, official databases with medical doctors practicing abroad are very hard to be obtained.

Despite the limitations imposed by the research techniques and the target population, some valuable conclusions could be drawn from these studies, representing a first step in the attempt of identifying a set of adequate measures to stem the medical brain drain phenomenon.

In Romania, the emigration of medical doctors is under researched, although our country is confronting with this phenomenon since the fall of the communist regime. The main studies are presented in the following lines.

Results of Prometheus project place on the top of the list the role of income, followed by the poor working conditions, the lack of opportunities for career development, the lack of social recognition and the low esteem (WHO, 2011). Dragomiristeanu (2008) added the constant aggression from mass-media and the lack of support from the community regarding the working conditions and transport.

According to a study realized in 2011 by Romanian College of Physicians (RCP), more than a half of Romanian doctors are totally unsatisfied by their salary, while 25.52% are unsatisfied. However, other recent studies conducted by RCP identified as main determinants of emigration the absence of job openings, difficult working conditions and the lack of respect for their profession.

Another study (Suciu et al, 2012), concluded that the main reason why Romanian doctors emigrate is the possibility of obtaining better salaries in the country of destination. According to other sources (Vasilcu, 2010), 88% of 106 medical doctors practicing in France and Ile-de France declared the socio-professional factor as the main representative in the decision of emigration.

One other exploratory study (Teodorescu, 2011) aimed to identify the main reasons behind the decision to emigrate among medical doctors. The results are based on a number of 8 in-depth interviews with medical doctors who practiced in France and Belgium and who returned in Romania, before the year of accession to the European Union. The most important factors are the desire for professional development and family-related factors (family reunification as the spouse was already working abroad). The economic factor is of lesser importance, none of the medical doctors interviewed mentioned the financial aspect as fundamental in the decision making process.

As a conclusion, literature on this topic is scarce and inconclusive in Romania. Some of the studies concluded that the level of payment is an instigator factor for emigration among medical doctors. On the other hand, the professional factor is mentioned as fundamental in the decision making process in other recent studies.

### 3. Research design

Starting from the conclusions of the existent studies in the literature, the research question raised is the following: “is the level of payment the most important factor instigating Romanian medical doctors to emigrate?” The main objective of the study is to identify the main determinants behind the decision to emigrate. Secondary objectives include: to rank the push and pull factors, to identify the factors influencing the choice of a destination country.

The research design includes literature review and a questionnaire which was distributed among Romanian physicians (trained in Romania) with an international work experience (currently working abroad or those who worked abroad and returned).

The first step is the survey of the literature on the push and pull factors influencing the decision to emigrate. This step has a double significance: firstly, it provides valuable information on the research methodology used in the literature and secondly, it contributes to the identification of the main determinants of the decision to emigrate.

The most important factors are then included in a questionnaire, containing different types of items: single choice, multiple choice questions and open questions. As mentioned above, the target population is difficult to be reached, that's why testing the validity of the questionnaire by administering it to an initial number of respondents is not an adequate option. The validity was tested through face-to-face short discussions with medical doctors working abroad.

The second stage includes the distribution of the questionnaire. The questionnaire is original, anonymous, written in Romanian language. Firstly, it was distributed online, to medical doctors and resident physicians working abroad, via electronic email addresses, personally obtained by the author. The snowball technique was then used, the initial

respondents being asked to forward the email to other colleagues and friends. The scope of the questionnaire was explained in the invitation email, a reminder was sent after two weeks. Due to the cost limitations, no incentives were offered for completing. Due to the fact that institutions in Romania don't hold databases with physicians working abroad or don't want to cooperate, the approach was a difficult one. Initially, a number of 34 questionnaires were obtained.

The second distribution modality included the post of the web link to the questionnaire on different social media groups of medical doctors working in different countries. The period of distribution was 6 months. A number of 139 responses were obtained, among them only 90 valid and complete. From these, I excluded the responses from medical doctors practicing in countries outside the European continent, as the purpose of this study is to identify the main determinants of the decision to emigrate among European countries. Finally, a number of 73 questionnaires were included in the analysis. The response rate is not relevant, as no initial target existed.

The survey collected information about the participants' socio-demographic characteristics, the push and pull factors, the return intention, the role of diaspora and the remittances. The current paper focuses on the determinants of the decision to emigrate, the results for the other aspects explored being presented in a different paper. Data was analyzed using SPSS software.

#### **4. Main findings**

The first part of the questionnaire offers information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. The profile of the emigrant includes young medical doctors (the mean age is 32.28 years, Standard Deviation=6.674), without family obligations (52.1% of the respondents are not married), leaving the country at the early stage of the career (63% of the respondents). The sample includes 22 general practitioners and 51 specialists, graduated from 8 out of a total of 12 medical universities existing in Romania: UMF Bucharest (27), UMF Timisoara (12), UMF Iasi (11), UMF Craiova (9), UMF Cluj Napoca (8), UMF Constanta (4), UMF Galati (1) and UMF Targu Mures (1). Destination countries are: France (43.8%), Germany (21.9%), United Kingdom (12.3%), Spain (8.2%), Belgium (6.8%), Sweden (5.5%) and Holland (1.4%). Most of the respondents (76.7%) were directly recruited by the employer (hospital in the destination country). Only 14 respondents mentioned that they found a job abroad through a recruiting agency from Romania (6) or from the destination country (8).

The two questions regarding the salary received in Romania and the salary received in the destination country confirm the gap in the levels of payment between Romania and destination countries. 80.8% of the respondents declared their salary in Romania was less than 2000 RON, while only 12.3% declared they earned less than 2000 euros in then destination country. 8 respondents declared they earn more than 6000 euros. The highest salaries received by medical doctors are in UK, Sweden and Germany.

Regarding the main determinants of migration, the working conditions (19.87% of the respondents) and availability or quality of facilities and equipment in the medical system

in destination country (19.87%) are the most important factors of emigration. Financial factor (remuneration) was ranked third (18.27%), followed by the career development (16.35%). Specialization opportunities and the respect or recognition for the medical profession are of lesser importance.

**Table 1.** Main determinants of migration

Main determinants	Percent	Percent of Cases
	Level of payment	
Working conditions	19.87%	84.93%
Career opportunities	16.35%	69.86%
Resources in the health system	19.87%	84.93%
Specialization opportunities	12.82%	54.79%
Respect/Social recognition	12.82%	54.79%
	100.00%	427.40%

\*Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Author's calculations using SPSS

Another objective of the study was to identify the main push and pull factors. The ranking of these factors are presented in Table 2.

**Table 2.** Push and pull factors

Push factors	Rank	Pull factors	Rank
Low pay	1	Higher pay	2
Poor working conditions	2	Better working conditions	1
Lack of resources in the health system	4	Better resourced health systems	3
Limited career opportunities	3	Better career opportunities	4
Limited educational/specialization opportunities	6	Opportunities for medical education/specialization	6
Economic and political instability	7	Economic and political stability	7
Lack of respect for the medical profession/low self-esteem	5	Travel opportunities/better life	5

Source: author

As it could be observed from the above table, low level of payment in Romania was ranked first among the seven push factors, thus reflecting the actual situation regarding the remuneration of health professionals. The salary of a doctor should be three times more than the average salary in an economy. In February 2014, net national average wage was 1760 RON, while in the health system (the whole workforce included) the average wage was 1495 RON (INSSE). The salary of a resident physician is about one half of the national average wage.

Among the factors attracting Romanian medical doctors to destination countries, the possibility of obtaining a better salary is not perceived as the most important pull factor. Highly skilled emigrants are not mainly attracted by the financial aspect, but by the working conditions from abroad.

The choice of the destination country was influenced by the following factors, according to their importance: the language skills (24.5% of the respondents mentioned thus factor), the infrastructure of the health system (23.9%) and the remuneration in the health system in the destination country (19%). Other important factors are the personal ones – family reunification or friends already working or living in the destination country (14.1%) and the previous experience in the destination country - gained through participation in medical conferences, internships or periods of temporary work in the receiving country (9.8%). Of lesser importance are the bilateral agreements between universities from Romania and from host country (4.9%) and the geographical proximity (3.8%).

The most important barriers against emigration considered by the respondents are: the recognition of the diplomas obtained in Romania (28.1% of the respondents), language-related barriers (18.13%), psychological costs of emigration - costs associated with integration in the destination country or the leave of family and friends (16.88%), financial costs of emigration - all the expenses associated with moving from one country to another (16.88%). Of lesser importance are the issues related to obtaining the work/residence permit (12.5%) and the lack of information regarding labor market (7.5%). The latter are perceived as less important because all of the respondents had a work agreement before leaving Romania.

## 5. Conclusion and limitations

The aim of this paper was to identify the main determinants of the decision to emigrate among medical doctors in Romania. The conclusions are consistent with the scholars' statements existent in the international literature and some of the studies from Romania.

The most important determinants of the decision to emigrate among medical doctors are the infrastructural ones, including working conditions and availability or quality of facilities and equipment in the medical system. The poor financing of the health care sector in Romania affects the medical profession. Low performance equipment in public hospitals and the absence of drugs in some cases affects the quality of the medical care and instigate physicians to emigrate in countries where they can practice their profession in adequate conditions.

Financial aspect (remuneration) was ranked third among the most important factors. The results of the study confirm one more time the gap in the level of payment between Romania and destination countries. However, when separating push and pull factors, a difference in the position of the level of payment is observed: medical doctors are more instigated to emigrate pushed by the low salary they receive in Romania than attracted to work abroad by the possibility of earning more money.



Career prospects play also a significant role in the decision making process. A system of career development based on performance and excellence, integrity and transparency, lifelong learning and specialization opportunities could be considered by policy makers in the health system as a measure in the attempt of dealing with physicians' emigration. The possibility of research or academic career opportunities could also be taken into account.

Another important factor is the respect for the medical profession. The constant aggression from mass-media, the denigration of medical doctors and the lack of support from the community instigate medical doctors to leave.

Although the gap in the level of payment between Romania and destination countries is significant, a policy measure proposing the increase of the physicians' salaries would not solve the emigration issue. Better working conditions, access to high performance equipment, career development or specialization opportunities instigate Romanian physicians to emigrate. In this respect, the major preoccupation among policy makers in the health system should gravitate around the implementation of a set of adequate measures, containing all the aspects that determine medical doctors to emigrate.

Main limitations of this paper are linked to the methodology used, as already described. However, it constitutes a starting point in the attempt of developing a model on the determinants of the decision to emigrate among medical doctors at national level, which could serve as a valuable instrument for policy makers, helpful in adopting the right policy measures.

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# UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL EXCLUSION OF ZIMBABWEAN MIGRANTS IN JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA

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**Abstract:** *This paper applies the social exclusion concept to understanding the experiences of Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg, South Africa. It argues that the experiences of Zimbabwean migrants are shaped by certain institutional, individual and social mechanisms of exclusion. The main institutions responsible for migrant exclusion are: the police; hospitals, banks and employers. The paper further argues that migrant social networks mainly used to deal with exclusion have unwittingly made it difficult for migrants to be integrated properly within the South African society. This is because migrant networks emphasise values of exclusivity and difference. The paper proffers a pragmatic view of understanding migrants as citizens of a global world. It maintains that the social exclusion of migrants must be understood from a cosmopolitan and global perspective.*

**Keywords:** *Banks; Hospitals; Migrants; Police; Social exclusion.*

## 1. Introduction

The concept of social exclusion has been used in relation to people belonging to the same nation. European studies of social exclusion have taken this stance in studying multiple levels of deprivation and weakening social bonds among different groups of a nation. However, there are studies that have attempted to use the concept of social exclusion to understand migrants in 'foreign countries'. This paper contributes to the growing literature on the social exclusion of migrants. This approach to studying migrants is crucial for various reasons; there are growing numbers of migrants in almost every country now, these migrants do not seem eager to return to their countries - some are applying for citizenship in their host countries, the economic recession and global restructuring processes taking place are affecting rates of employment and

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poverty and globally there are increasing levels of xenophobia. At the same time, there has been a growth of the influence of supra-national bodies that are raising awareness regarding the rights of migrants. All these factors have a bearing on the extent to which migrants can be integrated, thus raising the need to understand the possible processes of social exclusion of migrants who are ordinarily viewed as economic liabilities and outsiders.

This study broadens the concept of social exclusion to understanding migrants as citizens of the global world. In this view, we make use of the concept of cosmopolitanism which explains migration as one of the consequences of globalisation. The international bodies such as the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation have also come up with legal instruments (for example, the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their families (1990), which define the rights of migrant workers and human beings in a broader perspective that transcends national boundaries. This sets the scene for the understanding of social exclusion from a global perspective.

In conceptualizing the social exclusion of Zimbabweans the paper raises five main arguments: (a) social exclusion is about competition and distribution of scarce resources, (b) it is about lack of social cohesion and bonds, (c) it is about disadvantaged participation, or inclusion on unfavourable terms, of members belonging to devalued groups. Social exclusion is about inequality and having a devalued identity, (d) the Zimbabwean identity is a devalued identity. This explains why some migrants are motivated to quickly shed it off or conceal it and (e) social exclusion is facilitated by activities of individuals and institutional processes. These are agents of social exclusion.

### ***1.1. Research participants, methods and setting***

The research involved fifty eight (58) migrants; both documented and undocumented, who had been in South Africa for more than six months on a continuous basis. The migrants studied specifically lived in Kempton Park and Tembisa areas that are approximately 25km north-east of Johannesburg central. Research methods used were mainly semi structured and in-depth life history interviews based on a sample that was purposively selected. These were supplemented by moments of participant observation by the researchers as one of the researchers stayed with the participants for the duration of the study. The research was based on life history interviews/narratives and participant observation. Life history interviews are geared towards understanding the migrants' whole life course (Van Nieuwenhuyze 2009). The use of the word narratives here is to emphasise the focus on how migrants create 'their stories' in explaining their life courses. In order to adhere to proper ethical standards pseudonyms are used to refer to migrants in the study.

The sampling methods were purposive as attempts were made to approach knowledgeable individuals such as those who had been in Tembisa for a long period of time (for example, more than 10 years) or those with special circumstances such as being entrepreneurs, or those who had successfully changed their identities and citizenship to South Africa through naturalisation and other methods. This was a deliberate strategy to involve 'information rich' individuals. The other deliberate

purpose was including as many different men and women as possible to achieve heterogeneity. The gender ratio was maintained such that eventually there were 25 females and 33 males (1:1,3) that participated in the study. This roughly corresponds to the male- female ratio of migrants in Johannesburg.

## 2. Literature review

The term social exclusion gained currency in the late 1960s and early 1970s when most European countries were dealing with the crisis of the welfare state, high unemployment and slow economic growth. It is mostly associated with the French policy maker Rene Lenoir who in 1974 discovered that a large number of people, almost a tenth of the population, were not protected by social security (Atkinson 1998; Percy-Smith 2000; Saith 2001; Lelkes 2006). These were the 'excluded' ones. Daly and Silver (2008) contend that social exclusion can be traced to French republicanism, social Catholicism and social democracy. They further argue that "the influence of democratic and social catholic thought is to be seen in the concept's interest in respectively, redistributive state policies and the strength of familial groups and social ties and obligations" (Daly and Silver 2008:541). In sociological studies, social exclusion is mainly founded on the ideas of Emile Durkheim concerning social solidarity and Max Weber concerning status groups and social closure (Silver 1994; Levitas, Pantoras, Fahmy, Gordon, Lloyd and Patsios 2007). Social exclusion is both about social bonds or social cohesion (relational social exclusion) and also about distributional injustice and lack of access to resources (Room 1999; Kabeer 2000; Sen 2000).

### 2.1. *The agents of social exclusion*

Social exclusion is a process that is facilitated by individuals and institutions such as the employers, banks, hospitals and government departments. Atkinson (1998:14) argues that:

"Exclusion implies an act with an agent or agents. People may exclude themselves in that they drop out of the market economy or they may be excluded by the decisions of banks who do not give credit, or insurance companies who will not provide cover.... In terms of failure to achieve the status of inclusion, we may be concerned not just with the person's situation, but also the extent to which he or she is responsible".

Certain individuals may exercise their agency and voluntarily exclude themselves from others. This is called social isolation (Barry 1998). Bonacich (1973) highlighted how migrants contributed to their exclusion by the host population through their own 'sojourner' and 'stranger orientation' and general ambivalence towards their hosts. This ambivalence was perpetuated by migrant networks.

However, Barry (1998) cautions that what may be deemed as voluntary isolation may sometimes be a reaction to experiences of discrimination and hostility. In such a situation while the act of withdrawal is voluntary the context does not offer an individual much choice thus socially excluding them. Atkinson (1998) and Kabeer

(2000) further highlight that social exclusion entails discrimination and unfavourable inclusion.

### ***2.2. The different forms of social exclusion***

Silver (1995:58) identifies three types of exclusion: exclusion from the labour market reflected by long term unemployment and difficulty of initial entry into the labour market; exclusion from regular work which is reflected through the growing rates of precarious work and part time employment; and exclusion from decent housing and community services. Silver (1995) reiterates that exclusion from the labour market may be either through unemployment or through a situation where one is included in the labour market but is trapped in a “bad” job because of the segmentation of the labour market characterised by easy access to “bad” jobs and difficult access to good jobs due to such variables as gender, race or nationality. Zimbabwean migrants fall within the first and second categories where they are included in the labour market through participation in “bad” jobs especially in the service industry where they work as waiters and waitresses, shop assistants, domestic workers and security guards.

### ***2.3. Understanding social exclusion from a global perspective***

The social exclusion of migrants must be understood from the perspective of the world as a global society by acknowledging processes of globalisation and its effect of creating cosmopolitan societies. This discussion stems from the reality that in every nation state, there are increasing numbers of people who are not nationals (defined as strangers) who work and spend their lives there. The major question therefore, is: how can these people be incorporated or integrated so that they participate meaningfully in the social life of countries where they find themselves in? Migration is a feature of globalisation and global inequality such that with the intensification of these two processes, we can expect an increase in migration. Therefore since immigration is inescapable, there is a need to find ways of meaningful co-operation and integration with migrants. According to Beck (2000) we now live in cosmopolitan societies that are characterised by some high mobility, dual citizenship and high transnational activities. Beck (2000) argues that in cosmopolitan societies social exclusion happens to individuals defined as strangers/non-equals – by virtues of not belonging to the nation. A solution to social exclusion of these ‘strangers’ is to appeal to social solidarity that stems from the recognition of universal human rights. Social solidarity in such cases is the solidarity of strangers, rather than the solidarity of equals (ibid: 93). Therefore the participation of migrants in the social life of their host communities is on the basis of universal and international human rights.

In light of the foregoing, we combine the arguments of Levitas, Pantoras, Fahmy, Lloyd and Patsios (2007) and Kabeer (2000), to define social exclusion of migrants as: lack of, denial or inadequate access to resources, goods and services and the inability to participate in the common activities of the host community, facilitated by certain institutional rules, processes and mechanisms and also activities of other individuals.

Understanding how migrants (whether documented or not) are excluded gives an insight into issues of discrimination, social integration, cohesion, xenophobia and even

racism. Social exclusion affects their quality of life (Levitas et al 2007). These migrants are at risk of exclusion and even violence because they are usually seen as taking 'away' jobs from the locals (Sen 2000; Cholewinski 2005; Kalitanyi and Visser 2010). Sen (2000: 20) discusses active social exclusion of migrants where governments may, through certain policies, deliberately exclude migrants from participating in the economic and political activities of their communities. An example is where governments may delay the process of acquiring citizenship for foreigners such that they are excluded from voting.

### 3. Discussion

The following are identified as agents of social exclusion of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa: the government through its economic policies such as the BBBEE; employers; banks; police; hospitals; schools; South African locals, especially landlords; churches and Zimbabweans themselves through tribalism and regionalism. These factors are discussed one by one in the sections to follow.

#### 3.1. Government policies

*The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE) of 2003*

Among the aims of the BBBEE of 2003 are to promote black economic empowerment in a bid to de-racialise the white dominated economy and promote the participation of black people in the economy through entrepreneurship and occupation of all levels of management. The black people are defined as Africans, coloureds and Indians. The BBBEE Amendment Bill of November 2012 further defines these black as "citizens of the Republic of South Africa by birth or descent or (those) who became citizens of the Republic of South Africa by naturalisation before 27 April 1994". The provisions of this policy make it impossible for migrant entrepreneurs to benefit from state support on the basis of Black Economic Empowerment. Since most black migrants went to South Africa after 1994 at the end of apartheid, it is impossible for them to have attained citizenship then. Zimbabwean entrepreneurs cannot benefit from BBBEE Act provisions. The businesses of Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs are potential sources of employment which could even benefit local South Africans, if they have adequate financial support.

The macro economic and political environment is designed by the state as it defines who is welcome to enter through its immigration laws. It also determines who participates in the labour market by labour laws that afford more rights to certain individuals. When a state openly and elaborately puts in place laws that make it difficult for foreigners to participate in the labour market it is essentially telling them that they have no part to play. The Immigration Act is making it more and more difficult to employ even skilled migrants because South African employers must demonstrate their inability to get such skills locally. Not only that, but the South African government has gone on to provide incentives for hiring local South Africans citizens through its Black Empowerment Policy and Employment Equity provisions. These are laudable moves for correcting past injustices to the black South Africans. However, this does not

change the fact that the situation of foreigners becomes even more desperate as they find it difficult to participate in the formal labour market. The macro economic and political environment narrows their structure of opportunity and may unintentionally channel them towards illegitimate means of survival.

### *3.1.1. Legal limbo*

From September 2010 to December 2010, the South African government implemented the Zimbabwe Documentation Project where qualifying Zimbabweans were invited to apply for legal documents such as the general work permit and the business permit. The purpose of the process was to enumerate Zimbabweans in the country while encouraging them to legalise their stay; at the same time relieving the asylum system which was being overwhelmed by Zimbabwean migrant applicants. Although the Zimbabwe Documentation project (ZDP) was meant to increase the number of legal migrants in the country, it has created another monster. The process has created a new group of migrants that are in limbo - they are neither legal nor illegal - at least in the eyes of the police and it is up to them to define legality on the streets. In the same process, migrants were encouraged to surrender their asylum and fake identity documents to government officials. Some migrants surrendered their fake identity books and asylum documents with the hope that general work permits would be easily available. However, up to now, some still do not have permits though they have their passports. They have receipts showing that they applied for permits. To that extent therefore, their legality depends on the government officials' interpretation of the migrant's situation.

## **3.2. Banks and social exclusion**

Banks adhere to international anti-laundering and anti terrorism policies that require that they have full details of potential clients such as housing and employment details. However, these requirements expose migrants to social exclusion where some employers refuse to write letters as proof of employment or where house-owners refuse to provide the needed proof of residence. The inability to access banking facilities is related to what Atkinson (1998) refers to as social exclusion in consumption. Migrants whose legality is questionable have no access to banking facilities. This is in line with the international banking laws. However, even those that have the necessary documents may not fully enjoy banking facilities.

There was one person (Tendaï), whose money can be described as being 'trapped' in a bank. He was allowed to open a bank account using an asylum permit but after surrendering the asylum documents in order to apply for a general permit, he no longer has anything to identify himself with at the bank except for his application for permit receipt and passport. He is still waiting for the adjudication results on his application for a general work permit. In the mean time, he cannot access his funds because his account was 'frozen' and since the bank officials insisted that he produces a valid work permit. This means that he may languish in poverty while his money is in a 'frozen account' that cannot be withdrawn. This is another form of social exclusion that Zimbabwean migrants face. The questions to ask for such cases are: will the account



remain open or will it eventually close? Will the account earn interest and if so, will the migrant have access to it?

### *3.2.1. Access to bank loans*

“Some banks ask for permanent residence if you don’t have a green book. If you want to buy a house they will ask you to raise 60-90% cash. I tried and they said I should raise 60%. I wanted to buy a house. I gave up. I will raise the full amount by myself. Everything that I have I bought for cash including the car parked outside” (Vongai).

“I tried getting a loan to buy a car and they said because I am a foreigner on a work permit they couldn’t give me. It’s discrimination. The thing is; you are working in South Africa that’s where your life is, you cannot get the facilities that everyone else gets. That we can’t get opportunities to buy cars and other goods on credit pulling us down” (Trish).

Lack of access to loans also means that migrants may have difficulties buying durable goods and even cars since they have to pay cash for everything. While some migrants are enjoying access to credit facilities on clothes, they do not have the same access when it comes to buying bigger material goods such as stoves, refrigerators and cars. They thus mostly remain property-less. Those that have had access to loans of any kind are those that use fake South African identity books. To some extent, therefore, the banking requirements may lead to deviant behaviour on the part of migrants who end up faking identity in order to benefit from bank facilities.

### ***3.3. Employers and social exclusion***

Documented migrants still face exclusion and discrimination in the labour market as a result of employment practices and the creation of irregular jobs. The employment environment is also riddled with discrimination and xenophobia where some local South Africans will approach migrants telling them point blank (like what happened to Alex) that “if it was not for you my son would be occupying this same position that you have”, even if in reality the son is not as qualified as the migrant. Exclusion at the workplace happens through poor quality jobs, underpayment (includes long working hours without commensurate payment), not having a contract (thus not knowing what one works for and for how long), non provision of benefits (including non provision of protective clothing and generally proper tools for use in the execution of a task) and sometimes outright non-payment (when the employer reports the employee to the police).

Atkinson (1998:18) provides three conditions that must be satisfied for employment to end social exclusion. These are: the job must restore a sense of control, an individual must have an acceptable status relative to others and there must be future prospects provided by the job. This means that if the current job of the migrant does not provide a sense of control, a relative status and future development; it may not reduce the social exclusion of the incumbent. Most Zimbabwean migrants occupy insecure low status jobs that have no future prospects. They are not even guaranteed of working in the same jobs in the future. To some extent, therefore, they cannot have any long term

plans because they have no idea what the future would be. They live in the present as the future is not guaranteed. Employers benefit from such unclear situations.

Among the research participants was Tendai who was given a fake South African identity book by his employer. He claims that this is what the employer does to every new migrant recruit. He argues:

“I don’t even know whose identity book I am using. I was just given by the manager. I don’t know where he gets these identity books. He does that (giving identity books) to migrants. He gives migrants identity books...but I can’t be permanent because I use someone’s South African identity book”.

While this practice may give the job seeker a wage at the end of the month, the job is impermanent and has no benefits at all. The jobholder has no sense of control and security. They may be constantly reminded of their illegality, as a means of keeping them in check. This provides room for abuse of employees by employers. The employers tap on the vulnerability of migrants, knowing that they have no recourse to the law (for the undocumented migrants) or are afraid to jeopardise their job through legal battles (for the documented migrants).

### ***3.4. The police as a source of social exclusion***

According to Kabeer (2000) social exclusion is a product of processes of interaction. Social exclusion by the police is created by the way they interact with migrants. Therefore social exclusion is an everyday product of how the police deal with migrants. Vigneswaran (2012) views the South African Police (SAPS) as generally insensitive, violent, abusive and corrupt in dealing with migrants. The following ways of exclusion are discussed in relation to the police; public embarrassment and name calling, soliciting for bribes and lack of protection for migrants.

Although the police have no monopoly over the use of the stigmatising name *makwerekwere*, they have used it in dealing with foreigners. This negative labelling stigmatises and devalues all migrants regardless of whether they are documented or not. All foreigners are *makwerekwere* (babblers, people whose languages are not understandable). It also limits their freedom to engage in social activities as migrants become too self conscious and fear being conspicuous. Devaluing migrants in such ways make them be viewed as undeserving humane treatment. Reidpath, Chan, Gifford and Allotey (2005) concur that negative labelling leads to stigmatisation and devaluing of individuals. Being called *makwerekwere* has the effect of setting the foreigners apart, as the ‘others’. Such defamation has led to xenophobic attacks and murders of foreigners in general and Zimbabweans in particular, especially in the poor areas of Johannesburg (Morris 1998; Sinclair 1999; Monson and Misago 2009, Landau and Freemantle 2010; Hungwe 2012). Mai (2005) observed the same processes of stigmatisation of Albanian migrants in Italy who were referred to as ‘shitty’ Albanese.

There is rampant corruption in so far as migrants are concerned, such that Vigneswaran, Araia, Hoag and Tshabalala (2010) argue that there is informal immigration law enforcement. They further went on to argue how such informality weakens state power. One migrant, Norbert argued that:

“The police are a problem with or without identity documents. If they want a bribe they will tell you that your identity documents are fake. Because you would be desperate and cannot afford to spend a night in police cells, you just give them a bribe and go away. The bribe can be R100 or R200... My friend was put in a cell and he paid R1000 to get out after 7 days.....These days police do not deport you, they just put you in detention until you can pay the bribe”.

The police officers' love for bribes is also reflected in Worby (2010) who highlights how Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg central have adjusted their lifestyles to avoid police by limiting their activities in the city centre or by changing the times that they are seen outdoors. Police seem to be notoriously busy during their lunch hour in Johannesburg central (ibid: 2010). By dominating the public spaces police eventually force migrants into hiding where they live in fear. This does not only refer to undocumented migrants, but to documented migrants too who will tend to avoid certain areas for fear of being embarrassed by the police demanding identity books where police institute 'border performances' at any given public place and time. This increases the internalisation of the security gaze such that migrants end up policing themselves (McDowell and Wonders 2010).

There were cases of harassment reported by migrants. There was a common perception that the police were always after bribes and were not genuinely carrying out their duties as government officials. One female migrant called Trish (an accountant) described how she was harassed by a group of policemen:

“They asked for my passport. I gave them a photocopy because I don't move around with my original copy. I am scared that if I lose it that's the end of my life. They shouted at me saying; you come in this country and you want to change the laws. They said they will put me in prison because I have no documents. So I said take me to the police station. They said I was being rude to them. They gathered around me. They were about ten men against one woman. They shouted at me telling me to go back to Robert Mugabe. I told them that I am not a thief and the fact that I am a foreigner doesn't mean I am a thief. I responded because they were abusing me. The more I responded the more they got frustrated and one of them wanted to hit me but another policeman said this is a woman leave her alone...My policy is that I don't pay them bribes. They were being difficult because I did not offer them money”.

The main conclusion that can be drawn from this row between the police and the female migrant is the connection that was drawn between migrants and their political leaders. This is an exclusionary tactic where that identity serves to distinguish the migrant as different or 'belonging elsewhere'. This is so rampant in many government offices where if one is known to be from Zimbabwe he/she is immediately asked questions such as: How is Mugabe? How is Tsvangirai? Do you still want Mugabe to rule your country? Such questions are interpreted as patronising. To make matters worse, the questioning is done in public and in a sneering, mocking way.

Reference to political leaders is a position marker which sets the migrant apart. The same practice happens in hospitals where nurses tell Zimbabwean female migrants in

labour to go back to Mugabe and scream there (see the discussion of hospitals as agents of exclusion). This increases the extent of social exclusion because, in some cases, the migrants themselves are not big fans of their political leaders; especially so where their reasons for leaving the country in the first place are linked to their perceptions of the same political leaders having failed them. Their migration was to some extent their way of expressing a vote of no confidence in the same leaders, thus they were voting with their feet (Gaidzanwa 1997).

### ***3.5. Hospitals as institutions of social exclusion***

Hospitals have been viewed as institutions that tend to exclude migrants (Crush and Tawodzera 2011) especially for holders of foreign documents. Migrants argued that nurses would angrily claim that they do not know what an asylum is. Mary went to a public hospital twice. The first time she was received well. The second time:

“...the nurse asked: What is an asylum? They (nurses) started talking about Tsvangirai. They talked to me in Pedi. They said I am rude and they threatened me saying since I am going to theatre I should behave myself. They were really discriminatory”.

Migrants highlighted that they were shouted at while being attended, denied medicines or sometimes the nurses did not create a personal file for them. This meant that each time they went there they were treated as new patients, without a treatment record or history. That jeopardized their chances of getting good treatment. Dorothy was a high school teacher in Tembisa. She narrated how she was treated when she sought medical attention at a local clinic:

“the treatment was ok, but the nurses told me that they don’t create a file (for medical history) for foreigners because it’s against the law. If you don’t have a medical history it’s difficult to be treated well. But I know of other foreigners who have files...I didn’t complain because in the end they will chase you”.

Perceptions of ill-treatment could be justified by the percentages of those that use private doctors (31%) and those who neither go to hospitals nor private doctors (17,2%). Among those that do not go to hospitals were individuals who said that if they were sick they would just go and buy medicines they thought would heal them. Alternatively, they would go and describe their symptoms to a pharmacist and get medicines over the counter. These seemed to be of much help. The preference for expensive private doctors might not be evidence of wealth but the fear of being negatively discriminated against, in government clinics and hospitals.

Migrants were easily identified and stigmatised by their inability to speak local languages. Nurses address migrants in local languages like Pedi, Xhosa and Zulu and the moment an individual expressed inability to speak these languages (by preferring to speak in English) they became targets of abuse and insults. Vivienne explained:

“They like to speak their own languages. Someone would speak to you in Venda and you can’t continue with your English. They will tell you that there are 11 official languages in South Africa”.

Women migrants are more socially excluded than men when it comes to hospitals which they naturally frequent by virtue of their reproductive roles. Female migrants complained of second class treatment in public hospitals. Nurses engage in unruly practices when they shout “go back and scream in Zimbabwe” or when they create their own smaller policies of ‘one woman, one child’ as exemplified by the following quotation from Vongai:

“When I gave birth in Hillbrow the nurses were quite horrible. They were shouting; you foreigners, you Zimbabweans, go back to your country. Why do you come here to have babies? You are wasting our resources...”

Contrary to claims by some government officials and South African locals, Zimbabwean migrants under study do not have many babies. Table 1 depicts the number of children migrants had. Twenty four percent (24%) of the migrants did not have any children, while 67,2% had between one and three children. Only 8,6% had more than three children. These tended to be over the age of forty and their children mostly stayed with relatives in Zimbabwe.

**Table 1.** Number of children

Number of children	Frequency	Percent
no children	14	24.1
between 1 and 3	39	67.2
more than three children	5	8.6
Total	58	100

*Source: authors' fieldwork*

There were few migrants who stayed with their children in Johannesburg. This was a result of two main issues: the limited space for accommodation (as migrants mostly stay in single rooms) and the migrants' evaluation of the quality of education in South Africa. Again, life was generally deemed to be very expensive in South Africa. That is why they preferred sending the children back to Zimbabwe rather than actually staying with them. The other reason was fact that children of undocumented mothers cannot access birth certificates in South Africa. When they want the child to acquire a birth certificate, they will send the child back to Zimbabwe where it is easy to acquire one. The child ends up learning in Zimbabwe.

### ***3.6. Taxis and trains vehicles of social exclusion***

Individuals may be socially excluded if they feel they cannot fully participate even in taxis and public transport. The inability to speak *Shona* and *Ndebele* (Zimbabwean local languages) while in a taxi or train reveals the extent to which Zimbabwean migrants are not free to express themselves. This applies to both the legal and illegal migrants. When they receive phone calls from relatives speaking in their vernacular they usually switch off their phones or pretend not to understand until the caller eventually gives up. They

argue that they fear being given ‘dirty’ looks by other people in the taxis. The following quotation reveals the extent of self monitoring among Zimbabweans.

“You can’t speak Shona in a taxi. It’s like a dog barking in a taxi. They will wonder where the dog has come from...you are not welcome. You feel inferior and you cannot answer your phone” (Brian).

### **3.7. Schools and xenophobia**

Among the participants were three parents who complained that their children had experienced xenophobia at school. Vongai had a son who was in a day care centre. She explained how she had an altercation with one of the teachers at the day care centre:

“I had one nasty experience with his teacher. He has been through three teachers in the three years that he has been in day care. The first two teachers were white and there were no problems. This year his teacher is a black South African woman. She started telling me things I had never known about my child...She said my child was naughty etcetera and I really think that was a xenophobic attack. I ignored it and it just died down.... I could sense that it was because this child is Shona and Zimbabwean. You can feel the vibe that it’s not really about the child... it’s about the being a child of a foreigner”.

Another case was that of William’s daughter who was called *makwerekwere* by a fellow classmate at school. The third case was that of Mary’s seven year old son who was teased at school by being called Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai is the former Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. The child did not know who Tsvangirai was and came home asking “Mama who is Tsvangirai?” Mary and her husband did not confront the school authorities and preferred to ignore the situation, hoping it would eventually fizzle out. In the two cases of Mary and Vongai, ignoring the situation was felt as a better strategy to avoid the escalation of conflict. There was fear that the child would be further stigmatised. This avoidance could have been a result of the non-existent relationship between the parents of the migrant children and the school authorities. The situation was different from William who was well known by school authorities as a member of the School Governing Body. He easily approached the headmaster and the matter was dealt with. Parental involvement in the affairs of children at school is a form of social capital which helps decrease social exclusion of children of migrants (Turney and Kao 2009).

### **3.8. Migrant networks as sources of exclusion**

Migrant networks functioned to fan social exclusion through making exclusive claims to individual migrants and discouraging their membership and participation in the wider society. This happened through religious groups such as the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) church which discouraged mixing with locals who were regarded as ‘sinners’. Social exclusion was perpetuated by the same religious networks which tended to take the undocumented status of migrants as normal. By not questioning illegality, they helped perpetuate the undocumented status of these members, thus making it difficult for them to access employment and health and exposing them to harassment by the

police. In addition migrants generally did not prefer intermarriages with locals although some men had sexual liaisons with local women.

Another problem was tribalism which seems to have been carried over from Zimbabwe to South Africa. Godfrey had a very strong negative attitude against the Shona. This stemmed from deep feelings of injustice that he felt at his previous employment that was dominated by the Shona. For him the Shona language is a sign of domination. He argues:

“I hate the Shona language. When I trained at the Zimbabwe Prison Services (ZPS) they discriminated against us and forced us to speak Shona. They addressed us in Shona. The treatment I received was worse than what I experienced in South Africa. Even Ndebeles at ZPS would speak Shona and address us in Shona. They would beat us if we didn't understand. I learnt Shona in three months. It was forced. So I hated it... the recruitment process was also biased. Eighty percent (80%) of recruits were Shona... Ndebeles have always been sidelined... when I grew up I was told about Gukurahundi in rural areas of Matopo and I understood it when I was cruelly treated at work”.

An interesting point to note is the continuous tense used by the migrant that ‘Ndebeles have always been sidelined’. This means that, for him, the inequality between Ndebele and Shona is a continuous process. Stiff (2002:189) highlights that during the *Gukurahundi* (the mass executions of Ndebele speaking people between 1981 and 1987 whose toll is estimated to be between 16000 and 20000), Ndebele people were forced to dance on the graves of their relatives while singing Shona songs. These relatives were killed by the Shona speaking 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade.

The feelings of anger against *Gukurahundi* transcend generations among the Ndebele, such that Godfrey (who was born in 1981) evaluates his relations with the Shona from that perspective of anger and sense of injustice.

The same argument was put forward by William who is a fifty four year old Ndebele man. He had problems of accommodation when he came to Johannesburg in 1992. Though he had a Ndebele friend who offered him accommodation, resistance from other Ndebeles made the stay unpleasant and he eventually moved out. He argues:

“When I came here I first stayed with friends. It was bad. My friend was from Plumtree and had many friends from Plumtree. These friends from Plumtree thought that people from Silobela are not real Ndebele....so they looked down upon me because they said I was related to Shona people even though I am Ndebele. The treatment was bad.....we stayed together for three months and they chased me away”.

William's case shows how regionalism combined with tribalism led to his exclusion by other Zimbabweans. Silobela is a rural area in the Midlands province. The Midlands province is populated by a mixture of Ndebele and Shona speaking people. According to Williams' narrative, Ndebele speaking people from Midlands were not deemed as real Ndebele. They were discriminated against by those that called themselves hard-core Ndebele speakers from Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South.

## 4. Conclusions

The study has shown that being publicly known as a Zimbabwean elicits negative reactions from locals because the Zimbabwean identity is devalued. It is also clear that social exclusion is about scarce resources (such as jobs and public services) which locals find themselves sharing with migrants (most of whom are undocumented). The negative reaction of most locals must be understood from the perspective of a generally harsh economic environment characterised by recession, job cuts and an unemployment rate of 40%. The media does not help the situation when it constantly bombards the public with stories of 'hoards' or 'floods' of Zimbabweans in the country.

While the main agents of social exclusion were identified as banks, school, hospitals, the police and other government departments, this does not mean that the encounters between Zimbabweans and these institutions were always negative, there were cases of collaboration and friendships that also developed. These created bridging social capital for migrants.

The research also shows that all social classes seem to have problems accessing credit facilities in banks. The most frustrated migrants are the self-employed business owners who cannot expand their businesses because of lack of adequate capital and support from banks. Those who cannot save their money in banks risk being targeted by criminals. It must, however, be acknowledged that some banks are reaching out to migrants through cellular phone transactions where even those without bank accounts can access money if they have cellular phones.

In terms of health facilities, the better off go for private doctors. They avoid government clinics and hospitals. The poor bear the brunt of exclusion and xenophobia since they have no better options than visit the government clinics and hospitals. These are the ones that report more social exclusion in hospitals. However the reaction of hospital staff must also be evaluated from the perspective of stress and burnout. Public hospitals generally tend to be under-staffed and overloaded by work. Therefore the nurses' attitudes could reflect burnout more than social exclusion.

This study notes that habits of secrets and lies are some of the consequences of social exclusion. The tendency to lie is necessitated by the harsh treatment that migrants see being experienced by those who disclose their foreign status. Those that would have started friendships, relationships and marriages based on lies feel motivated to continue lying in order to maintain the relationship. Migrants usually lie about who they are and where they come from. This is especially true for undocumented ones who run the risk of losing jobs, friends and lovers if they reveal their true selves (Sigona 2012). Disclosing who they truly are could lead to the painful end of a cherished relationship. That is why most migrants would rather not have any relationships at all with the locals.

A quarter of the sample participants are now self employed migrants. According to Kloosterman, Van der Leun and Rath (1998:250) the self-employment of migrants results from strict government employment laws and restrictive policies in general. Literature reveals that migrants and ethnic minorities in general are pushed into self-employment due to blocked mobility, discriminatory hiring and rewarding procedures



and non-transferability and non-recognition of educational qualifications (Van Tubergen 2005). Most of these factors are connected to social exclusion.

These findings also reveal that rejection of new migrants are other consequences of social exclusion. All Zimbabwean migrants maintained that they knew and had seen poor Zimbabweans. In most cases these poor resorted to begging on the streets in order to survive. Poverty meant lacking any of the following: accommodation, food, employment and help from relatives and friends. Migrants were not really inclined to help the poor because they were also hard pressed in terms of money. They therefore preferred to tell the worse-off to go back home. To this end, this research adds to the growing literature on the rejection of migrants by their fellow co-ethnics (Menjivar 1997; Worby 2010). This rejection is connected to harsh economic environments that create a narrow structure of opportunity for migrants. This structure of opportunity encompasses government laws, institutional activities and regulations, employers, other migrants and South African locals. These are all agents of social exclusion.

The findings of this study refute Bonacich's (1973:586) claim that "in the host country ethnic and regional division fade before an overriding 'national' unity). Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) also made a similar argument on bounded solidarity (a type of solidarity born out of common challenges or adversity). This research has revealed that although the Ndebele and Shona Zimbabweans may face the same adversities, this does not necessarily cause them to be united because of deep seated feelings of tribalism and regionalism. This is causing the exclusion of Zimbabweans by other Zimbabweans lending support to Polzer's (2008) claim that Zimbabweans participate in their own exclusion.

The research lends validation to Kabeer's (2000) claim that no-one is completely excluded from society, thus a binary view of social exclusion and social inclusion is problematic. What must be appreciated is that there are different levels of inclusion and exclusion, especially when considering participation in the labour market. Individuals may be employed in unfavourable conditions thus participating on disadvantaged terms.

Finally, the paper outlines the various forms of social exclusion of Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg showing how government policies and institutions function to exclude migrants. The use of the concept of social exclusion to understand the situation of migrants allows us to appreciate how government institutions function in a non-neutral manner creating an exclusionary environment. It also reveals how migrants exclude each other and how social networks lead to encapsulation and self exclusion of migrants.

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## ASSISTANCE OF THE CHILDREN TRAFFIC VICTIMS – INTERVENTIONS AND MULTIDISCIPLINARY EVALUATIONS

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**Abstract:** *Child trafficking is a crime with very serious consequences on the side of the victims. The instruments developed in order to recover the victims of child trafficking developed much during the past decade, but the essence of the multidisciplinary interventions performed by the teams of specialists remains. This paper shows the evidence collected during the case studies performed from 2004 to 2006 within the regional Transit Centres for the unaccompanied children who were victims of human trafficking, operating in Romania. Given the complexity and particularities arising from the approach of each individual situation, the recovery of the children who were victims of human trafficking needs the development and operation of a distinct approach, specific to these social groups, within the multidisciplinary interventions.*

**Keywords:** *child trafficking; recovery; multidisciplinary; victims.*

### Introduction

Most certainly, human trafficking cannot be dissociated from the international migration; very often the victims of human trafficking are immigrants by intention, whose migration strategy failed. According to Lăzăroiu (2000), human trafficking can be seen as “*failed circulatory migration*”.

The problem of the victims of human trafficking increased very much in scale lately, which determined the NGOs and the services of social work to adopt distinct working methodologies for the different categories of victims of this phenomenon. While, migration usually involves the circulation of the human capital from east to west and the circulation of the financial capital from west to east, in the case of the human trafficking, this path is cut off.

In Romania, the problem of human trafficking reached the public agenda in 2001, in terms of the prevention and control of human trafficking and of the social protection

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of the victims (Ferdean, A., 2008: 99). The multiple dimensions of the phenomenon allow multiple analytical perspectives: legal, economic, psychological, and sociological and of the human rights (National Agency Against Human Trafficking, 2006: 7-8).

The victims of human trafficking suffer dramatic consequences in terms of “their long-term individual objectives of development – dignity of the persons as human beings and their image in the community (Petrescu, C, 2005: 253).

Child trafficking is a serious crime which has major and long lasting consequences on the victim. This is why the assistance of the children who were victims of human trafficking must be an enterprise with multiple interventions of multidisciplinary teams. Child victimization requires special attention within the context in which the dynamics of life within the modern society is continuously confronted with situations in which the life and physical and psychical integrity of the child are endangered (Zamfir, E., 1995), either because of neglect, or as consequence of abuse in all its forms.

According to an estimation from 2009, the “children represent about 15% of the total number of human trafficking victims identified each year in Romania” (Gavril, I. G., Tamaş, A., M., 2009:11).

The working instruments used to assist these victims evolved much over the past 20 years on the background of an increased attention of the authorities and of the associative structures, both in the countries of destination, and in the countries of origin.

This article which relies in the case studies performed in 2004-2006 within the zonal Transit Centres for the unaccompanied children who were victims of human trafficking, operating in Romania, I am making an exposition of the dimensions of the interventions conducted in the case of 15 children, victims of child trafficking.

## **Context of the operation of the Romanian transit and protection centres for the children victims of human trafficking**

The protection of the unaccompanied children in distress on the territory of other countries or victims of the human trafficking has been a concern for the National Authority for the Protection of Children Rights, as shown by the start in 2004 and 2005 of the National Interest Programs PIN 415 and PIN 3. In 2007, the National Authority for the Protection of Children Rights and the organisation Save the Children<sup>1</sup> decided to make a survey of the operational efficacy of the transit centres with the purpose of improving and developing their activity so that they can provide as complete as possible services for their beneficiaries. These protection centres address exclusively the children victims of human trafficking, who are unaccompanied and repatriated. They operate as transit structures, according to the provisions of Law 272/2004. They provide swift intervention and special assistance ensuring protection and assistance for a period of 15

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<sup>1</sup> ANPDC, Save the Children, Evaluation of the activity of the transit centres established within the framework of the National Interest Programs 415/2004 and 3/2005 (period 2004-2006), 2007.

days, with the possibility of extension up to 90 days if no solution is identified for the children. In 2007, the capacity of the transit centres was of 118 beds. The zonal Transit Centres for the unaccompanied children and for the children victims of human trafficking operate as structures of temporary protection during the early stages of the recovery intervention (emergency assistance). Their residential structure resembles the family pattern, the children receiving shelter and special assistance for a period of 15 days. Once these protection centres were established, they needed a common operational methodology, which focused on the component of repatriation of the unaccompanied children victims of human trafficking identified on the territory of other states, on their accompaniment up to the transit centres and of working with them during their stay in the transit centres in view of their integration.

The total number of beneficiaries of the transit centres from 2004 to 2006, was of 661, with an average of 60 assisted children per transit centre. The transit centres which provided assistance to the highest number of children were those from Arad, Oradea and Bucharest which covered together 85% (559) of the total number of children beneficiaries of the assistance specific to this program.

#### Length of the period of assistance and protection of the children victims of human trafficking within the transit centres

CENTRE	Total number of children assisted by each centre from 2004 to 2006	Length of the period of assistance and protection in the transit centres	
		Average number of days per child	Total length of the period (col. 1 × col. 2)
1. ARAD	337	Not specified*	Not specified
2. IAȘI	19	120	2280 days
3. GALAȚI	20	5**	100 days
4. PIATRA NEAMȚ	12	180	2160 days
5. SATU MARE	12	45	540 days
6. ORADEA	116	9	1044 days
7. BUCUREȘTI	106	14	1484 days
8. TIMIȘOARA	1	60	60 days
9. MEHEDINȚI	14	Not the case***	Not the case
10. BOTOȘANI	24	1	24 days
11. SUCEAVA	0	0****	0 days
12. GIURGIU	-	*****	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>324 children (661-337 Arad)</b>	<b>23.74 days/child (7692:324)</b>	<b>7692 days (8 centre)</b>

\* „The period of assistance varied, with the particular case, from several hours to several days; the cases in which the children asked for assistance benefitted of services in agreement with the legal provisions, until their situation was solved; \*\* „There have been cases when they remained for just 5 days, but we also had cases when they stood for more than one year because the penal trial was very long”; \*\*\* It was not the case because „all the parents agreed for the reintegration of the child within the family after repatriation”; \*\*\*\* The centre had no beneficiaries;

\*\*\*\*\* The centre had no beneficiaries

Source: ANPDC, Save the Children, 2007.

The other 8 centres provided assistance to an average number of 13 children per unit. The transit centres from Timișoara and Suceava were on the bottom positions from this point of view, with 1 and 0 assisted children, respectively. From the total number of children who benefitted of special assistance, 103 (16%) were children victims of human trafficking in Romania (34) and 69 were victims of human trafficking in other countries. A total of 22 cases ended in court; in 7 of these cases damages were demanded, but in just one instance, assisted by the lawyer of the organisation Save the Children, Romania, the court ruled in favour of damages (Galați).

The survey of the transit centres activity included investigations at the transit centres and at the partner institutions, which used for the interviews open question questionnaires specific to the two groups of analysis. The “face to face” interviews were conducted with the representatives of the transit centres and of the partner institutions, at their headquarters (for the interviews at the transit centre, there also was the possibility of filling in the electronic version of the questionnaire).

## Multidisciplinary interventions – case studies

Within the process of operationalization and operation of the transit centres we conducted specific interventions for the psycho-social recovery of the children victims of human trafficking. These interventions were performed by a multidisciplinary team which I coordinated throughout the implementation of the program run by the Organisation “Save the Children”. This team used the services of a psychologist, two social workers, a psychiatrist and a legal advisor. The evaluation performed on each individual child included specialised interventions in different areas (social work, psychological assistance, medical and legal assistance).

The evaluation and intervention activities during 15 cases of children victims of human trafficking required a large volume of working hours of the multidisciplinary team, but the result in most situations, reintegration of the children within their families, or their return to school education, provided particular professional and personal satisfaction.

A general view of the 15 cases operated throughout the 6 months of interventions included in this investigation, show that all the children beneficiaries of special interventions were girls, victims of human trafficking in Romania, and that they originated from different historical regions of Romania.

Depending on the age criterion, we noticed that just one victim was aged 14, one was aged 15, five of them were aged 16, and eight were aged 17 (at the moment when they entered the transit centre).

### Age of the subjects

Age of the subjects	Number of subjects
14 years old	1
15 years old	1
16 years old	5
17 years old	8

In terms of their area of residence, 7 children came from urban areas and 8 children came from rural areas, while in terms of the geographical distribution, most of them came from the counties forming the historical region of Moldova (2 – Iași County, 2 – Bacău County, 1 – Botoșani County, 1 – Neamț County, 1 – Galați County, 1 – Brăila County), 1 – Bistrița Năsăud County, 1 – Teleorman County, 1 – Bihor County, 1 – Constanța County, 1 – Sibiu County, 1 – Ialomița County, 1 – Bucharest.

#### Residential area of origin

Urban	Rural
7	8

Even though the children were protected by the laws governing child protection, among the 15 cases assisted during the period of our survey, we had a girl aged 17 who was married at the age of 12 according to the rules of the Roma community; when she was admitted into the transit centre she was divorced and had a child 2 years old. No other assisted person had been married, or had given birth to children.

#### Marital status

Married	Single	Divorced	Remarried
0	14	1	0

The educational status of the children victims of human trafficking show that at the time of their recruiting, most of them were attending school, therefore didn't drop out of school: just one girl, aged 17, had just graduated 4 elementary grades; a girl aged 14 graduated 6 classes; 3 girls graduated 7 classes; 4 girls graduated 8 classes; 3 girls graduated 9 classes and 3 girls graduated 10 classes.

#### Educational status of the subjects

Graduated classes	Number of subjects
4 grades	1
5 grades	-
6 grades	1
7 grades	3
8 grades	4
9 grades	3
10 grades	3

Regarding the social assistance provided to the subjects of my investigation, the following facts resulted from the analysis of the individual situations:



- Situation of the family of origin – it resulted that in just 6 cases the children victims of human trafficking came from nuclear families, having brothers and sisters (except for one case). We also identified four subjects who lost one of their parents (death due to serious illnesses), three subjects had divorced or separated parents; one girl whose parents were unknown had been adopted by a family (which dissolved subsequently – during the period of our survey the adoptive mother was prostituting in Turkey), while both parents of one girl were missing from home (the father was in custody, while the mother was admitted in a psychiatric facility for alcohol addiction associated to problems of mental health).

#### Situation of subjects' family of origin

Subject	Situation of the family
1.	Retired parents, 2 brothers
2.	Mother dead, father – jobless, 3 sisters
3.	Mother – separated, father – worker, no brothers or sisters
4.	Separated parents, mother – retired (illness), father - worker
5.	Mother –dead, father – worker, 1 brother, 2 sisters
6.	Mother – household worker, father – sells second-hand cars, 4 brothers, 3 sisters
7.	Divorced parents, mother – tailor, father – driver, no brothers or sisters
8.	Mother – worker (remarried), father – dead, 1 brother, 1 step sister
9.	Parents – unknown, adoptive mother (divorced and remarried) – prostituting in Turkey, step father– in custody, 1 step brother
10.	Mother – admitted in a psychiatric facility (alcohol addiction), father – in custody, no brothers or sisters
11.	Mother – household worker, father – sick in bed (work accident), 10 brothers (1 dead)
12.	Mother – worker, father –truck driver, no brothers or sisters
13.	Mother – jobless, father – dead, 2 sisters, 1 step brother
14.	Mother – household worker, father – driver, 1 brother
15.	Mother – tailor, father – farm worker, 1 sister

- Incomes of the family of origin – we noticed that only four subjects came from families with medium incomes and who had proper households; at the opposite end there were three subjects who could make no reference to the incomes of their family of origin (jobless, living from the state allocations for the children, from seasonal work or from just one pension); the family members of the other 8 subjects had incomes at the level of the minimal threshold and were living in precarious households (some of them didn't have electric power, most of them were heating with fire wood and had no running water).

### Incomes of the family of origin

Subject	Family incomes
1.	Medium incomes, medium household
2.	Minimal incomes, apartment with 2 rooms, modest
3.	Minimal incomes, minimal household
4.	Minimal incomes, minimal household
5.	No incomes (living from the state allocations for the children), precarious household
6.	Medium income , apartment with 7 rooms, bathrooms, kitchen
7.	Minimal incomes, small household, precarious situation
8.	Minimal incomes, apartment with 2 rooms, modest
9.	Minimal incomes, precarious household
10.	No incomes (pension of the grandfather), modest one-room apartment of the grandfather
11.	Minimal incomes, precarious household
12.	Medium incomes, medium household
13.	No incomes (seasonal work), precarious household
14.	Minimal incomes, apartment with 2 rooms, modest
15.	Medium incomes, apartment with 2 rooms, modest

- Meetings with the social worker with the view of social integration – for the 15 cases of reintegration of the children victims of human trafficking, we planned and conducted 253 meetings: 202 with the subjects, 23 with the members of the families of origin and 28 with representatives of the local authorities (mayoral departments , deconcentrated services, police, church, etc.)

### Meetings with the social worker in view of social integration

With the subjects	With the members of the local family	With local representatives
202	23	28

- School reinsertion/professional orientation/social reintegration – of the 15 girls victims of human trafficking integrated in the program of assistance, 8 were supported to go on with their school education, 7 attended various vocational training courses (4 of them are also going on with their school education), while the remaining 4 girls didn't go on with their studies due to various reasons (1 school dropout, 1 admitted to psychiatry unit, 2 working, 1 in Romania and 1 in Spain). At the end of the 6 months of survey we noticed positive outcomes in terms of social reintegration in 13 cases and a negative outcome in two cases (re-trafficking in Romania and admission in the psychiatry unit).

**School reinsertion/professional orientation/social reintegration**

School reinsertion	Professional orientation	Social reintegration
8	7	13

The following facts resulted from the analysis in terms of psychological assistance delivered to the subjects of my survey:

- Meetings with the psychologist – for the 15 subjects of our survey we conducted a total of 187 meetings of psychological counselling and therapy; one girl refused this form of assistance (on grounds that “only God can help me with this”).
- Psychological diagnosis – 7 of the 14 subjects who received special assistance were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder; 3 – with acute reaction to stress; while the others were diagnosed with other disorders – affective disorders, hypersexualisation and general anxiety
- Evolution of the subjects during the psychological assistance – in most cases there was a good cooperation with the subjects, so that at the end of the period, except for three cases which didn’t participate or leaved the program, we managed to solve the acute problems challenging them.

The health assistance provided to the 15 children, victims of human trafficking referred to HIV check-up, check-up for sexually transmitted diseases (STD), psychiatric check-up, health insurance, family planning and contraceptive products.

- HIV check-up: all subjects did the HIV/AIDS check-up, just one girl was positive and she received subsequently the adequate treatment.

**HIV check-up**

Positive	Negative
1	14

- STD check-up: the 15 were checked-up and it resulted that 8 of them had sexually transmitted diseases (an extremely serious disease in one case - tertiary syphilis)

**STD check-up**

Positive	Negative
8	7 Papilloma Virus, primary syphilis, tertiary syphilis, chlamydia

- Psychiatric check-up: all the girls were evaluated by the psychiatrist and the results were negative for 14 of them; just one case needed specialised psychiatric

intervention (girl with tertiary syphilis who was subsequently admitted to the Special Centre from Techirghiol).

#### Psychiatric check-up

Positive	Negative
1	14

- Health insurance and family doctor: all subjects benefited of family doctors services with the support of the social worker (just one of the subjects had family doctor when the program started).
- Family planning and contraceptive means: all girls received contraceptive means and, depending on the particular situation, family planning meetings.
- **Legal counselling** about their traffic-related experience – in 6 of the cases the subjects were part in the criminal case prosecuted against the traffickers, which presumed legal counselling so that they know what rights and duties they have in their position of witness in the criminal case. Four of the subjects received legal counselling about the status of human trafficking victim. There also were some other situations: two subjects needed protection from the specialised police department (General Directorate for the Control of Organised Crime and Drug Addiction), while other two subjects received special support for the termination of parental rights of the father of the child born during their marriage, and assistance to get custody of the child.

#### Legal counselling related to their traffic experience

Provided due to their participation as witness in the criminal prosecution trial	Provided in relation to their status of human trafficking victim
6	4

## Conclusions regarding the evaluation of subjects

Within the context of child trafficking for commercial purposes, we could notice that the *gender differences* are very important. The different social roles of the girls and boys and the differences of status vary with the culture and traditions. The girls have to endure more difficulties than the boys, they are more exposed to sexual exploitation, and this fact may be the result of the vulnerable role which the society bestowed on women.

The girls coming from modest and large families undergo special risks, particularly if the girl is the eldest of the brothers and she has to care for her younger sisters and brothers. The eldest girl of the family is responsible for the care of her younger siblings, for the household chores (cooking, cleaning, doing the laundry, etc.). Her involvement

in these activities of “invisible” work affects her cognitive, social, emotional development and the quality of her life. Also, her academic performance is also affected by the very short time she has available to study, read, learn or for leisure time.

There is a trend of higher demand on the human traffic market for girls aged 14-17. Very many girls are trafficked for sexual exploitation. The most destructive consequences in view of the associated risks are: the unwanted pregnancies and the sexually transmitted infections, which may affect their reproductive capacity. Social reintegration can be extremely difficult for the girls victims of human trafficking because of the feeling of shame and guilt which they have, due to the negative attitudes of the family and community. The adverse reactions of the community are the consequence of the same gender differences between girls and boys, the girls being bestowed a role of inferiority.

Another factor which increases the vulnerability to traffic consists in the **living conditions within the family**. The family is the first environment which any child gets to know, it determines the emotional structure of the child and introduces the child into society. Hence, one of the most frequently met behaviours is the one in which the child starts working to help his/her family. This behaviour is the consequence either of the poverty, which requires work from all the family members, or of the cultural values which consider that working make the child responsible in his/her future status of adult person, or of the psychical state of health of the parent. Thus, for the people whose families live in rural areas, work starts very early in their life, by their almost daily presence, next to the parents, in the agricultural or household activities. Initially, the child performs easy tasks, but the level of difficulty increase gradually. In such situations it is very hard to draw a line between what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, things being different for each individual child.

The low educational level of the parents and their scarce knowledge about rearing and educating a child bear a negative impact on the children and on their future. The parents with a low educational level provide their children with a limited perspective on the importance of education and don't encourage their aspirations for educational or professional accomplishment. Thus, if the parents attended school for a short period, if ever, they don't understand the need of education for their children. Such an example is the situation in which the parents send their small children to work in unskilled activities, for other people, hoping they will thus learn to support themselves and will have a better life as adult people; or, they are knowingly involved in internal traffic networks to make more money. This induces in the child the wish to make easy money and the next step is the involvement in external trafficking networks. The educational level of the children and teenagers is low because they dropped out of school, while their parents too have a very low educational level or are even illiterate.

Most children come from disorganised families whose poverty is worsened by the manifestation of the social stress – alcoholism, physical and/or verbal violence, sexual aggression. The relations of the child with his/her family are very weak, which makes these children to be much more vulnerable to the influences of the environment external to the family.

Another relevant aspect is the fact that a child who is victim of human trafficking is confronted with learning experiences which develop in him/her specific abilities, different from those of a child who didn't have such experiences. These abilities (to negotiate, to relate, which form personal coping resources), are protector factors for the children and they are extremely important resources within the process of rehabilitation. The analysis of the development needs of the child will identify these personal resources which can facilitate the process of rehabilitation of the child victim of human trafficking. The most frequent disorders which appear in comorbidity or in the post-traumatic stress are: abuse or addiction of substances; anxiety; panic with or without agoraphobia; general anxiety; obsessive-compulsive neurosis; social phobia. The intervention involves compulsorily the intervention of the associated disturbances.

The analysed subjects show us that the trafficking history and the forms of abuse which the child endured while being trafficked have disastrous consequences on the emotional balance and on the general behaviour of the children. Most times, behind each history of traffic is a history of abuse in the family, in the group to which he/she belongs. In the case of the traffic history too, like in the case of the intra-family violence, one may speak of a "learned impotency". This means that the victim initially tries to get out of the relation, but this attempt is gradually smothered by the support systems – institutions, extended family, friends, etc., which is why the child returns to the initial relation. We may speak here of the so-called "attachment to the abuser (trafficker)", or of the "Stockholm syndrome", which is the highest obstacle in our work with the children victims of human trafficking. The analysed subjects show that most children have been the victims of repeated experiences of neglect, physical and/or sexual abuse, which increased their risk of becoming again such victims. The most important factor which maintains the risk of becoming again such victims has been identified in the dysfunctions at the level of the perception of the risk situations. A child, victim of human trafficking for sexual exploitation runs an even higher risk of being involved in illegal activities such drug smuggling, because of the cognitive underestimation of such risk situations.

### **Final remarks**

Child trafficking requires particular attention and specific responses due to the vulnerability of the children to the traffic. The individual national states have to guarantee and protect the rights of the children, as it is stipulated in the UN Convention of the Rights of Children, as well as in other international instruments (Nicolăescu, D., 2004). Because the children, victims of human trafficking, is a problem of the space and time in which we are living, solving it using as low as possible human and social costs presumes knowledge of the underlying mechanisms, of the forms of manifestation, of the amplitude and of the predictable effects. It is also necessary to design and apply a distinct approach, specific to these social groups (Nicolăescu D., 2011: 126) within the multidisciplinary interventions aiming to recover the victims of child trafficking. Within this context, the scientific analysis by the development and adoption of optimal quality standards which are to be used as scientific instruments adequate to the problems of the children who were victims of human trafficking and of the Romanian population, will standardize the interventions and will generate a distinct approach, characteristic to such types of abuses.

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## IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION REGIMES IN EU COUNTRIES

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**Abstract:** *This paper aims to explore immigration related policies implemented by the European Union countries in order to identify common patterns which can be interpreted as integration regimes. We build our analysis on data from 2010 Migration Integration Policy Index. Latent class analysis is used for obtaining number and structure of European integration regimes. Profiles of the regimes are given by the combination of scores obtained by countries with respect to seven different policy areas: labour market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination. Our results point to the existence of three immigration integration regimes at the level of EU countries.*

**Keywords:** *Immigration, integration regimes, latent class analysis*

### Introduction

Nowadays, immigration represents a major challenge for the European Union. In response, EU aims to implement a common immigration policy with the goal of making legal immigration to contribute to its socio-economic development and fight against illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. We study the progress of EU countries towards the above mentioned goal of implementing a common immigration approach. Therefore, this paper aims to explore immigration related policies implemented by the European Union countries in order to identify common

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patterns which can be interpreted as integration regimes. We build our analysis on data from 2010 Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Latent class analysis is used for obtaining number and structure of European integration regimes. Profiles of the regimes are given by the combination of scores obtained by countries with respect to seven different policy areas: labour market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination.

We continue the work of Meuleman and Reeskens (2008) who performed a similar analysis for data of 2007 MIPEX which didn't cover the education policy strand. Also, the 2010 MIPEX is calculated for a larger number of countries, including Romania. So, the scope of our work is to identify and characterize integration regimes as they appear from the data of 2010 MIPEX. The new results will show the evolution of the European integration policy patterns, as well as the way in which the immigrants' integration policies in the field of education connect with the other policy areas.

## Literature review

Much literature on incorporation regimes was produced in developed and democratic countries, most of it under new institutional economics theory that combines economics, organizational theory, political sciences, sociology and other in order to better understand the social, political and economic life (Klein, 1999). Most of the studies focused on analyzing policies and access to citizenship and civil rights, some of them on the access to labour market and welfare, while during the last decades, studies covered issues related to social and cultural life of immigrants. According to Adida (2011), a lot is known on the situation of immigrants in developed countries, but much less on the situation of immigrants in developing countries. Moreover, she advocates for the need to develop appropriate frameworks to address and understand the immigration in developing countries as some of them still struggle with fragile national identities. So, constructing a framework to analyze comparatively immigrants' incorporation regimes in developed and developing countries is a very challenging task as the policy indexes developed so far are based on the experiences and theories emerged in western countries.

In all countries, irrespective of the type of incorporation policies, some migrants are preferred to another due to their origin, or to their level of education or skills. So, stratification of immigrants is determined by various factors and policies present at national level. For instance, left parties used to make citizenship more accessible to immigrants, while right parties are focused on strengthening the ties with the diaspora or with other nations with strong cultural similarities. Also, integration regimes depend a lot on the economy structure and on the economic cycle. During recession, anti-immigrant discourse increases, while during economic growth countries are more open, mostly to labour migration. But, where do we find migrants in the destination countries? Are they rather in the formal sector of the economy, or rather "trapped" in the lower layer with no opportunities to move up? What social security systems cover their risks, are the social security and social benefits fairly split in between natives and immigrants? How difficult is to become a citizen of one destination country and how is the racial and ethnic discrimination combated?

Even if there is such amount of literature on immigrants' integration, both case studies and comparative analysis, there is still no common definition of the concept "integration" or "incorporation" regime. According to Phalet and Swyngedouw (2003) "integration" is referring to a "collection of policies towards immigrants and Post-migration minorities". Also, they define incorporation regime as the "selective extension to non-national of legal, social, cultural and political rights and opportunities that were once the exclusive entitlements of nationals" (Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2003). According to Freeman (2004) incorporation defines the ways in which membership is accessed across the political, economic and cultural domains of society. Furthermore, he proposes a multisectoral framework in order to analyze and classify different integration regimes (Freeman, 2007).

After analyzing the integration regimes in eight countries, Freeman (2007) points out that there is no truly coherent regime, but different institutions, norms, practices that create a unique framework where both immigrants and natives access opportunities and deal with constrains. Even if the goals of the policies are similar, the institutional framework leads sometimes to completely different outcomes. The incorporation regimes vary on a continuum from assimilation to multiculturalism, both in between different countries, but also within the same country during different periods of time.

One of the most refereed studies in the literature of incorporation regime is "Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany" (Brubaker, 1996) in which two types of immigrants treatment are described: *jus soli policies* - attribution of citizenship by birth and *jus sanguinis policies* - attribution of citizenship through blood lines. So, Brubaker (1996) makes a distinction between civic territorial approach of Germany and ethnic and cultural approach of France towards immigration. Even if the two regimes presented in the study have been reformed during the years, lot of scholars tried to extend the typology created by Brubaker to other countries.

Another typology is the one proposed by Castles and Miller in 2003 based on the policy analysis:

- *differential exclusion model*. This model is displayed by Germany, Austria and Switzerland as main representatives. This model provides little mobility to immigrants on the labour market that fill in mostly the inferior segment of it, the one that is characterized by lower security and higher incidence of dirty, dangerous and degrading work. Becoming a citizen of these countries is difficult and state policies are segregationist and discriminatory.
- *assimilation model* characterizing France, Great Britain and Netherlands, former colonial countries. This cluster of countries asks immigrants to adopt the language and culture of the nation they are willing to integrate in. The educational regime of this model is well developed and accessible both for migrants as well as for their children. As ethnicity is not recorded by these countries, there are no relevant statistics on discrimination and exclusion. Access to citizenship is open, but only after assimilation has been proved.
- *multicultural model* acknowledges the right of immigrants to constitute themselves in minority groups, that are tolerated or promoted. Dual citizenship is allowed, so

immigrants can become fully citizens of both origin and receiving countries. Canada, Australia, United States of America and Sweden are the exponents of this model.

In fact, the model proposed by Castle and Miller (2003) establishes a correlation between the history of migration of one country and its integration regime. The multicultural model characterizes traditional countries of immigration; the assimilation model is displayed by former colonial countries, while the differential exclusion model is present in traditional guest worker countries. Also, Castle and Miller stated that a country can move from a model to another, but they didn't develop fully this part of the theory.

Entzinger (2000) cited by Freeman (2007) proposes three strands to analyze the integration policies: the legal and political one establishing mainly the citizenship rules, the cultural one (if policies of assimilation or identity affirmation are promoted) and the socio-economic (if the rights provided are temporal or permanent).

Even if significant efforts to identify models of immigrant integration exist, Freeman argues that for each particular strand of a regime we could identify different models. So, Freeman (2007) proposes a typology where USA, Canada and Australia form a cluster characterized by open immigration and citizenship regimes, liberal political economies and welfare, formal multiculturalism. Sweden and Netherlands stand for another cluster characterized by moderately open immigration and citizenship regimes, coordinated market economies, socio-democratic or corporatist welfare state. Germany, Austria and Switzerland provide open access to labour migration, coordinated market economies, corporatist welfare, but discourage permanent settlement or access to citizenship. And finally, Spain, Portugal, Greece restrict access to citizenship, have liberal political economies and welfare, but do not employ policies to foster multiculturalism.

Starting from the premise that there are other unobserved factors shaping integration policies, Meuleman and Reeskens (2008) employ a Latent Component Analyse on the 2007 scores of Migration Integration Policies (MIPEX) in order to identify some common patterns of association. They identify three classes of incorporation regimes. The first latent class gathers Sweden, UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Finland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. These countries score highest on all the policy strands analyzed by MIPEX. They have rather generous procedures facilitating the access to labour market, political participation, family reunification, long-term residence and citizenship. The second class scores lowest to all policy strands as compared with the first class. Eastern countries, Austria, Denmark, Greece and Malta are gathered under this class, mainly characterized by difficult access to citizenship and political participation. The third class is located in between the previous ones. Germany, France, Ireland, Luxemburg and Switzerland have the highest probability to belong to it. This class scores better than the second one to all policy strands, except the long term residence strand. After that, authors study the link between the classes of integration regimes and the population attitudes toward migration showing that there is not a causal direction between the two phenomena. Therefore, policies promoted by one country do not necessary shape population attitudes to immigration. Countries characterized by more inclusive policies have the lowest levels of perceived ethnic

threat, but the promotion of integration policies increases competition between natives and immigrants and also the perceived ethnic threat (Meuleman and Reeskens, 2008).

Koopmans (2010) investigates the effects of the integration policies and welfare-state regimes on the socio-economic integration of immigrants in eight selected countries: Germany, France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Belgium. His results show that multicultural policies combined with a generous welfare state determined poor participation of immigrants on the labour market, high segregation and increased incidence of delinquency among immigrants. On the other hand, countries with more restrictive integration policies or lean welfare state display better integration results of their immigrants.

Cavasola (2012) analysis the way EU fosters a common policy regarding the integration of immigrants and questions the progress towards the creation of a homogeneous European model. Her conclusions point to the fact that there is a partial convergence in national integration strategies. She argues that this progress is the result of an interstate emulation, rather than an effect of proactive EU legislation. Cavasola (2012) refers to this process as “informal Europeanization”.

Fewer studies address the integration regime promoted by Romania. Voicu (2013) proposes a theoretical framework to analyze the Romanian integration model. He defines three plans of integration: the ideal (the concept and the fundamental rights), the vision (public policies and specific legislation of Romania) and the practice (citizens’ perceptions and opinions as well as how institutions implement the policies). These plans were overlapped for five levels: (0) the opening, (1) the acceptance of differences, (2) the basic support for integration, (3) the inclusion and (4) the citizenship. For each plan, several indicators are proposed, analyzed and assessed as “unsatisfactory”, “acceptable” or “good”. Romania scores “good” for most indicators of the level (0) the opening and “unsatisfactory” for most of indicators proposed for level (1) the acceptance of differences.

## Migration Integration Policies

We built our analysis on data from the **Migration Integration Policy Index - MIPEX**. The Index covers key dimensions regarding immigrations integration governance and policy for 34 countries, namely 27 EU countries, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, USA, Australia, Japan and Serbia. MIPEX includes 148 policy indicators counting for seven policy areas related to integration of immigrants. Data were collected from national independent scholars and practitioners in migration law, education and anti-discrimination. Results were anonymously peer-reviewed by a second group of experts. Finally, a Migration Policy Group double checked and validated the discrepancies across policy dimensions and countries. Data were collected in March 2007 and May 2010. The 2010 wave included “education” as a new policy area taken into account for construction of MIPEX. The index aims to assess the way overall policies creates both obstacles and opportunities for immigrants to become full members of the society. Regardless some methodological limitations, MIPEX represents a valuable and comprehensive source of data as it offers scholars and

practitioners the opportunity to better understand the way multiple factors influence the integration of immigrants into society.

2010 MIPEX includes seven policy strands, each of them grouping indicators that cover four dimensions. The Index takes into account both social and civic integration, aiming to assess the progress of the countries towards ensuring equal opportunities for immigrants. The total number of policy indicators is 148. The seven policy areas of MIPEX are as follows: Labour market mobility; Family reunion; Education; Political participation; Long-term residence; Access to nationality; and Anti-discrimination.

**Table 1.** Structure of the 2010 Migration Integration Policy Index

<b>Policy areas</b>	<b>Policy Dimensions / Indicators</b>
1) LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access (5 indicators)</li> <li>• Access to general support (3 indicators)</li> <li>• Targeted support (4 indicators)</li> <li>• Workers' rights (4 indicators)</li> </ul>
2) FAMILY REUNION FOR THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Eligibility (5 indicators)</li> <li>• Conditions for acquisition of status (6 indicators)</li> <li>• Security of status (4 indicators)</li> <li>• Rights associated with status (6 indicators)</li> </ul>
3) EDUCATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access (7 indicators)</li> <li>• Targeting needs (5 indicators)</li> <li>• New opportunities (4 indicators)</li> <li>• Intercultural education for all (6 indicators)</li> </ul>
4) POLITICAL PARTICIPATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Electoral rights (4 indicators)</li> <li>• Political liberties (3 indicators)</li> <li>• Consultative bodies (4 indicators)</li> <li>• Implementation policies (5 indicators)</li> </ul>
5) LONG TERM RESIDENCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Eligibility (3 indicators)</li> <li>• Conditions for acquisition of status (4 indicators)</li> <li>• Security of status (7 indicators)</li> <li>• Rights associated with status (4 indicators)</li> </ul>
6) ACCESS TO NATIONALITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Eligibility (5 indicators)</li> <li>• Conditions for acquisition (7 indicators)</li> <li>• Security of status (7 indicators)</li> <li>• Dual nationality (2 indicators)</li> </ul>
7) ANTI-DISCRIMINATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Definitions and concepts (7 indicators)</li> <li>• Fields of application (6 indicators)</li> <li>• Enforcement mechanisms (12 indicators)</li> <li>• Equality policies (9 indicators)</li> </ul>

Source: [http://www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/mipex\\_indicators\\_2010.pdf](http://www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/mipex_indicators_2010.pdf)

We include in our analysis data from MIPEX 2010 in order to identify latent classes of integration regimes among the 27 EU countries. The analyzed data consist in scores obtained by countries for all the seven policy areas. Data are presented in Table 2. Sweden registers the highest overall score, having the maximum number of points for labour market mobility and high performance for the anti-discrimination strand. High scores are also obtained by Portugal, Finland and Netherlands. Romania scores 45.2 points from a maximum of 100, displaying poor performances for education and political participation strands and higher value for the anti-discrimination dimension. One should remember that these scores reflect the degree of implementation of certain policies elements (presented in Table 1) that favor the integration of the immigrants. Moreover, the score registered by Romania for the political participation of immigrants is the lowest among the scores obtained by all the 27 EU countries for each of the seven policy areas. Overall, it is considered that the policies implemented by Romania are only halfway favorable to immigrants. Poorest results for 2010 MIPEX are obtained by Latvia, Cyprus and Slovakia.

**Table 2.** Scores obtained by EU countries for the seven policy areas and overall score of MIPEX, 2010

Country	Area 1	Area 2	Area 3	Area 4	Area 5	Area 6	Area 7	Overall
Austria	56.3	40.8	44.4	32.5	58.3	21.6	33.0	41.0
Belgium	52.7	68.3	65.7	58.5	78.7	68.6	78.7	67.3
Bulgaria	40.4	51.3	14.8	16.7	56.8	23.9	79.7	40.5
Cyprus	20.8	39.2	33.4	25.0	36.8	32.0	59.3	35.2
Czech Republic	54.8	66.5	44.2	12.5	64.7	33.4	44.5	45.8
Denmark	73.1	37.0	51.4	61.9	65.8	33.1	46.5	52.7
Estonia	65.2	64.8	50.4	28.1	66.5	15.5	31.5	46.0
Finland	71.0	69.8	63.5	86.9	58.5	56.8	78.0	69.2
France	48.8	51.6	28.9	43.5	45.6	59.0	77.0	50.6
Germany	76.9	60.2	43.2	64.4	50.1	59.2	47.9	57.4
Greece	49.6	49.2	42.2	39.6	56.3	56.8	49.7	49.0
Hungary	41.5	60.6	11.9	33.3	60.0	31.4	75.3	44.9
Ireland	39.2	33.8	24.6	78.8	42.6	58.2	62.8	48.6
Italy	69.0	73.5	40.6	49.8	65.6	62.9	61.6	60.4
Latvia	35.6	46.3	16.6	17.5	58.9	15.4	24.9	30.7
Lithuania	46.3	59.0	17.2	25.0	56.7	19.8	54.7	39.8
Luxembourg	47.7	66.7	51.7	77.7	55.8	74.0	47.6	60.2
Malta	43.1	48.1	16.2	25.0	64.3	25.5	36.2	36.9
Netherlands	85.4	57.6	50.7	79.4	67.9	65.6	67.5	67.7
Poland	47.9	67.1	28.8	12.5	65.3	35.0	35.8	41.8
Portugal	93.8	90.6	63.1	70.2	68.5	82.0	83.8	78.8
Romania	67.7	64.6	19.7	8.3	54.2	29.1	72.6	45.2
Slovakia	20.8	52.9	23.6	20.8	50.2	26.7	58.8	36.3
Slovenia	44.4	74.8	24.3	27.9	68.9	32.7	66.4	48.5
Spain	84.4	84.6	48.1	55.8	77.5	38.6	48.7	62.5
Sweden	100.0	84.4	77.4	75.0	77.7	79.3	87.7	83.1
UK (Great Britain)	55.4	53.8	57.7	52.5	31.5	59.3	86.1	56.6

Source: [http://www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/mipex\\_indicators\\_2010.pdf](http://www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/mipex_indicators_2010.pdf)

## Integration regimes among EU countries

The findings of our paper are based on the results of a latent variable model for categorical data. Latent class analysis (LCA) is similar to factor analysis, in the sense that it identifies the patterns of association that encounters among observations, but it is applied to categorical variables, while factor analysis is suitable for continuous variables (McCutcheon, 1987). The model used seven observed polichotomous variables having three classes to build a latent or unobservable variable which also has three classes. The observed variables are known as the manifest variables (Hagenaars, McCutcheon, 2002).

Therefore, latent class analysis is a clustering technique among observations in multi-way tables of categorical variables. Cases are not absolutely assigned to classes, we estimate a probability of membership to each class. The main idea is to build a model in which any association between the manifest variables can be explained by a single unobserved "latent" categorical variable. Estimated parameters include the class-conditional response probabilities for each manifest variable, the proportions denoting population share of observations corresponding to each latent multi-way table. The estimation was performed with polCA R package and STATA software (Lanza et al, 2011).

In order to decide the number of the latent classes we look for low values in the case of the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), sample sized adjusted BIC statistics and high values in the case of entropy measure. Also, we have to take into account the meaning of the latent classes in practice, the number of individuals in each class and if these classes are associated with observed characteristics in an expected manner.

As shown in the Table 3, number of classes representing different immigration integration regimes is established on the ground of several coefficients and measures of performance. On the base of the registered values, there are two solutions that we could consider as offering a good representation of the reality, namely the solution with 2 classes and the one with 3 classes. Solution with 2 classes obtains better values for AIC and BIC, while the solution with 3 classes scores better to Adjusted BIC and Entropy R-square. Cumulating the values of AIC, BIC, Adjusted BIC and Entropy R-square, we decide to keep the solution with 3 classes as it is consistent with results of Meuleman and Reeskens (2008) who classified integration regimes on the basis of 2007 MIPEX and found three classes of countries.


**Table 3.** Performance of different solutions of the Latent Class Analysis

No. of classes	Log-likelihood	AIC	BIC	Adjusted BIC	Entropy R-sqd
1	-207.637	270.845	288.987	245.494	NA
2	-175.696	236.963	274.542	184.451	0.956
3	-162.959	241.489	298.506	161.816	0.974
4	-156.327	258.225	334.679	151.390	0.96

*Source: Author's estimations using LCA Stata Plugin (Version 1.0)*

Figure 1 presents the conditional probabilities of a country with a certain level for the studied variables to belong to each of the three classes. First, the results of the latent class analysis show that 25.8% of countries belong to class 1, 48.2% to class 2, while 26% of countries form the third class. Distribution of countries by classes can be interpreted as an indicator for a solution with for classes, but the values of AIC, BIC and Entropy R-square clearly indicate that this solution is no good. The numbers attributed to the classes have no meaning of order, but represent labels of the three integration regimes. The seven manifest variables represent the seven policy areas covered by MIPEX. Class 1 includes countries with low performances registered for variables 1, 3, 4 and 6, meaning labour market mobility, education, political participation and access to nationality. Also, the integration regime specific to class 1 includes countries with low and medium access for family reunion, medium opportunities for long term residence and rather good implementation of anti-discrimination policies. So, first integration regime that covers a quarter of EU countries is not very favorable to immigrants, except for the anti-discrimination provisions.

**Figure 1.** The conditional probabilities of a specific category, given the class membership



Source: Author's estimations using *polCA* R package


Note: Manifest variables represent the seven policy areas and levels 1, 2 and 3 are labels for low, medium and high values on the MIPEX scale



Class 2 includes countries with high performances for almost all the analyzed policy areas. Strong belonging probabilities to this regime are registered for countries with high levels of immigrants' inclusion (e.g. immigrants' children) in education and very good access to nationality. The area where countries from class 2 don't have good performance is represented by the strand of anti-discrimination policies. So, the second regime of integration includes almost half of the countries of the European Union that implement rather efficient and open policies in the field of immigration.

The third class identified by the latent class analysis registers high probabilities of belonging for countries that display low and medium performance for areas of labour market mobility, access to nationality, long term residence and anti-discrimination. Also, this integration regime is characterized by poor policies with respect to family reunion and medium values for dimensions regarding education and access to nationality. So, the second class reunites countries that are more performant to integration policies for immigrants, while the other two classes include countries that present specific combination of policies. First regime is characterized by poor performances especially for labour market mobility, education, political participation and access to nationality. Finally, the third regime displays poor policy for family reunion, but medium results at the level of education and access to nationality. On the other hand, anti-discrimination is the area that discriminates less among the three integration regime. Still, the third class scores less to this dimension. The belongings of each EU country to the integration regimes are presented in the Figure 2. The map is constructed on the base of highest belonging probabilities.

*Figure 2. The map presents the latent class prevalence of each investigated country*



Source: Author's representation using Tableau 8.1

## Conclusions

This article presents results of the latent class analysis on data coming from 2010 MIPEX. Our results point to a solution with three classes representing three different integration regimes across EU countries. Although the European Union aims to implement a common approach regarding integration policies destined to immigrants, countries still display significant differences in this respect. However, the fact that one of the three identified regimes covers an important number of countries having higher scores in 2010 MIPEX is an indicator towards the achievement of that goal. One should notice that countries displaying this favorable integration regime are countries with more important history of immigration. On the other hand, newer member states that are located to the Eastern border of European Union implement more restrictive integration policies. Different combinations of more restrictive integration policies form the other two policy regimes.

Comparing our classification with the results obtained by Meuleman and Reeskens (2008) on 2007 data that didn't take into account the education strand, we find that the outcomes are strongly consistent. One important difference is the presence of Germany in the group of countries that implements favorable policies for immigrants' integration. Although Germany doesn't score very high to the seven dimensions of the MIPEX, it displays rather homogenous performances for the covered strands. Romania belongs to the integration regime that is characterized by significant restrictions with respect to labour market mobility, access to education, political participation and access to nationality. These domains represent the main areas of socio-economic challenges that are faced by immigrants coming to Romania.

The main differences among the three identified integration regimes show that the first regime, the one that includes Romania, has education and access to nationality policies as weak points and anti-discrimination area as strong point. On the other hand, the second regime is exactly the opposite as it has poorest performances to anti-discrimination and to the access of immigrants to long term residence, as well as very good results at the level of education and access to nationality policies. So, the two groups of countries that form the first two regimes implement rather divergent approaches with respect to the integration of immigrants. The third integration regime has as its main weak point policies regarding family reunion for third-country nationals.

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# REMITTING DEMOCRACY? THE ROLE OF MIGRANT REMITTANCES IN PROMOTING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN GUANAJUATO, MEXICO

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**Abstract:** *Remittance-led development in Mexico reveals the potential for state-migrant cooperation to channel remittances towards public works projects in migrant hometown communities. In some cases, such as the one presented in this article, the transfer of ideas and knowhow-i.e., social remittances-incites constructive interaction between migrants, government officials, and hometown citizens. Moreover, under the right conditions, the multiplier effects of migrant remittances (both social and economic) can act as a catalyst for democratic growth. Building on observations from the field, this study argues that the promotion of migrant investments in entrepreneurial projects has the potential to foster the growth of democratic norms in migrant hometowns.*

**Keywords:** *remittance-led development, democracy, migration and social remittances.*

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*One of the things that Mexico had never acknowledged about my father-I insist that you at least entertain this idea-is the possibility that my father and others like him were the great revolutionaries of Mexico. Pocho pioneers. They, not Pancho Villa, not Zapata, were heralds of the modern age in Mexico. They left for the United States and then they came back to Mexico. And they changed it forever.*

-Richard Rodriguez. 2009. "Go North Young Man," pp. 215-216.

## 1. Introduction

As the popular Latino writer Richard Rodriguez notes, Mexican migrants have had a profound impact on their home country (Rodriguez 2009: 215-216). Every year migrants play an instrumental role in underwriting the economic wellbeing of the Mexican countryside by remitting billions of dollars back to their friends and family members. In fact, since 2005 Mexican migrants have sent back more than \$20 billion

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dollars per year, accounting for roughly two percent of the country's GDP (Banco de Mexico). However, migrants also partake in the shaping of social and political norms in their hometown regions. For example, over the last decade migrants have worked closely with their hometown communities and the Mexican state in an effort to promote meaningful development in rural townships across the country. Still, the actual effect of this type of collaboration on social and political norms is not well understood.

In this article I systematically analyze the nature of remittance-led development (RLD) in Mexico through an in-depth case study of El Timbinal, Guanajuato. The town of El Timbinal, which has been working with migrants on development initiatives for more than three decades, provides a particularly fruitful environment to study the effects of RLD on the ground. As I argue below, El Timbinal reveals the role of social and economic remittances in promoting political change, while at the same time illustrating the trials and tribulations of deepening democratic practices within political circles traditionally marked by patron-client relationships. The article is structured in the following manner. I open with a brief literature review, followed by an in-depth analysis of RLD in El Timbinal. Finally, I conclude by discussing several policy implications that emerge from my research in Guanajuato.

## 2. Literature Review

In Mexico, few factors affect local communities more than emigration. Jonathan Fox, borrowing from Albert Hirschman's classic analysis (1970), describes the potential influence of migrants on their communities as a distinct process of *exit* and *voice*. Specifically, Fox (2007; 2008) argues that Mexican citizens faced with entrenched poverty and lack of access to political voice frequently opt to migrate or "exit" due to an inability to influence the conditions that structure their lives. However, as Fox points out, in recent decades Mexican migrants living in the U.S. have begun to exercise their "voice" in their communities of origin in the form of remittances and communal development initiatives. Fox's work implies that unsatisfied citizens have four basic options: remain faithful to the status quo (loyalty), stay and take action in an effort to improve social conditions (voice without exit), permanently withdraw (exit without voice) or withdraw with the intention of improving social conditions through migration (exit with voice). Given this, migration appears to have a potential dual effect on Mexican society, such that it first reduces social pressure on politicians and then fosters the potential for social and political change as migrants begin to remit money and ideas back to hometown communities. This relationship is depicted in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Exit, Voice and Loyalty In Mexican Migrant Communities

	Silence	Voice
Stay	<i>Loyalty</i> - Compliance, Clientelism	<i>Voice</i> Mass Protest, Electoral Opposition
Migrate	<i>Exit without voice</i> - Migration only	<i>Exit with voice</i> -Remittances, Human Capital, Political Capital

Source: Adopted from Jonathan Fox (2007: 297).

Extant research supports Fox's theoretical framework. Early research, for example, found that emigration drained local communities of their most productive citizens and workers, thus having an overall detrimental effect on local development. This body of literature depicts migration as an irrevocable form of exit that traps communities in a vicious cycle of dependency in which migrants and their families waste away precious savings on superfluous consumption (Reichert 1981; Staurt and Kearney 1981; Wiest 1979). Subsequent research, however, found that remittances have multiplier effects within local economies, thus directly and indirectly stimulating employment, investment and income (Adelman, Taylor and Vogel 1988; Adelman and Taylor 1992; Durand, Parrado and Massey 1996; Calderón 2008). This line of research illustrates the potential for a migrant "voice" in communal development. This notion is reinforced by recent findings that demonstrate that migrants have the potential to leverage local politics (Batista and Vicente, 2010; Burgess, 2005; Chauvet and Mercier, 2011; Fitzgerald, 2000; Fox and Bada, 2008; Goldring, 2002; Goodman and Hiskey, 2008; M. P. Smith, 2003; R. Smith, 2006; Rother, 2009; Waddell, 2015).

Specifically, Pérez-Armendáriz and David Crow (2010) find that in Mexico connections with migrants improve one's inclination toward democratic participation. Their findings indicate that individuals living in areas with high levels of migration are more likely to participate in politics beyond the electoral booth such as civil associations and protests. Pfutze (2012), in turn, documents a link between household remittances and political change in the Mexican countryside. His work suggests that migrants, via cash transfers and social networks, play a role in promoting electoral competition and "the improvement of democratic institutions at the local level" (174). Pfutze findings are supported by Chauvet and Mercier's research in the West-African nation of Mali, which demonstrates that migrants frequently trigger "transfers of political norms" and in this manner contribute to higher participation rates in local elections (2011: 29). On a similar note, Batista and Vicente (2010) document evidence in Cape Verde that indicate that return migrants have a positive effect on the demand for political accountability. Like Chauvet and Mercier, they note that this effect is particularly evident among migrants who have lived in countries with relatively more democratic forms of governance (3). Related to this, Rother's work in the Philippines demonstrates that the effect of return migrants on local politics is often dependent on the political environment of the country to which individuals have migrated. This finding leads the author to the conclusion that "it [is] clear that migrants are a worthwhile factor to include in the research on external factors of democratisation, diffusion, democratic consolidation and diffuse support for democracies" (2009: 274).

Given the aforementioned findings, one might expect migrants to have a particularly profound effect on Mexico's social and political norms. To be certain, few nations have experienced such a deep integration of transnational migrant communities with local development initiatives. This is particularly evident in the case of the program 3 x 1 para migrantes, which brings migrants and the Mexican state together to work on development projects across the country. The 3x1 program, which matches migrant contributions dollar-for-dollar, channels migrant remittances towards a variety of development projects, including: bridges, roads, electricity grids, drainage systems, community centers, schools, healthcare centers and occasionally, businesses. A typical

3x1 project begins when a group of migrants in the U.S., typically organized through a Hometown Association (HTA), decides to spearhead a development project in their hometown. If approved, the project receives matching funds from the federal government through reserves made available by SEDESOL.<sup>1</sup> In turn, state and municipal governments match migrant contributions to the project with funds from their respective budgets. In this manner, migrant remittances donated towards development projects are tripled, thus incentivizing migrants and their communities to participate in the program.

Still, while the 3x1 program is an obvious catalyst for local economic development, it is less clear to what degree it engenders the transfer of so called “social remittances” between migrants and hometown regions (Fernández de Castro, et al 2006). Social remittances symbolize the circulation of new identities, innovative ways of thinking and new behaviors that migrants acquire in the U.S. and bring back to their hometown communities (Conway and Cohen 1998; Fox 2008; Levitt 1998, 2011; Smith 2006). Given the degree of influence that migrants wield over local development patterns in rural Mexico, one might expect that migrants affect the nature of local social and political norms. This is particularly true in the case of the program 3x1 para migrantes. Surprisingly, extant research pays little attention to the role of social remittances in communal development directed by the 3 x 1 para migrantes program. With this in mind, as a means of expanding the accounting methods used to analyze the relative success or failure of 3 x 1 projects, in this study I focus on the less quantifiable social remittances channeled between migrants and hometowns within the 3 x 1 framework. To this end, I provide an ethnographic snapshot of RLD in one migrant hometown community: El Timbinal, Guanajuato.

### 3. Social Remittances and Political Change in El Timbinal, Guanajuato

Located in the southern most extreme of Guanajuato, El Timbinal, population 538, is largely dependent on *migradollars* or migrant dollars.<sup>2</sup> However, the town is somewhat unique in that while migrants have privately funded more than a dozen public works projects since the late 1980s, the town’s only use of 3 x 1 funds was registered in 2009

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<sup>1</sup> If a 3x1 project is deemed viable and is in accordance with the rules of operation stipulated by the 3x1 program, the file is submitted for final evaluation to the Committee of Validation and Attention to Migrants (COVAM). Each state has its own COVAM, which consists of twelve representatives: three migrants, three municipal officials, three state officials and three federal officials. Each year, the COVAM votes on which projects to approve for funding. If a project is approved, funds are allocated for the following fiscal year and all parties involved are given a green light to move forward with the project (SEDESOL). It is important to note that a majority vote is necessary for project approval and thus government representatives share a comparative advantage over migrants in determining which projects will ultimately be funded.

<sup>2</sup> This section of my paper is constructed from interviews and observation made during field visits to Guanajuato during the period 2009-2013. I would like to thank the Fulbright foundation for funding the most formidable period of this work during the spring and summer of 2011.

for the reopening of a clothing factory or *maquila*.<sup>1</sup> The maquila was built in the late 1990s through an initiative named *Mi Comunidad*, which was spearheaded by then governor of Guanajuato, Vicente Fox. *Mi Comunidad* sought to channel migrant remittances towards the construction of maquilas throughout the state. El Timbinal's maquila, however, like the rest of the more than twenty maquilas funded by *Mi Comunidad*, closed its doors after just three years of production. The factory shut down in part due to the tumultuous global market that emerged in the wake of 9/11; however, poor management and a general lack of entrepreneurial culture amongst workers also influenced the factory's demise. El Timbinal's maquila remained closed from 2001 to 2009, when Angel Calderón, the president of the town's lone hometown association (HTA), acquired 3 x 1 funds from the state to aid with the training of new factory workers and improved marketing strategies. Interestingly, in this particular case, while the federal and state government both contributed roughly \$40,812 dollars to the project, the municipal government in Yuriria did not contribute to the project. (I revisit the cause of this unique outcome below.) The reopening of the factory was still considered a 3 x 1 project because it was also supported by Western Union, which donated roughly \$17,330 dollars.<sup>2</sup> Currently, the factory is run by *Las Mujeres Emprendedoras del Timbinal*, a group of five women who have been thoroughly trained by MIDE AC, a civil society association that works with migrant hometown communities throughout central Mexico. The factory is currently operating on a contract basis but it is in search of more stable, long-term contracts that will permit it to sustain itself overtime. Taken together, El Timbinal presents a unique opportunity to analyze the role of social remittances in promoting the evolution of political norms in rural Mexico. In the space that follows I provide excerpts from semi-directed interviews conducted in the town of El Timbinal as a means of illustrating the role of social remittances in the small town's development.

Ángel Calderón, or Don Ángel, as locals know him, migrated to the U.S. for the first time in the 1980s. For many years he worked in agriculture fields but he currently oversees three migrant shelters in Napa Valley, which provide housing to migratory workers who are employed in the valley's fertile wine fields. Here I provide a brief account of the nature of Don Ángel's work in order to give the reader an idea of the knowledge sets that Don Ángel has acquired in the U.S. through his work. The following conversation, which I recorded in the summer of 2011 during a site visit to El Timbinal, recounts how he got involved in his current job:

Angel: One day I happened upon a group of 40 peasant workers living under a bridge. And among these 40 peasants were 3 women and one of them asked me to, 'Imagine the nights that we have to spend with these 40 animals, with all the alcohol they consume one doesn't have to have much of an imagination to figure out what goes on here.' And I responded, 'M'ijias , why are you here?' To which she responded, 'Where the hell are we supposed to go?!' So I got them out of there and took them to a Catholic Church and the Father made space for them. From there I went back to the bridge and I told the men that if they stopped drinking I would start looking for a place for them to live. I began to take photos

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<sup>1</sup> In the paragraphs that follow I use both maquila and factory.

<sup>2</sup> Amounts converted with an exchange rate of 12.5 pesos to 1 US dollar.



of their living conditions and with the photos in hand, I would go around to the grape producers. I would tell them, 'Here is your labor force. This isn't Central America and it's not Mexico. This is the United States, this is California, this is Napa Valley and this is *your* labor force.' I went from one producer to the next.

Author: When did all this start?

Angel: In 1998.

Author: So about the time the maquila opened in El Timbinal?

Angel: Yes. Yes and then in 2000 I began working full time with the migrant worker program and at that time it was just one center, we only had twenty tiny bunk beds. Three to each room, we stuffed sixty people in there.

Author: Did you receive government funding for the project?

Angel: No, at first we collected a small rent of \$10 per day from the migrants and the grape producers gave a small donation. Later we acquired funds from different organizations and then, in 2000 we pushed for a small tax of \$10 per acre, which provided us with half a million dollars for the program. By 2003 we had three good centers, nothing opulent but good. I pushed my twelve employees to provide good treatment. I had to let several people go for not treating the workers well. I ran off one of the managers and his family because they used expressions like "pinche Oaxaqueños." When the harvest season was over I let them go... The most important thing in the center is respect. They are all honorable workers, they are the most responsible people in the valley and they are humans. Right now we have a good system and we provide respectable housing for 180 workers.

As the aforementioned passage reveals, like many HTA leaders, Don Ángel is an altruistic individual and his noble actions are evident on both sides of the border. Moreover, it is clear that Don Ángel's work in the U.S. naturally feeds into the "social" nature of the projects that El Timbinal's HTA has supported in Mexico. For example, as manager of the Napa shelter, Don Ángel has come to demand respect and equal treatment for all and as the excerpts below reveal, he has placed similar demands upon those individuals that have come to participate in the maquila in El Timbinal. Most importantly, as Don Ángel expressed to me while walking through his hometown streets, in the U.S. he has seen the ability of his people [Mexicans] to change and adopt to new cultural norms and for that reason, he knows that change can also be brought to the hills of Guanajuato. The question is how to catalyze it.

In El Timbinal locals refer to the last thirty years as the "age of migration," and as they pointed out to me on multiple occasions, during this period change has been a constant. At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century El Timbinal was a rural village located at the end of a dusty trail. The town was settled during colonial times and many of its current inhabitants, including Don Ángel and the women that work at the factory, are direct descendants of these original *pobladores*. For generations economic activity in El Timbinal revolved around subsistence farming and ranching and the village did not begin to change until the onset of migration to the U.S., which began in 1942 with the

dawn of the *Bracero* period.<sup>1</sup> The first remittances arrived as migrants began to settle in the U.S. and as Don Ángel explains, they changed everything:

Author: And when did the first migrants head north?

Angel: With the *bracero* program, in the 1940s and 1950s.

Author: What changes has migration provoked in the village?

Angel: Immigration has driven a great deal of drastic changes. The population has gone down. Construction has gone up due to remittances and the economy has changed considerably. Now the people dress well, eat well, they can pay for a taxi, they can travel...in that sense the economy has improved a lot with the remittances. Still, there is no production in the community. No agriculture and no cattle and the only source of work is external and that's what we would like to change with the factory.

Thus, while remittances created new consumers in El Timbinal, they did not generate jobs, which is the goal of the factory. Still, the HTA's communal development plans did not begin with the factory but rather, in the 1980s with the public works projects that Don Ángel and other migrants helped the town fund. These initial migrant projects were not supported by the government but rather, as Don Ángel phrases it, "were 1 x 0":

Author: What were the first projects that migrants funded in the town?

Angel: We invested about \$7,000 [in the church] and it was 1 x 0, there was no government assistance...The second project was to tear down the old kindergarten and build a new one. This project was 1 x 0 as well and we invested about \$14,000...Then we supported the Lepitos [children of a migrant family] so they could study music because they weren't doing anything productive. Their fathers were in the U.S. and their mothers couldn't control them and they boys frequently went out to party. It was dangerous because they could get into fights and Raúl was one of the leaders of a group and other kids in town followed his lead. So we found a retired musician to teach the boys music. Some of them quit being loafers and started playing in a band, others went on with their lives but they became more productive. After that we fought for a better central plaza. I didn't completely agree with the project but we went along with it because the municipal president said, 'Whatever you guys raise for the project I will match' and so we build a new plaza and added an arch to the church...I didn't like the project because it was very expensive and in those years there were still outbreaks of diarrhea every year due to the bad water. So eventually we funded a project to pipe in potable water from a well outside the village. And after that is when we opted to invest in a productive project, and that is when it got complicated, it is very difficult to create a business, a clothing factory, for example, in a place with these characteristics. We knew it would be an ordeal, that it would be a long road and that we would have to change a whole culture.

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<sup>1</sup> The Bracero program, which ran from 1942-1964, was a U.S.-sponsored program that facilitated the contract of Mexican laborers in the U.S.

As the above quote demonstrates, like in Napa Valley, migrants and Don Ángel in particular, have played a fundamental role in the town's development over the last thirty years. Not only have they funded public works projects but they have also played a principal role in the social welfare of locals by helping fund a community center and extracurricular activities for youth. Also, Don Ángel, although not always successful, has pushed for projects with social impact. What is unique about the majority of the projects that preceded the factory is that they materialized without the assistance of the government and in fact, if it had not been for the government's persistence, the club might not have pursued the maquila at all. However, while the government persuaded the HTA to build a maquila through the program Mi Comunidad, as Don Ángel explains, the only monetary support they supplied came in the form of a large loan:

Angel: If we had built the factory at cost, it would have cost us \$50,000 but the government insisted that we take out a government loan to buy the material and so we took out a \$50,000 loan but we paid it back in installments. In two years we paid back \$100,000.

Author: The interest rates were that high?

Angel: Yes but the good part was that of the \$50,000 that we paid in interests, they technically returned \$12,000 because they paid for a technician for twelve months and provide him with a salary of \$1,000 a month. Later they gave us another \$10,000 in order to keep a technician on for a while longer. So in all, they returned \$25,000.

Author: So the government provided you with a good deal of technical assistance?

Angel: Yes but back in April [of 2009] when we began thinking about reopening, I simply asked that they assist me with the bureaucratic paperwork that one has to go through every time one goes into a government office. For God's sake, it can be so frustrating. They treat you bad, they run you off and so I told the governor, help me with the bureaucratic work ...that's all I wanted but someone in government said, 'Wait a minute, how much did you invest originally? Ok, what you need to do is solicit a 3 x 1 project and that way you can receive government assistance to reopen the maquila.' So that's what I did but it was advice from the government. They offered and so I accepted. We sat down and wrote up the project. That's when we remodeled part of the maquila, we bought a pick-up, two more machines and computers.

In addition to 3x 1 funding, the maquila is currently being supported by a non-governmental organization called Migración y Desarrollo (MIDE AC), which is dedicated to assisting migrant clubs with the development of entrepreneurial projects in central Mexico. MIDE AC has been extremely instrumental in the factory's reopening. For example, they were the ones that first brought the project to the attention of Western Union, which allowed the club to access a generous grant of \$17,330 dollars. Most importantly, MIDE AC has provided the factory workers with hundreds of hours of professional training through workshops sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). As MIDE AC's co-founder Anselmo Meza explains, the nature of the organization's work is part of a larger vision aimed at promoting

democratic development norms and “political capital” within Mexico’s nascent democratic society. The following excerpt is from an interview that I conducted with Anselmo in 2011 en route to El Timbinal:

Author: How did MIDE AC begin?


Anselmo: Alejandra [co-founder of MIDE AC] worked in the federal office of SEDESOL in Mexico City and she was working with the program ‘Oportunidades.’ She and I talked frequently about the situation that was taking place in Mexico. Vicente Fox had just won the presidency, PRI was out but it was clear that there was a need for more civic participation. We also talked about how the respective powers—the executive, the legislative and the judicial—were beginning to divide and that given all the changes, there was an opportunity to develop a sort of ‘social lobby’ which didn’t exist in the country. There were lobbyists, like myself, for businesses and political parties. The pharmaceutical business, the auto industry, the insurance companies, they all had lobbyists but there were no lobbyists for the people. And around that time, at the outset of Fox’s presidency congress passed a law that supported sustainable rural development and part of the legislation called for the promotion of investment strategies that channeled migrant remittances towards development and that is when Alejandra and I saw an important opportunity to begin lobbying for the people. And so we began the initial process of founding an association that would be an intermediary between the government and migrant organization. Why? Because just as the government didn’t understand the migrants well, the migrants did not understand the government... And so we decided to promote migrant investments in their hometowns and offer them a contact point and a means through which to contact key legislators that were in one form or another conscious of the role of the participation of everyday citizens in politics.

MIDE AC’s promotion of “political capital” is quite evident amongst the workers of the factory. Through training sessions and meetings, Don Ángel and MIDE AC have clearly changed the lives of the five women that run the factory. During my site visits to Guanajuato I noticed that, unlike most rural women in the Mexican countryside, these five individuals are assertive and proactive. For example, one afternoon, while I was visiting the factory in El Timbinal, I had the opportunity to observe a business strategy meeting held inside the maquila. What was most interesting about the meeting was how the women interacted with Don Ángel, Alejandra and Anselmo. They were highly participatory in the meeting and proposed, in many cases, very viable solutions to the problems currently facing the factory. Most importantly, the confidence that I observed in the women that day is not limited to the confines of the factory. Rather, their newfound confidence as entrepreneurs and business owners carries over into the public sphere. When they have to file official paperwork with the government they immediately solicit meetings with officials in the state capital and in the meetings they look government functionaries in the eye and ask direct questions. As Anselmo pointed out as we were leaving the town one evening after a visit to the factory, “That’s not how things used to work in Mexican politics, especially in rural areas and *never* with women.” It was not that long ago that all political relationships in Mexico were dominated by men and marred by clientelism. This was especially evident in the rural countryside where the hierarchal relationships defined during the semi-feudal colonial

period were reinforced under the seventy-five year political reign of PRI. Given this, the very notion of a female peasant sitting down and negotiating the terms of a business venture with the male governor of a state is nothing short of monumental.

#### 4. Social Remittances and Democratic Inroads in Guanajuato, Mexico

Figure 1. Flow Chart of Democratic Growth Within the 3 x 1 para Migrantes Framework



Source: Author.

Note: ----- = possible causal path; \_\_\_\_\_ = established path

Taken together, El Timbinal presents the opportunity to analyze the evolution of political norms in relation to the 3 x 1 para migrantes program. Figure 1 reveals the feedback loop inherent to the 3 x 1 model. At all junctures, and specifically following the completion of projects, migrants and government officials have the opportunity to provide feedback to each other. For example, in recent years the government of Guanajuato, in conjunction with Mexican HTAs in the U.S., has organized conferences in cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston and Dallas. These public forums provide the government and civil society members like Don Ángel, Anselmo and Alejandra the opportunity to discuss the outcomes of projects across the state, and most importantly, they allow for both parties to learn from past experiences. As the case of El Timbinal demonstrates, these feedback loops are also evident in hometown communities. The factory workers, for example, actively pressure the government to concede to their demands and in doing so, they openly question traditional political and social norms. Although subtle, such developments provide snapshots of democratic progress in rural Mexico.

Still, although El Timbinal clearly demonstrates the potential for RLD to underwrite constructive collaboration between migrants, community members and the state, it also reveals the difficult nature of changing political culture in rural Mexico. In the excerpt that follows Don Ángel outlines the troubling nature of Yuriria's local political culture:

Author: Have you and your fellow migrants seen any notable changes within the local government? Do you think, for example, that the government has become any more transparent and/or open to working with citizens on development projects?

Don Ángel: We have received support from the federal and state government but not from the municipal government. With the municipal government it is different, they have a very limited vision and their objectives are very small. Their perspective is very close-minded. However, in our experience with the federal and state government it is very different. At this level the officials are very educated. In their offices you find engineers, architects, contractors, business administrators, ecologists and so on. It is much easier to work with these individuals because they have a different vision of Mexico. In the municipal government, however, things are different. The jobs at this level are handed out based on personal connections and not individual capacity. As a consequence, often they have very little knowledge and they don't understand the first thing about entrepreneurship. Moreover, their administrative period is quite short and as a result projects are often not followed up with.

Author: And regarding the municipal government in Yuriria, have there ever been changes in terms of the ruling party or has the same party always controlled the government?

Don Ángel: Right now it is a big mess. The local government is a disaster. For many years the PRI controlled the government through the traditional *caciques*. Then a young member of PRI emerged and a group of young, professional priistas [PRI party members] took the municipal presidency for a number of years. I worked with a few of them. After that the old priistas, the dinosaurs,

jumped over to PAN and they won under the PAN label and they led us to ruin.<sup>1</sup> The next president was the son of the previous president but the son did not run under PAN but instead ran with the green ecologist party [PVEM]. He recently left the presidency and now the president is his wife, who also ran under the PVEM but the family has been involved with PRI, PAN and PVEM. Their party, as you can see, really doesn't mean much.

Although the case of El Timbinal reveals the potential for RLD to catalyze change in rural Mexico, Don Ángel's account of municipal politics draws into question the depth of Mexico's recent transition towards democracy and clearly illustrates the types of barriers faced by RLD.

## 5. Conclusions

In recent decades the Mexican state has strategically positioned itself to reincorporate their large diaspora community into the political fold. The country's pro-migrant turn has included the development of a number of migrant-centered services, including: international life insurance, distance education programs, microcredit for rural housing initiatives, and migrant-led development programs such as 3x1 para migrantes. More recently, in 2005, the state launched the "Red de Talentos Mexicanos" or the "Mexican Talent Network," which is designed to "facilitate the participation of emigrants in the develop of their home country, thus reducing the effects of brain drain and incentivizing 'brain circulation'" (Red de Talentos Mexicanos). Still, as noted in the introduction to this article, the actual effect of state-migrant collaboration on Mexican society is not well understood.

The findings presented in this article reverberate with the evidence from existing literature that demonstrates the *potential* for migrants to impact social and political norms within migrant hometowns (Batista and Vicente, 2010; Burgess, 2005; Chauvet and Mercier, 2011; Fitzgerald, 2000; Fox and Bada, 2008; Goldring, 2002; Goodman and Hiskey, 2008; M. P. Smith, 2003; R. Smith, 2006; Rother, 2009; Waddell, 2015). Specifically, the case of El Timbinal demonstrates that RLD has the ability to incite social, economic and political shifts within hometown communities. Over the course of the last thirty years, Don Ángel and other migrants from El Timbinal have taken it upon themselves to provide for their small village's basic development needs; such as education facilities, roads, potable water, and most recently, a potential center of employment in the form of a clothing factory. Throughout this process, social and economic remittances have played a distinct role in the development of the community. Still, one of the most difficult parts of measuring social remittances is determining the direction of causality. That is, do migrants actually remit learned behavior? Or do some migrants simply have an altruistic disposition that makes them more prone to lend a hand to those in need. For example, if Don Ángel had never gone to the U.S., would he have still tried to change his hometown for the better? Given Don Ángel's benevolent

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<sup>1</sup> "Dinosaurs" is the term commonly used in Mexico to label PRI party members that continue to hold conservative ideals more closely aligned with the traditional party beliefs defined during the PRI's seventy-year reign in the executive branch.

nature and his deep commitment to his community, it is quite likely that he would have found a way to help even if he had never left. That said, the fruits of his labor would have had much less impact in the community. In this sense, what the case of El Timbinal illustrates is that under the right conditions the 3 x 1 para migrantes program has the potential to channel social and economic remittances towards development projects, and in this manner, spur multiplier effects within society. El Timbinal helps the reader visualize how the multiplier effects of social and economic remittances materialize on the ground. Just as importantly, this case demonstrates that the effects of migrant remittances cannot be measured in an economic vacuum, but rather, must be considered in light of their interaction with the government, local residents and civil society organizations.

Taken together, El Timbinal sheds light on both the potential for, and the limits to, migrant-led development. For instance, it is important to note that since reopening its doors in 2009 the maquila has had trouble securing stable work orders and while the young women who run the business are working hard to create solutions, at this point, it is not entirely clear that the factory will be successful. (As of April 2014 the factory was still in operation.) However, as Don Ángel informed me following a particularly frank and open discussion with the women concerning the factory's economic future, "It is important that we give them enough room to create solutions themselves because that is the only way to create meaningful change in them and the village's society." As this exchange demonstrates, change begins by leveling of the playing field (i.e., creating initiatives like the 3 x 1 program that allow citizens to partake in the redistribution of resources) but actual progress only takes place once the game is underway. Given Mexico's history, the very fact that the citizens of El Timbinal are on the playing field at all is evidence of progress. Still, the degree to which any such progress is paid forward will likely depend on the ability of the state and migrants to collaborate with local government. As the research outlined above indicates, this may very well be the village's largest challenge yet. Despite the justified criticism of the 3x1 program in existing literature (Aparicio and Meseguer 2009, 2011; Zamora 2006), the solution to this barrier will likely come through the expansion of programs like 3x1 para migrantes. Currently, the 3x1 program captures less than one percent of all remittances sent back to Mexico. Capturing a larger percentage of this total would arguably improve the nation's development, but just as importantly, it would provide everyday citizens with more opportunities to engage with—and pressure—the state for meaningful change.

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## MINIMUM STANDARD OF LIVING, A CONSTANT OF RESEARCH AND SOCIAL POLICY WORK OPTION

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**Abstract:** *The article gives us a true picture of the purchasing power of goods and services from the market. The incomes of many types of customers such as: persons, families, households are a good indicator to measure the poverty in our country, in dynamics, between 1990 and 2013. In the Research Institute for the Quality of Life we used to measure the poverty, using the normative method, which is based on consumption. We calculated two consumer baskets: the consumer basket related to the decent minimum standard of living and the subsistence level consumer basket. We monitored the different types of families in urban and rural areas: active persons and the pensioners. We used equivalence scales in order to calculate the expenditure per household member. The consumer basket is a tool to measure the wealth of poverty of the people from urban and rural areas. Many households have resources below the minimum requirement for a decent living standard as well as below the minimum subsistence standard established by the normative method.*

**Keywords:** *normative method, incomes, consumption, decent and subsistence minimum living standard.*

A new culture linked to a simpler lifestyle that respects the work itself with low or modest incomes who appreciate a moderate consumption compared to the ostentatious. This does not mean a life of sacrifice but a simpler lifestyle. Those who opt for this lifestyle was observed that enrich their existence pursuits type: lifelong learning, public life, volunteering, participation in community activities, surfing, sports, cultural activities and nature observation or communion with it. They discover, as Elgin said that "Voluntary simplicity is a simple life on the outside and rich interior" (Elgin, 2010). It seems there are more and more followers of a low food supplies, food and service, without hardship to obtain other sources of the satisfaction.

Population and society are changed. Living habits change over time. People adapt of these movements of life, some faster, some slower. Following the evolution of consumption habits and trends of the active population, employed them or the inactive population age-specific habits several steps were necessary configuration and recalculation of the consumption basket for the two types of families. We took into

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account residential environments, with their specific and families employed painting was completed with dependent children parents.

- In the first stage of analysis were developed structures and calculation of consumption baskets in urban, the employees and pensioners (2001) and rural areas, the workers and farmers (2002), the market prices of the years mentioned (Mihăilescu, 2004).
- In the second phase of work was revalued consumption basket of the urban and rural population, the two types of households, at market prices in August 2005.
- The third stage was limited to reshaping the consumer basket, those two areas and types of families (Mihăilescu, 2012). The calculation was performed in March of 2010 prices (Annex 1 and Annex 2).

The Research Institute for Quality of Life analysis of household consumption in Romania has been an ongoing concern since the establishment of the Institute on 1 January 1990. Over time operated several research groups, with concerns in this area, published studies, some theoretical with the segment address specialists, and others more accessible to the general public. Prospects were pursued consumption, revenues and how these revenues can cover consumption needs. It is expressed as purchasing power of goods and services on the market of people at one time or over a longer period of time horizons and changes in short, medium and long study.

RIQL methods were used:

1. Normative method addressed by research teams coordinated by prof. Phd. Cătălin Zamfir, Phd. Gheorghe Barbu (Barbu, 1994) and Phd. Adina Mihăilescu.
2. Method of self-assessment of population and consumption on individual and family income (household) within the research " diagnosis quality of life ", coordinated by prof. dr. Ioan Mărginean and held annually from 1990 to 1999, restarted and then, in 2003, 2006 and 2010.

This continuity in the study of consumption and household income issues in Romania led to defining, structuring and evaluation of minimum living standards in our country. Defining minimum standard of living has two aspects:

1. One related to the usual consumption (food, clothing, footwear, housing, services), tradition, customs, education and training and individual and family participation in society. All these aspects define appropriate minimum standard of living of a certain degree of dignity of the individual and his family. From this level of poverty can talk down to the individual and his family. Usually decent population between the minimum and the subsistence are in relative poverty, as defined in the terms.
2. And one related to the survival of a people, which is defined as the minimum subsistence, so elements of development and social affirmation of the person and his family are provided. From this level down we can talk about absolute poverty.

Calculation of the two minima decent and subsistence expenses include the following types of both urban and rural areas:

- Supply, rural is envisaged that some of the expenses from a household power, that of self-consumption;
- Food costs are included: meat and meat derivatives, dairy products and milk derivatives, fish, eggs, vegetable and animal fat, vegetables, fruits, sugar, sweets and coffee in quantities determined by nutrition experts at the Institute of Hygiene and Public Health in Bucharest.
- Foods are between 2700 and 3200 calories per day / adult, working in conditions of physical and intellectual environments, but because he had taken an option minimal calculation stopped at 2700 calories / day / adult.
- Food including: expenses related to clothing, footwear, housing and household electrical items, sanitary and hygiene textiles for domestic use, crockery, cutlery, glassware and other household products.
- Housekeeping services related to water, heat, electricity, radio and television transport repair and subscription, telephone, cultural services, healthcare services; maintenance of clothing and footwear hygiene.
- Safety and saving fund to cover various expenses necessary contingencies that occur in people's lives.

Advantages offered by the normative method of research, constituted as option RIQL are:

1. Objectivity, using standards set by professionals: nutritionists, sociologists, economists and consolidation of expenditures for clothing, footwear based on discussions with experts in the field of marketing, other specialists interested in the consumption of public goods and services;
2. Transparency because it allows detailed knowledge of the elements of material, cultural, educational, health, etc. used in the calculation.


## **I. Vulnerable group, poor or very poor, which is placed below the subsistence minimum (MS).**

This group is represented by single-parent families with one, two, three or more dependent children, the families of two adults with one, two, three or more dependent children and the threshold set out in the Law and the Law VMG/2004 61/1993, republished in 2012, retired couple or are single, but living in an average pension or two minimal pensions (the pension has been granted since 2010), no longer speaking retired couple living just a minimum pension of 350 lei, having their highest share among retired farmers and others. For many low-income pensioners and very small the question of coverage of needs for survival. The situation became more bearable around the years 2008-2009, with the increase of the pension point, but then the 2010-2012 economic crises marked by lowered again the Romanian pensioners living in urban and rural areas. Very low purchasing powers of pensions explain why pensioners in Romania are forced to work after retirement compared to pensioners from other

European countries. The following is the current amounts for income by the number of people (VMG) and family support allowance.

**1. Single-parent family with two dependent children** in urban areas are one of those families that fall in welfare laws mentioned above. If you look at the chart to see that this type of family income plus allowances for two children can not cover more than a third of the subsistence minimum (MS), a peak occurring in 2009, about 39% of MS (Chart 1).

**Chart 1.** Dynamics for guaranteed minimum income for three persons and two allocations for children related to the minimum for a decent and subsistence living in urban area, 2004 – 2013




Legend: VMG- guaranteed minimum income for three persons and two allocations for children, MD- minimum decent living basket, MS- minimum of subsistence living basket.

The situation is dramatic in the analysis of a *minimum wage and two child allowances*, the minimum subsistence income covers only the years 1989 and 1990, after which the actual purchasing power of this type of family income did not make ends meet necessities of life. End of interval analysis, 2013, place this family a level of 44.3% from the corresponding basket of subsistence living and 36% of that of a decent (Chart 2).


With a *average salary and allowance of two dependent children* who have this income families could buy only half of the goods and services provided in the corresponding minimum subsistence basket, between 1998-2002 less than 80% of the minimum and in the level of standard of living, it was covered just over half in 1993 and 1994, from 1999 to 2003, when the full liberalization of prices and higher utilities to hot water, heat and electricity have caused this came to be unable to cover consumer goods set to a minimum of life.

**Chart 2.** Dynamics of one minimal wages and of two allocations for children related to the minimal requirement for a decent and subsistence living, in urban area, October 1989 - 2013



2. Family of two adults with two dependent children in urban having income consists of a guaranteed minimum income for four people and two children allowances, VMG granted since 2004 is still in an extremely difficult economic situation. Even the minimum standard of living which in 2004 was covered almost half begins to decrease with each year until finally reaching a quarter of subsistence basket and a decent fifth of the consumption (Chart 3).


**Chart 3.** Dynamics for guaranteed minimum income for four persons and two allocations for children related to the minimum for a decent and subsistence living in urban area, 2004 - 2013



Legend: VMG- guaranteed minimum income for three persons and two allocations for children, MD- minimum decent living basket, MS- minimum of subsistence living basket.

If we consider *two minimum wages and child allowance* that family incomes fall since 1991 to 71%, as of next year to reach 47% each year to drop to one-fifth of the minimum decent and a third of minimum subsistence since 1992 (73.8%). Family of two adults with two dependent children in urban income consists of two minimum wages and allowances of two children over the analysis period 1989-2013 is still in a very difficult economic situation. In recent years, this family incomes fell even below the minimum subsistence since 1992 (68.7%) continued to decline sharply in 2002 (38.9%) and in terms of decent minimum he difficulty was to be covered by this income in 1990 (81.6%), reaching 20 %, a fifth in 2000, continuing to maintain the extremely low values until the end. In the final years 2011-2013 described above income did not even cover half of the minimum decent living of the reference year 1989 (Chart 4).

**Chart 4.** Dynamics of two minimal wages and of two allocations for children related to the minimal requirement for a decent and subsistence living in urban area, October 1989 – 2013



## II. Group which is placed at the decent minimum living level and above this level, the middle class in society.

1. *Family of two adults with two average wages* above the minimum decent living at the beginning of the interval. Its revenues have covered one and a half needs a decent minimum in October 1989, 161%. In only eight years, this family has had to satisfy only half of what has allowed in 1989, 80% of the needs of the living, and now, in 2013, they cover 140% of the minimum needs decent.

2. *Family of two adults with dependent children* with income consists of *two average wages and child allowance*, over the analysis period 1989-2013 fluctuated a lot. 1993 and 1994, followed by 1999 to 2002 have enabled this family to be able to cover only 80-90% of the minimum decent level, but still to a much better position than other families previously presented in this article.



## Conclusions

The analyses performed in this chapter we can conclude that there were years in which evolution was favorable purchasing power of the general population. There were years only advantageous for certain types of income of the population, and years as a result of unfavorable economic policy measures, such as: rising inflation, increasing foreign exchange which further influenced the purchasing power of the Romanian lei market purchase of goods and services, increasing price of fuel or cubic meter in hot or cold water, etc.

According to the statistical data on the socio-occupational categories of Romania, the most affected by poverty, over the twenty-five years of analysis were: the income decile 1 were located usually families unemployed and farmers; next deciles 2, 3, 4 were placed, the unemployed families, farmers and pensioners living in one average pension insurance or one or two guaranteed minimum pension (social minimum pension has been granted since 2010). Halfway classification in poor-rich scale is placed families of pensioners, and the employees who live with the minimum wage. At the top of the scale for self-assessment of well-being is placed families of pensioners living with two state pension insurance, and employees pay above the minimum wage. Last deciles of income, persons or families who are richer in Romanian society, the employees which are paid above the average wage, self-employed, employers, labor market specialized people working in International Corporations, banks, companies insurance specialists working at the peak of the respective companies. Household income must be said that in Romania the ripples of the global financial crisis, which began in 2010 when total household income decreased compared to previous years. Greater reductions have supported farmers' income, part of the income of pensioners and the unemployed.

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**Annex 1. MINIMUM LIVING STANDARDS**  
(in urban area)

URBAN-decent standard	MONTHS:											
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC.
2e+2c												
2010			1.964	1.971	1.974	1.977	2.036	2.039	2.049	2.064	2.074	2.085
2011	2.101	2.112	2.125	2.139	2.143	2.137	2.129	2.122	2.117	2.131	2.140	2.149
2012	2.156	2.170	2.179	2.180	2.184	2.183	2.196	2.208	2.234	2.240	2.241	2.254
2013	2.284	2.292	2.293	2.296	2.301	2.301	2.293	2.305	2.291	2.298	2.297	2.304
2.p.												
2010			1.224	1.228	1.230	1.232	1.264	1.267	1.274	1.281	1.288	1.294
2011	1.304	1.314	1.322	1.331	1.334	1.330	1.325	1.321	1.318	1.326	1.332	1.335
2012	1.340	1.349	1.354	1.355	1.358	1.357	1.365	1.372	1.388	1.392	1.393	1.400
2013	1.419	1.424	1.424	1.426	1.429	1.429	1.424	1.431	1.423	1.427	1.427	1.431
URBAN-subsistence standard												
2e+2c												
2010			1.599	1.605	1.607	1.610	1.651	1.655	1.664	1.673	1.682	1.691
2011	1.704	1.717	1.727	1.739	1.742	1.737	1.731	1.725	1.722	1.733	1.740	1.744
2012	1.750	1.761	1.769	1.770	1.774	1.773	1.783	1.792	1.813	1.818	1.819	1.829
2013	1.854	1.860	1.861	1.863	1.867	1.867	1.861	1.870	1.859	1.865	1.863	1.868
2.p.												
2010			982	985	987	988	1.014	1.016	1.019	1.024	1.030	1.035
2011	1.043	1.051	1.057	1.064	1.067	1.063	1.060	1.056	1.054	1.061	1.065	1.067
2012	1.071	1.078	1.082	1.083	1.085	1.085	1.091	1.097	1.110	1.113	1.114	1.120
2013	1.135	1.139	1.139	1.140	1.143	1.143	1.139	1.145	1.138	1.141	1.141	1.145
URBAN-decent standard												
1.e												
2010			634	636	637	638	657	658	662	666	670	674
2011	679	683	687	692	693	691	689	686	685	689	692	695
2012	697	701	704	705	706	706	710	714	722	724	724	728
2013	738	741	741	742	744	744	741	745	740	742	742	745
2.e.												
2010			1.204	1.208	1.210	1.212	1.248	1.250	1.256	1.265	1.272	1.279
2011	1.289	1.295	1.303	1.312	1.315	1.311	1.307	1.302	1.299	1.307	1.312	1.318
2012	1.322	1.330	1.336	1.337	1.340	1.339	1.347	1.354	1.370	1.374	1.375	1.382
2013	1.401	1.406	1.406	1.408	1.411	1.411	1.406	1.413	1.405	1.409	1.409	1.413
URBAN- subsistence standard												
1.e.												
2010			516	518	519	519	533	534	537	540	543	546
2011	550	554	557	561	562	561	559	557	556	559	561	563
2012	565	569	571	571	572	572	575	578	585	587	587	590
2013	598	600	600	601	602	602	600	603	599	601	601	603
2.e												
2010			980	983	985	986	1.012	1.014	1.020	1.026	1.031	1.036
2011	1.044	1.052	1.059	1.066	1.068	1.065	1.061	1.057	1.055	1.062	1.066	1.069
2012	1.073	1.080	1.084	1.085	1.087	1.087	1.093	1.099	1.112	1.115	1.116	1.122
2013	1.137	1.141	1.141	1.142	1.144	1.144	1.140	1.146	1.139	1.142	1.142	1.146
URBAN- decent standard												
2.e + 1.c												
2010			1.647	1.653	1.655	1.658	1.707	1.710	1.719	1.731	1.740	1.749
2011	1.762	1.771	1.782	1.794	1.798	1.793	1.787	1.780	1.777	1.788	1.796	1.803
2012	1.809	1.821	1.828	1.830	1.834	1.833	1.844	1.853	1.875	1.880	1.881	1.892
2013	1.917	1.924	1.924	1.926	1.931	1.931	1.925	1.935	1.923	1.929	1.929	1.934
2.e. + 3.c.												
2010			2.281	2.289	2.324	2.327	2.396	2.400	2.412	2.429	2.442	2.455
2011	2.474	2.486	2.501	2.518	2.523	2.516	2.507	2.498	2.493	2.509	2.520	2.530
2012	2.539	2.555	2.566	2.568	2.573	2.572	2.587	2.600	2.631	2.639	2.640	2.655
2013	2.691	2.700	2.701	2.704	2.710	2.710	2.701	2.715	2.698	2.706	2.706	2.714

URBAN- subsistence standard												
2.e. + 1.c.												
2010			1.341	1.346	1.348	1.350	1.385	1.388	1.396	1.403	1.411	1.418
2011	1.429	1.440	1.449	1.458	1.461	1.457	1.452	1.447	1.444	1.453	1.459	1.463
2012	1.468	1.477	1.484	1.485	1.488	1.487	1.496	1.504	1.522	1.526	1.527	1.536
2013	1.557	1.562	1.563	1.565	1.568	1.568	1.563	1.571	1.562	1.566	1.566	1.571
2.e + 3.c												
2010			1.857	1.863	1.866	1.869	1.918	1.922	1.933	1.943	1.953	1.964
2011	1.979	1.994	2.006	2.019	2.024	2.018	2.011	2.004	1.999	2.012	2.021	2.025
2012	2.033	2.046	2.055	2.056	2.060	2.059	2.071	2.082	2.107	2.113	2.114	2.126
2013	2.154	2.161	2.162	2.164	2.169	2.169	2.162	2.173	2.160	2.166	2.166	2.173

Legend: e-employee, c-child.

**Annex 2. MINIMUM LIVING STANDARDS (in rural area)**

RURAL- decent standard	MONTHS:											
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC.
2a+2c												
2010			1.588	1.594	1.596	1.599	1.640	1.644	1.653	1.662	1.670	1.679
2011	1.692	1.705	1.715	1.727	1.730	1.725	1.719	1.713	1.710	1.721	1.728	1.732
2012	1.738	1.749	1.757	1.758	1.762	1.761	1.771	1.780	1.801	1.806	1.807	1.817
2013	1.841	1.847	1.848	1.850	1.854	1.854	1.848	1.857	1.846	1.852	1.851	1.857
2.i												
2010			1.169	1.173	1.175	1.177	1.207	1.210	1.217	1.223	1.230	1.236
2011	1.246	1.255	1.263	1.271	1.274	1.270	1.266	1.261	1.259	1.267	1.272	1.275
2012	1.280	1.288	1.294	1.295	1.298	1.297	1.305	1.311	1.326	1.330	1.330	1.338
2013	1.356	1.361	1.361	1.362	1.364	1.364	1.359	1.366	1.358	1.362	1.362	1.366
RURAL- subsistence standard												
2a+2c												
2010			1.382	1.386	1.389	1.392	1.433	1.436	1.443	1.453	1.460	1.469
2011	1.481	1.488	1.497	1.506	1.509	1.505	1.499	1.494	1.491	1.501	1.507	1.513
2012	1.519	1.529	1.535	1.536	1.539	1.538	1.548	1.555	1.573	1.578	1.578	1.587
2013	1.608	1.613	1.614	1.616	1.619	1.619	1.614	1.622	1.612	1.617	1.617	1.622
2.i												
2010			899	902	904	905	932	934	938	945	950	955
2011	962	967	973	979	981	978	975	971	969	975	979	983
2012	987	993	998	998	1.000	1.000	1.005	1.011	1.023	1.026	1.026	1.032
2013	1.046	1.049	1.050	1.051	1.054	1.054	1.051	1.056	1.050	1.053	1.053	1.056
RURAL- decent standard												
1.a												
2010			512	514	515	515	529	530	533	536	539	541
2011	546	550	553	557	558	556	554	552	551	555	557	558
2012	560	564	566	566	567	567	570	573	580	582	582	585
2013	593	595	595	596	597	597	595	598	594	596	596	598
2.a												
2010			973	976	978	979	1.005	1.007	1.013	1.018	1.024	1.029
2011	1.037	1.045	1.051	1.058	1.060	1.057	1.054	1.050	1.048	1.054	1.059	1.061
2012	1.065	1.072	1.076	1.077	1.079	1.079	1.085	1.091	1.104	1.107	1.108	1.114
2013	1.129	1.133	1.133	1.134	1.136	1.136	1.132	1.138	1.131	1.134	1.134	1.138
RURAL- subsistence standard												
1.a												
2010			446	448	449	450	464	465	467	470	473	476
2011	479	482	485	488	489	488	486	484	483	486	488	490
2012	492	495	497	498	499	499	502	504	510	511	511	514
2013	521	523	523	524	525	525	523	526	523	524	524	526
2.a												
2010			847	851	853	855	882	884	888	894	900	906

2011	912	918	924	930	932	929	926	923	921	927	931	935
2012	938	944	948	949	951	951	956	961	972	975	975	981
2013	994	997	998	999	1.000	1.000	997	1.002	996	999	999	1.002
RURAL- decent standard												
2.a + 1.c												
2010			1.332	1.337	1.339	1.341	1.375	1.379	1.386	1.394	1.401	1.409
2011	1.419	1.430	1.439	1.448	1.451	1.447	1.442	1.437	1.434	1.443	1.449	1.453
2012	1.458	1.467	1.474	1.475	1.478	1.477	1.486	1.494	1.512	1.516	1.517	1.526
2013	1.546	1.551	1.552	1.554	1.557	1.557	1.552	1.560	1.551	1.555	1.555	1.560
2.a + 3.c.												
2010			1.844	1.850	1.853	1.856	1.904	1.908	1.919	1.930	1.940	1.950
2011	1.965	1.980	1.992	2.005	2.009	2.004	1.997	1.990	1.985	1.998	2.007	2.011
2012	2.018	2.031	2.039	2.041	2.045	2.044	2.056	2.067	2.091	2.097	2.098	2.110
2013	2.138	2.145	2.146	2.148	2.153	2.153	2.146	2.157	2.144	2.150	2.150	2.156
RURAL- subsistence standard												
2.a + 1.c.												
2010			1.159	1.164	1.167	1.170	1.205	1.208	1.213	1.219	1.227	1.235
2011	1.242	1.250	1.258	1.266	1.269	1.265	1.261	1.256	1.253	1.261	1.267	1.270
2012	1.274	1.282	1.288	1.288	1.291	1.290	1.298	1.304	1.319	1.323	1.323	1.331
2013	1.349	1.354	1.354	1.355	1.359	1.359	1.355	1.362	1.354	1.358	1.358	1.362
2.a + 3.c.												
2010			1.605	1.612	1.616	1.620	1.668	1.672	1.679	1.687	1.698	1.709
2011	1.719	1.730	1.741	1.752	1.756	1.751	1.745	1.739	1.735	1.746	1.754	1.758
2012	1.764	1.775	1.783	1.784	1.788	1.787	1.797	1.807	1.828	1.833	1.834	1.845
2013	1.870	1.876	1.877	1.879	1.881	1.881	1.875	1.885	1.873	1.879	1.878	1.884

Legend: a-agricultural worker, c-child, i-inactive old person.